MASCULINITY, WAR, AND REFUSAL: VICISSITUDES OF GERMAN MANHOOD BEFORE AND AFTER THE COLD WAR by Gardiner, Steven Lester
 
MASCULINITY, WAR, AND REFUSAL: 
VICISSITUDES OF GERMAN MANHOOD BEFORE  
AND AFTER THE COLD WAR 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Steven Lester Gardiner 
May 2004  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2004 Steven Lester Gardiner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
MASCULINITY, WAR, AND REFUSAL: 
VICISSITUDES OF GERMAN MANHOOD BEFORE  
AND AFTER THE COLD WAR 
Steven Lester Gardiner, Ph.D. 
Cornell University 2004 
 
Over the course of the last two centuries, Germany has experienced 
several shifts in its position in what I refer to as the war system. The war 
system is an important determiner of masculinity such that variations in one 
impact the other. The total surrender of Germany in 1945, combined with the 
association of the Nazi regime with heroic, soldierly masculinity, has opened 
the door in post-World War II Germany for new forms of masculinity to arise. A 
key value in the new configuration is the increased importance of refusal and 
the decreased importance of obedience and subordination. Between 1945 and 
1990, Germany remained a nation both divided and occupied. This, combined 
with the literal feminization of German society in the immediate post-war 
period, led to the valorization of refusal. In effect, in an occupied society, the 
relationship of masculinity to nation-state is shifted. At the same time, of 
course, market pressures have led to a more individuated society—yet it is 
important to point out that though refusal has become much more common in 
all Western societies, in none of the traditional Great Powers has the culture of 
the military itself become so accommodating to the idea of refusal. This shift, I 
think, can be attributed to the institutionalization of refusal within the 
Bundeswehr, and its valorization in German society as a whole, as 
subsequent generations encounter the failed refusal of the Nazi period in a 
war system context that has isolated the German military from deadly  
combat—a situation which is, of course, changing in the here and now. These 
trends can only really be understood through an analysis that triangulates on 
changing masculinity by making use of a variety of evidence, historical, 
literary, institutional and personal. Finally, the relationship between war and 
masculinity itself should be seen in a longer evolutionary perspective and 
assumptions about inevitability challenged through comparative ethnography 
and review of the archeological evidence. 
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PREFACE 
 
  In a letter to people of the Greek city of Corinth traditionally attributed to 
Paul of Tarsus (1 Cor. 13:12), the apostle warns that the world is not always 
what it seems, “for now we see through a glass, darkly.” Yet he also proffers 
the hope that the epistemic myopia that is our lot in life may one day, kingdom 
come, be corrected. My hopes for such a day are slim. At least as regards all 
things human, perfect knowledge remains, I believe, unobtainable. Fatally 
embedded in dynamic and intricately interlocking systems that stretch from 
molecules to galaxies and from the Big Bang to the heat death of the universe, 
we lack perspective. So perhaps Paul will be right after all: when, at the end of 
time, the complexity of the universe has been reduced to a point of cold 
uniform dispersion, the system will be a lot easier to understand. Not, of 
course, that there will be anyone around to understand it.  
  This dissertation is my attempt to look “through a glass darkly” at two 
things—note the precision of the language—war and masculinity. I did not, 
however, start out with this focus. The primary locus of my investigation was 
contemporary Germany, where I did two years of ethnographic fieldwork from 
September 1999 through October 2001. My original intent was to look at the 
impact of the German military on the larger German society. My understanding 
evolved as I tried out various theoretical frameworks and applied them, like 
corrective lenses, to my dark vision. This is my invitation to the reader to try on 
a particular set of such lenses.  
  At first when I sat in on various training seminars conducted by the 
German army, I could see only the orderly replication of a system with which 
most everyone seemed fairly satisfied. Only later, as I conducted a number of  xiii
in-depth interviews with professional soldiers, former draftees, and 
conscientious objectors, did I start to see first the importance of refusal in the 
construction of post-World War II Germany identities, and second, the second 
the way refusal fit into a post-war reconfiguration of German masculinity.  
Compared to what I knew of Germany history, the increased 
valorization of refusal amongst German men emerged from interviews with 
various informants. It was clear, however, that other key soldierly values, e.g. 
physical and emotional toughness, were also affected. In many ways the ideal 
German soldier in the year 2000 was not only very different from the his 
counterpart from 1900 or 1940, but also from soldiers in the armies of other 
major Western powers today. I was seeing, in many ways, a comparatively 
kinder and gentler army—gentler as compared with my own military 
experience in the American army and my knowledge of German military 
history. Eventually I hypothesized that changes in Germany’s relationship to 
war as an activity, brought about as a result of its defeat and occupation 
following World War II, had had a significant impact on the construction of 
German masculinity. 
Well, there was clearly a correlation between the two—but what about 
causality? This is an area where I still see but darkly—nonetheless I now 
would be surprised if Germany’s changed position in the war system was not 
at least in part responsible for the changes in the extant form of masculinity 
and soldierly values. 
At the same time that I was trying to understand the relationship 
between the war system and masculinity, by tracing it backwards through 
German history, I was trying to sort out the more specific business of refusal. 
The stories my informants told about their experiences with refusal, though  xiv
they often related to issues of identity, didn’t typically make reference to war 
system changes. Rather, their stories—what I think of as identity narratives—
touched on expectations and constraints imposed by formal and informal 
sanctions: laws and peer/parental pressure. 
Tracing these formal and informal sanctions from rearmament through 
century’s end, I found a clear trajectory. Values associated with the National 
Socialist regime—including obedience, toughness and the relatively greater 
importance of the Volk as compared to the individual—were not immediately 
abandoned, but led to deep splits in the population. However, the post-1945 
political changes, and the total defeat of the NS state, did open room for a 
widespread critique of traditional military masculinity, and, indeed, militarism 
itself. Some of these critiques were written into the German Basic Law—for 
example the constitutional right to refuse to do military service. Others 
operated at the cultural level, erupting in the work of post-war authors and 
artists and informing the social movements of the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s. Though it is hard to weight the relative impact of these phenomena, 
collectively it is clear that German masculinity has changed. 
Yet if I was going to make the assertion that German masculinity had 
changed and that the change had something to do with the war system, I 
started to think that maybe I should try to clarify what I meant by “masculinity” 
and “war.” This led, inexorably, to a second round of research, working 
backwards through German history and on to a broader evolutionary 
conception of war and gender. 
This second set of investigations underlies the entire project but is set 
forth primarily in Chapter 1, a theoretical exploration of gender and war. 
Though the latter chapters hang together without this detailed unfolding of  xv
underlying concepts, I was unable to bring them into their current form without 
backing up and considering bigger issues of origins and sources of change 
and variation. In particular I was concerned to challenge various forms of both 
biological and cultural determinism. In my view, both gender (or sex/gender) 
and war are complex amalgams of biological and cultural factors mutually 
imbricated in complex, bi-directional feedback loops. The complexities are, 
admittedly, daunting. Nonetheless I make a case for these the involvement of 
these interlocking complexities in the origins of both war and gender and in the 
specific historical intersection between the two in the almost (but not quite) 
universal selection of men as combat soldiers. 
The issues raised in Chapter 1 are more general and abstract than 
those raised in the chapters that follow. The language and body of theory 
addressed reflect this. For the reader primarily interested in the German 
military or issues relating to post-WWII conscientious objection it might seem 
to be beside the point. Ultimately, however, it is meant to provide tentative 
answers (and additional questions) associated with problems of change and 
stasis. As a prelude to discussing how change happened in post-war 
Germany, I wanted to respond preemptively to the critique that phenomena of 
the sort under discussion—war and gender—are stable, biologically 
determined, or of such ancient and unchanging provenance as to be 
impervious to most change. 
In other words: change is possible. 
That is not to say that it is necessarily easy. The complexity of the 
systems involved are such that the consequences of particular interventions 
are hard to predict. Moreover, the events and interventions that I posit as 
important for the subsequent transformation of German masculinity are, by  xvi
any standards, extreme. The total surrender of Germany and its subsequent 
occupation eventuated in the disbanding of the German military. Former Nazis 
were tried by the Allies. The war itself led to massive changes in German 
demography, with millions of men killed, wounded or imprisoned in the 
immediate aftermath. In other words, the precipitating change in Germany’s 
position in the larger war system was major. The calculus by which degree of 
change in the war system correlates with degree of change in masculinity, of 
course, has not been invented. I don’t mean to suggest, however, that the 
relationship is necessarily linear. 
The only correlation that I can claim with complete authority is that 
between the writing of this dissertation and my own conscious reflection on 
war and masculinity. As a former soldier both have been issues of residual 
fascination for me. I undertook research on the military in no small part 
because of a feeling of unfinished business. I chose the German military 
largely because of the history of recent change, but also because of the 
impression that when it comes to the Western version of soldierly manhood, 
the Germans, and especially the Prussians, have been widely considered as 
the paradigmatic example. Moreover, the specter of the Holocaust and the 
catastrophe of World War II was much on my mind as I began this work, and 
now as I bring it to a tentative conclusion, precisely because I am interested in 
the possibility of change. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  Berlin is a city saturated with history. The past permeates not only the 
monuments and museums, but the endless streets of five-story, masonry-front 
apartment buildings. It rises up from the subway stations, flows through the 
canals and hangs in the air, usually like a miasma, but occasionally as the 
sweet scent of linden blooms. For all the weight of history, however, there is 
also a relentless modernity. Unlike London or Paris or Rome, or even New 
York or Tokyo, Berlin’s history is tilted decisively, inevitably, toward the 
twentieth century.  
  Like all great cities, Berlin is a multiplicity. There is the Berlin of the 
Kaiserreich, imperial city of an empire that never quite achieved the lofty 
ambitions it set for itself in competition with French and British rivals. There is 
the Berlin of the Weimar era, of Otto Dix and the cabarets. There is the Berlin 
of the Third Reich, which defies any single epithet. There is Cold War Berlin, 
cut in half by the most tangible manifestation of the Iron Curtain. Then there is 
today’s Berlin, in the apt title phrase of a book by John Borneman, Berlin After 
the Wall (1991).
1 Composed as they are of an uneasy amalgamation of 
wartime memories, grainy photographs, faded newspaper clippings, television 
documentaries, books, movies and nightmares, most of these Berlins no 
longer exist. Our connection to them is, at best, tenuous. They, like Dicken’s 
Ghost of Christmas Past, reside primarily in the imagination. 
                                                 
1 A search on Amazon.com turned up twenty-eight books (in English) about post-Cold War 
Berlin that included the phrase “after the wall” in their titles. The equivalent phrase in German 
is nach der Wende (after the change). A search on Amazon.de (the German language version 
of the online book giant) turns up seventy some titles using that phrase. The vast majority of 
these, however, have to do with Germany as a whole, as opposed to Berlin. The phrase, 
“nach der Mauer,” a more literal translation of “after the wall,” turns up only nine titles.    2
  Only the last Berlin—Berlin after the wall—has substance. It is a Berlin 
of yellow sky cranes and an unintentionally ironic glass, steel and stone 
building called the Reichstag, home to the Bundestag, the German 
parliament.
2 Consciously constructed with the democratic value of 
transparency in mind, the new structure is designed so that visitors can look 
down from overhead galleries and see their representatives at work. No less 
appropriate metaphor for the actual workings of the German government, 
characterized as it is by intricate compromises, local-national alliances, and 
bureaucratic inertia could be found (Katzenstein 1987).  
  Yet whatever the intended trope, the actual feeling of staring down from 
the galleries at the lawmakers in session in the new Reichstag building is one 
of almost infinite distance. It does make a sort of sense. As one young man, 
himself close to the political process (a political aide to a member of the 
Bundestag), put it to me when questioned about the apparent apathy of 
ordinary Germans toward national politics: “Germans think politics is the 
business of politicians; people don’t do anything because they know they can’t 
do anything.” 
  This distance between people and government is echoed in the growing 
symbolic distance between present and past. Berlin is a city of elisions and 
evasions. The space once occupied by the Wall is increasingly not even an 
absence. At least in the city itself, the West-that-was shades imperceptibly into 
                                                 
2 The original Reichstag building was destroyed by arson on February 27, 1933. Though no 
definitive answer to the question of perpetration and responsibility has ever been proffered, 
what is clear is historically clear is the results. Hitler and his supporters used the incident as 
proof of a widespread communist conspiracy to undermine the government. By the early hours 
of the February 28th, over 4,000 communists and anti-Nazi intellectuals had been arrested. 
Though not a Nazi, 86-year old President Hindenburg was shaken by the incident and easily 
convinced to sign an emergency decree suspending the basic rights of citizens. Knows as the 
“enabling decree,” this ordinance provided the legal cover for the Nazis to take control of the 
entire state apparatus and to use the full force of the state repressive apparatus against its 
enemies.     3
the East-that-was, the heretofore division paved over with newly-renovated 
apartment buildings and departments stores, all constructed in the obligatory 
Berlin style. In most places you can now walk from West to East across an 
erstwhile border that once cost lives, without noticing. 
  I did so, regularly, on my way to the Laundromat. 
  This is my Berlin and I arrived with my partner, Angie Reed Garner, in 
late September 1999. We stumbled off of our plane at Tegel airport, in the 
northwest of the city, and took a Taxi to Wilmersdorf, where a sparsely-
furnished apartment—prudently, if unadventurously prearranged with a Berlin 
contact back at Cornell—waited for us. The taxi driver responded to my 
German with grunts. The REM song “The End of the World as We Know It 
(and I Feel Fine)” was playing on the radio—as it would countless times in the 
months leading up to the millennium—but this particular rendition felt 
appropriately personal. This was my first time in the field. 
  It was a little past noon when we arrived in front of our new home on 
Konstanzer Strasse, in a quiet residential neighborhood a few blocks from the 
Ku’Damm. A combination of jetlag, Berlin architecture, and the gray central 
European light cast a surreal haze over the experience. I kept trying to shake 
my head, to wake myself up. Over the course of the next two years I would 
become accustomed to the Berlin light and architecture. The jetlag and mental 
cobwebs, however, seemed to stay with me. 
  Jet lag, mental cobwebs, the kind of “culture shock” that cosmopolitan 
anthropologist types are supposed to be immune to, were constant 
companions in the field. That first day, a day that I should by tradition recount 
with an eye toward building my own personal mythology, was particularly 
unsettled.    4
  Most of our things were in storage. Our household goods had been 
jammed into the basement of a kind friend—thank you, Fran—when we left 
Ithaca to become homeless wanderers the previous spring. With us were three 
overstuffed military-style duffle bags (one of them a survivor from my first 
sojourn in Germany, as a soldier in the United States Army almost twenty 
years before), a battered beige suitcase, and a hastily-purchased laptop 
computer. 
  Angie Reed spoke virtually no German and I was acutely aware—no, 
strike that, I was sick with worry—that in spite of my classroom study, I 
wouldn’t be able to communicate with any “real” Germans (meaning those not 
being paid to suffer my abuse of their language). My first chance came when 
we arrived on the landing outside our fourth floor apartment, panting and 
sweating from dragging the eighty pound duffle bags up the steep stairs.  
  The building, typical of many older Berlin residential arrangements, was 
designed such that each floor featured a trio of apartments, left, right and 
center, arranged around a foyer which was separated from the stairwell by a 
door. It was my introduction to the German penchant for barriers. Immediately 
upon my dropping the luggage with a thump and wrestling the foyer door 
open, an elderly German woman poked her head out from the left-hand 
apartment, and gave me the look—the infinitely skeptical, slightly askance and 
disapproving look so typical of Berliners. She started to duck back into her 
apartment. I thought her quite capable of phoning the police. 
  Fortunately I’d been warned. The woman was my new across-the-foyer 
neighbor, Frau Richter.
3 She had been described to me as a nice old lady who 
                                                 
3 Unless otherwise indicated I use pseudonyms throughout this work. In crafting them, 
however, I have maintained a symmetry with the form of address I actually used with the 
person in question. That is, I never referred to Frau Richter in any less formal manner.   5
was easily frightened. I would do well, my contact had advised, to introduce 
myself and make it clear that I was an American student subletting the 
apartment from him. 
 “ Hallo,” (hello) I said, attempting to arrest her flight, eager from both a 
personal perspective not to scare my new neighbor, and an anthropological 
one, not to frighten my first native. When she continued her retreat, I repeated 
the greeting. 
 “ Guten Tag,” she said, rather severely. 
  It was not until some months later, when I read an article in a German 
newspaper about changes in the German language, that I realized that 
amongst older Germans the informal “Hallo”—nearly ubiquitous with younger 
Germans—was considered overly familiar and the more traditional forms, 
Guten Tag, etc., were preferred. 
  Not exactly a stellar performance on my part—but then so much of 
anthropological fieldwork is about being willing to muddle your way through 
situations that saner folk would avoid putting themselves into in the first place. 
The memory of this encounter remains sharp. I was exhausted, fuzzy-headed 
and confronted with a suspicious neighbor. Worse, I could see that Angie 
Reed was dead on her feet and doubtless worried that I might loose my 
temper or otherwise make a complete fool of myself. I was fumbling with the 
apartment keys and trying to figure out what to say to smooth things over. 
 “ Ja,” I said, like an idiot, “Ich bin Stefan Gardiner, Doctorand aus die 
USA und der neue Untermieter. Ich bin ein Freund von Johan Beck.” (Yes, I 
am Stefan Gardiner, a graduate student from the USA and the new sub-letter. 
I am a friend of Johan Beck.) 
                                                                                                                                              
Likewise some informants are Major or Professor or Herr, while others are Fritz or Hans.   6
  “What?” she said, putting a hand to her ear. “I can’t understand you.” All 
in German, of course. 
  When speaking a language with which you are less than one-hundred 
percent fluent it is very common to speak softly. It’s something like the adult 
version of mumbling the answer when a teacher calls on you unexpectedly in 
fourth grade. There’s a certain logic to the practice, as presumably the teacher 
knows the answer to the question and the “foreign” interrogator knows how to 
speak the language with which you struggle. It is, however, a terrible tactic for 
basic communication. 
  “I’m the new tenant,” I said, spitting my consonants as enthusiastically 
as I could manage under the circumstances. “I’m a friend of Mr. Bech’s. I’m 
from the United States.” 
  “Ach so,” she said, her eyes lighting up, “Sie können nicht sprechen. 
Sie sind Ausländer.” (Oh, I see, you can’t speak. You are a foreigner.) 
  From the look on her face she might as well have said, “oh, you’re an 
idiot who doesn’t even know how to talk.” I could tell, however, that having 
safely categorized me, I was at least safe from an  immediate intervention by 
the authorities. 
 
Big Questions 
  During the time we were preparing to go to Germany, Angie Reed 
asked an odd question: 
  “How often do you think about the Holocaust?” 
  I mumbled a reply, not sure what she was getting at. 
  “Come on,” she said, “how often?” 
  “Okay,” I said, “every day, at least. I don’t know how many times.”   7
  For the seven years prior to being accepted into the anthropology 
program at Cornell, I worked for a civil rights organization called the Coalition 
for Human Dignity. Its purpose was to monitor and oppose the extreme right, 
including neo-nazis, the Christian Right and the so-called Christian Patriot 
movement. In some sense I suppose I was looking for the source. I 
understood, of course, that a notion of this kind reeked of essentialism. It was, 
however, an ironic and nominal essentialism, reflecting not a belief in the 
unchanging, but the intersection of stereotype and personal obsession—and I 
am of the opinion that it’s a waste of time to try to study something you’re not 
obsessed with at some level. 
  By the time we packed up and headed for Berlin, however, I’d moved 
beyond the need to look at the neo-nazi and neo-fascist right per se. The big 
interpretive question that I took with me—the kind that is extremely difficult to 
operationalize or turn into a funding proposal—is “have the Germans changed 
and if so, how?” 
  The subject of such a query, of course, is inevitably a kind of projection. 
Any generalized statements about “Germans” are apt to lack validity, 
verifiability and other such notions generally valued by social scientists. 
National character arguments are most definitely out of fashion. Moreover it is 
ground that a great many people have taken up before me. Any “conclusions” 
that I came to would probably be nothing more that pale iterations of other 
people’s work. 
  This knowledge, of course, didn’t change the basic nature of my real 
question. I just had to find some co-questions that would be more 
academically acceptable and potentially productive. Hence my initial focus on 
the military, a key institution of National Socialist Germany that was, at least   8
ostensibly, reinvented in a completely new way after the war. The story of the 
Bundeswehr seemed to suggest that change was possible and I was out to 
understand how things had changed, as in by what means. 
  Following my fascination, I was, over the course of my two years in the 
field, involved in dozens of conversations on topics related to the military, 
foreign policy, nationalism and related topics. Some of these conversations 
can be classified without too much violence as interviews. The majority, 
however, were informal if earnest and prolonged discussions with new 
German friends and acquaintances. In these conversations the subject of this 
work was often front and center, though I didn’t realize it at the time.  
  Again and again the conversations returned to a knot of related topics: 
refusal (Verweigerung), individualism, and obedience (Gehorsamkeit). It was 
only much later that I began to understand what I was being told, that refusal 
in the paradigmatic form of conscientious objection, increasingly valorized 
throughout Europe, had gradually become a paramount value in post-World 
War II Germany. Moreover, it was a value that was particularly important for 
men as men, for it was men who were subject to conscription. I started to think 
that the much commented-upon post-World War II changes in German 
masculinity (Beck 1986; Jerome 2001; Bogdal 2001) might be linked in 
important ways to processes more specific than an all-encompassing 
modernization.  
  Specifically, I began to link changes in German masculinity with 
changes in the German military and more broadly with German attitudes 
toward war. This in turn led me to an investigation of the place of Germany as 
a nation-state in an international system of alliance, defensive posturing and 
war preparation—what I refer to as the war system. I made it my task to   9
examine some of the ways in which war and masculinity are entangled with 
each other and consider how this has been reflected in contemporary 
Germany and over the course of recent German history. 
  Thus, though my fieldwork began with an examination of the 
Bundeswehr, the contemporary German military, my project is not an 
institutional study. From my ethnological study of some specific institutions of 
the Bundeswehr—particularly those responsible for training soldiers to interact 
with the larger society—I worked backwards, looking for the roots of key 
concepts and practices. Even as I sat in on the training of recruiters, press 
officers and youth officers, I was also conducting interviews with soldiers, ex-
soldiers and conscientious objectors.  
  As my sample size grew, I began to discern a very interesting contrast 
between those who had served or refused to serve most recently and those 
from earlier times. Put simply, while conscientious objection (as well as all 
forms of refusal and disobedience) loomed large in the identity narratives of 
those who came of age before the late-1980s, those who served or refused 
since 1989 had a markedly (and increasingly) blasé attitude toward the whole 
business. Which is not to say that they were more obedience-prone or less 
likely to refuse, quite the contrary, they did so with much greater ease. A major 
difference was that the decision to refuse military service seemed no longer to 
elicit aspersions against ones manhood or patriotism. 
  Part of this change was undoubtedly the result of the increasing 
valuation of the social contributions of conscientious objectors through the 
mandatory alternative civilian service (Zivildienst). Beginning with the 
liberalization of both the criteria and process for obtaining status as an 
objector (Wehrdeinstverweigerer) in the early 1980s, objectors in civilian   10
service have become such an important source of low-cost social labor that 
German social services now depend upon them. The need for their labor has 
become so significant that it now constitutes one of the strongest arguments 
against complete abolition of conscription (Kuhlmann and Lippert 1991b, 
Bredow 1992, 299–300). 
  Yet this reevaluation of civilian service is, in itself, part of a larger trend 
regarding what it means to be manly in German society. Traditional, pre-1945 
masculine values in Germany almost precluded Germen men from the helping 
occupations, particularly at their lowest levels—taking care of the elderly, 
looking after children, doing the most menial tasks of cleaning and tending—
that are central to Zivildienst. Nor did these attitudes change quickly. Even 
while the German population was deeply split over issues of rearmament and 
the military in the 1950s and 1960s (Noelle and Neumann, 1956; Noelle-
Neumann and Neumann 1967), conscientious objection continued to be 
controversial and rates of objection low into the late 1970s. Objection did not 
reach a level of parity with conscription until the late 1980s (Bredow 1992, 
297). 
  It is also true that the trend toward an increasing state accommodation 
with refusal goes well beyond Germany. Different Western societies have 
dealt with growing tension between the pre-1945 idea of military service as a 
key component of virtuous republican nationalism and an increasing public 
rejection of obligatory service in one of two ways. In the case of the United 
States, the answer to this conflict was found in the abolition of the draft and 
reliance on an all “professional” military—sometimes referred to as an 
economic draft, disproportionately attracting those with few alternative 
prospects.    11
  Britain was actually ahead of the U.S. in this, abolishing the draft in 
1960 (WRI 2000, United Kingdom). France maintains the draft, but has 
created procedures for conscientious objection and substitute civilian service 
under military supervision since the mid-1960s. The number of actual 
objectors, however, remains very small, only about 8,000 of over 150,000 
conscripts in 1994 (WRI 2000, France). Italy maintains a draft and allows for 
conscientious objection, with a growing number of objectors, reaching close to 
a quarter of all men called up in a year (WRI 2000, Italy). In Spain the 
numerical situation is closer to that in Germany, with up to fifty percent of 
draftees filing for conscientious objection (WRI 2000, Spain). 
  So clearly Germany is not an isolated example, but part of a trend 
toward either the abolition of conscription or the institutionalization of 
conscientious objection with or without mandatory substitute service. This 
suggests a bigger picture for the forces leading to state accommodation with 
refusal. Yet the German situation, though part of a pattern, retains some 
unique elements. Not least of these is the positive valuation given to 
conscription as a way to keep the military integrated into society. The 
dependence on the social labor of those doing civilian service has already 
been mentioned. And, finally, there is the lack of state resistance to the idea of 
refusal. In another country the burgeoning numbers of objectors in the late 
1980s might have been seen as a crisis. In the German context it seemed 
normal—exactly because by the time the number of objectors increased to 
levels rivaling the number doing military service, refusal had been normalized. 
In a sense, the institutions, primed by a prior wave of activism and changing 
attitudes, anticipated the higher numbers of conscientious objectors.  
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The War System, History and Origins 
 
  In an attempt to understand the normalization of refusal in Germany 
and beyond, and the place of refusal in the construction of masculinity, I was 
led to a close reading of German history for clues that might come from 
consideration of prior reconfigurations. The obvious starting place, of course, 
was the defeat and occupation of Germany in 1945 and the subsequent 
dissolution of the armed forces, division of the country, and integration of the 
Federal Republic into the Western Alliance (and the German Democratic 
Republic into the Warsaw Pact, though for the most part the story of the GDR 
is beyond the scope of this project). 
  One important consequence of the post-1945 changes in Germany was 
its isolation from the immediate possibility of war. Paradoxically, West 
Germany’s position on the frontlines of the Cold War (a war which was 
increasingly understood as unthinkable, because of the nuclear capacities of 
the primary opponents) created a level of insulation from actual combat. 
Though the country itself was at first occupied by and then later host to large 
numbers of foreign troops, no German soldiers died in combat or fired a shot 
in earnest in the decades between the founding of the Bundeswehr and 
reunification with the East. 
  There was, in effect, a pacification of Western Europe as a whole, and 
Germany in particular. Of the large states, this was particularly true for 
Germany in that unlike the French or the British, its military was deployed 
neither in the conflicts associated with the latter part of decolonization on the 
one hand, nor in peacekeeping chores on the other. Both by provision of the 
German Basic Law and because of the continuing mistrust of its European   13
neighbors, the army of the Federal Republic was a strictly defensive entity. 
  Thus from the point of view of a global system of interstate relations of 
war and peace—what I refer to, following Joshua Goldstein (2001) as the war 
system—the position of Germany had shifted considerably as compared to its 
place in the pre-1945 system. The same is true for Europe as a whole, with 
Germany as the most extreme example. Germany moved from being among 
the most belligerent, aggressive and nationalist participants in the war system, 
to an isolated, integrated and existentially peaceful nation-state. 
  This is not to say that Germany was no longer part of the war system, 
but that its role in that system was considerably diminished. This occurred in 
combination with a well-documented turn away from the valuation of military 
values as central to the construction of masculinity and a generalized 
skepticism of all things military (Borneman 1998a, 302–302). How did the two 
fit together? Was there a causal connection between changes in the war 
system and changes in masculinity? What role did the increased valuation of 
refusal play here? 
  In order to answer these questions, I turned to the historical record, to 
consider the relationship between Germany’s changing position in the 
international war system over the past few centuries and the valuation of the 
military and military virtues on the other. I recount this history in some depth, 
from the time of the Napoleonic Wars through German Unification and the 
First World War in chapters 2 and 3 and consider the aftermath of the Second 
World War in Chapter 4. My view of the complex and important relationship 
between the war system and local forms of masculinity emerge from a 
consideration of this history. The contemporary trends began to make sense to 
me only as I charted them in relation to past developments, seeing the shift   14
and flow of values and societal position of the military as institution in relation 
to the war system. 
  With respect to the big question of continuity—had the Germans 
changed—I started to see the question less in term of continuity vs. 
discontinuity, and more in terms of social values within a society shifting not in 
lock step with the war system, but in response to war system repositioning. 
Put another way, Germany’s new position in the war system opened internal 
space for shifts in values associated with masculinity. This did not happen 
automatically, but over time as always extant (if previously ineffectual and 
isolated) forces within Germany moved away from militarized values, 
particularly obedience. 
  I began to place recent German history, and particularly the shift in 
masculine values away from obedience, discipline and toughness—the 
paramount military virtues—toward refusal, independence and openness, in a 
larger context. That context is the way in which the war system seems to 
shape masculinity, and that participation in the war system tends to lead 
toward the valorization of the aforementioned military virtues. This, of course, 
is a claim.  
  Germany is a particular test case, and the relationship seems to hold. In 
my mind, an attempt to generalize from the German case requires an 
examination of longer trends in war and masculinity. In particular, a general 
theory of war and masculinity has to address the evolutionary origins of each 
and the particularity of their intersection. Because so much is at stake, it would 
also seem important to attempt to sort through alternative causalities, including 
those grounded in biological determinism, for the origins and particularities of   15
gender and war. This I attempt in chapter 1, raising questions and proposing 
possible solutions to the origins of war, masculinity and the war system. 
 
Triangulation: The Anthropological Study of Western Institutions 
 
  The last three chapters are dedicated to an exploration of Germany 
since 1945, weaving back and forth from historical and literary sources to my 
own fieldwork in Berlin between 1999 and 2001. Thus some of my source 
material emerges from fairly traditional ethnographic practice—spending time 
in a particular ethnographic setting, making observations, reflecting on them, 
eliciting comments from Germans, and conducting interviews. Then again, 
what I actually wrote about—masculinity, war and refusal—certainly went far 
beyond the particular corner of the Bundeswehr where the bulk of my official 
fieldwork was done. My less-formal fieldwork did as well. I made no attempt to 
represent the training facilities where much of my participant observation took 
place—in various training courses conducted by the Bundeswehr Academy for 
Information and Communication—in any kind of ethnographic detail. 
  There is a methodological problem here associated with trying to study 
something as large as masculinity and war in a large scale, complex state 
society. Traditional anthropological methods, grounded in village studies, 
would seem not to apply—or, as I would have it, they apply but are insufficient. 
The method I settled upon was to combine the situated study of various small 
groups—the sets of officers and NCOs who went through the various training 
seminars that I sat in on—with formal and informal interviews with Germans 
from as diverse backgrounds as I could possibly manage.    16
Even taken together, however, the interviews plus the participant 
observation materials still kept me isolated from larger and longer trends. My 
somewhat ad hoc solution to this limitation was to use German media, public 
events and controversies, opinion polls, literature and history to supplement 
my first hand observations. These materials, of course, are a somewhat 
idiosyncratic selection, often chosen because they happened to fit my 
personal fascination with the subject of continuity and change. In other cases 
an informant who was knowledgeable of my project would point me to a 
source or an event. An enthusiastic (or thorough) few amassed clippings for 
me. Whenever possible, I would test my perceptions and interpretations of a 
particular controversy (for example, the controversy over the Wehrmacht 
Exhibition, discussed in detail at various places herein) against those of one or 
more informants. The informants didn’t always agree with me—or with each 
other—but disagreement was much more often a matter of emphasis than 
pure opposition. 
Gradually in my review of media, opinion, literary and historical sources 
and their correlation with my own interviews and observations, I came to have 
a certain amount of confidence in two points. One, the Germans had changed 
in significant ways since 1945—even if their ongoing struggles with 
demographic change and attitudes toward the ethnic other could easily make 
for another dissertation (and they may). Two, the nature of the change was 
fundamentally a shift in masculine values away from obedience, hardness and 
discipline (the military virtues extraordinary) and toward refusal, openness and 
individuality. 
The shift has not been a complete break, but a trend. This trend has 
followed on, and likely from, Germany’s changed position in the international   17
war system. The shift in values did not happen instantly or automatically, but 
had to be fought for and created, through collective action, cultural 
representation and law. From the point of view of my central fascination with 
change—and let me be clear, I mean change in the descendents of the people 
who perpetrated the Holocaust—this is a particularly significant shift. This is so 
because of the nature of refusal itself. To the extent that the prerequisite to 
genocide is the hardening of the individual, then the moment for refusal is not 
when someone puts the gun in your hand and orders you to start shooting, but 
much earlier. Learning to refuse means in the first place refusing to be 
hardened—and, perhaps more to the point, refusing to perpetrate regimes of 
hardening on the next generation.  
 
Limitations: A (West) German (Male) Story 
 
  For the most part this work refers to various shifts in the relationships 
between war and masculinity from the Kaiserreich through the Weimar 
Republic, the National Socialist period, the Bonn Republic and what I see as 
its successor state, unified Germany. The specifically East German story is not 
without interest, but it is sadly beyond the scope of this project, though the 
facts and circumstances of division are directly relevant. East German soldiers 
play a part in my research only to the extent that they enter the Bundeswehr 
after unification, and then mostly as seen through the eyes of officers from the 
former West Germany. I understand this as a limit. The things I have to say 
about Germany and Germans should, in the post-1945 era, be interpreted as 
applying to the Federal Republic, unless otherwise indicated. 
  Because my fieldwork focused on the military, and because I have   18
elected to address war and masculinity, I have little to say about German 
women or German femininity. Again, this is not from a lack of interest, but from 
limits of time and resources. To do justice to the same themes as they apply to 
women and femininity would require a second dissertation. For if war has 
almost everywhere been defined as the business of men, women are 
nonetheless implicated in the war system. Their roles are many and my focus 
on soldiers and soldierly masculinity casts a distorting light on them. This is a 
lack that I would, at some time in the future, like to address.
4 For now, 
however, this is a work about men and war. 
 
                                                 
4 Following a decision by the European Court ruling that the exclusion of women from most 
positions in the Bundeswehr violated the basic rights of women, Germany reversed its 
longstanding position and began to admit women in January 2000, in the middle of my 
fieldwork. As of yet this ruling has done little to change the overall demographics of the 
Bundeswehr, particularly given that as of this point only men are subject to conscription, but 
the Bundeswehr was mounting a fairly ambitious public relations program designed to 
reassure the public that women were, in fact, welcome in its ranks. 19 
CHAPTER 1 
THE WAR SYSTEM: 
TOWARDS AN EVOLUTIONARY  
THEORY OF WAR AND MASCULINITY 
 
  In the last half-century contradictory efforts in science and scholarship 
have involved, on the one hand, attempts to find genetic or more generally 
biological origins for specific aspects of gender and gender-linked behavior 
such as “aggression” and war-making  (Lorenz 1966; Wilson 1978). On the 
other hand many scholars have argued, persuasively if not always clearly, that 
gender in its various forms is a relatively fragile social construct that requires a 
lot of cultural reinforcement to maintain (Butler 1990, 1993; Laqueur 1990). 
Debates of this simplistic type, pitting nature against nurture, though long 
since clichéd, nonetheless remain completely current in both the academy and 
the public sphere. 
  This chapter is an effort to work through the theoretical issues lying 
behind the possible origins and sources of variation in sex/gender on the one 
hand and war on the other hand—respectively a “trait” and “phenomenon” that 
have been at the center of the nature vs. nurture debate more often than 
virtually any others. Though this project is focused on the co-variation of 
masculinity (an aspect of “gender”) and the war system (the interstate context 
of war) in Germany in the post-World War II period, it is, I think, important to 
look first at the ways in which masculinity and war have been conceived and 
try to sort out the various kinds of explanations—and to reject those that 
clearly do not work, even if a complete explanation remains elusive.  
  To begin, it is worth taking a moment, I think, to consider why the  
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nature verses nurture debate continues to fascinate people, contributing to the 
commercial success (and political influence) of such irredeemable garbage as 
Herrnstein and Murray’s book The Bell Curve (1996). One possibility is that 
the either/or dynamics of the debate is driven by reductionism, on the model of 
the paradigmatic sciences, especially physics. Whether the focus is on the 
biological end of the spectrum or the cultural, reductionist thinking allows the 
theorist to eliminate an entire set of variables from consideration—or, as is 
more common, relegate them to the causal dustbin of unimportance.  Extreme 
statements from one end of the spectrum elicit extreme denunciations from the 
other in the classic way of people talking past each other. Attempts to combine 
biological and cultural explanations quickly involve a staggering level of 
complexity, and run hard into the wall of our ignorance.  
  We now have a reasonably good description of “the human genome,” 
but as for higher levels of biological explanation—particularly neurological 
functioning but also gene expression, protein synthesis, enzymatic action, 
hormonal effects, embryological and behavioral development—our knowledge 
is still sketchy at best. In terms of culture we are hardly less ignorant, 
particularly at the level of meta-knowledge (or theory). We may be most 
ignorant of all with respect to how culture and biology intersect and influence 
each other—undoubtedly a crucial nexus of explanation.  
  There is all this tempting and vulnerable complexity (vulnerable, that is, 
to myopic, ideological interpretations), and a corresponding temptation to 
reduce that complexity down to a more “thinkable” level. Yet, at the same time, 
it must be said that the tendency to complicate and confound is no less 
prevalent than reductionism as a human cognitive strategy. Moreover, the 
reductionist tendencies in the nature/nurture debate have not been  
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evenhanded. The tendency of the last two centuries, with the rise of the 
biological sciences, has been to biologize and medicalize, and more recently 
geneticize, human behavior. Those on the nurture end of the argument, 
though no less prone to exclusionary thinking, have for the most part 
responded to this tendency by attempting to explain why it can’t be true, at 
least in a particular case. Thus reductionism alone, though it certainly plays a 
role in the favoring of one methodology over another within particular 
academic disciplines, is unlikely to be solely responsible for the endurance of 
the debate. 
  I tend to think that the real reason for the continuing fascination with 
nature vs. nurture is the political implications. The nature vs. nurture debate is 
really about the ways we typically conceptualize the possibility of change and 
the desirability of stasis. The clash of the progressive desire to “make change 
happen” with the conservative desire to categorize certain relationships as 
beyond the proper reach of human “social engineering” gives the 
nature/nurture debate its perduring heat. 
  In the short form, traits and resultant behaviors that can be identified as 
exclusively or primarily genetic in origin are (supposedly) not easily subject to 
directed modification or cultural intervention. The adage about the musical 
pedagogy of pigs comes to mind. The counterpoint, of course, is that traits that 
have a larger cultural component are, according to the presuppositions of the 
debate, subject to intentioned modification. It is perfectly possible of course for 
both types of traits—genetic and cultural—to resist change and remain 
relatively static. Moreover, the presumption that genetic inequalities are not 
easily susceptible to cultural modification is obviously incorrect. Corrective 
lenses, for example, are an entirely non-controversial cultural amelioration of a  
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genetic/biological inequality. The presumption of many, however, is that 
characteristics with strong, direct genetic origins will resist change, belonging 
somehow more intrinsically, or essentially, to the individual—not least of all 
because such traits are presumed to be passed on, more or less intact, to 
offspring—notwithstanding the fact that traits per se, as phenotypic 
expressions, are not genetically heritable. Strictly speaking, only genotypes 
are genetically heritable. Observed variation in a particular trait, in a particular 
population, at a particular time may or may not have a genetic component. As 
Richard Lewontin puts it rather starkly, “We do not inherit our phenotypes. 
They develop throughout our lifetimes partly as a consequence of our 
genotypes—but only partly” (Lewontin 1995, 18). 
  In the language of evolutionary theory, the granddaddy of theories of 
change and stasis, the tendency to pass particular traits from generation to 
generation is referred to as heritability—i.e. some mechanism by which 
offspring resemble parents—which is one of the two characteristics necessary 
for natural selection to take place. The other necessary factor is referred to as 
differential fitness, which means the presence of differences within a 
population that, under given circumstances, make a difference in the ability of 
individuals to survive and reproduce. 
  Heritability refers to the conservatism or intergenerational fidelity of a 
trait. The conventional unit of such fidelity, as understood since the genetic 
revolution, is the gene—or the minimal segment of DNA that “codes for” some 
portion of the phenotype as it emerges. Philosopher David Hull (1980) refers 
to genes and all analogous devices as “replicators”—where heritable 
information is codified. 
   Differential fitness refers to the business end of the selection process.  
 
23
In any given population, there will be a certain amount of phenotypic variation 
from individual to individual. Some individuals will, because of this variation, 
have a better chance of passing the reproductive bar. Hull refers to such 
“evolutionary individuals” as “interactors”—i.e., they interact with the 
environment. 
  The difference between interactors and replicators is a key one, 
because it highlights the two-stage process of natural selection and points to 
the fact that causality—in the sense of Aristotelian efficient cause—is at the 
level of interactors, not replicators. Replicators are like bookkeepers—a vital 
function to be sure—and information recorded here becomes a kind of basic 
blueprint for the next generation. It is interactors, however, that make contact 
with the environment and are differentially successful. Only interactors are 
operant at the level of selection and thus replicators qua replicators can never 
be seen as the locus of efficient cause in evolutionary processes. 
  Philosopher of science Elliott Sober extends the point, arguing that 
though replicators are necessary for natural selection, such replicators need 
not, in principle, be genes. 
 
Strictly speaking, evolution by natural selection does not 
require genes. It simply requires that offspring resemble their 
parents. For example, if characteristics were transmitted by 
parents teaching their children, a selection process could 
occur without the mediation of genes (Sober 1994, 479).
1 
 
Thus the exact vehicle of replication is not essential, so long as there is such a 
vehicle. A gene is like an institution. And (here is a point very important for 
                                                 
1 Keep in mind that when Darwin first proposed the mechanism of natural selection as the 
primary mode of evolution in 1859, he had no concept of genes—the site of replication—only 
the observation that offspring tend to resemble parents and a handful of subsequently 
disproved theories as to why.  
 
24
consideration of continuity and change at the cultural level), exactness of 
replication (fidelity) does not necessarily act as an evolutionary determinant. 
Biological reproductive strategies with respect to replication run the gamut 
from asexual organisms producing exact self-duplicates (apart from change 
introduced via mutation), through hymenoptera species (ants, bees and 
wasps) that produce both clones and genetically unique individuals, to 
sexually-reproducing organisms, where reproduction happens via dissolution 
of the genetic structure (and many less familiar possibilities besides).  
  Discussion of heritability—that is, of the importance of mechanisms of 
stasis—in the context of a theory of change (evolution via natural selection) 
inevitably generates confusion. This confusion arises at least partially because 
the phenomenon under discussion is a two stage process—heritability plus 
selection—involving (at least) three hierarchical levels: the gene (as 
replicators), the organism (as locus of fitness and therefore unit of selection 
considered causally) and the population/species (as locus of genetic 
variation).
 2 Given the need to keep at minimum these five components 
simultaneously in mind when thinking about evolutionary processes, confusion 
is understandable. Discussions of evolutionary processes are, in fact, 
particularly vulnerable to what Gregory Bateson so often referred to as the 
confusion of logical types (Bateson 1972, 180–192; Bateson 2002, 106–119). 
                                                 
2 In conversations with both students and those casually interested in the subject of evolution I 
have found that the hardest point to get across—the one that seems to slip in and out of 
focus—is that natural selection is a two stage process. Whether by training or some innate 
quality of mind, most people tend to default to a one-stage process for evolutionary change—
i.e. Lamarckism, or the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Lamarckism, of course, has the 
advantage of both power and simplicity. Unfortunately (at least from the point of view of ease 
of conceptualization), the strong intragenerational barrier between organism and gene means 
that characteristics acquired in the course of a life cannot be passed to the next generation 
using genes as replicators. This does not, of course, prevent the operation of Lamarckian 
processes at other possible level of evolutionary pressure, species selection for example, nor, 
more obviously, in culture (e.g. Gould 2002, 722–724).  
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  Working backwards, I’ll start with variation. Conventional evolutionary 
change, in the sense of evolution by natural selection, refers to changes in the 
frequency of occurrence of a particular characteristic in the population.  Put 
another way, although natural selection functions primarily through individuals, 
by “selecting” differences that make a difference in reproductive success, it 
can only be measured in the aggregate. It can only be measured at the level of 
the population as it changes over time, as a change in the frequency of a trait 
or behavior as it is distributed through the population. Variation exists at the 
level of the population, with selection “acting” to weed out those that don’t 
manage to survive to reproduce.
3  
 Because  population and individual represent different levels of 
hierarchy, or logical types, they are incommensurable as objects of theory. 
Statements about the population do not necessarily apply to any particular 
individual and statements about the individual may not apply to the population 
at all. As Bateson puts it:  
 
there is a deep gulf between statements about an identified 
individual and statements about a class. Such statements 
are of a different logical type, and prediction from one to the 
other is always unsure. The statement “The liquid is boiling” 
is of different logical type from the statement “That molecule 
will be the first to go” (Bateson 2002, 39). 
 
Confusion arises when theories derived from (or found to be in substantial 
                                                 
3 Note that selection does not necessarily weed out any particular individual nor any particular 
phenotypic variation in a given generation or span of time. Under certain conditions the affect 
of selection can be very relaxed; under others it can be very strict. Moreover, non-selective 
processes—e.g. a volcanic eruption or meteor impact—may wipe out portions of a population 
(or entire populations) irrespective of phenotypic variation. Biological determinists often 
presumes a tight fit between past selection and current variation that may not obtain. The 
theory only requires that under certain intersections of population and environment, at certain 
times, selection occurs. 
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agreement with) one hierarchical level are applied unwittingly to another.  
  Even this separation of levels, however, can only take us so far in 
dealing with biological and other information rich, replicative systems. In 
abstract logic there are classes, and classes of classes, and classes of 
classes of classes, etc., that can be denoted as different levels. Such 
schemata, however, lack the biologically essential element of time. The 
nominal levels of biological systems are actually more like nested, complexly 
interfaced processes linked together with the additional input of collateral 
energy (Bateson 2002, 174).   
  For example, in thinking of evolution by natural selection, it is all too 
common to miss the fact that variation, arising from various processes, exists 
synchronically only at the level of the population, not in individuals.
4 Thus 
statements that apply to variation—e.g. those that refer to frequencies, means, 
modes and totals—do not apply to individuals. Likewise, statements that 
characterize an individual are not ipso facto characteristic of the population. 
Thus, for example, the statement that the average height of population n is 67-
inches, tells you nothing about individual a even if he is part of that population. 
Averages apply to groups, not individuals. 
  There is a necessary corollary to the division between individual and 
population as each is impacted by natural selection that is, perhaps, not 
obvious at first glance: natural selection is an inherently conservative process. 
If this seems counter-intuitive, it is because we “know” that natural selection is 
largely responsible, in Darwin’s phrase, for “the origin of species” and 
ultimately the fantastic diversity of life on Earth.
5  
                                                 
4 This is a simplification unless read literally. Individuals can express phenotypic variation over 
time, changing anatomically, physiologically and behaviorally within a range.  
5 A new “post modern synthesis” seems to be emerging in evolutionary theory that  
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  In a long letter to Darwin, Alfred Russel Wallace, often described as the 
“co-discoverer” of evolution by natural selection, writes: 
 
The action of this principle [natural selection] is exactly like 
that of the centrifugal governor of the steam engine, which 
checks and corrects any irregularities almost before they 
become evident; and in like manner no unbalanced 
deficiency in the animal kingdom can ever reach any 
conspicuous magnitude because it would make itself felt at 
the very first step, by rendering existence difficult and 
extinction almost sure to follow (Bateson 2002, 39–40).
6 
 
Which is to say that “selection” in the sense of natural selection works not by 
picking that which works best for a particular individual, but by “filtering out” 
that which doesn’t work across the range of variation existent in the 
population. There is no case-by-case “picking” of the preferred, which is what 
we usually mean when speaking about selection.   
  The process of natural selection may or may not have an impact on the 
reproductive success of any individual in particular. Theoretical “optimality” is 
no guarantor of evolutionary success and theoretical non-optimization no 
guarantor of evolutionary failure—success defined as reproductive success or 
passing the genes that code for the characteristics in question onto the next 
generation. Rather, at the level of the population, those traits that support 
reproductive success are more liable, in the aggregate, to become more 
                                                                                                                                              
acknowledges a fuzzy hierarchy of evolutionary individuals, including, at least, genes, cell 
lineages, organisms, demes (stable breeding populations), species and clades as potential 
loci of selection (or non-selective evolutionary pressure). Though organisms still take pride of 
place when adaptation of complex organs—e.g., eyes, brains—in multicellular creatures is 
concerned (Williams 1992), selection at the deme/species level may well be a more important 
factor in generating overall biotic diversity (Sober 1980; Sober and Lewontin 1982; Gould and 
Lloyd 1999), while gene selection and non-selective iteration may be more important in 
generating the raw material from which higher levels in the hierarchy are constructed (Kimura 
1985, 1991). 
6 Wallace’s letter to Darwin is reprinted in Darwin, a Norton Critical Edition, ed. P. Appleman 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1970).  
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common in the population over time. 
  There is more to emphasize, in fact, than Wallace ever glimpsed about 
the conservative nature of natural selection as a process. Writing without 
benefit of knowledge of genetics, nor even the differentiation between sex 
cells and somatic cells, neither Darwin nor Wallace could know just how 
important conformity would be for sexual reproduction—the most common 
source of variation in microevolution. In short, it is not only that the 
environment acts as a check on radically non-conforming mutations, but that 
sexual reproduction itself requires a very high degree of genetic conformity 
between gametes—too much difference and fertilization is impossible. Thus 
the first step in the selective process is a sorting for fidelity. Sorting occurs 
redundantly, at the level of the combination of gametes in sexual reproduction, 
and then again at the level of survival to reproduction after fertilization. 
  So, to follow through, if natural selection is typically a conservative 
process, acting to weed out that which is too different, then how does change 
occur at all? The answer is of two parts. In the first place, it is not always the 
case that it is the outliers which are weeded out. Under certain conditions, e.g. 
environmental change or the emigration into new territory, it might be that it is 
the very different obtains a previously unknown advantage. The different may 
be selected for and those nearly the mean completely wiped out. This 
possibility may in fact be an important driving force in macroevolution 
(Eldredge and Gould 1972). In the second place, even under more “typical” 
circumstances—i.e. during periods of relative environmental stasis—the 
selective filter only removes differences that are too different—i.e. big enough 
to prevent successful reproduction. Differences that make a difference—i.e. 
those that are significant enough to provide some reproductive advantage, but  
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not so great as to prevent reproduction (failure in which, keep in mind, can just 
as easily be the result of behavioral incompatibility or territorial segmentation 
as genetic mismatch)—tend to spread through the population. There is, 
however, no guarantee. Moreover, there is no necessity that such selective 
processes produce “optimal” solutions to various survivability problems as 
defined by abstract criteria. Life muddles along. 
  My point here is to consider natural selection as one way of thinking 
about stasis and change. Why? Partially because biology and evolution 
undoubtedly have a place in the explanation of all human behavior, and in the 
balance between stasis and change in human social relations. Nor is the role 
of biology in behavior, in culture itself, necessarily a small one. Attempts to 
eliminate biological factors in understanding culture and social behavior 
inevitably smack of special pleading. 
  Unfortunately, a great many attempts to include biological factors in the 
explanation of culture and human social behavior amount to little more than an 
attempt to reduce such to genes and to invoke biological determinism as an 
unanswerable cause for behaviors we find hard to explain or injustices we 
have found difficult to eradicate. In my view, the difficulty does not come from 
the inclusion of biological factors in cultural explanation, but from reductionism, 
categorical confusion, and the mistaken assumption of present function as 
emerging inevitably from the ability of natural selection to “adapt” organism to 
environment—what Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin (1979) have 
criticized as the “Panglossian Paradigm.” 
  Dr. Pangloss, of course, is the character from Voltaire’s Candide, the 
learned teacher of the young Candide, who argues that the world we live in is 
the best of all possible worlds and that things could not be other than they are.  
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When Candide returns to Pangloss after a series of adventures, and discovers 
that the old man is gravely ill, dying of syphilis, his pupil exclaims,  "what a 
strange genealogy is this! Is not the devil the root of it?” 
  The unflappable Pangloss then explains that it is not the devil at all, but 
a further demonstration of life’s inevitable beneficence. “Not at all,” says the 
old sage,  
 
…it was a thing unavoidable, a necessary ingredient in 
the best of worlds; for if Columbus had not caught on an 
island in America this disease, which contaminates the 
source of generation, and frequently impedes propagation 
itself, and is evidently opposed to the great end of nature, 
we should have had neither chocolate nor cochineal.
7 
 
Thus in Pangloss’s worldview, any ostensible tragedy—whether his death from 
syphilis or the deaths of thousands in Lisbon from a volcanic eruption—
however bad it may seem, is justified by both inevitability—“it could not have 
been otherwise”—and a deeper, invisible good. In the misuse of evolutionary 
theory, the equivalent reasoning allows that some extant, apparently 
obnoxious behavior type (e.g. aggression), can be “explained” by its “adaptive” 
utility under certain circumstances and therefore must have been shaped by 
natural selection. I will return to this point below. 
  Besides panglossian tendencies—which fallaciously presume that 
existent traits must have been shaped to present utility by the inexorable 
workings of natural selection—and confusion of logical types, the most 
common misapplication of evolutionary reasoning to social and cultural 
phenomena may be the failure to account for, or often even to acknowledge, 
emergence. 
                                                 
7 From chapter 4 of Candide, as it appears at http://www.literature.org/authors/voltaire/ 
candide/index.html.  
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   Emergence is a general systems theory concept that formalizes the old 
adage concerning things that are “more than the sum of their parts.” 
Emergence, as the very word implies, requires time, developing from a 
temporal process instead of a formal relationship (Bateson 2002, 100). Even a 
simple, enduring structure like a house can be seen as emergent in the 
process of its construction. A house is not constructed as walls + floor + roof + 
doors + etc., but rather as a particular spaciotemporal arrangement of 
elements that emerges only when they are put together in a particular way, in 
a particular order, as is possible only in certain environments. Moreover, 
though a house is not a complex, self-replicating system, its continuing status 
as house can certainly be affected by additional inputs. It is relatively enduring, 
but input of sufficient strength, an earthquake for example, might transform it 
from a house in to a pile of rubbish.  
  Moreover, there are other characteristics that are non-emergent in a 
strictly philosophical or mathematical sense, but still provide a level of fitness 
at the population level that does not exist for the individual—variation is the 
most obvious example. Thus reductionism, and particularly reduction of cause 
(which is an attribute of interactors) to the level of replicators (paradigmatically, 
genes) is a failure to reason at the appropriate hierarchical level—a confusion 
of logical types. Replicators qua preplicators can never be causes in the 
evolutionary sense because they do not code in a linear way for phenotypes.  
  There are, in fact, only a limited number of ways in which change can 
propagate in a population and much of the complexity that emerges does so 
as the result of the interaction between various levels of the hierarchy. The 
close study of genes, though it offers the promise of telling us something about 
historical relationships between populations, can never offer an insight into  
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either evolutionary cause (which is a matter of interactors) or emergent traits 
or fitness that exists only at the level of the collectivity. 
 
Three Models of Stasis and Change 
  With the basic understanding of evolution via natural selection as a 
model of change/stasis presented above, I can proceed to a discussion of 
other types of change/stasis and their possible relationships to natural 
selection. There are three conceptually separable—but often in practice 
irrevocably and intricately linked through feedback loops and emergent 
properties—types of evolutionary (i.e. change/stasis) models: 
  (A) those in which information is transferred from parents to offspring 
(heritability) exclusively through their genes (e.g. human blood type) and in 
which evolutionary change (differential fitness) is defined exclusively in terms 
of successful biological reproduction.
8 
  (B) those models in which fidelity of intergenerational similarity 
(heritability) is by some replicator other than genes (learning, culture) or by 
genes and culture but fitness is still defined exclusively in terms of successful 
biological reproduction. 
  (C) those models in which information is passed along via non-genetic 
paths (learning, culture) and fitness is determined not by biological 
reproduction, but by some other criteria, e.g. having students or imitators, 
cultural reproduction.
9 
                                                 
8 Note that non-genetic factors are often responsible for a protion of phenotypic variation of a 
trait. Type A models don’t require genes to be 100% responsible for observed variation—they 
rarely are—only that they be the only replicator at work. Environmental conditions may 
account for observed variation, but not be a replicator in this sense. 
9 These criteria are adapted from those suggested by Elliot Sober in his elegant little essay, 
“Models of Cultural Evolution” (1994, 480).  
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  Models of type A conform to what is usually meant when we talk about 
natural selection. Type B models, though it may not be instantly obvious, also 
operate in a mode very similar to natural selection, in that extra-genetic 
information, passed from parents to offspring, can in theory produce the 
necessary heritability for the operation of selection. Selection models of this 
type can be evoked to explain behavior patterns that lead to differential 
reproductive success but that are not necessarily coded by genetic 
difference—the incest taboo might fall into this category. Sober writes: 
 
Suppose that incest avoidance is advantageous because 
individuals with the trait have more viable offspring than 
individuals without it. The reason is that outbreeding 
diminishes the chance that children will have deleterious 
recessive genes in double dose. If offspring learn whether to 
be incest avoiders from their parents, the frequency of the 
trait in the population may evolve. And this may occur 
without there being any genetic differences between those 
who avoid incest and those who do not. Indeed, incest 
avoidance could evolve in this way in a population of 
genetically identical individuals, provided that the 
environmental determinant of the behavior runs in families 
(Sober 1994, 479). 
 
Whether or not this explanation is the best way to account for the existence of 
the incest taboo as such is an empirical question, but the example illustrates 
some important points. It suggests the possibility of natural selection operating 
on behavioral patterns without the existence of specific genes that code for the 
trait in question. Information is passed along via teaching (in the broadest 
sense, including imitation, sanction, reward, etc.) from parents to children. 
Families that successfully pass the behavior of incest avoidance along tend to 
have healthier children who have better chances to survive to reproduction. If  
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they in turn teach their offspring the taboo, the trait is heritable, even though 
there is no specific gene that codes for incest avoidance.
10  
  Furthermore, consideration of this example offers us the chance to 
circle back to the distinction between individual and population. The 
importance of the distinction becomes apparent when we consider that by 
defining evolution as a change in the frequency of a trait in the population, 
heritability need not be an all or nothing proposition. That is, for the trait to 
increase in frequency (or maintain a certain frequency once established), it 
does not require that every offspring of parents who kept the incest taboo also 
must keep it. Nor does it require that it be kept in the same way or to the same 
extent between parents and offspring. In fact, and this is a critical point that is 
hard for most people to keep in mind, the degree to which the trait is or is not 
passed along with absolute fidelity in any particular case is completely 
irrelevant to natural selection as such. All that is required is some degree of 
heritability and some degree of differential fitness. 
  Also, and perhaps most crucially for any consideration of evolution as a 
potential agent of change/stasis in human culture, the selection process itself 
has absolutely no necessary relationship to the ostensible reason or meaning 
of the taboo as considered from the point of view of those actually practicing it. 
That is to say, it is perfectly possible for such a process to operate “behind the 
backs” of those practicing it, and would require no knowledge of genetics or 
understanding of the greater statistical likelihood of double recessives in 
inbred offspring. People might adopt the practice of outbreeding for economic, 
                                                 
10 I do not mean to suggest that the range of actually-existing incest taboos could be 
accounted for or, more particularly, emplotted (placed into culturally meaningful narratives) by 
invocation of type B evolutionary models alone. As every anthropologist knows, the 
observable range of incest prohibitions extends far beyond any genetically valid motivation for 
outbreeding.  
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religious, military or any other reason or combination of reasons ever 
suggested for the incest taboo, and the natural selection process would still 
operate. 
  However, and this is the great big however that is so often elided in 
selection-based accounts of the spread of behaviors in humans, the possible 
operation of natural selection with respect to human social behavior is neither 
sufficient to “explain” these behaviors—in the sense of superceding the need 
to consider other types of explanation—nor necessarily the most important 
type of process in operation. Seeing the incest taboo, or any other complexly-
structured, context-bound human sociocultural trait, as the more or less pure 
product of genetic determinism is the result of a double prejudice toward 
reductionist and adaptationist thinking. 
  In their essay on adaptationist fallacies, Stephen J. Gould and Richard 
Lewontin critique a case with similar logic—that of the Aztec human sacrifice 
and the supposed “adaptation” of cannibalism. Originally proposed by 
anthropologist Michael Harner (1977), and later championed by sociobiologist 
E. O. Wilson (1978), the idea is that  the Aztec practice of human sacrifice can 
be explained as an adaptation by humans, genetically predisposed to be 
carnivorous, to chronic meat shortages (Gould and Lewontin 1994, 75).  
  Following Marshall Sahlins’ (1978) original critique of the Harner-Wilson 
use of the Aztec material, Gould and Lewontin argue that human sacrifice 
played an important role in Aztec cosmology and maintenance of social 
hierarchy. Sacrificial meat was distributed only to the higher levels of society 
and even then only a small portion of the potential (the arms) were actually 
eaten. Other sources of protein were not, in fact, in short supply. Given this 
larger understanding, they write:   
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We strongly suspect that Aztec cannibalism was an 
“adaptation” much like evangelists and rivers in spandrels, or 
ornamental bosses in ceiling spaces: a secondary 
epiphenomenon representing a fruitful use of available parts, 
not a cause of the entire system. To put it crudely: a system 
developed for other reasons generated an increasing 
number of fresh bodies; use might as well be made of them 
(Gould and Lewontin 1994, 76). 
 
The references to “evangelists,” “rivers in spandrels,” and “ornamental bosses 
in ceiling spaces” refer to the two biologists’ acrid comparison of telling “just so 
stories” to explain the origins of currently existing traits as explaining the 
ornamental details in the nooks and crannies of a cathedral as the cause of 
said nooks and crannies.  
  There is, however, another point to be made, which requires a closer  
look at type C evolutionary models and their possible relationship to model 
types A and B. As noted, type C models are not, properly speaking, biological 
models at all. Rather they describe a kind of “cultural” selection that is 
analogous to type A models—whereas type B models have a mixed character 
(see Table 1.1 below). Type C models can be seen, for example, in certain 
kinds of economic theories, for example the theory of the successful firm.  
  Consider a potential trait of such firms, say the attempt to maximize 
          Model Type 
 
A (Natural Selection) 
 
B (Mixed Selection) 
 
C (Cultural Selection) 
Table 1.1 – Three Models of Selection 
Heritability Agent
 
Genes 
 
Learning 
 
Learning 
Fitness Defined By 
 
Biological Reproduction 
 
Biological Reproduction 
 
Having Students  
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profit. Let’s start with the assumption that, ceteris paribus, a certain amount of 
profit maximization is adaptive for any specific firm. One explanation for the 
spread of profit-maximizing behaviors in the population is that managers and 
owners are well informed and able to calculate, using “rational self-interest” as 
a guide, how to maximize profit. The process can be learned, taught and 
imitated. This, however, is not a “selection” model at all, even though in effect 
it might lead to an increased frequency of profit-maximizing behavior. An 
alternative explanation of profit-maximizing behavior, however, is to forego the 
assumption that managers are particularly well informed and acting on a 
rational, calculated understanding of the system as whole. In this version, the 
frequency of profit maximization in the population might still increase,  
because those that don’t profit sufficiently end up going out of business. Those 
that more or less by chance seize upon tactics yielding acceptable profit 
margins stay in business, meaning that over time profit-maximizing increases 
in the population of firms still in business 
  Four points follow from this discussion of the firm as a potential 
example of type C models of evolution. The first is obvious, but has very 
important implications—learned behaviors can be spread through processes 
other than selection. Instead of spreading from parent to offspring, they can 
move laterally through a population. Behaviors, processes and ideas can be 
taught to anyone, imitated and imitated again, even recreated by inference 
and guesswork based on product. Their lateral spread, in other words, is more 
closely analogous to contagion—the spread of a virus across a population—
than to evolution by natural selection. Both are forms of diffusion (increasing 
frequency in the population), but they operate through different mechanisms.
11  
                                                 
11 The reason that viruses, or bacterial infections for that matter, can spread quickly across a  
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  The second, also obvious, is that traits spread by cultural replicators are 
Lamarckian in character. That is to say, traits acquired over the course of 
single generation by parents can be spread directly to offspring. A parent who 
learns a new technique for building fires, baking bread or making a more 
efficient weapon can teach this directly to his or her children. Again, the 
consequences are enormous. Such traits can spread far more quickly through 
the population. Moreover, and of equal significance, such cultural change is 
not suppressed by the needs of organismic integrity in the way that, for 
example, cellular mutation and replication within a single generation of the 
organism is. When a trait spreads through the culture, it is innovation (or fad). 
When a new cell type spreads through the body, it is cancer. 
  The third point, though perhaps not quite so obvious, is equally 
important: both selective and non-selective (contagious) modes of diffusion 
can operate at the same time. Going back to the example of the firm, specific 
operational tactics which have evolved more-or-less (and I will come back to 
this more-or-less business in a moment) at random, and proved useful under 
certain conditions, can then be imitated, taught, sold, bought, plagiarized, 
stolen, etc. Once something has been created as a culturally-transmissible 
possibility, it can spread like a disease. Moreover, to return to the “more-or-
less random” business, I mean by this that the selection process is stochastic, 
involving both what Bateson has called a “raid on the random”—for the 
random is by definition the only source for the new—and a process whereby 
only certain results of random variation are allowed to endure (i.e., selection). 
                                                                                                                                              
population of macroorganisms is because of a substantive difference in relevant temporal 
scale. Because there can be many thousands of generations of microorganisms in the same 
durational period as the lifetime of one macroorganism, contagious forms of the former can 
spread from host to host in, what from the subjective time reference of the latter, seems a 
short period of time.  
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  Fourth point, the sweet spot—or best value in a range. Again, perhaps 
not quite so obvious, but also immensely important: often it turns out that the 
“best” result in evolutionary terms is not the biggest, smallest, longest, or even 
“most profitable” possible. If a ten-foot neck is good for reaching branches at 
the top of the tree that others can’t reach, a twenty-foot neck isn’t necessarily 
better—it depends both on the structure of the animal (can it support the extra 
length without losing mobility, the ability to bend over to drink, etc.) and the 
environment (are there trees available that could be reached with a twenty foot 
neck but not a ten foot neck?). And this leaves aside the limitations of form 
itself: the twenty-foot option might be structurally unworkable, or outside the 
range of available variation, even if it could in theory be useful.  
  In the case of the firm, certain behaviors might tend to maximize short 
term profits but lead to the rapid decline of a business’s ability to stay in 
business. Workers might quit, unionize or sabotage the firm because of low 
wages; equipment might break down because of lack of maintenance or 
replacement; other firms that invested more in marketing might gobble up 
market share, leaving the profit-maximizing firm with no customers. Certain 
activities might be very profitable, theft for example, or the more typical 
corporate formula known as “creative accounting,” but lead to consequences 
such as legal or social sanctions that hurt the firm or even force it out of 
business. 
  An important corollary of point three takes us back to the individual/ 
population distinction and the consequences thereof. Actions taken by the 
individual that benefit the individual and are, therefore, in a narrow sense 
adaptive or attractive—that is, they could lead to differential reproductive 
success or the imitation of a strategy perceived as successful—can prove  
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maladaptive for the population. The classic example is the peacock’s tail, 
which increases the individual’s likelihood of reproduction, but almost 
guarantees the contraction of the duration of the species measured in 
geological time. Examples can be more extreme. This is most obvious in 
groups where phenomena such as unbalanced resource extraction and 
environmental pollution may lead to short term profits but result in increased 
stresses on the entire population. 
So, to summarize my points so far, there are three conceptually 
separable but often inextricably entwined models of selection (see Table 1.2 
below): (A) classic natural selection (heritability via genes, fitness measured in 
terms offspring); (B) mixed selection (heritability via culture—or genes and 
culture—but fitness till measured exclusively in terms of offspring); and (C) 
cultural selection/diffusion (where “heritability” is via culture, and “fitness” is 
measured in term so of students and imitators). These are three different 
processes that can all be operating simultaneously in ways that reinforce, 
oppose or are irrelevant to any particular trait.   
With respect to the type C models, which I illustrated with the case of 
the firm, there are four important points: (1) traits spread via culture can be 
spread through non-selective modes (contagion), as well as a process 
analogous to natural selection; (2) acquired traits can be spread to offspring; 
(3) selective and non-selective processes can be operating simultaneously 
with respect to the same trait; and (4) in type C models—as in other types of 
selective models—there is often a “sweet spot” within a range of variation that 
is adaptive, where higher or lower values may not be. More is not necessarily 
better. It may in fact be lethal. Finally, there are (at least) three hierarchical 
levels at play in evolution via natural selection: (I) replicators (genes), (II)  
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interactors (organisms), and (III) collectivities (population/species). 
The above summary is meant to convey something of the complexity 
and possibility of hierarchical entanglement that can, and so often does, lead 
to a kind of reductionist thinking that commits the cardinal sin of applying 
invalid kinds of theoretical propositions to inappropriate levels of analysis. 
This, combined with a tendency to favor one-stage thinking, to view emergent 
phenomena as reducible, and to conflate present use with historical origin 
leads to errors of thinking both perverse and pervasive. Taking this discussion 
as the minimal set of underlying suppositions, I will now proceed to 
consideration of war and gender and some ways of thinking about their 
relationship.  
 
Three Levels of Evolutionary Hierarchy 
 
I. Replicators (e.g. genes) 
II. Interactors (e.g. individual organisms) 
III. Collectivities (e.g. populations or species) 
 
Three Types of Evolutionary Models (Heritability/Fitness) 
 
A. Natural Selection (genes/babies) 
  B. Mixed Selection (culture/babies) 
  C. Cultural Selection (culture/students) 
 
Four important considerations for type C models 
 
  1. Diffusion possible by contagion as well as selection 
  2. Both Lamarckian and Darwinian processes possible 
  3. Contagion and selection can operate simultaneously 
  4. The sweet spot—more is not always better 
 
Table 1.2 – Outline of Evolutionary Models and Considerations  
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The Origins of Masculinity and War 
  Joshua Goldstein, writing with a political science background but 
borrowing liberally, if selectively, from anthropology, has argued in a recent 
book (Goldstein 2001), that there is a strong link between war and masculinity. 
Though at an empirical level this is a rather obvious claim, the various possible 
meanings of such a claim remain controversial. Is the claim, for example, 
based on an ethnocentric extension of what has obtained in western societies 
in relatively recent times? Or is the link of masculinity and war a cross-cultural 
truth? Is the link biologically determined? Or is it the product of culture? What 
happens to men who fail as soldiers in societies where soldierly qualities are 
regarded as essential to manhood? Is the link between masculinity and war a 
factor in the oppression of women? If so, how does this work? What about 
peaceful societies? Are there such? Is gender differently constructed, within 
such? 
  These questions are basic ones, central to issues of peace, justice and 
social integration. They are also unlike some of the more esoteric questions 
posed in anthropology, of an immediate interest to people—or so at least I 
have found them to be. And if the default slant in parts of academia not under 
the spell of sociobiology and its successor projects tends to be away from 
biological determinism, a gut-level feeling that the link between men and war is 
the product mostly, or even exclusively, of biology (“nature”) is widespread in 
the broader population. The typically unexamined kernel of the argument is 
that men are, “by nature,” prone to violence and that war is in some sense the 
simple outgrowth of this. In other words, war is the product of “human” (read, 
human male) nature. 
  The interesting thing about Goldstein’s hypothesis is that he turns this  
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argument upside down—masculinity becomes, in his formulation, the product 
of war instead of the other way around—and inside out: instead of being 
“natural” in origin, gender has its origins in the sociocultural organization of 
intergroup conflict. The question concerning the link between the two arises for 
me—as it does for Goldstein—because of what could be called a comparative 
anomaly:  both intergroup conflict (warfare in its modes, styles and goals) and 
gender norms, at least those not directly related to warfare, show a great deal 
of variability across cultures. Yet when it comes to gendering of war in those 
cultures where war is prevalent— the link between war and gender—variation 
diminishes almost (but not quite) to the vanishing point.  
  Much of what I have to say in this dissertation has to do with this link 
and its consequences, particularly for Germany, but also more generally. 
Although a definitive proof—if such a thing is even possible—of the historical 
link between war and gender is beyond the scope of this project, I think it 
worthwhile to consider the evidence as it exists and suggest some ways of 
approaching it—if only because a consideration of the last two centuries of 
German history has played a pivotal role in the development of my conception 
of the way in which masculinity and the war system relate, in contemporary 
Germany and beyond. 
 
Variation and Origins of War 
  A part of the reason for my focus on the relationship between war and 
gender is what I see as a bias against theoretical frameworks that emphasize 
conflict as a causal agent in human history in anthropology and particularly in 
humanistic anthropology. The reasons for this bias are rooted, I think, in a 
reaction to misapplication of, and fundamental misunderstanding of, conflict- 
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based models as found in social Darwinism, human sociobiology and some 
types of economic theory. The history of misuse of conflict-oriented theory, 
indeed, warrants caution—and from the point of view of all disciplines at all 
times (not to mention popular conceptions), the opposite bias—toward crude 
conflict-based models—can likely be said to be operative.  
  I am speaking, however, to the subset of social science and humanities 
disciplines that includes especially cultural anthropology, social and cultural 
history, literary theory—including critical theory—peace studies, gender 
studies and other specialized disciplines that deal, especially, with issues of 
identity. A great deal of the interdisciplinary work that has happened in the last 
twenty years has been amongst these disciplines and specialties, and, I would 
argue, in this group—where I have no trouble placing myself—there is a bias 
against seeing warfare as a causal agent at the macroscopic scale. 
  This is not to say, of course, that questions of war have been 
completely ignored or considered unimportant by cultural anthropologists and 
those in related fields. The bias is not against considering war, per se, but 
against seeing the largest-scale, worldwide occurrences of war as a strong 
factor in the origin and subsequent shaping of particular institutions and 
identities. The following statement from Leslie Sponsel, an anthropologist of 
war and peace who has done fieldwork on Yanomami groups and written 
extensively on the mutual relevance of anthropology and peace studies, is 
fairly typical: 
 
Peace appears to be elusive not because relatively 
nonviolent and peaceful societies are so rare—they are 
not—but instead because so rarely have nonviolence and 
peace been the focus of research in anthropology and other 
disciplines, including even the field of peace studies. The 
deficiency lies in the research, including the ethnographic  
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record, and not in human nature. Although conflict is 
inevitable and ubiquitous, violence is not. Human nature has 
the psychobiological potential to be either nonviolent/ 
peaceful or violent/warlike. Nonviolence and peace appear 
to have prevailed in many prehistoric and prestate societies. 
War is not a cultural universal. The potential for the 
development of a more nonviolent and peaceful world is 
latent in human nature as revealed by the natural history of 
peace (Sponsel 1996, 114 15). 
 
This is a balanced statement that I substantially agree with-- and will even take 
a moment to expand on my points of agreement. 
   Surely Sponsel is correct that both war and peace lie within the realm of 
human potentiality. Evidence from primatology, archeology, ethnography and 
history shows beyond any doubt that the possibility for both cooperation and 
violent conflict have existed, to some extent, in every known human society 
and in all of our nearest evolutionary relatives. Thus whether one wants to 
argue from biology or from culture, or any possible combination thereof, a 
simple “people have wars because they are innately violent” statement is 
misleading in the extreme. It is the explanatory equivalent of saying that 
people wear trousers because they have legs. Except when they don’t—wear 
trousers. Except when they don’t—have legs. The (il)logical form of the 
statement would be A is A, therefore B, or because A exists, B is inevitable. It 
commits the logical fallacy of assigning causality to prerequisite. Certainly the 
capacity for war (or peace) is sine qua non to the actuality of war (or peace), 
but can never be an efficient cause or seen as sufficient explanation.  
  I am in full sympathy with Sponsel’s claim that as compared to war, 
peace may have historically been seen as a kind of evidentiary lack, elided in 
research because of ideological prejudices concerning the universality of war. 
As he puts it, “war is not a cultural universal.” I would go even further, and  
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say—again on fairly cursory review of the evidence that could and probably 
should be examined statistically, using strictly operationalized criteria, 
although I have no real doubt that it would prove to be generally true—that 
most people, in most societies, at most times in human history, behave 
peacefully. The unexamined evidence for peace is liable to be far more wide-
spread than war, even on simple intuitive extrapolation from the current 
situation. Most of the world’s nearly 6 billion human inhabitants are not 
engaged directly in war today and won’t be directly impacted by it. The same 
is true most days. 
  Now for the caveats. The “war is not a cultural universal” statement 
smacks more than a little of a disciplinary hammer used to beat down the 
naïve—and simplistic—notions of the uninitiated. At a session of the recent 
American Anthropological Association meetings in Chicago (2003), I heard 
one veteran anthropologist comment on the classroom technique of asking 
students to name cultural universals. 
  “Invariably, one of the first thing students name is war.” 
  Judging both from the knowing smiles of those in attendance and the 
delight with which the colleague in question explained the ritual disabusing of 
this supposedly ethnocentric idea, I whiffed (not for the first time) the peculiar 
scent of consensual (if parochial) delusion. As I had previously identified 
myself as interested in the anthropology of war (it was a small session, 
wherein people introduced themselves), the facilitator asked me how I would 
respond to a student who thought war might be a cultural universal. 
  I am rather embarrassed to admit that, rather than make a pot-stirring 
stink, I mumbled something about the matter being complex, and that 
universality is a tricky proposition. Not, of course, that a contrary claim would  
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be true in some unambiguous sense—rather I suspect that anthropologists, 
like people everywhere, can benefit from a few jousts on their paradigms..  
  In fact, to circle metaphorically back to evolutionary theory, I rather think 
there is a pretty analogy between the role a few paradigmatic statements of 
the “war is not a cultural universal” type play for anthropology as a discipline 
and the role played by the supposed textbook sequences of phyletic 
gradualism
12—they are striking in the classroom, but not necessarily 
congruent with either fact or truth (Gould 2002, 760).  
  Obviously, to make any meaningful statements about war, peace and 
cultural universality, we would need appropriate definitions of all of these. With 
such in place, I would be somewhat comfortable with either of the following 
statements: 
 (1)  the  capacity to take part in war is latent in the vast majority of 
human individuals and the vast majority of human cultures have either been 
impacted by or participated in war in important ways. 
  (2) the vast majority of human individuals are peaceful most of the time 
and the importance and frequency of war varies from culture to culture and 
time to time. 
  A further question has to do with the role of warfare in the original 
moment and development of various social institutions and behaviors. I 
suspect that it is an important and somewhat paradoxical role. The origins of 
many types of cooperative behavior—including the classic selective puzzle of 
human altruism—may in fact be closely linked to so-called competitive 
cooperation (though I make no claims as to the exclusivity of this factor). 
Ethnologist Frans de Waal makes a good case for such origins based both on 
                                                 
12 The slow, smooth and imperceptible evolution of one taxon into another.  
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primatological research and the logic of what factors would be necessary for 
the evolution of such characteristics by the mechanism of natural selection (de 
Waal 1994, 29–34). 
 
War Itself 
  Before trying to take the argument any further I will provide a definition 
of what I mean by war and a context for thinking about what I refer to as the 
war system. Social scientists have proposed several possible definitions, 
which for my purposes can be divided between the behavioral and the 
complex (i.e. those involving both behavioral and structural considerations).  
  Behavioral definitions of war, such as those favored by Ember (1978) 
and adopted by Goldstein (2001) have the virtue of simplicity and inclusivity, 
but may fail to discriminate between phenomena that become important in an 
evolutionary consideration of the coevolution of warfare and society (Kelly 
2000, 3). Aware of at least some of the issues, Goldstein defines war as “lethal 
intergroup violence” and goes on to explain: 
 
If members of a small gathering-hunting society go out in an 
organized group to kill members of another community, I call 
that war. Indeed, warfare worldwide in recent years seldom 
has taken the form of pitched battles between state armies. 
A very broad definition such as “organized violence” has 
advantages, and still excludes individual acts of violence that 
are not sanctioned and organized. However, “organized 
violence” is not quite specific enough, since it would include, 
for example, the death penalty. The difference is that wars 
occur between groups (Goldstein 2001, 3). 
 
But even specifying that wars occur between groups, does not do enough to 
distinguish war from certain types of capital punishment or unplanned, but 
lethal, skirmishes.  
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  Raymond Kelly does a good job of setting out an operational definition 
of war that distinguishes it from similar instances of lethal violence using 
logical criteria that turn out to coincide with social-structural considerations. He 
writes, 
 
  The boundary between war (including feud) and other 
similar phenomena such as collective execution can thus be 
very precisely specified in terms of the presence or absence 
of a calculus of substitutability. The emergence of this 
calculus and its companion concepts is clearly a watershed 
event in human history in that it creates the preconditions for 
a more general deployment of lethal violence as an 
instrument of the social group and a legitimate means for the 
attainment of group objectives and interests (Kelly 2000, 7). 
 
That is, instances of war (including blood feud) have a great deal in common 
with capital punishment and differentiating the one from the other becomes a 
matter of particular interest with respect to the origins of war and the 
delineation of warless, verses completely non-violent, societies. 
  The problem with the purely behavioral definition, even one as carefully 
drawn as Goldstein’s, can be shown by ethnographic example. The Gebusia, 
as described in the ethnographic record (Knauft 1985, 16–31), are a group 
numbering some 450 persons who reside in small communities (average=27) 
in the south-central portion of Papua New Guinea. Living in the lowland 
tropical rain forest, in the Strickland River watershed, they are horticulturalists 
and hunters who rely economically on the shifting cultivation of bananas as a 
staple crop, supplemented by hunting, foraging for wild plant foods, and 
processing wild sago palms. 
  Many instances of lethal violence among the Gebusi are the result of 
attribution of lethal sorcery (Knauft 1985, 113–56). When someone falls ill the 
cause is typically considered to be sorcery and the malefactor is identified by  
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divination involving a spirit medium. The sorcerer is subsequently beseeched 
to withdraw his lethal sorcery so that the victim can recover. If the sick person 
dies, this is interpreted as a failure of the sorcerer to discontinue his sorcery. 
After  death the Gebusi equivalent of an inquest is held. If the identity of the 
sorcerer is confirmed by divination the kin of the deceased have a social 
warrant to pursue the death penalty—a warrant that they may or may not carry 
out. 
  In any case, the crucial points are these. If there is sufficient consensus 
on the part of the deceased kin to seek the accused sorcerer’s death (56 of 
the 211 cases in Knauft sample, 1985, 124–25), then these kin enact the 
sentence collectively. The executioners form themselves together, take up 
weapons, make a plan, and pursue the death of the sorcerer. To this extent 
the act resembles a raid or retaliation in a blood feud. However, the crucial 
difference is that if the aggrieved kin are unable to reach the specific individual 
accused, they may under no circumstances seek to kill another member of his 
group instead. There is no substitutability of individuals. There is an 
understanding that what is happening is the socially sanctioned punishment of 
a crime, i.e. capital punishment, carried out by a group that ostensibly looks 
like a raiding party. This understanding extends to the accused sorcerer’s kin. 
In some cases, when they are convinced of their kinsman’s guilt, they may 
actively collude in his execution. In the majority of cases they do not 
cooperative with the execution, but also do not pose violent resistance to it. 
Finally, and crucially, they do not retaliate (Knauft 1985, 123). This point is 
critical, because among gathering-hunting groups described in the 
ethnographic record, when warfare exists at all, its most typical manifestation 
is feud, where one group seeks indiscriminate revenge against another group  
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for a previous killing (Dickson 1990, 166; Otterbein 1968, 279).
13  
  The criteria of substitutability thus becomes crucial in the differentiation 
of war from episodes of collectively enforced capital punishment which might, 
on purely behavioral grounds, look very similar. This differentiation is important 
because it allows the differentiation between warless societies, which on these 
criteria exist in the ethnographic record and may in fact correspond to the 
circumstances which obtained in human pre-history, and societies which are 
uniformly peaceful, lacking both homicide and capital punishment, which do 
not exist in the known ethnographic sample. 
  In Kelly’s definition of collective lethal violence, violence can be 
importantly differentiated—externally, from non-collective lethal violence 
(homicide) and internally, between war and capital punishment, on seven 
relevant criteria: (1) collectivity, (2) group sanction, (3) considered morally 
justifiable by participants, (4) group esteem for participants, (5) organization 
and premeditation, (6) identifiable instrumental objectives, and (7) social 
substitutability. The only point of internal differentiation is on the last point, 
substitutability, and thus it is at the point where one individual can be 
substituted for another—which corresponds to a notion of collective guilt, 
collective injury, and collective responsibility—that one sort of social violence 
(war), differs from another (capital punishment) (Kelly 2000, 7) 
 
The War System  
  Kelly’s definition of war is subtle and powerful and it allows him propose 
an interesting theoretical framework for the coevolution of war and society 
                                                 
13 The account of Gebusi group execution provided above is largely derived from Kelly’s 
account (Kelly 2000, 7– 9).  
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(see below). War, however, is not easily isolated to forces inside of a society 
and my interest lies primarily in the phenomena of warfare over time involving 
forces both intrinsic and extrinsic to particular societies—in other words, war 
as a system. 
  Goldstein writes, “I define the war system as the interrelated ways that 
societies organize themselves to participate in potential and actual wars. In 
this perspective, war is less a series of events than a system with continuity 
through time” (2001, 3). The continuity of the war system is crucial to its 
definition. In the war system lethal conflict is not simply that which occurs 
when groups meet by chance. Rather, the war system is characterized by 
preparations for future wars grounded in memories of past ones. The war 
system relies upon a sharp distinction between insiders and outsiders and 
treats all outsiders as, at the least, potential enemies. The war system is far 
more than the armed forces. It includes economic production, institutions that 
support war and war preparation, and, most important of all, the social 
production—through training, education and indoctrination—of human beings 
able and willing to fight wars. In certain circumstances, and as a useful 
shorthand, such people can be referred to as soldiers. 
  War and the war system can be thought of as a kind of “contingent” 
hierarchy. The war system itself has three levels: 
 I.  Individuals 
 II.  Group/Society 
 III.  Global 
Each level can be further parsed, for example, Level I as soldiers and non-
soldiers (or as combatants and non-combatants, an important distinction); 
Level II as a range of societies from the most warlike to the most peaceful; and  
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Level III as they system as a whole changes through time, expanding to 
include more groups and/or shrinking to include fewer. The hierarchy itself is 
contingent to the extent that at any one point in time each of the constituent 
units at the two lower levels may or may not be actually at war and each such 
constituent (individual or society) is more-or-less imbricated in the global 
system. 
 
The (Possible) Origin of War 
  In considering the historical origin of war there are several types of 
evidence that we can consider: archeological, ethological and ethnographic. 
Of the three types of evidence, the archeological record is the most direct and 
for that reason most be given preferential weight. However, for reasons 
intrinsic to the discipline—and shared with other disciplines that deal primarily 
with the physical remains of prehistoric periods—archeology gives an 
incomplete view. The argument runs like this: because only a fraction of all 
artifacts of material culture (and human remains) are preserved, and only a 
fraction of those preserved have been found, any argument made from the 
evidence that has been found is suspect in that it only represents a fraction of 
a fraction and not a representative fraction at that. In other words archeology 
exists under the aegis of negative evidence, or that which has not (yet) been 
found. 
  The smaller the selection of evidence that has been dug up by 
archeologists, particularly when from a geographically restricted range, the 
more suspect any generalizations. So, for example, if the Upper Paleolithic 
period (35,000 – 10,000 BP) shows little or no evidence of war, there are a 
number of possible explanations for this: (1) warfare was uncommon or non- 
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existent during this period, (2) warfare is difficult to induce from the sorts of 
evidence available, (3) the extant finds are insufficient to draw any general 
conclusions. And, of course, the explanations are not mutually exclusive.  
  Note that explanations of the last type have the peculiar feature of 
irrefutability, in that someone can always propose the need for more evidence 
on the supposition that such evidence will contradict that which is available. 
Such a position certainly has its place when available evidence consists of a 
bare handful of examples or examples from a restricted geographic range, but 
becomes a rather obvious case of special pleading as evidence accumulates.  
  The primary reason for such special pleading, of course, is 
misalignment with some extant theory. Thus if war is presumed to be primal, 
with deep roots in the human past, then finding evidence of such would 
perforce be central to the archeological enterprise. If war is presumed to be of 
relatively recent origins, however, this would accord with the lack of 
archeological evidence for war between 35,000 and 10,000 B.P. The actual 
case is that theories of both types—recent and primal origins of war—exist 
and the archeological evidence is mixed. On the one hand, Keely (1996) has 
argued that there has been a systematic “pacification of the past” by social 
scientists who have discounted evidence of lethal violence in the archeological 
record. On the other hand, Kelly (2000) argues, that although “lethal violence” 
is common enough in the archeological record, there is no such unambiguous 
evidence for war, as defined above, before the late Paleolithic.
14 Moreover, 
                                                 
14 The earliest known conclusive evidence for war, as opposed to other types of lethal 
violence, is from a Nubian cemetery (site 117) near what is now the town of Jebel Sahaba in 
the Sudan. The site dates to between 12,000 and 14,000 B.P. and the evidence consists of a 
number of grave with multiple internments and the presence of multiple stone projectile points 
imbedded in each skeleton and/or the presence of such points inside the skeletons. The 
combination of multiple deaths occurring within a short amount of time and the presence of the 
skeletal evidence of violence is highly indicative of warfare. By contrast, either factor in  
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based on a review of the evidence presented by Ferguson (1997), Kelly 
concludes that objection two, that the existent archeological evidence is 
ambivalent, seems to only apply to evidence pre-dating about 10,000 B.P., 
suggesting that the supposed difficulty of interpretation is an artifact of the 
absence of war—but not the absence of lethal violence. 
  In order to evaluate the likelihood of Kelly’s conclusions we need to turn 
to the other types of evidence available, the ethological and the ethnological. 
With respect to the former—evidence based on contemporary observation of 
closely related phyla, especially the great apes—there are two things that can 
be said definitively. 
  First, the potential for lethal violence in species closest to humans in 
evolutionary distance—chimpanzees—is well documented (de Waal 1996, 38, 
194). Though chimps are not evolutionary ancestors to homo sapiens, the fact 
that lethal violence exists in all known human societies (Otterbein 1986) and in 
many species of primates with lineages older than the divergence of 
hominoids (apes and hominids), strongly suggests that the common ancestor 
of hominoids had such potential. 
  Second, lethal violence between groups of chimps is also now well 
documented, and in fact seems to be more common in the wild than individual 
and intragroup lethal violence (de Waal 1996, 194). “Wild male chimpanzees, 
for example, may take over a neighboring territory by systematically killing off 
the males of the other community” (de Waal 1996, 30). Primatologists have 
observed lethal raids that include an element of strategy, to the extent that 
such lethal intergroup violence always seems to occurs when an isolated 
                                                                                                                                              
isolation—either a single individual grave showing signs of death by violence or a mass grave 
showing no such signs—might or might not be evidence of warfare (Kelly 2000, 148–151; 
Wendorf 1968, 993).  
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individual male or male and female is encountered in a border zone by a larger 
group of at least three males. The larger group attacks with relative impunity 
and in none of the observed instances were any of the attackers seriously 
injured (Goodall 1986, 522–34; Pusey 2001, 8–12, Manson and Wrangham 
1991, 369–71). 
  Thus the evidence for origins of a potential for lethal violence—as well 
as many forms of peaceful cooperation and reconciliation (de Waal and van 
Roosmalen 1979, 62)—suggests a pre-hominid origin. War, however, is a 
somewhat different question. An ancient origin for “intergroup violence” is not 
necessarily equivalent to war, particularly when both social substitution and 
systemic factors are considered. Again, lethal intergroup violence observed in 
chimpanzees is behaviorally very similar to war but seems to differ in crucial 
dimensions—at least with respect to those systemic characteristics in which I 
am most interested. 
  A combination of the ethological and the archeological data thus tends 
to confirm ancient origins for lethal violence, including lethal violence with 
some collective component, but leaves war per se as an open question. Here I 
will, following Kelly, turn to the ethnological data in hopes of finding some 
clarification. 
  Even as archeological data suffers from intrinsic difficulties associated 
with permanent incompleteness, and ethological evidence from problems of 
defining criteria for analogical appropriateness, so ethnological analogies are 
fraught with their own difficulties.
15 The classic objection to reasoning from 
                                                 
15 The appropriateness of analogies between apes and humans rests on the proposition of 
closeness in evolutionary terms as measured in both genetic similarity and temporal proximity 
of divergence. Yet all such analogies must contend with the reality that contemporary apes are 
not ancestral to contemporary humans. In fact all of the recent evolutionary ancestors of apes 
and humans are extinct and the hominoid group is an exceptionally small, side-branch on the  
 
57
extant cultures backward to conditions in the human past is the primativist 
fallacy. That is, the presumption that contemporary cultures of a particular 
type, typically those described as “hunter-gatherers” (or gatherer-hunters, in 
the ordering by caloric importance schema), can stand in for pre-historic 
cultures in evolutionary comparisons. The well-known objections to such 
primitivism are twofold. First, very few if any of such cultures can be 
considered “pristine” even when they are first encountered by colonial officials, 
missionaries and ethnographers. In most cases such cultures had centuries, 
or even millennia, of contact of some sort with neighboring pastoral and 
agricultural communities. Second, and more fundamentally, contemporary 
gatherer-hunters are not Paleolithic. The presumption that their way of doing 
things and thinking about the world—their cultures—are unchanged over tens 
of thousands of years is impossible to test and in many cases made unlikely 
by shifting climates and well-established migration patterns. 
  In spite of these objections, and with them firmly in mind, Kelly makes a 
fairly convincing case for using particular types of ethnographic evidence, in 
combination with the archeological evidence, in considering the origins of war. 
It would be redundant for me to rehearse the details of his argument here—
and beyond the scope of my current project—but I will give a short outline 
followed by some explication. 
  (1) Most extant studies of peaceful societies make two 
counterproductive moves: (a) They establish utopian standards for what they 
                                                                                                                                              
evolutionary tree. The historical path from apes to humans (or vice versa) is V-shaped, leading 
back to a common ancestor in the primate family, and then forward again through various 
branchings to contemporary species. The genetic distance is slight, but the expressive 
differences are open to interpretation—including the possibility that ape “cultures” are different 
not just in quantity but in type from human cultures.  
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mean by “peaceful” societies; (b) They identify societies by economic type 
(gathering-hunting, agricultural) instead of social organization. 
  (2) Use of ethnographic data to draw conclusions about the past should 
depend on characteristics that societies of a certain type have in common and 
that are logically consistent and in accord with the archeological record. 
  (3) Relevant traits must be defined in ways that are useful for 
evolutionary reasoning—thus behavioral homology is not enough to establish 
a good definition, in the same way that defining monarch butterflies and robins 
as “flying creatures with orange patterning” is true but irrelevant from the point 
of view of evolutionary classification.
16 
  With respect to the first point, Kelly notes the tendency to look either at 
a highly sorted sample of the “usual suspects”—e.g. the !Kung, Semai, Mbuti, 
Siriono and Copper Eskimo (Fabbro 1978)—of “peaceful” gathering-hunting 
societies, if the investigator is primarily interested in peace, or to take a 
broader sample of gathering-hunting societies and thereby demonstrate that 
such societies are not, in fact, particular peaceful (Ember 1978), if the 
investigator is interested in war. These two tendencies correspond to 
subpoints (a) and (b) above.  
  In the (a) situation are studies like those of Fabbro (1978) which fail to 
discriminate between peaceful societies and warless ones. Thus Fabbro sets 
out criteria for peacefulness that include not only a lack of internal or external 
wars, but a lack of significant interpersonal violence and a lack of structural 
violence (oppression). Not surprisingly, no actually-existing societies live up to 
                                                 
16 Taxonomy has historically been one of the most contentious subjects in biology. Two 
principles, homology and descent have been employed, with the latter taking precedence 
since the ascent of evolutionary theory. However, actual classification, especially of fossil 
species which may be known by a single preserved shell or tooth, remains a vexatious 
process as decent can be very difficult to establish from the paleontological evidence.  
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these rather utopian expectations, leading Fabbro both to relax his criteria and 
to limit his sample to a small group of societies that, at least from available 
ethnographic evidence, are relatively peaceful by his criteria. 
  It is worth noting that an important reason for Fabbro’s criteria is the 
presumption that types of violence strongly impact each other across levels. 
Thus it is often presumed, for example, that authoritarian forms of child-rearing 
will correlate with interpersonal violence, that interpersonal violence will 
correlate—“lead to” is the usual formulation—war. This, however, does not 
seem to be the case. Kelly writes: 
 
  The striking conclusion suggested by the comparative 
ethnographic data Fabbro assembles is that societies 
lacking war are not necessarily nonviolent in other ways and 
consequently not invariably “peaceful” in this extended 
sense of the term. Thus societies initially selected on the 
grounds that they were warless may fail to entirely fulfill the 
additional criterion of “little or no interpersonal violence.” 
While this point runs counter to Fabbro’s expectations and is 
downplayed, it emerges quite clearly from his data. They do 
not show that there is a strong pattern of covariation 
between one form of violence and another…. One can 
conclude that the attainment of societal peace in the form of 
an absence of war is not contingent upon an absence of 
other forms of physical violence. Achieving utopian levels of 
human perfection is fortunately not a prerequisite for peace 
(Kelly 2000, 19). 
 
Kelly does a thorough review of the ethnographies of each of the groups 
described by Fabbro to back up his conclusion. His main point is that the 
utopian construction of “peaceful” societies is not very useful in looking at the 
ethnographic evidence concerning war and warlessness because peaceful 
societies of the utopian type don’t exist and war does not co-vary with other 
types of lethal violence—suggesting it is hierarchically distinct. 
  In type (b) cases, the very existence of warless societies is thrown into  
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doubt by the twin mechanisms of an over-encompassing definition of war and 
the selection of gathering-hunting groups as the type that is supposedly 
warless. Carol Ember’s work is the classic in this genre. In a 1978 Ethnology 
article, appropriately titled “Myths about Hunter-Gatherers,” she reviews a 
sample of thirty-one gathering-hunting societies which had no reliance on 
either agriculture or herding. Her conclusion is that “64 percent had warfare 
occurring at least once every two years, 20 percent had warfare somewhat 
less often, and only 10 percent … were rated as having rare or no warfare” 
(Ember 1978, 443, as cited in Kelly 2000, 2).  
  If only 10 percent of gathering-hunting societies in fact engage in 
warfare rarely or not at all, this is not exactly a ringing endorsement for the 
warlessness of the group. Of course 10 percent is not nothing, and leaves 
some wiggle room for discussion. The fact that such a small percentage of all 
gathering-hunting societies are warless, and many of these consist of only a 
few hundred individuals in any case, leaves plenty of room for recasting such 
societies as anomalies or interpretive mistakes. Worse still, many of these 
societies had homicide rates that were in fact higher than those found in state 
societies. Put another way, the low percentage of warless societies in the 
sample, combined with the high tendency to non-war types of violence, 
suggests that there is no causal relationship between the gathering-hunting 
mode of subsistence and warlessness. Without identifying a commonality 
among the warless societies, it is difficult to suggest any grounds for 
generalizations. 
  What Kelly points out, and demonstrates through a rigorous re-
examination of the source data used in various studies, is that the warless 
societies observed do have something in common that differentiates them  
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from all other societies, including other gathering-hunting societies. It is social 
organization and not mode of subsistence which is the factor that covaries with 
war. In short, all of the warless societies were of the unsegmented type. All 
societies, of course, have some degree of organization, but those designated 
as “unsegmented” have the minimum level of such organization. Local groups 
of coresidents are the highest level of organization, even though a sense of 
shared language and culture extends beyond the group. Though the specific 
type of family is not specified, families typically form semi-detachable units. 
These units, by definition, have no character equivalent to a lineage or other 
perduring element that extends beyond the length of a marriage (Kelly 2000, 
44). 
  Amongst unsegmented gatherer-hunters, as analyzed by Kelly, the vast 
majority are warless (although not peaceful in the extended sense of lacking in 
lethal violence). Also, even for those rare unsegmented gathering-hunting 
groups where war has been documented, the wars in question seem to fall 
into one of two clearly identifiable categories: either the unsegmented group is 
attacked by a segmented neighbor, or, and this is of particular interest, cases 
where a group of unsegmented societies meets the very specific criteria of 
cohabitation in a geographically isolated location (e.g. an island) with 
predictable and usually plentiful resources and a relatively high population 
density.
17  
                                                 
17 Population density amongst gatherer-hunters, whether segmented or unsegmented, is 
generally quite low, often as low as 0.2 per square-mile (e.g. Semang, Copper Eskimo, !Kung, 
Ingalik, Gilyak, Gros Ventre, Eyak, Saulteaux, Comanche, Chiricahua, Shavante, and 
Aweikoma). But population density does not vary independently with frequency of warfare. 
Segmented gatherer-hunters living at this extremely low density (e.g. the Shavante and 
Aweikoma) are observed to have both internal and external warfare as often as once per year. 
High density in this class means above the 0.2 per square-mile threshold, with densities above 
5 per square-mile being extremely rare (Kelly 2000, 72), e.g. 1 in 25 of the groups considered 
by Kelly.  
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  The point here is that the ethnographic evidence concerning war 
supports the proposition that gathering-hunting groups of the unsegmented 
type are warless except under very specific circumstances. However extant 
unsegmented gathering-hunting groups may differ from human groups in the 
Upper Paleolithic, such prehistoric human groups would nonetheless likely 
share the key trait of unsegmented social structure centered on local 
coresidents. Even minding the danger of inappropriate backwards analogy, 
this seems a reasonable assumption, uncontroversial in the anthropological 
literature. Further, assuming the initial absence of segmented societies, it 
seems likely that the point of origin for warfare would be precisely those 
situations where resources were concentrated and relatively predictable, 
geography was somehow circumscribed, and population density high. 
  Whatever the truth of this particular construction, the general picture of 
warless contemporary unsegmented societies, combined with the lack of 
archeological evidence for war (as opposed to homicide) in the archeological 
record before about 10,000 B.P., suggests the origins of war as a wide-spread 
system is relatively recent and co-emergent with the development of 
agriculture, pastoralism and segmented social structures.  
  While I generally agree with Kelly’s conclusions concerning the likely 
recent origins of war and find his definitions plausible, I nonetheless want to 
emphasize that his assertion that war is not a cultural universal has far more 
power when viewed as a statement about the long term, than the present. The 
group of societies which he uses to elaborate his theoretical claims—
unsegmented gatherer-hunters—may have the relevant criteria of internal 
consistency and geographic distribution to make his claims plausible. They 
nonetheless constitute only a tiny portion of extant societies and an even tinier  
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portion of extant population. Moreover, today such groups tend to exist only in 
the most geographically isolated and inhospitable environments, where they 
have either been pushed by competition with more complex societies, or 
where such societies have not bothered to go, largely because of the low 
population densities supportable in such regions. The conclusion, then, is that 
war is not a cultural universal in an absolute sense, but it does seem to be 
ubiquitous with respect to societies above a certain level of social complexity 
over the last 10,000 years. The ethnographic counter-examples, in effect, 
consistently represent societies that have never developed the level of social 
complexity necessary to engage in effective warfare. For my purposes the 
most interesting thing about such societies is that if my assumptions about the 
link between warfare and certain styles of masculinity are correct, then this 
small group of societies that are not part of the war system as it has developed 
since Neolithic times should show gendering patterns that differ significantly 
from societies (the vast majority) which are part of this system.  
 
Masculinity: Origins and Variation 
  Perhaps even more so than the human propensity for war, sex and 
gender have been front and center in the nature vs. nurture debate. Even the 
development of the two concepts—sex and gender—where until recently one 
sufficed, reflects this tension. Nor is the division into two concepts in English 
usage a straightforward one. Whereas it may seem simple enough—and it is 
certainly common enough in and outside of the academy—to attribute 
whatever is of “nature” to sex and of “culture” to gender, such a division is 
misleading both historically and existentially. 
  Historically, the word sex enters English from the Latin secus or sexus,  
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meaning section—thus the male or female section of humanity. It does not 
become common, however, until the late sixteenth century when it begins to 
be associated more specifically with women, as in “the gentle sex” (from the 
late sixteenth century), “the weaker sex” and “the fairer sex” (respectively from 
the early- and mid-seventeenth century) and simply “the sex” from the 
sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries. The now common use of sex in 
reference to erotic behavior is more recent and seems to have been 
promulgated in medical and biological writing from the late eighteenth century. 
The full span of contemporary connotations, where the “active-eros” meaning 
all but overwhelms the “section of humanity” meaning any place but on an 
application form, does not obtain until the early part of the twentieth century 
(Williams 1983, 283–86). 
  For my purposes, the interesting thing about this history is that the term 
gender, formerly used almost exclusively as a grammatical term, enters 
English with the feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s, at least as much 
to differentiate the division of humans into women and men from sexual acts 
(and the panoply of connotations that accrued to sex over the course of the 
twentieth century), as to distinguish biological from cultural components of the 
sectioning of humanity (Williams 1983, 285). 
  So, from the historical perspective, the origins of the use of the term 
gender—with its proper grammatical associations—instead of sex was at least 
in part an effort to flee not so much from the bodily and physical, but from the 
active sense of sex, as in sexual behaviors. Thus the notion, common among 
progressives, that the distinction between sex and gender is somehow 
politically useful in the cause of justice—i.e., that by separating biology from 
culture we can at last get at the important cultural determinants, with biology  
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shoved safely out of the way—has to be considered in the context of this 
historical urge to distance from sexuality. 
  The problem with the distinction between sex and gender, however, 
goes much deeper than a tangled historical origin. My main point is that the 
uncritical use of the two terms to designate differences attributable to biology 
from differences attributable to culture does not so much bridge the supposed 
divide between nature and nurture, as cement it in place. In the process three 
sets of supposed binary divisions are reinforced: the difference between men 
and women as cultural subjects, between males and females as biological 
organisms, and between biology and culture as agents of determination.  Each 
of these divisions are forcibly mapped onto a single plane of differentiation. 
 
Nature vs. Nurture: Hierarchy, Process, Feedback and Emergence 
  Even the proposition that both culture and biology are responsible for 
observable differences between types of people remains counterintuitive to 
most people, or at least most Americans. A 1998 Washington Post poll, for 
example, asked men and women: “What do you think is the main reason for 
any differences there might be between men and women? Is it mainly because 
of the way men and women are brought up, or are the differences part of their 
biological makeup?” (Morin and Rosenfeld 1998, A17). 
  The question is obviously weighted towards the selection of a single 
factor. Still, about 10 percent of those answering volunteered “both.” Of the 
remaining 90 percent of the sample, men split evenly between a preference for 
biology verses upbringing.  Women answered two-to-one in favor of 
upbringing as the most likely explanation for differences between men and 
women.  
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  The question, however, was even more weighted than the failure of 
offering a “both” option. The relationship between biology and “upbringing” is 
not a simple matter of addition. First, biology is a mask for a plenitude of 
processes. There are several pertinent levels of structure and process 
between the gene and the organism, including proteins, biochemistry, cells, 
anatomy and physiology. Moreover, there are biological entities above the 
level of the organism as well, including the biological population and the 
species. Populations, of course, exist in the context of ecosystems which 
include other biota, and in environments that include non-biological elements. 
Similarly with “upbringing” (or “nurture” or “culture”), which is a stand-in for a 
broader set of factors including individual experience, social context and, 
again, the larger environment. 
  The nominal duality of biology/culture conceals a hierarchical 
multiplicity. This multiplicity, what is more, is no simple hierarchy of 
encompassing types. Unlike in abstract logical systems, wherein discreet 
levels of analysis can be defined, in biological systems—and in cultural ones—
such divisions are misleading. The key difference between abstract systems 
and biological ones is the element of temporality—and the possibility of 
change it affords. Thus in applying the theory of logical types to “levels” of 
biological existence, it is important to recognize that the various levels are not 
related by convention, but rather by processes. 
 The  movement from genes to proteins to cells to anatomy to physiology 
to neurons to neurological processes to consciousness to communication to 
culture and beyond entails a series of interlocking processes. Genes are built 
from strands of DNA. Proteins are synthesized and built up through the 
interaction of genes with the organismic environment. Proteins unfold various  
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ways that lead to anatomical differentiation, under the influence of 
biochemistry (also produced through gene-environment interaction). Moving 
up the hierarchical levels there is an intervention of processes that connect 
one with the next. In Bateson’s words, 
 
when we take the notion of logical typing out of the field of 
abstract logic and start to map real biological events onto 
the hierarchies of this paradigm, we shall immediately 
encounter the fact that in the world of mental and 
biological systems, the hierarchy is not only a list of 
classes, classes of classes, and classes of classes of 
classes but has also become a zigzag ladder of dialectic 
between form and process (Bateson 2002, 182, emphasis 
in original). 
 
Thus form—equivalent to a hierarchical level—can be seen as mediated by 
processes that that produce forms, that communicate with processes, that in 
interaction with the appropriate environments produce forms and so on. Yet 
even at this level of conceptual complexity, the surface of modeling actual 
biological and cultural systems has been only scratched. At the least, having 
disaggregated culture and biology into a multiplicity of levels, and then pointed 
out that such systems are characterized not by static levels but by 
interconnected processes, with outputs of one set of processes becoming 
inputs for the next, one still requires the concept of multidirectional feedback. 
  Feedback is, in essence, a fairly simple concept. Bateson illustrates it 
with the idea of a system surrounding thermostatic control of temperature in a 
dwelling. At the lowest level of this system is ambient temperature, which 
varies over time. As it changes from moment to moment (a process), it affects 
a thermometer, which registers changes in temperature in a way that is 
reflected in physical changes in a switch. This switch makes or breaks an 
electrical connection if the temperature goes below or above a set point. When  
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the temperature goes up, the connection is broken, and the furnace is turned 
off. When it goes down, the thermostatic switch reflects this change as well, 
reestablishing the electrical contact, turning the furnace back on, causing the 
temperature to rise. The result is the oscillation of the temperature around a 
mean. The actual change in temperature is feedback, of a particular level, to 
the thermostatic control module. 
  Temperature, however, is not the only possible feedback to the 
thermostat. A person who for whatever combination of reasons feels too cold 
in the dwelling in question, could change the set point of the thermostat. This 
too is feedback, which then becomes part of the system. The person in turn 
makes his decision to change the setting (a process), based on his personal 
discomfort threshold (similar to the set point in the thermostat, but controlled 
by the perceptions of the man instead of a thermometer). This threshold will 
vary over time for the same person (or from person to person in a population) 
based on a combination of training and experience, (a process), as well as 
factors like humidity that alter the experience of temperature, which becomes 
feedback to the threshold. The person’s training and experience, in turn, 
depend on factors such as his socioeconomic status, place of origin, etc. Thus 
disparate levels or types of feedback have a feedback on the system as a 
whole (Bateson 2002, 184). 
  A fairly simple biological example of feedback between social 
environment and sex/gender comes from the wrasse fish. Wrasse males 
compete for territories that include several sub-territories occupied by females, 
with the females ranked in the fishy equivalent of a social hierarchy. If the 
territory-holding male dies, and no other male quickly claims the territory, then 
the dominant female in the territory changes, within a day, into a fully  
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functioning male and claims the territory (Caspari 1978, 104, cited in Goldstein 
2001, 130). However complex the underlying mechanisms for the change from 
female to male, the presence or absence of a dominant male is 
social/environmental feedback that at least in the case of the wrasse fish can 
result in a change of “state” from female to male. 
  Taken together the factors outlined above—hierarchical multiplicity, 
process and feedback—serve to complicate any simple combination of biology 
and culture, much less a simple division. There is, however, another important 
consideration. Namely, human culture—which in this context I am using as a 
shorthand for non-genetic information/communication—is an emergent 
property. 
   Emergence, as discussed above, is a property of a system as it moves 
through time and space. Just as walls + floor + roof + doors does not makes a 
house, but a house only results when these elements are placed (which takes 
time) in a particular arrangement, culture is a non-additive outcome of the 
interaction of humans over time. A house, or rather the building of a house, is 
a terminal process. It has fairly definitive start and end points, and yet still 
emerges from the process. In more complex systems, and especially in multi-
level/multi-process, self-replicating systems, emergent traits are continuously 
generated. What is more, in many cases it is traits emergent from one level/set 
of processes that interacts with traits emergent from another level—and these 
various processes can, over time, become so entangled one with the other, or 
may in fact emerge so entangled, that disentanglement requires theoretical 
violence.  
As Geertz puts it his influential essay on the coevolution of culture, 
mind and brain:  
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…there is no such thing as a human nature independent of 
culture. Men without culture would not be the clever savages 
of Golding’s Lord of the Flies thrown back upon the cruel 
wisdom of their animal instincts; nor would they be the 
nature’s noblemen of Enlightenment primitivism or even, as 
classical anthropological theory would imply, intrinsically 
talented apes who had somehow failed to find themselves. 
They would be unworkable monstrosities with very few 
useful instincts, fewer recognizable sentiments, and no 
intellect: mental basket cases. As our central nervous 
system—and most particularly its crowning curse and glory, 
the neocortex—grew up in great part in interaction with 
culture, it is incapable of directing our behavior or organizing 
our experience without the guidance provided by systems of 
significant symbols (Geertz  1973b, 49). 
 
“Monstrosities” may in some ways even be generous. A human monster, after-
all, is still human. An individual human without culture is thus a “monster” in 
the sense of an unformed or deformed human. But if neurological functioning, 
consciousness and culture are all three the emergent properties they seem to 
be, and if they have been formed, over evolutionary time, through a tangle of 
processes of types A, B and C that feed back on each other in complex loops, 
then homo sapiens itself seems unlikely in the extreme minus this complex of 
emergent feedback processes. A hominid species lacking culture would not be 
Homo sapiens, for culture is as much woven into the evolutionary texture of 
the species as bipedal locomotion and live birth. 
 
Biological Gender and Cultural Sex 
  The discussion of nature and nurture presented above provides a 
backdrop for a more specific discussion of the perils involved in attempting to 
separate sex from gender, most profoundly because sex and gender are not 
an aggregation. Splitting the one from the other is not a matter of simply 
saying the difference between men-males and women-females is X percent  
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cultural and Y percent biological. At least in theory heritability might be 
reduced to a weighting of percentages of this type, but since an average 
heritability would tell us almost nothing about the array of specific traits that we 
are typically interested in when we talk about differences, even that project is 
of limited utility, particularly when it comes to characteristics such as 
rationality, aggression, perceptiveness, self-discipline, dominance, 
submission, nurturance—the stuff of behavioral sex/gender (stereo)typing—
and particularly if notions of heritability are mapped onto a default either/or 
map. 
  I want, however, to spend some time considering why sex continues to 
seem (to most people) such a given. When it comes to our intuitions about sex 
and gender—as indicated in the Washington Post poll referenced above—
there remains a curious, embarrassingly simple truth that much of the high-
flown academic and feminist discourse seems designed to circumvent: 
Namely, there are males and there are females and they are biologically 
different. Science critic Anne Fausto-Sterling puts it like this: 
 
In the current intellectual fashion, men are made, not 
born. We construct masculinity through social discourse, 
that array of happenings that covers everything from 
music videos, poetry, and rap lyrics to sports, beer 
commercials, and psychotherapy. But underlying all of this 
clever carpentry is the sneaking suspicion that one must 
start with a  blueprint—or, to stretch the metaphor yet a bit 
more, that buildings must have foundations. Within the 
soul of even the most die-hard constructionist lurks a 
doubt. It is called the body (Fausto-Sterling 1995, 127–
28).  
 
In contrast, she explains, medical men and biological scientists (and she could  
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add sociobiologists to the list), have no such doubts. “For them, the body tells 
the truth” (Fausto-Sterling 1995, 128). 
  However, the truth about male and female bodies—and bodily 
capacities—is not so simple. Medical certainty arises, Fausto-Sterling argues, 
not through induction from irrefutable evidence, but from categorization, 
appeal to normative expectation, and, in a pinch, surgical intervention. 
Categorization is itself derivative of the study of variation in human 
populations. Through the study of such variation, outliers are identified and a 
norm, in the statistical sense, established. The statistical sense of a normal 
variation, however, refers to degree of predictability around a mean. In the 
case of human gender, it is conflated with “normal” in the sense of within the 
realm of the acceptable. “Thus we have a profound irony. Biologists and 
physicians use natural biological variation to define normality. Armed with this 
description, they set out to eliminate the natural variation that gave them their 
definitions in the first place” (Fausto-Sterling 1995, 128). 
  One of the most influential voices in the setting of sex assignment 
norms of the last quarter century is psychologist John Money. Among other 
things, Money developed a schematic road map of the journey to the 
acquisition of sex and gender (in the aforementioned biology vs. culture 
sense). In Money’s version—still reproduced in new medical textbooks at least 
into the mid-1990s—the journey to sex/gender determination must pass ten 
significant road marks: 
  (1) chromosomal sex, the presence of an XX or XY chromosome set; 
  (2) gonadal sex, instructions coded in the appropriate chromosome, X 
or Y, signal the undifferentiated fetal gonads to develop into either testes or 
ovaries;  
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  (3) fetal hormonal sex, meaning the production of differing proportions 
of certain hormones, particularly testosterone in males-to-be and estrogen and 
progesterone in females-to-be, produced by the now differentiated gonads, 
and influencing later stages, especially 4, 5, and 6; 
  (4) internal morphological sex, meaning the development of internal sex 
organs; 
  (5) external morphological sex, meaning the development of external 
sex organs; 
  (6) brain sex, meaning the exposure of the brain to differentiated 
proportions of the aforementioned sex hormones; 
  (7) sex of assignment and rearing, meaning the decision by doctors and 
parents regarding whether the new born is either male or female and 
subsequent childrearing based on that assignment; 
  (8) pubertal hormonal sex, meaning the increase in the production of 
sex hormones that results in further morphological differentiation, particularly 
secondary sex traits; 
  (9) identity/role, meaning the acquisition of sense of self as man/woman 
and acceptance in roles culturally determined as appropriate thereto; and 
  (10) procreative sex, meaning the successful ability to engage in sexual 
intercourse resulting in impregnation.
18 
  Even at a glance, an obvious feature of this “road-map” to sex/gender 
acquisition is its complexity—particularly given that the road-map metaphor is 
intended to indicate that things can go wrong at any stage of the process, 
resulting in individuals of ambiguous sex or gender. A second interesting point 
                                                 
18 This account is adapted from Fausto-Sterling’s summary of Money’s schema (Fausto-
Sterling 1995, 129).  
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is the interface between the biological and the cultural, particularly in step 7, 
where sex assignment must be made based on some criteria. 
  Money is in some ways a radical constructivist, arguing that with 
respect to gender it is socialization that really matters—regardless of the real 
biological sex of a person. In fact his belief in this was so strong that not only 
did he advocate the surgical alteration of babies with ambivalent external 
sexual traits—intersexuals in the emergent emic language—he was involved 
in the rather infamous case of the sex reassignment surgery of a three year 
old boy whose penis was amputated in a horribly bungled circumcision.
19 
Despite his cultural determinism of what he calls “gender mapping” (Money 
1995), including both culturally assigned sex roles and gender personalities, 
his schema retains an almost manic duality. He presupposes a necessary 
sorting of humans into either male or female categories. 
  Evidence of a strong version of this dualistic imperative is visible not 
just in Money’s theories, but in the criteria by which medical managers advise 
physicians to proceed when they encounter newborns of “ambivalent” 
anatomical sex: 
 
Genetic females should always be raised as females, 
preserving reproductive potential, regardless of how 
severely the patients are virilized. In the genetic male, 
however, the gender of assignment is based on the 
infant’s anatomy, predominantly the size of the phallus 
(Donahue, Powell and Lee 1991, 527 quoted in Fausto-
Sterling 1995, 130).
20 
 
                                                 
19 This sensational case came to light when the subject of the operation, who had been raised 
as a girl after the sex reassignment surgery, came forward almost thirty years after the fact. 
After 14 years living as a girl, he (now) went back to living as a man. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/science/horizon /2000/boyturnedgirl.shtml as of January 28, 2004. 
20 Note that because “genetic females” should always be brought up as females (presumably 
meaning to be women), does not mean that surgical intervention isn’t practiced. Rather the 
“virilized” “genetic female” is typically subjected to the excision of “excess” genital anatomy.   
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That is, a genetic male born with a penis below a certain size (0.6 inches, 
where the average birth size is between 1 and 1.5 inches) is subjected to 
penile amputation along with the surgical construction of a vagina and the 
admonition to parents to raise “he” as a “she” (Danish et al. 1980). 
  I raise the case of intersex individuals to point up the cultural 
component of sex assignment: so strong is the presumption that people 
should be definitively marked as either male or female, that actually-existing 
variation is subject to surgical intervention in order to create categorical 
conformity. Also, I wish to note that extreme constructivism, as in Money’s 
case, is not in the least incompatible with either strong presumptions 
concerning underlying biological sex or strong gendered division of people into 
women or men. 
  Here we meet with our by-now familiar friend, the confusion of logical 
types. The physicians’ confidence in bodily truth—and the doubts of 
constructivists—come back to a failure to differentiate between map and 
mapped. Blithe confidence in “genetic sex” is grounded—as blithe confidence 
always should be—in a tautology: genetic sex of the individual equals that 
portion of the individual’s sex that is genetically determined. The fact of some 
part of the genetic code corresponding with some set of biological processes 
(within a variety of expressive possibilities depending on environment and 
other factors not well understood) defined as having to do with sex, isn’t 
controversial. It is, however, a completely different type of process than the 
assignment of category. 
  Another way to say this is that the distinction between sex and gender 
(biology and culture) is of a different logical type than the distinction between 
male and female. Above I discussed the difficulties involved in untangling  
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biology and culture in humans, of the complex interlock and multidirectional 
feedback between them, but this entanglement does not mean that biology 
unexists. The question is not is there such a thing as a biological basis for sex, 
but what do differences that arise from biological sex mean? 
  Here the possibilities for logical confusion multiply. As it turns out, 
conceptualizing and measuring difference is fraught with difficulties. In the first 
place, we have to decide what to measure. Even Money’s highly schematic 
and simplified ten-fold path to the acquisition of adequate sex/gender should 
give some idea as to the problems involved. We might, for example, 
interrogate each of his ten steps—and I promise not to—with respect to 
discovering important differences, embedded processes and relationships. 
Even at the presumably cut-and-dried level of chromosomal sex, important 
complexities arise that are the merest snowflake in a blizzard compared to 
those that accrue within the entire system of biocultural evolution and 
individual development. 
  In humans, genetic material is distributed along 23 pairs of 
chromosomes (chimps and gorillas have 24 pairs) which are tube-like 
structures made of proteins and DNA. The DNA is the genetic material, itself 
made up of a pair of chains of acidic sugar-phosphate chains linked together 
by four base pairs (nucleotides), adenine, cytosine, guanine and thymine, 
generally abbreviated A, C, G and T. These four chemicals are arranged such 
that molecules of adenine (A) can only bond with cytosine (C). Likewise, 
guanine (G) can only bond with thymine (T). Thus the construction of the DNA 
molecule is accomplished by the predictable linking of the appropriate base 
pairs, A to C and G to T. This matching structure is what makes DNA, in the 
appropriate environment, a self-replicating molecule, because the base pairs,  
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linked by weak hydrogen bonds, come apart in the middle and reassemble 
predictably. The genes themselves, about 30,000 in humans by the latest 
count (Gould 2001), are in the form of strands of base pairs of differing 
length.
21 Various arrangements of base pairs—arranged in triplets—code for 
20 amino acids, which are the actual material from with proteins are formed. 
  Humans inherit half of their 46 total chromosomes (23 pairs) from each 
of their parents, 22 of which are matching in “type,” (meaning they are of the 
same shape but contain differing DNA chains) and are conventionally referred 
to by numbers 1 through 22. The remaining two chromosomes are referred to 
as X and Y, and contain the genetic information that leads to sex 
differentiation. In most cases human beings have either two X chromosomes 
(XX) or an X and a Y (XY). The Y chromosome seems to contain only one 
gene of importance (Breedlove 1992, 40–41), which apparently codes for only 
one protein, referred to as testis determination factor (TDF). This protein in 
turn impacts the other processes of sex differentiation outlined in Money’s 
schema, largely through the differential release of hormones. In the presence 
of the TDF protein, switched on by the gene on a Y chromosome, an embryo 
develops into a male; in its absence, a female. Hence, what is meant by 
chromosomal sex is a categorization into either XX for females or XY for 
males. 
  The reason for this highly simplified review of human genetics is that 
even at this level, where the usual expectation really is only one of two 
                                                 
21 The discovery that the number of genes in humans is only about 30,000 surprised most 
investigators. Earlier estimates were for 100,000 or more. The low number of genes struck a 
particular blow to certain forms of reductionism, as it means that “secondary” and “tertiary” 
processes—protein folding, genes acting in combination, random fixation, emergent 
properties, etc.—become more important in the biological construction of a human being than 
was previously hoped by some investigators.  
 
78
possibilities—XX or XY—the matter is not so simple. As with so much else in 
the world of biological and cultural systems, the usual situation does not 
always obtain. Relatively rare, but still well-documented, situations occur of 
human beings with a different combination—XXX, XXY, XYY and X0 (meaning 
only one X). Thus even at the level of chromosomal sex, a simple split into two 
types is not possible without reference to factors from other levels and 
processes. Even the categorization of chromosomal type has a broader range 
than either XX or XY. 
  The variation in possibilities with respect to chromosomal sex only 
increase as we move through the various levels/processes. For example at the 
fetal sex stage (level 3) a condition called androgen insensitivity—a lack of 
responsiveness to the presence of hormones associated with the development 
of male phenotypes—leads to type XY individuals with female phenotypes. 
Chromosomal sex then differs from internal sex, external sex and most likely 
sex of assignment. 
  These examples may seem as if I am only pointing out that the usual 
classificatory system runs into some problems in some relatively rare cases. 
These “extreme” examples, however, are only the tip of the morphological 
iceberg. So far I have been dealing with—or treating characteristics as if they 
were—discreet variables. 
  A variable is a mathematical concept, usually represented by some 
symbol such as X, Y, p or q which can assume any of a prescribed set of 
values, called the domain of the variable. Variables come in three types: 
constant, continuous and discreet.   
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  Constant variables can assume only one value, that is they don’t vary at 
all or can be held constant or considered constant for practical purposes in 
describing the real world as opposed to theoretical systems.  
  Continuous variables can theoretically assume any value between 
minimum and maximum potentials. Such variables are usually characterized 
by measurements, which are only ever approximate representations of some 
point along a continuum. An example is the height. An individual of height X 
can be 58 inches tall, or 61.5 inches tall, or 63.045867978187873 inches tall.  
  Discreet variables, by contrast, are characterized by distinct numbers 
between minimum and maximum points. Thus the number Y of children in a 
family may be 0, 1, 2, 3, … 26, etc., but it cannot be 1.333 or 6.47298. The 
number of possible variations can be large or small, as in the number of cells 
in the body of a particular human at a particular time or number of possible 
results in the flip of a coin. 
  In biological terms, traits that are characterized by discrete variables 
are referred to as polymorphisms. A polymorphism is characterized by 
qualitative difference—a particular possible trait is either present or absent. 
The familiar genetic example of hemoglobin type serves as an example. 
Hemoglobin is a blood protein that carries oxygen. Hemoglobin comes 
primarily in two types, classified as A and S.
22 The S type hemoglobin, present 
in 25% - 30% of the population in parts of West and Central Africa, South India 
and the Arabian Peninsula, can result in a condition known as sickle-cell 
anemia. However, most people with hemoglobin S don’t in fact suffer from 
anemia, since they also have hemoglobin A, having inherited a different type 
                                                 
22 There are, in fact, over 300 known hemoglobin variants, but the vast majority of these are 
known from only a single individual or one family (Lewontin 1995, 29). The larger number of 
variants does not, however, affect the basic point.  
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from each of parent, which, incidentally to this story, offers a degree of 
resistance to a particularly deadly form of malaria common in the same 
regions.  
  The point, of course, is that you either have S type hemoglobin or you 
do not. There are people who have both type A and type S, but the two 
chemically distinct types are just that. Polymorphisms of this type are 
qualitatively different from each other, characterized by presence or absence. 
They are fundamentally different from traits characterized by continuous 
variation such as height, weight, metabolic rate, form and most types of 
behavior.  
  In spite of the difference between continuous variables and discrete 
ones, there are a number of intellectual tricks, part heuristic device, part self-
delusion, by which continuous variation can be characterized as discrete. 
Chief among these are aggregation, normalization and categorization. 
  Aggregation as used here is the process of combining some set of 
variables, in whatever mixture, as a single unit. So, for example, IQ tests claim 
to measure something called general intelligence, which is—in the definition of 
the tests—an aggregate of various sub-types of intelligence (mathematical, 
logical, spatial, verbal, etc.). The sub-types of intelligence are measured by 
separate tests and the various results are combined using statistical 
techniques to derive a single numeric value, referred to as IQ. Although IQ 
tests use a relatively sophisticated type of aggregation, even so the 
aggregation in question still obliterates the underlying variables—variables that 
vary independently of one another. 
  Normalization is the process of examining continuous variation in a 
given population and identifying a range of normality. In statistical terms  
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normality refers to symmetrical variation around a mean, most commonly 
defined in terms of standard deviations. This means in a normal distribution 
(graphed in the familiar form of a bell curve), 68.27% of all cases fit within plus 
or minus one standard deviation of the mean; 95.45% of all cases within plus 
or minus two standard deviations, and 99.73% of all cases within plus or 
minus three standard deviations. Thus most cases fit within plus or minus two 
standard deviations of a mean, and almost all within three standard deviations. 
Various sorting and sampling techniques and mathematical procedures can be 
used to tweak results that may be disproportionately weighted toward rare or 
unusual cases because of a small sample size. This can be referred to as 
normalization. Beyond statistics, what I mean by normalization is setting a 
threshold beyond which observable variation is simply disregarded (as in 
normally males have an XY chromosome pattern and females have an XX) or 
recategorized. 
  Categorization, as I use it here, refers specifically to the process of 
aggregation and/or normalization plus sorting and labeling. Thus in the case of 
IQ tests persons could be described as “below average” or “above average” 
with the average depending on the population tested. The meaning of “above 
normal” and “below normal” in this context, however, is detached from the 
statistical sense of the mean, and refers to below some defined range of 
scores presumed to match normal functioning. The aggregated IQ score 
becomes a grounds for categorization, which has in the not so distant past 
been further broken down into a rising scale of categories from idiot, through 
imbecile and moron before reaching the ranks of the normal.
23 Variables that 
                                                 
23 These were all once terms of psychological import, even if they have become mere epithets 
and stock-joke characters. For a history of I.Q. testing and its uses to define “mental 
defectives” for eugenic and other purposes see Gould 1981, 188–95.  
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vary independently are first smothered in the aggregated I.Q., normality is 
defined in terms of this aggregate, and then further divisions are made, 
creating categories. These categories conceal the fact that the statement “he 
has type S hemoglobin” is not of the same logical type as “he is an idiot” (in 
the usage of circa 1920 American I.Q. testers). One is a statement about the 
presence of a discrete polymorphism; the other is an operationally defined 
portion of a scale of an aggregate, derivative value that has been normalized 
in a particular way. 
  In terms of sex/gender there are multiple processes—hundreds?, 
thousands?—spanning all of the steps (and many others) in Money’s schema. 
Most of these processes eventuate in traits that exhibit continuous variation. 
Many of these continuously varying traits exhibit only minimal covariance and 
in some cases none at all. This becomes particularly true when we move to 
behavioral traits of interest in considering the relationship of sex/gender to a 
particular activity, such as war. For though there are traits, the ability to 
gestate, for example, that can be described as possessed only by women 
(though, of course, not everyone conventionally classified as a woman has this 
ability), most traits exhibit continuous variation and vary independently. 
  This means, for example, that for height—a continuous variable—a 
population of humans shows a bi-modal distribution, meaning that heights will 
tend to cluster around two different points, which in turn correspond to 
categories we call women and men, with the mean height for men higher than 
the mean height for women. Thus if we graph women and men separately, 
under two different curves, the result is two normal curves (for height) that 
overlap significantly (see Figure 1.1 below). Thus though a man who happens 
to be close to the average height for all males will be taller than a woman  
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close to the average height for women, a tall woman is taller than an average 
man, and a short man is shorter than an average woman. 
  The same pattern of overlapping curves—although by no means always 
normal curves—can be see with most traits. Some overlap only at the very 
extremes. For example, both men and women produce testosterone, but at 
least in the case of adults, the amount produced by men is, on average, many 
times higher and the two curves hardly overlap at all. On many other 
measures—e.g. lower body strength, spatial computation, average speed over 
distance on foot, verbal ability, body weight, hand-eye coordination—the 
curves overlap significantly, sometimes favoring women, sometimes men. In 
some cases, of course, “favors” can only be defined contextually. A taller 
person has a potential advantage as a high jumper or in certain kinds of melee 
combat where reach is important; a shorter person has a potential advantage 
as an equestrian or in the cockpit of a jet aircraft. 
  The case, then, is that sex/gender is characterized by (1) overlapping 
curves, (2) continuous variables that do not necessarily sort neatly into two 
and only two categories, (3) the intertwining and emergent character of many 
 A    B
     C 
Women Men
Figure 1.1 – Distribution of Height by Sex/Gender  
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characteristics. Taken together I see this as a case where the analytically 
useful thing to do is to disaggregate traits and sets of traits from the 
sex/gender rubric and consider them independently with respect to whatever 
phenomena is under investigation. In other words, I’m making a case for 
thinking about biological gender—that is the biological contributions to 
phenomena usually thought of as cultural—and cultural sex, or the cultural 
contributions to what is usually thought of as sex. Or, better still, toward the 
recognition that in the case of many, many traits and sets of traits there is a 
strong sex/gender mapping, but that the actually observed variation means 
that even when a biological component to the variation pattern exists, the 
phenomena cannot be explained fully in biological terms—and vice versa. 
 
The Masculine Continuum and Soldierly Qualities 
  Though I have spent some time discussing sex/gender in generic 
terms, this study is primarily interested in masculinity. Masculinity, of course, is 
neither sex nor gender, but a term connoting some set of traits that men ought 
to have. I say ought to, because in many cultures—those in which masculinity 
is considered important—masculinity is something that must be acquired and 
demonstrated. Phenotypic “maleness” may or may not be a prerequisite to the 
acquisition of masculine traits, but the acquisition of the appropriate traits is 
often considered necessary in order to become a real man.  
  In David Gilmore’s Manhood in the Making (1990) he surveys 
masculine values from cultures around the world. He finds that on such 
common areas as the relative importance of sex, marriage, procreation, 
provisioning, protecting, public performance, audacity and generosity there 
exists a great deal of variation. In some cultures, e.g. Andalusian Spain,  
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performative excellence is the key masculine value (Gilmore 1990). In others, 
it might be some combination of carousing and physicality as a young man, 
followed by responsible and efficacious family life as a mature adult, as 
amongst the Mechinaku of Central Brazil (Gregor 1977). An examination of the 
ethnographic record reveals a great deal of such variation with respect to the 
many roles that a man might be expected to play under certain conditions. In 
some cultures, men harvest crops, and it is important to his masculinity that he 
do so. In other cultures, harvesting crops is considered women’s work, to be 
avoided by men. In some cultures men and women both participate in certain 
activities, say tending children or fishing, in others these are exclusive to one 
or the other. 
  This observed diversity of sex/gender roles, then, is consistent with the 
picture of the biocultural constitution of sex/gender and the complex and often 
independent variation of particular traits, subject even to reversed assignment 
from men to women and women to men. There is, however, a set of practices 
and traits associated with masculinity, which do not exhibit the same degree of 
variation as other gendered traits. The most common of these are toughness, 
self-discipline, bravery and duty—these are the masculine traits associated 
with fighting war. 
  This most common set of masculine traits—what I gloss as soldierly 
masculinity—is specifically inculcated and encouraged through a broad class 
of rites of passage, public ritual and ongoing informal testing and competition. 
Not all warlike societies use all of these modes to produce soldierly 
masculinity, but the use of one or more is extremely common—for the 
additional cross-cultural commonality is that manhood must be earned, trained 
and constantly proven.   
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  Gilmore hangs his interpretation of masculine commonality on neo-
Freudian psychoanalysis (Gilmore 1990, 26 –27). I think neo-Freudian ideas 
have a place, but I don’t think they can explain this most wide-spread set of 
masculine characteristics and the differing types of rites and testing associated 
with the making of real men. Simply put, neo-Freudian theory relies on the 
male experience of separating from the mother as a common developmental 
trauma. This trauma is supposedly derivative of the difficulty of forming a 
sex/gender identity different from that of the mother, while at the same time 
establishing an autonomous identity as someone separate (Erikson 1985; 
Mahler et al. 1975; Rochlin 1980; Stoller and Herdt 1982, Winnicott 1968). Yet 
all men have mothers from whom they separate, but there are cultures where 
men are not expected to acquire soldierly traits. In fact, soldierly masculinity is 
found precisely in that majority of cultures that participate in the war system. 
Moreover, those cultures relatively lacking in soldierly masculinity are precisely 
the kind of unsegmented, foraging groups shown by Kelly (2000) to be 
relatively warless, including the two outliers in Gilmore’s sample, the Semai 
and the Tahitians (Gilmore 1990, 201 – 219). 
 
Making Men: Rites, Rituals and Soldiers 
 
  The most important attributes for soldiers are not physical strength and 
ferocity, but bravery and discipline, both of which require a highly developed 
ability to suppress and channel emotion.  
 
What war requires of fighters is not blood-lust or activation of 
murderous impulses. Rather, war requires men to willingly 
undergo an extremely painful, unpleasant experience—and 
to hang in there over time despite every instinct to flee. the  
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basic requirements for being a soldier, furthermore, tend to 
be the same everywhere. As General Sir John Hackett put it: 
‘Whether he was handling a slingshot weapon on Hadrian’s 
Wall or whether he’s in a main battle tank today, he is 
essentially the same” (Goldstein 2002, 266; Dyer 1985, 4). 
 
These most characteristic soldierly qualities correspond to the emphases upon 
toughening and hardening found in manly rituals and manly expectations. 
  Any number of examples, drawn from diverse and geographically 
separated cultures could be given (Gilmore 1990, 13-14), but I will offer three, 
one from Ethiopia, one from nineteen century Germany, and one from 
personal experience. 
  My first example comes from the Amhara, a Semitic-speaking tribe of 
agriculturalists residing in Ethiopia. For this group the crucial aspects of 
masculinity are described by the concept of wand-nat, which includes physical 
courage, stoic endurance, and undauntability  (Levine 1966, 18, as quoted in 
Gilmore 1990, 13). As Gilmore explains, in order to prove their wand-nat, 
Amhara youth engage in whipping contests called buhe (Reminick 1982, 32). 
Gilmore’s description is as follows: 
 
During the whipping ceremonies, in which all able-bodied 
male adolescents must participate for their reputation’s sake, 
the air is filled with the cracking of whips. Faces are 
lacerated, ears torn open, and red and bleeding welts 
appear (Reminick 1982, 33). Any sign of weakness is 
greeted with taunts and mockery. As if this were not enough, 
adolescent Amhara boys are wont to prove their virility by 
scarring their arms with red-hot embers (Levine 1966, 19; 
Gilmore 1990, 13). 
 
  On the one hand, the example is exotic and titillating, allowing us the 
conceit of  “horrified” voyeuristic pleasure at the excesses of a people who is 
clearly Other. On the other hand, I am struck at just how familiar even this  
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“exotic” example of manhood-proving test really is. Young men in the Chicago 
neighborhood where I lived after my return from Berlin bear scars and boast of 
self-inflicted cigarette burns on their forearms.  
  Norbert Elias’s descriptions of Germany’s late nineteenth century 
dueling fraternities also jump to mind, in particular the Bestimmungsmensur 
(fencing match by appointment). In these “matches,” fraternity members were 
assigned to a highly ritualized “fight” with someone from a rival fraternity. Each 
member was required to fence a certain number of matches each semester 
during which he was closely monitored. He was forced to schedule a rematch 
if it was decided that he had violated the strict rules of the matches in any way. 
  The set of expectations for these matches, particularly after 1871 (see 
chapter 2 for the role of dueling in the late nineteen century German 
bourgeoisie), were extremely rigid, designed to demonstrate courage and self-
control in the face of pain, not skill or athletic ability. “The caps which had 
protected the head were done away with, stances which would help to parry 
the opponent’s thrusts were restricted. Students selected by their fraternities to 
participate in a fencing match by appointment had to return every thrust, but 
were allowed to move only hand and arm in doing so” (Elias 1996, 100). In 
other word, rather than the athletic contest we currently think of as the sport of 
fencing, these matches were about inflicting punishment and testing discipline. 
 
It was a popular joke to get one of the beginners to bring a 
live chicken to the fencing ground. It was needed, he was 
told, so that its flesh could be used to replace the cut-off tips 
of noses. The rapiers with which the duels by appointment 
were fought were essentially designed to cut through the 
skin of the face and skull and the blood vessels lying below 
the surface. Only the eyes were protected. One could injure 
one’s opponent with a single blow so that the skin of the 
head hung down in great shreds. One could split one’s nose 
and lips so that, for the time being, one could no longer  
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speak; cut ears might hang down, and blood flow in streams 
from the veins in the temples (Elias 1996, 107). 
 
Crucially, and similarly to the Amhara and other cases, “anyone who revealed 
himself as weak counted for nothing,” (107) and “anyone who did not satisfy 
these strict rules was thrown out” (99). Facial scars received in these duels 
were highly prized in later life, worn as a badge of honor. Nor was the dueling 
in these fraternities limited to marginal individuals. They included both social 
elites and intellectuals like Max Weber, who fought many duels as a student. 
  The social contexts of the examples above are very different. The basic 
project of manhood-testing, and the precise characteristics most valued, are 
nearly identical. Of course, very similar results can be obtained—in terms of 
testing and training for courage and toughness—with different methods. In my 
own memory, growing up in rural western Oregon, I never fought unflinching 
bloody duels or whipped my peers. I was, however, subjected to various 
“toughening” rituals. I recall, for example, a football practice drill from late 
elementary school (approximately age 13–14 ), called the “meat grinder.” In 
this drill, mandated by the most authoritarian and most respected of the 
coaches, a single player would set himself a few yards from a line comprised 
of every other player. One by one the others would run at the set man full 
speed and delivery a “hit” (a body block in the parlance of American football). I 
was a relatively big, strong and skilled player in this context, but after the first 
several repetitions, I became dizzy. After twenty to thirty it was difficult to 
stand. Though blood was rare and mostly from nosebleeds, everyone who 
participated in these drills left covered with garish bruises, clearly visible in the 
locker room post-practice. 
  I also remember a more “peer inflicted” form of toughness testing  
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similar to the Amhara burning themselves with hot coals and the Chicago 
youths with cigarettes. It was a “game,” popular among grade school boys 
from about age ten to fourteen, called “Man or Mouse.” In Man or Mouse, the 
“player” was expected to sit still and show no sign of weakness while another 
boy rubbed his thumbnail vigorously across the back of his hand. Though this 
may not sound particularly onerous, in fact the thumbnail would very quickly 
scrape away the outer layers of skin and create a wound akin to a rug burn or, 
in extreme cases, an asphalt scrape. Many of my classmates incurred 
permanent scars in this manner—some of the scrapes, not surprisingly, 
resulted in severe infections. The point of the game, of course, was to hold out 
as long as possible without saying “mouse.” In my own case, though I never 
objected to or refused to participate in the “supervised” meat-grinder football 
drills, I declined to participate in Man or Mouse and vividly recall the hot rush 
of shame associated with being a “wussy,” even while thinking that the “game” 
was unquestionably one of the stupidest I had ever encountered. 
  Examples of manhood tests could be multiplied almost indefinitely, 
though the examples listed above are fairly typical. The tests do not always 
involve simulated combat or direct competition. Toughening tests and training 
include, but are not limited to, adolescent circumcision, ritual torture, and acts 
of physical daring such as diving without equipment in shark-infested waters 
(Gilmore 1990, 12-14; Goldstein 2002, 264). In hunting cultures, the solo kill of 
a large game animal is often required to qualify as a real man, as in the case 
of the !Kung San (Gilmore 1990, 15). In a small but non-trivial number of 
societies, military training and toughening is followed by the requirement that 
an aspirant actually kill someone in order to prove his manhood (Ulman and 
Brothers 1988, 155).  
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  The ubiquitous outcome—or at least the desired outcome—of all of 
these rites, tests and modes of training is a physical and emotional toughening 
of boys (some would say, a deformation) that prepares them to fight in wars, to 
be potential soldiers.  
 
The Sex/Gender System 
Masculinity, however, is not a simple precipitate of rites and rituals. It 
exists in a sociocultural context and even those aspects that are the most 
ubiquitous are still part of a larger cultural system. In fact, though the link 
between what I call soldierly masculinity and war is fairly clear, it is important, I 
think, to consider the context of sex/gender within which such masculinity is 
created. For this purpose, I will turn to Gayle Rubin’s idea of a sex-gender 
system and the production of human beings of specific sex/gender. 
  Rubin’s 1975 essay, “The Traffic in Women,” is still one of the most 
productive pieces of analysis regarding sex/gender roles and the gendered 
division of labor. She opens it with a bold pronouncement: “The literature on 
women—both feminist and anti-feminist—is a long rumination on the question 
of the nature and genesis of women’s oppression and social subordination” 
(157). This strikes me as obviously true and extremely important. I also think 
this focus forms part of a conundrum that tends to obscure the question of 
gendered injustice.  
  Consider: Non-feminist and pre-feminist writing, research and other 
cultural products tend to take sex/gender as a given. Even when sex/gender is 
addressed—as in the fin-de-siecle “crisis of masculinity”—it is usually done so 
from a proscriptive position: thou shalt not fail in thy manliness. Feminist (and 
as Rubin points out, anti-feminist) analysis focuses on the origins of  
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subordination. Is it nature? Is it culture? The potential problem is not, as 
certain post-structuralist /post-modernist analyses would have it, that feminist 
critique of gender oppression buys into “male” categories and modes of power. 
The problem, as I see it, is that the various suggested points of origin for 
gender oppression fail to posit a plausible cause or complex of causes. For if 
we say that women have less access to economic resources and political 
power, though this is a statement of fact, it does not speak to the question of 
why. And if we ground our answer to this question in a male conspiracy to 
disempower women, that simply pushes the question back a step.  
  A crude version of the male conspiracy theory (Patriarchy with a capital 
P) features the proposition that men are “naturally” oppressive, aggressive, 
domineering, etc., or at least more so than women. These traits give men an 
advantage in a supposed battle of the sexes which they use to gain a one-up 
position, mutually supporting each other against any challenge from the 
gendered Other. More nuanced versions of the theory might include some 
element of “maternal instinct” leading women to be disadvantaged by child-
rearing duties, smaller, weaker bodies, or a “natural” tendency toward 
pacifism.  
  The vast majority of analyses of gender oppression either try to 
circumvent questions concerning the reasons why the particular division of 
labor exists—as in attempts to apply Marxian analyses to gender—or to let 
these questions of origin evaporate into an indeterminate fog and try to 
address issues of gender injustice through cultural engineering—even though 
such inequalities are presumed, though this is never quite stated, to be in 
some part biologically based.  
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Mode of Production and the Production of Sex/Gender 
  The goal of Rubin’s essay is to suggest the outline of a theory of 
sex/gender with a degree of explanatory power similar to that of Marx’s theory 
of capital/wage labor. Of course if gender oppression is already accounted for 
in the theory of capital, or more generally is a reflection of whatever mode of 
(economic) production is in use, then the a new theory of sex/gender 
production would be redundant. Hence the first part of her paper is taken up 
with a demonstration of where Marxian analysis has failed to account for 
sex/gender. 
  Her explanation of capital and relations of production under capitalism 
is exemplary and worth repeating here both for its elegance and also to set the 
stage for a critique. She writes, 
 
Marx argued that capitalism is distinguished from all other 
modes of production by its unique aim: the creation and 
expansion of capital. Whereas other modes of production 
might find their purpose in making useful things to satisfy 
human needs, or in producing a surplus for a ruling nobility, 
or in producing to insure sufficient sacrifice for the edification 
of the gods, capitalism produces capital. Capitalism is a set 
of social relations—forms of property, and so forth—in which 
production takes the form of turning money, things, and 
people into capital. And capital is a quantity of goods or 
money which, when exchanged for labor, reproduces and 
augments itself by extracting unpaid labor, or surplus value, 
from labor and into itself (161). 
 
That is, in Marx’s definition, capitalism is a set of relationships between 
people, whereby the very terms of the relationships produce the expansion of 
capital. Capital, then, is a means for extracting surplus value. 
  The terminology here is confusing. After all, what can it mean for value 
to be surplus? Isn’t value, by definition, that which everyone always wants, as  
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much as they can get? Rubin’s gloss is exemplary: 
 
The exchange between capital and labor which produces 
surplus value, and hence capital, is highly specific. The 
worker gets a wage; the capitalist gets the things the worker 
has made during his or her time of employment. If the total 
value of the things the worker has made exceeds the value 
of his or her wage, the aim of capitalism has been achieved. 
The capitalist gets back the cost of the wage, plus an 
increment—surplus value (161). 
 
The only change I would suggest is to make the exchange between capitalists 
and laborers instead of “capital” and “labor”. The convention by which the 
same word, “capital,” stands for both the abstract opposite of labor and the 
ultimate product of capitalist relations of production is confusing even in 
German, a highly inflected language, and positively obscure in English. There 
is nothing intrinsically wrong in using a shorthand in which capitalism is said to 
do this or require that so long as we understand that social systems do not act 
on their own behalf; they are made up of people and emerge from the actions 
of people, capitalists and laborers. 
  The creation of surplus value in capitalist systems is possible because 
wages are not tied to the value of the things workers make, but by the value of 
what it takes to reproduce the worker. Reproduction here is tricky. In its 
simplest form it mean the ability to sustain the worker at a level that allows him 
or her to continue to work. Thus it includes such things as food, shelter, 
adequate rest and whatever pleasures or enjoyments are necessary to bring 
him or her back to work.
24 In general, the less it costs to reproduce a worker—
                                                 
24 Considered from the point of view of capital, that is the system of production and 
reproduction, it does not matter who does the work, so it is not necessary that a specific 
worker be reproduced at all. Hence if there are enough workers available able to do the work 
in question, wages need not even pay for minimal reproduction—literal starvation wages. In 
this sense, if divorced from other considerations (which it never is), capitalism is completely 
amoral. The only limitation on literally working people to death is the availability of more  
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i.e. bring him or her back to work the next day—the lower his or her wages 
and the more surplus value can be extracted. 
  Here is where many attempts to bring sex/gender into the theory of 
capitalist relations of production come in. The argument goes like this: the 
bedrock cost of reproducing a specific worker is determined by the cost in 
commodities—food, clothes, shelter, etc.—that it takes to keep him or her 
working. These commodities, however, are not purchased in an immediately 
or continuously usable form. These commodities require additional labor in 
order to reproduce workers who are fit to work: food has to be shopped for, 
prepared and cooked; clothes have to washed and mended; living spaces 
have to be cleaned and cared for. In short, housework, typically the work of 
women, contributes significantly to the reproduction of workers, and thus 
amounts to unpaid labor which increases the amount of surplus value which 
can be extracted from the system.  
  All of this is rather obviously true, if too often neglected as a social 
reality, “but to explain women’s usefulness to capitalism is one thing. To argue 
that this usefulness explains the genesis of the oppression of women is quite 
another” (Rubin 1975, 163). It seems unlikely that all of human history was 
simply the prologue to capitalism with women predestined to play a particular 
role in augmenting the increment of surplus value. However valid the critique 
of the role of women in capitalism might be, it does not explain the origins of 
the oppression of women. 
  While acknowledging the power of marxian analysis in understanding 
class relations and explaining certain aspects of women’s oppression in the 
context of capitalist societies, Rubin suggests that an alternative mode of 
                                                                                                                                              
workers able and “willing” to do the work.  
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analysis is needed to explain the origins of sex/gender and the specific forms 
of social relations characterized by historical forms of sex and gender. This 
she calls a sex/gender system and proposes its derivation from against-the-
grain readings of Freud and Levi-Strauss. 
 
Structuralism, Psychoanalysis and Kinship 
  At the intersection of Freud and Levi-Strauss lies the family, family 
relations and what anthropologists refer to as kinship. Freud’s innovation is the 
location of the development of the individual psyche in the context of the family 
where he finds various problems and conflicts that center on the attainment of 
a functioning adult sexuality. Such functionality is presumptively heterosexual 
and divided by sex/gender, different for men and women. Levi-Strauss deals 
with many of the same themes addressed by Freud—particularly the incest 
taboo—and is interested in the origins of culture and social cooperation. 
Though neither man explicitly addresses the issue of gendered oppression, 
Rubin sees it as imminent in their writings. “In reading through these works, 
one begins to have a sense of a systematic social apparatus which takes up 
females as raw materials and fashions domesticated women as products” 
(Rubin 1975, 158). 
  In Rubin’s reading of Levi-Strauss, the origins of the incest taboo in the 
exchange of women is the key point. “Since the existence of incest taboos is 
universal,” writes Rubin, glossing Levi-Strauss with her usual clarity, “but the 
content of their prohibitions variable, they cannot be explained as having the 
aim of preventing the occurrence of genetically close matings” (1975, 173). 
The factual diversity of whom is forbidden as a sexual partner logically 
eliminates genetic hygiene as the only reason for such prohibitions— 
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particularly since many such prohibitions exist between persons who are 
closely related by classification and not by genes. “Rather, the incest taboo 
imposes the social aim of exogamy and alliance upon the biological events of 
sex and procreation” (Rubin 1975, 173). “The prohibition on the sexual use of 
a daughter or sister compels them to be given in marriage to another man, and 
at the same time it establishes a right to the daughter or sister of this other 
man…. The woman whom one does not take is, for that very reason, offered 
up” (Levi-Straus 1969, 51).  
  And again, put slightly differently, he explains, “The prohibition of incest 
is less a rule prohibiting marriage with the mother, sister, or daughter, than a 
rule obliging the mother, sister, or daughter to be given to others. It is the 
supreme rule of the gift…” (Levi-Strauss 1969, 481, quoted in Rubin 1975, 
173). 
  That is, incest prohibitions are about creating networks of social 
relationships by giving women as gifts. As gifts, however, women are unique, 
because gift-women facilitate other exchanges (bride price, dowry) and help to 
make durable relations. Levi-Strauss quotes an Arapesh man as 
representative: 
 
What, would you like to marry your sister? What is the matter 
with you? Don’t you want a brother-in-law? Don’t you realize 
that if you marry another man’s sister and another man 
marries your sister, you will have at least two brothers-in-
law, while if you marry your own sister you will have none? 
With whom will you hunt, with whom will you garden, whom 
will you go visit?” (Levis-Strauss 1969, 485). 
 
The basic point being that affines are useful and that only the incest taboo 
would insure their acquisition. Thus the exchange of women grounds social 
order, or at least social organization broader than relatively small family units.  
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It also implies a certain type of social order. “As long as the relations specify 
that men exchange women, it is men who are the beneficiaries of the product 
of such exchanges…” (Rubin 1975, 174). 
  As with Marx, there is a good bit of interpretive power in Levi-Strauss—
as Rubin acknowledges. The idea of the “exchange of women” moves the 
oppression of women to the dynamics of social systems and away from 
biology. It also suggests that marriage and kinship may be more important to 
understanding the oppression of women than commodity relations. Nor is it 
difficult to find concrete examples of various ways in which women are 
trafficked, effectively treated as property or quasi-property by men.  
  Rubin, however, is also critical of Levi-Strauss’s notion of the exchange 
of women. She doubts that culture can be derived entirely from the incest 
taboo and the exchange of women. She writes, “The ‘exchange of women’ is 
neither a definition of culture nor a system in and of itself. The concept is an 
acute, but condensed, apprehension of certain aspects of the social relations 
of sex and gender” (Rubin 1975, 176). These relations, conventionally referred 
to by anthropologists as “kinship systems,” are at once interpretive frameworks 
and social impositions: people behave in certain ways toward each other 
based on categories, categories which they pass on along with the approved 
behaviors. Such systems are, “therefore, ‘production’ in the most general 
sense of the term: a molding, a transformation of objects (in this case, people) 
to and by a subjective purpose” (Rubin 1975, 176). 
  This is the seam in Rubin’s essay, the point where she makes the vital 
suggestion—that societies “produce” individuals whose prescribed modes of 
relating to one another are, in effect, what we call sex/gender—but she does 
not develop the idea very far. Following Levi-Strauss, she suggests that local  
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variation in gender roles disproves a biological basis for such specialization. In 
his account such specialization must serve some other purpose, specifically, 
“to insure the union of men and women by making the smallest viable 
economic unit contain at least one man and one woman” (Rubin 1975, 178).  
  That is to say, for Levi-Strauss, the simultaneous ubiquity of the 
division of labor by gender and the fact of its endless local variations means 
that it is the division itself which is vital, rather than any local variation in its 
content. Its purpose is to force men and women to depend on each other by 
causing them to specialize in different tasks. Rubin puts a spin on this, 
explaining it in terms of mandating heterosexuality: 
 
The division of labor by sex can therefore be seen as a 
“taboo”: a taboo against the sameness of men and women, a 
taboo dividing the sexes into two mutually exclusive 
categories, a taboo which exacerbates the biological 
differences between the sexes and thereby creates gender. 
The division of labor can also be seen as a taboo against 
sexual arrangements other than those containing at least 
one man and one woman, thereby enjoining heterosexual 
marriage (Rubin 1975, 178). 
 
  Thus she teases out the implications in Levi-Strauss, arguing that 
heterosexual marriage becomes the foundation of kinship systems because 
males and females become “men” and “women” via a process that produces 
each as incomplete, needing the other. Heterosexual marriage must be 
guaranteed by the manufacture of economic interdependence, perhaps 
because heterosexuality itself is a weak force. Yet, she acknowledges, far more 
is going on in kinship and gender identity than the suppression of 
homosexuality. Viewed globally, many variations exist, including very specific 
forms of heterosexual requirement, e.g. cross-cousin marriage, as well as 
institutionalized homosexuality.  
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  It is at this point that she turns to psychoanalysis for help in 
understanding the impetus behind kinship patterns, the manufacture of 
sex/gender and the traffic in women. She extracts a Freud seen through the 
lens of Lacanian feminism, presenting a theory of femininity in the following 
terms: 
  (1) kinship systems impose sexual prohibitions that mark human 
children in particular ways, depending on their place in the system.  
  (2) negotiation of the Oedipal complex requires establishing a 
relationship to the phallus, disjoined from anatomy, as a symbolic nexus of 
individual potency and social authority. 
  (3) this relationship is necessarily different for men and women, 
because men have rights to women that women do not have in themselves. 
The phallus, though not to be confused with the anatomical penis, is 
something that men have, but which simply passes through women. 
  Thus, “in the normal course of events, the boy renounces his mother for 
fear that otherwise his father would castrate him (refuse to give him the 
phallus and make him a girl)” (Rubin 1975, 193). The boy child, in essence, is 
bribed to concede the mother to the father in exchange for the phallus—the 
sign of social approval, the evidence of potent manhood. Though he gives up 
his initial love interest, with the phallus comes the guarantee of a woman of his 
own and his libidinal organization retains a heterosexual orientation. 
  “What happens to the girl,” however, “is more complex” (Rubin 1975, 
193). Her discovery of the incest taboo is paired with the discovery that she is 
not just forbidden from having her mother, but from all women, by the rule of 
heterosexuality. The result is a double forbiddance at the nexus of individual 
identity and sexual orientation. “The mother, and all women by extension, can  
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only be properly beloved by someone ‘with a penis’ (phallus). Since the girl 
has no ‘phallus,’ she has no ‘right’ to love her mother or another woman, since 
she is herself destined to some man. She does not have the symbolic token 
which can be exchanged for a woman” (Rubin 1975, 194). 
  This picture of male and female sexuality, of course, is a mirror image 
of masculine and feminine identities, which is what the post-Freudians 
emphasize. With respect to identity, it is the boy child who is in the more 
“complex” situation, since he must not only “separate” from his mother, but 
establish a gender identity which is different from hers. The symmetry is 
predictable if we take gender differentiation as a necessary component of 
sexual attraction. There are enough inconvenient outliers however—in the 
form of homoerotic, gender bent and “perverse” attractions—that the necessity 
of gender differentiation as a prop to attraction is clearly counterfactual. In my 
evaluation, existing psychoanalytic models do have a certain explanatory 
power, but they have the feel of Ptolemaic astronomy, inventing nested 
epicycles to explain observable phenomena rather than positing a new center 
of the universe. The question I would pose to psychoanalysis is this: What if 
human social systems don’t revolve significantly around individual psycho-
sexual development? 
 
Habitus and Evolution 
  In spite of its limitations, Rubin’s essay is a remarkable attempt to 
address the issues involved in the generation of sex/gender and its 
consequences. Her goal, salutary as I see it, is to imagine a model that does 
for sex/gender relations what marxian theory does for class relations. The 
pregnant moment in her paper is in her invocation of Marx’s sense of  
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production in the most general sense, “A kinship system is an imposition of 
social ends upon a part of the natural world. It is therefore ‘production’ in the 
most general sense of the term: a molding, a transformation of objects (in this 
case, people) to and by a subjective purpose” (Rubin 1975, 176). More than 
the critique of capitalist relations of production per se, this is the biggest idea 
imminent in Marx: people make themselves (and each other), even as they are 
made by a world that was itself made in previous cycles of productive activity 
(Turner 1985). 
  If sex/gender is a product, that is produced through human activity, then 
an understanding of sex/gender should start with a description of concrete 
moments of its production and reproduction. Marx begins his analysis of 
capital in the first volume of Kapital with the commodity form, yet he is at pains 
to make the reader understand that he is starting in the midst of a process that 
is constantly moving. In some sense, it doesn’t matter where you start, as long 
as you start with the recognition that the place from which you start is never 
tabula rasa. There is a material body, which has been shaped by an 
evolutionary past. There is also a sociocultural past, also shaped by various 
selective and contagious change and yet self-replicating. This mode of self-
replication, wherein people make cultures that in turn act back on people, is 
what Bourdieu and Elias refer to as a habitus, the sociocultural equivalent of 
an evolutionary context. 
  To understand sex/gender, I argue that you have to begin by de-
centering individual psychosexual development and start with the idea of the 
social production of appropriately gendered, erotically adapted individuals, 
whereby “appropriately” I mean in accord with local expectations. “Regardless 
of other normative distinctions made,” writes David Gilmore, “all societies  
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distinguish between male and female” (1990, 9). They do more than recognize 
a biologically-inscribed difference; they also, without exception, “provide 
institutionalized sex-appropriate roles for adult men and women” (9)—i.e., they 
construct sex/gender. A few societies, a very few, construct more than two 
genders, as in the “intermediate” berdache of the Cheyenne and the mahu of 
Tahiti (9). The question is, however many variants of sex/gender are 
recognized, what are the forces that go into producing gendered persons? 
  The short form of the answer is that human children are shaped to fit 
into a matrix of already existing—but potentially shifting—roles and 
relationships. This is done both intentionally, through teaching, training, 
punishment and reward, and through various unconscious processes—
unintended role modeling, imitation—and through constraints and 
opportunities. The processes work together. Hence where elaborate, gender 
marked clothing is available, parents purposefully dress children in a particular 
way to match the ascribed sex/gender. Children are often ridiculed for 
dressing in gender-inappropriate ways, or even for wearing clothing in a way 
that does not properly respect the seriousness of gender convention. They 
also see the way successful adults and older children dress and seek to 
imitate them. 
  The process does not, however, start with the children. The roles and 
relations are pre-existing, waiting for the children to be rendered, through 
human activity and their own participation. What is more, in order to count as 
an appropriate social person, each child must somehow fit or be fitted within 
the boundaries of one of two (or at most, a scant handful) types, in spite of the 
genetically-unique starting place of each child. Given a range of capacities,  
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people must be systematically trained in the gender-appropriate behaviors, 
dispositions, postures and activities. 
  The institutions that train and direct, of course, must themselves be 
produced, and this too happens through human activity. Thus in some way 
groups develop habits, technologies and cultural idioms that are self-
reproducing. That is, in going about their business, people generate the very 
institutions that in turn shape people. This is what Pierre Bourdieu (1987) 
refers to as a habitus: people generate institutions through modes of acting; 
these institutions in turn train and direct people to the modes of action which 
produce and reproduce the institutions. In this way a cyclic recursion ensues, 
each turn of the cycle reproducing the set of factors that produced it. 
  In Bourdieu, however, habitus as an explanatory model tends toward 
stasis, that is, as a way to describe how societies reproduce themselves in 
more or less the same forms over time. This is an important question, because 
reproduction in the sense of continuous replication of very similar sets of 
relations, is intrinsically difficult. Every time a copy of something is made, 
whether a gene, a photograph, or a rite of initiation into manhood, there exists 
a potential for error. A variety of processes contribute to this potential.  
  Replicative fade, for example, sets in when one makes a photocopy of 
a photocopy. In only a very few “generations,” detail is lost. There are also 
situational constraints and mutations. This could happen if paper becomes 
difficult to obtain and copies have to be made smaller or when someone spills 
coffee on the glass. In order for copies to be made with any hope of integrity, 
correcting mechanisms must be built into the replicative process. This editing, 
however, introduces still more opportunities for change. Even an explanatory 
or interpretive note, e.g. one explaining that in former times copies were  
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larger, constitutes a kind of change that may or may not turn out to be 
meaningful.  
  In the case of human institutions, dispositions and capacities, the 
successful reproduction from generation to generation is highly politicized. 
People are routinely accused of heresy, of hide-bound traditionalism, of 
heterodoxy, blasphemy and deviation. Social power is mobilized around the 
true, correct, authentic, etc. replication of the culture and those in power run 
great risks when they neglect, or are understood as being neglectful of, the 
appropriate reproduction of the culture. Given all of these obstacles, there 
must be powerful countervailing forces tending toward conservation of cultural 
forms. 
  There are of course. One example is a schema, or learned mode of 
interaction with an object. Typing, for example. The device and the skill to 
type, brought together, form a conservative totality, for knowing how to type is 
not an abstraction easily subject to invention, since meaningful variation would 
depend on changes in both knowledge and object (which has, in fact, 
happened with the introduction of personal computers). Perhaps a simpler 
example is the enduring organization of space, as in the construction of roads, 
fences, canals, durable structures and the like. These culturally-constructed 
spaces shape and constrain what happens within them in ways that 
encourage the reproduction of cultural forms—within certain parameters. 
Other examples include books, mathematical formula, idioms, folk wisdom, 
mnemonic devices, and standard operating procedures. Also, there is some 
help from innate human capacities, in that for most people it is quite possible 
to develop “habits” that are “second nature,” meaning things they do 
automatically, even though they are not “instinctive.”  
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  In the usage of Norbert Alias, however, the concept of habitus is slightly 
more fluid. “Elias contends that ‘the fortunes of a nation over the centuries 
become sedimented into the habitus of its individual members’ [Elias 1996, 
19], and it follows from this that habitus changes over time precisely because 
the fortunes and experiences of a nation (or of its constituent groupings) 
continue to change and accumulate” (Dunning and Mennell 1996, ix, preface 
to Elias 1996). Thus change is part of habitus, even if the trend of habitus qua 
habitus is toward continuity. 
  In a larger sense, this takes us back to the evolutionary models 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Type C models, that include both 
selective and contagious modes of transmission and change.  
  To review: War probably has its origins about 10,000 years ago. Most 
contemporary societies are not warless, but there continue to be examples of 
warless societies. The threshold for war is a certain level of social 
organization, the formation of segmented groups (e.g. lineages) or more 
complex social groupings. This corresponds to the idea of social substitution, 
of one person being equivalent to another. Certainly the capacity for both 
lethal violence and peaceful cooperation are firmly grounded in human 
biology. War however is more than just violence, or even intergroup violence, 
it involves both social substitution and has organized, purposive character. 
  Sex/Gender is a complex amalgam of traits that exhibit a lot of variation 
with mixtures of biological and cultural aspects and emergences. Masculinity 
fits into a system of sex/gender as a set of ideals that men are expected to 
acquire and practice. It varies considerably across culture except with respect 
to traits linked to war-fighting, what I call soldierly masculinity, which is more or 
less ubiquitous in those societies that fight wars.  
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  Masculinity exists in cultural contexts in which issues of economic 
activity, sexual reproduction, social alliance and family form are also present, 
but the specific forms of all these vary from culture to culture. The specific 
contexts, however, are important in shaping the local variations found between 
cultures. 
  The question, then, is just how do war and masculinity come to co-vary 
the way they do? I suspect, though the matter requires further investigation, 
that it is the presence of war, or rather, the development of a standing war 
system between groups, that exerts the pressures that lead to the creation of 
soldierly masculinity. The basis for this proposition is logical: soldierly 
masculinity either doesn’t exist, or is relatively muted, in unsegmented, 
warless societies. The least warlike societies, tend to have the least onerous 
forms of manhood initiation and least regard for soldierly values. More warlike 
societies tend to have initiations, rites of toughening and training, and 
elaborated beliefs about the importance of manhood itself. Therefore, the 
proposition is that with the advent of war an inter-group war system develops. 
This system links groups together by a number of processes that  include 
warfare. The system exerts certain pressures that leads to the development of 
the rites, rituals and regimens through which soldierly masculinity is inculcated 
and the social expectations and rewards that encourage boys to acquire such 
masculinity. 
  The exact combination of processes and factors that moved particular 
groups to adopt regimes leading to the creation of some portion of its 
members as having soldierly characteristics is difficult to reconstruct. One 
possibility is a simple type C adaptationist model. In this case one or more 
groups varying in degree of soldierly masculinity already existing—perhaps by  
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“pre-adaptation” of traits for some other purpose, hunting perhaps, or ritual—
might gain an advantage, presumably in warfare itself. Such groups would 
subsequently thrive through conquest and/or strong defenses and tend to 
expand, embedding their form of masculinity in the local incarnation of the war 
system. 
  Alternatively, in a type C contagion model, soldierly masculinity need 
not even grant an advantage in war. It could simply be copied because it was 
seen as attractive by other groups, perhaps because they believed it would 
give them an advantage in war, an area of endeavor fraught with uncertainty 
and fear and where it is difficult to ignore any potential advantage. 
  The two modes, of course, are not exclusive of one another, and the 
rites, rituals and regimes of training, once established, might henceforth have 
a quite independent life, acquiring meanings and importance far beyond war.  
  The actual mode of dispersion certainly is worthy of further study, but 
the basic point is that at the point of social complexity where not just war but a 
war system emerges, pressures toward the spread of certain forms of 
masculinity ensue. These forms might be pre-existing adaptations, developed 
for quite different reasons, and adopted parasitically by the war system; they 
might be directly shaped by selective forces, or they might even be invented 
from whole cloth. However originating, once extant, they are subject to spread 
by contagion, e.g. imitation, conquest, theft, immigration, etc. 
  So if the social production of soldiers is plausible at the point in human 
history where war comes on the scene, and we have seen that in fact for most 
of human history soldierly values have been bound up with masculinity—itself 
a complex precipitate of sex/gender—the question remains: why men?  
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Why Men 
  If a group has a use for soldiers, and soldiers need to be raised up to 
have soldierly qualities, then why not train everyone and let the training itself 
sort out the most potentially war-adept, be they male or female? The question 
arises because of the overlapping curves discussed above. Some women 
would on any conceivable measure of war-adeptness score well ahead of 
most men. Moreover, the few verifiable instances where women have been 
soldiers in relatively large numbers, they have performed well and contributed 
to the successes of the armies they fought in, obliterating the objection that as 
women they would be unable to learn soldiering. So why only men as soldiers 
so much of the time? 
  In the first place it has to be acknowledged that there is a difference 
between inculcation with soldierly values and training as a soldier. Given that 
combat soldiers consume large amounts of group resources—weapons, 
training, food—not everyone can be a soldier. Societies may hold soldierly 
training and the potential for universal mobilization as an ideal, the reality is 
that someone has to plant and harvest, tend children, prepare food, repair 
weapons and continue the daily business of living. 
  It is also highly probable that one important reason everyone is not 
trained and prepared for war is that such training, at least in most of its historic 
iterations, is socially detrimental in non-war situations. Wars, though not 
“unnatural,” are nonetheless extraordinarily stressful. Effective soldiers learn to 
shut down or divert emotional responses like fear, horror and grief and ”soldier 
on.” Almost no one, however, can do this indefinitely under battlefield 
conditions and a large percentage of individuals exposed to ongoing  
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conditions of war suffer enduring psychological damage, e.g. post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD), from the experience (Gabriel 1987; Dean 1997). 
   Nor is the impact of soldierly training and toughening limited to those 
actually exposed to combat. The ability to shut down emotionally, to suppress 
immediate responses such as fear or grief, is adaptive under certain 
circumstances, but comes at a price. “Biology endows us with a range of 
emotional responses because they are useful in a complex language-using 
social species whose members depend on each other’s cooperation. To 
truncate this range of responses—such as by losing the ability to cry—
diminishes a society” (Goldstein 2001, 269).  
  Emotional crippling in men means that women end up burdened with 
the majority of communicative, emotionally nurturing and empathic tasks in 
relationships. Not all men, of course, are equally affected, or affected in the 
same way, by the training. Some fail or refuse to be trained and hardened and 
thereby become negative examples, often paying a price in ridicule and 
contempt. Some make it through the training but are endowed with enough 
psychic flexibility to thrive, especially given the various bribes and spoils that 
accrue to war-adapted men. Some, probably more than anyone would like to 
admit, end up so damaged by the training for and/or experience of war that the 
capacity for empathy and communication are monstrously deformed. No one 
is unaffected. 
  It would seem then, that the maladaptive aspects of war-training and 
war-fighting, make it better for the minimum number of persons possible to 
receive such training. Thus efforts to achieve the maximum war capacity—
adaptive in a time of war—and the best capacity for intragroup cooperation 
and communication, are at odds. In any case, actually-existing cultures have  
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solved the problem through a division of labor in which men, in most times and 
places, have been schooled in the characteristics of the soldier. 
  Remembering that sex/gender traits tend to have both biological and 
cultural components, that interlock in complex ways, we can nonetheless also 
take note that men tend to have average advantages on many war-adaptive 
qualities, such as size, strength and spatial cognition (useful in cross-country 
navigation). These average advantages would not lead to the exclusion of 
women from soldierly roles, unless selection is on the basis of something other 
than ability. I suggest that the answer to this riddle is that the slight average 
advantage of men is linked to an enhanced gender identity that includes the 
elements of soldierly masculinity linked to social privileges. Why? Because 
acquiring soldierly traits, much less fighting in wars, is onerous, and 
sex/gender, a previously existing if less important social division, becomes 
linked to both soldiering and social privilege. 
  Goldstein puts it this way: 
 
…killing in war does not come naturally for either gender, 
yet the potential for war has been universal in human 
societies. to help overcome soldiers’ reluctance to fight, 
cultures develop gender roles to equate “manhood” with 
toughness under fire. Across cultures and through time, 
the selection of men as potential combatants (and women 
for feminine war support roles) has helped shape the war 
system. In turn, the pervasiveness of war in history has 
influenced gender profoundly—especially gender norms in 
child-rearing (Goldstein 2001, 9). 
 
Or , more succinctly, “gender identity becomes a tool with which societies 
induce men to fight” (Goldstein 2001, 252).  
  Furthermore, as argued above, the process of turning someone into an 
effective soldier tends to have a negative impact on his ability to perform other  
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tasks, described here as “intragroup cooperation.” This in itself, quite apart 
from the experience of combat, is difficult and expensive for both the society 
and the individual. Many of the “privileges of manhood” are actually bribes 
given out to men as the carrot part of a carrot and stick regime to induce them 
to accept the full package of masculinity—that is, to act the role of potential 
soldiers. This reward and punishment regime is reinforced by dualistic 
categorical thinking that transforms a range of possibilities into a clear-cut 
division.  
  Of course male privilege does not follow automatically or only from the 
selection of men as soldiers. Moreover, not all men become soldiers, yet the 
privileges of manhood extend to all men, or at least to all “real men,” meaning 
those who measure up to the locally construed standards of masculinity. 
Relatively few contemporary societies, in fact, are governed by active 
soldiers—even if former soldiers are quite common in this role. This, too, is 
adaptive.  
  Historically, soldier-led societies, and societies oriented 
disproportionately to the needs of the war system, have been prone to 
cataclysmic failure following from spectacular misjudgments.
25 Such 
misjudgments can, of course, also be made on the side of peace, but the 
same forces that mold men for the battlefield, also tend to inhibit, or at least 
limit, their ability to think outside the war box.  
  Biological factors alone, as noted above, cannot explain the gendered 
division of labor with respect to war-fighting. Even considering factors such as 
size and strength that favor the selection of men as soldiers, a selection based 
on such criteria would still lead to the training and deployment of large, strong 
                                                 
25 Germany between 1890 and 1945 is a prime example.   
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women. The decisive reason for masculine militaries can probably be located 
in gender identity. With masculine identity comes certain privileges, which I 
regard as bribes, as well as expectations and punishments, which I see as 
goads. These bribes and goads compel men toward the acquisition of soldierly 
masculinity—fear of war compels the reproduction of this particular form of 
masculinity down through the generations.  
  Soldierly masculinity is in effect what emerges from the interaction of 
the war system and the sex/gender system. It is the name given to the 
characteristics of war-trained human beings—even if it also includes other 
characteristics having to do, for example, with ritual or economic activity. The 
boundaries of masculinity are policed; shame is one of the primary goads used 
to make males into soldiers. To the extent that this is true, the inclusion of 
those who are by definition “not men” in the military threatens the dynamic. A 
non-commissioned officer in the United States Army put it this way: having 
women in the ranks “sort of makes the man to feel like—I’m not really the man 
I thought I was, I’ve got a female who can do the same job” (Astrachan 1986, 
61, quote in Goldstein 2001, 283).  
  One enthusiastic young German Lieutenant told me, in the wake of a 
European court ruling (2000) that opened the way for women to serve in the 
Bundeswehr, that the question is not the performance of women who enlist. 
Women can be tested and those who don’t measure up to established 
standards can be rejected. The real problem is that “women make men 
nervous, if they are thought of as women, in the army.” Most men will accept it, 
he explained, even though “they believe that women in the army, especially in 
war, makes it harder for the men.” This thought, he told me, would remain 
largely unspoken because of “political correctness,” but he thought that male  
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soldiers wanted, perhaps needed, to see themselves as fighting for something 
and that women represent that for men. In other words, women threaten the 
self-image of men as protectors, as well as their egos, when they join the 
military. Traditionally women are bribes and compensations for the soldierly 
man—not colleagues. 
  Nor are these attitudes confined to the rank and file. The move to a 
volunteer force, with market driven demands for personnel, has led to some 
changes in the gender composition of the American military in recent years. 
Nonetheless the U.S. armed forces, like militaries the world over, has been 
remarkably resistant to change and this reluctance is reflected in the attitudes 
of senior soldiers—particularly in the years before it became impolite to state 
such opinions publicly. In 1979 General William Westmoreland, commander of 
U.S. forces in Vietnam, told the Congress, “No man with gumption wants a 
woman to fight his nation’s battles” (Francke 1997, 23). In 1980 the Marine 
Corps Commandant put it even more explicitly. Women in combat positions 
“would be an enormous psychological distraction for the male who wants to 
think that he’s fighting for that woman somewhere behind…. When you get 
right down to it, you’ve got to protect the manliness of war” (Enloe 1983, 153-
54, quoted in Goldstein 2002, 283). The “manliness of war” is nothing other 
than an apology for the system by which human beings, born with a multitude 
of potentials, are systematically trained and prodded to follow a path that ends, 
for many of them, on the battlefield.  115 
CHAPTER 2 
THE WAR SYSTEM, MASCULINITY  
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATION-STATE  
 
  It is tempting to describe the 750 year old town of Strausberg as quaint 
or picturesque, but moody is probably more accurate. It is located at the 
extreme eastern end of Berlin’s justly renowned public transit system—placing 
it just barely within the orbit of the German Hauptstadt. The trip from 
downtown, which I took quite often during my two years in the field, takes 
about an hour—speaking strictly of linear durational time. Subjectively it’s 
more like twenty years. Backward. 
  The journey is on the S-Bahn, or commuter train, line S-5, which 
originates at the Zoologischer Garten station and terminates at Strausberg 
Nord. The contrast could hardly be more marked. The Zoo station (Bahnhof 
Zoo in local parlance) is a combination commuter, subway and cross country 
rail nexus located in the heart of the old West Berlin and housing its own 
shopping mall. The station at Strausberg Nord, if it can even be dignified with 
that appellation, is a simple dead end. Trains come to the end of the line, stop, 
and then reverse direction without even a circular turn about. Weeds grow 
through the cracks in the concrete platform. The black steel and Plexiglas 
shelters stink of urine and do little to protect travelers from the perpetual 
winds. Obscenities are scratched into the surfaces. Given that I got off there at 
all times of year, there must have been many pleasant sunny days—but in my 
memory the stop is painted gray.  Whereas the differences between East and 
West Berlin are being rapidly erased, such that a naïve traveler would, at this 
remove, have a hard time discerning any systematic difference in the city  
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proper, in Strausberg they are palpable. 
  To be fair, I’m not really speaking of the town proper, but of the small 
corner of the region near the aforementioned end of the line. To be doubly fair, 
a good portion of the general gloominess of the place is likely attributable to 
the usual difference between a thriving, bustling downtown with plenty of 
shops and pedestrian traffic and a someone isolated suburb. 
  There is something else, however. During the time of the DDR, the 
Nationalvolksarmee (NVA), the old East German military, maintained 
significant military facilities here. Many former NVA officers and their families 
still reside in the area. Since the Wall came down,
1 the Bundeswehr has taken 
over these facilities and expanded them significantly. The local population 
keeps its distance, suspicious if not overtly hostile. When I stepped off the 
train at Strausberg Nord for the first time and asked for directions to the 
Bundeswehr facilities, I was met with a long silence followed by a taciturn nod 
of the head. One former NVA officer who successfully made the transition to 
the Bundeswehr—a pleasant, mid-level officer in his mid-forties—told me of 
being called a Verräter (traitor). 
  The Bundeswehr facilities, new and inherited, are about a ten minute 
walk from the station. The facility itself is open, lacking both guards and 
fence—the ubiquitous markers of most military installations—inviting approach 
by the public. Among the agencies housed here are the 
Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, section five of the Zentrum 
                                                 
1 The German phrase is “seit die Wende” or literally, “since the change.” As of this writing, the 
phrase refers unambiguously to the collapse of the former East Germany and subsequent 
unification with the West. Like the phrase “post-war,” however, the reference is contextually 
bound. In the old Federal Republic in 1988, for example, “seit die Wende” would have referred 
to the shift from SPD led, left-leaning government, to the resurrection of the CDU under Kohl 
and a right-leaning government.  
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Innere Führung and a major new military archive that is open to all. Also 
located here is the Akademie der Bundeswehr für Information und 
Kommunikation (AIK), housed in a monumental modernist box constructed by 
the NVA. Officers and NCOs who work in this building delight in demonstrating 
that “handies” (cell phones) don’t work inside it—“…because the NVA used so 
much steel in its construction.” I conducted much of my fieldwork inside this 
building, attending trainings and workshops conducted by the Akademie.  
  One such course (Lehrgang), important to the career non-
commissioned officers, is the course for Wehrdienstberatungsfeldwebel (lit.: 
military service advising sergeants, but the effective equivalent of recruiters).  
This three week course includes training in basic communication skills, 
Bundeswehr structures and administrative procedures, and career paths and 
options. The NCOs attending this Lehrgang tended to be of the 
Hauptfeldwebel and Stabsfeldwebel rank, approximately equal to sergeant first 
class and master sergeant or first sergeant in the American Army, or in other 
words senior NCOs with 15 to 20 years of service behind them. Successful 
completion of the course was essential to their military careers. 
  I felt a certain kinship with these men. They tended to come from 
working class backgrounds. For the most part they were within a few years of 
my age and had begun their service at about the same time I began mine, in 
the late 1970s or early 1980s. They were holdovers from the cold war. Men of 
equivalent rank in the American military typically combine professional 
competence with a hard-bitten, often cynical demeanor. By this point in their 
careers they would have spent years dealing with the physical, emotional and 
relentlessly bureaucratic demands of military life. Moreover, they would have 
spent most of their adult lives closely managing the work of lower enlisted  
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soldiers, oftentimes young men with short fuses, short attention spans and big 
chips on their shoulders. All of this takes a toll. 
  From the first, the Bundeswehr NCOs attending these seminars 
seemed different. Though they came from socioeconomic and educational 
backgrounds similar to those of their American counterparts, to my eyes and 
ears they lacked the penchant for casual brutality and confrontation so 
common in my experience of the American military. Granted, this was a select 
group of professionals, but they came from every military specialty, and high 
ranking American NCOs—first sergeants and sergeant majors—often present 
the hardest, roughest exteriors. 
  The difference between the two militaries was brought home to me by 
an incident that occurred early on in my fieldwork. About two weeks into my 
first Wehrdeinstberater Lehrgang, after a particularly grueling three-hour 
lecture on administrative procedure in the Bundeswehr, the instructor called 
for a break. Worn down by the lecture, the bulk of those in attendance 
remained in the classroom, standing to stretch in place and commiserate with 
one another. I ducked out to use the restroom and when I returned a few 
minutes later, I noted a certain charge in the air, some of the attendees stifling 
chortles and casting side-long glances in my direction. 
  “Herr Gardiner,” asked one attendee, “Möchten Sie ein Stück 
Kaugummi?” (“Mr. Gardiner, would you care for a piece of chewing gum?”) 
  “Danke,” I said, thank you. It was so obvious that something was up 
that to decline would have demonstrated conclusively that I wasn’t willing to 
play. I took the piece from the package, noting that it was a sour apple flavor, 
unwrapped it and popped it in my mouth. 
  The group of German NCOs in the room watched with varying levels of  
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interest as I started to chew. The taste was sour and peppery, fairly strong but 
not unpleasantly so—at least to my curry and jalapeno-trained palate. 
  As I started to chew some of the others started to make faces and it 
became clear that they had previously accepted pieces and were suffering 
from the experience. One man was actually starting to sweat. 
  “Wie schmecht?” asked the NCO who had offered the gum—how is it? 
  “Schmecht gut,” I answered. It’s good. 
  “Echt?” he asked, slight incredulous—really? 
  “Ja,” I said, as one of the other victims spat his piece onto a sheet of 
hastily torn notebook paper. It dawned on me that I was being attributed with 
either a freakish palate or a surplus of stoicism and perhaps both.  
  “Americans like spicy foods,” I explained. 
  The group went on about its business, perhaps slightly disappointed 
that the sour apple gum hadn’t made a bigger impression on me. But if the 
gum failed to impress, the incident certainly stuck in my mind. Several hours 
later, on the long train ride back to Berlin, I realized that I had just been 
through a kind of hazing incident. It took me a while to recognize it as such, 
not least because of the almost absurd—by American military standards—
mildness of the test. Food related “practical jokes” or hazing at the expense of 
newcomers is certainly common enough, but for the soldiers I knew a “good” 
joke would have been far more severe—the sort of raw jalapeno extract in the 
coffee stunt that would have a one-in-three chance of sending someone to the 
emergency room. 
  Of course in many ways the situations are incommensurable—a foreign 
anthropologist with past military experience is not the same kind of mark as a 
recruit in basic training or a newbie at his first active duty assignment. My  
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interpretive frame for the hazing incident, however, is the many interviews I 
conducted with both active duty and former Bundeswehr soldiers of ranks from 
draftee to full colonel. Many of these subjects, particularly the former draftees 
who had spent the minimum amount of time in the military, complained bitterly 
about there experiences. Yet even the most critical of my interviewees tended 
to complain about a loss of control, the lack of a serious work ethic, sexual 
licentiousness and a general lack of purpose, rather than specific incidents of 
hazing, macho testing, or casual cruelty. By contrast, virtually any American 
soldier or former soldier would have a grab bag full of such stories to tell, 
which he (or increasingly she) could tell with varying degrees of good humor 
depending upon whether he/she was the victim or merely a witness. 
  The sour apple gum incident came at a crucial moment in my research, 
though I didn’t realize it at the time. Reflecting on it months, and then years 
later, I recognized it as emblematic of a crucial difference between the 
German and American militaries (and from the militaries of other Great Power 
and former Great Power countries such as France, Britain and the Soviet 
Union). In a nutshell, the contemporary German military—amongst other 
differences—seems to be relatively lacking in the kinds of official and unofficial 
rituals of toughening found in many other militaries. I say relatively lacking, 
because of course, like any military, German soldiers are exposed to the 
elements, experience cross-country road marches and spend time “in the 
field,” sleeping outdoors. There seems, however, to be little of the celebration 
of the “hard core,” the demonstratively macho, gratuitously sadistic or 
intentionally more painful than necessary experience. 
  As I will discuss below in the historical chapters, this marks a significant 
change in the construction of German soldierly masculinity. German (and  
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especially Prussian) armies since the reforms of the Napoleonic era  have 
been know for two things: a goal-oriented, flexible style of battle organization 
(Auftragstaktik) along with a merciless regime of training to obedience for the 
common soldier (Kadavergehorsamkeit—literally, corpse obedience). Young 
men who aspired to a military career—or even a commission in the reserves—
were subjected to extreme forms of hazing and manhood testing in fencing 
fraternities. Recruits were routinely brutalized by sadistic noncommissioned 
officers. And all of this was done in the name of producing “superior” men who 
would have the courage to move on command when they came under fire. 
  To a certain extent, of course, I had anticipated finding in the 
Bundeswehr an armed force that was significantly different from German 
militaries of the past. Even before arriving in Germany, I had read a good bit 
about the foundational concepts of the Bundeswehr, summarized in the 
phrases Innere Führung and Staatsbürger in Uniform.
2 These concepts, along 
with the integration of the German armed forces into the Western alliance, the 
constitutional right to refuse to serve in the military, and the much touted 
principles of “openness” and integration into the larger society suggested a 
kinder and gentler military—at least on paper. What I didn’t know is to what 
extent these democratic reforms were actually practiced. What I began to 
                                                 
2 Wolf Graf von Baudissin, a charismatic and controversial figure amongst the team of officers 
appointed to develop doctrine and policy for the Bundeswehr when if was founded in the 
1950s, is generally credited with developing and popularizing the twin concepts “Innere 
Führung” and “Staatsbürger in Uniform.” Innere Führung, literally “inner leadership,” is 
accounted to be particularly resistant to translation. This is at least partially because even forty 
years later, the concept remains controversial and its definition is contested. Whereas 
Staatsbürger in Uniform—citizens in uniform—is fairly straightforward, when coupled with 
Innere Führung the two concepts point to the idea of soldiers as citizens first, balancing their 
military duty with respect for the rule of law as inscribed in the Grundgesetz and universal 
human rights. Innere Führung also means that soldierly obedience must flow from both 
understanding and commitment to mission and that the individual soldier is always responsible 
to refuse to obey orders he deems unlawful, mission inappropriate or in contradiction to basic 
ethical principles (see, for example, Bundeswehr 1997, 94-95). “Innere Führung” in 1000 
Stichworte zur Bundeswehr [Berlin: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, 1997, 94-95).  
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suspect is that the reforms in the context of the institution amounted to an 
insightful and early codification of changes in German society itself with 
respect to the construction of normative masculinity. 
  As I continued with my analysis, I began to wonder about the 
relationship between the social organization of violence within a society, that 
society’s place in an international war system, and the construction of 
masculinity. Causality, of course, is a notoriously difficult nut to crack when 
speaking of any particular human trait or social institution. It is often easy 
enough to devise a “just-so” story about the present utility of a particular habit, 
custom or institutional practice. Such a functional description, however, is 
rarely (if ever) sufficient to explain either how the habit or trait came to be in 
the first place, or what it means to any particular human subject. In spite of 
these difficulties, I came to believe that the relations that obtain between 
organized intergroup conflict and gender are not only significant, but key to 
understanding changes in constructions of contemporary masculinity. This 
chapter represents an attempt to begin to trace out some of the historical 
relationships between gender and war. 
 
Historical Contexts 
  If the theoretical framework presented in chapter 1 is generally correct 
and soldierly masculinity is largely a product of what I call the war system, 
then it seems quite likely that changes in one, should be reflected, sooner or 
later, in the other. This chapter is an attempt to trace some of the key 
developments in the relationship between the war system and masculinity in 
the long nineteenth century. My purpose is to look at some of these shifts as a  
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way to better understand both their dynamics as they happen and to see the 
present as shaped by the past. 
  The timeframe under consideration in this chapter, roughly 1790 to 
1914, is historically both too vast and too varied to examine in any detail here. 
I am consciously mining the past in search of material with which to illuminate 
the present. My eye has been drawn to the development and proliferation of 
the nation-state, the shift in political systems from monarchical to liberal/ 
representative ones, and the shift from an economy dominated by agriculture 
and handicraft to an industrial mode of production. Any historical 
understanding of shifts in masculinity and their relationship to the war system 
must, at a minimum, consider these phenomena. Further, I argue that these 
social, political and economic developments cannot themselves be well 
understood without reference to war and gender. 
  Germany makes an almost ideal test case for examining shifting 
interrelationships between the war system/masculinity, social organization, 
political systems and economics. In Germany, more than any other Western 
European nation-state, the military has played a central role in social and 
political developments. As Gordon Craig put it in his canonical history of the 
Prussian military: 
 
If, as has often been said, the Prussian army made the 
Prussian state, it is also true that that the subsequent 
political development of Prussia and Germany was 
dependent, to a far greater extent than is true of any other 
country, upon the organization of the army, its relationship to 
the sovereign power, and the will of its leaders (Craig 1964, 
xiv). 
 
This was apparent in the so-called era of reform (1807–1813), when Gerhard  
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Scharnhorst, along with his followers Gneisenau, Stein and Boyen, remade 
the Prussian army along “rational” lines, centralizing command and control and 
democratizing recruitment. These reforms proved critical to the victory in the 
war of liberation against the forces of Napoleon and were promptly eviscerated 
in its wake, mainly because of resistance within the officer corps. 
  As a result of the successful war of liberation, the prospect of a 
Prussian-led German nation-state gained considerable ground. Arguably the 
victory over Napoleon signaled both the beginnings of the special relationship 
between army and state and the viability of Prussian leadership in Germany. 
In every subsequent crisis of the nineteenth century—1848, the 1860s, the 
war with Austria and the Franco-Prussian war that led to unification—the 
military played a key role, always siding with the monarchy and the old order. 
The pushed Germany into the First World War and quashed the revolution of 
1919–1922. Permanent war became the prime orientation of the Third Reich 
with the active complicity of the military leadership. In short, the influence of 
the war system on German society has been particularly naked, often directly 
visible in the political activities of its military. This makes the relationships 
somewhat easier to study than in cases where the impact of the war system 
on other social systems is more mediated. 
  A word of caution, however, is called for. To speak of a single German 
military is a useful fiction. Even between the declaration of the Second Reich 
in 1871 and the defeat of the Third in 1945, there were three nominally 
different forces—the Imperial Army, the Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht. What 
is more, the various reforms, counter-reforms, innovations and developments 
within the Prussian and German armed forces has led to what Michael Geyer 
calls an “excess of meaning.” In the Prussian-German military people have  
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seen a force that is at once “professional, atavistic, skill-oriented, and heroic” 
(Geyer 1990, 183)—which is to say, all images of the military rolled into one. 
Further, Geyer argues that this excess of meaning is not the result of 
misreadings or different tendencies at different times, but rather it reflects an 
accurate assessment of an institution that has often been fragmented and 
divided against itself. The Prussian-German military has pursued technical and 
tactical innovation, recognized the importance of the innovations unleashed by 
industrial society, and at the same time sided with the most politically 
conservative forces in the nation. 
  The very wealth of conflicting images associated with the Prussian-
German military and particularly its officer class speaks to its central 
importance in pre-1945 German history. Officers were “demi-gods” and 
strutting buffoons; soldiers were drunken thugs and the elite of the nation; the 
military was a “state within a state” and the state itself. More than one 
commentator cast the army as the only guarantor of the state. The account 
that follows takes this centrality as a given—and looks to some of the 
consequences. The focus is Germany, but in order to make sense of the large-
scale phenomena under consideration, I first take a broader view, weaving a 
discussion of the processes of nation formation, representative politics and 
industrialization across Europe into a more specifically German story. 
 
The Rise of the Nation-State 
  In his account of the spread of the nation form, Benedict Anderson 
emphasizes two factors: the formation of a deep horizontal brotherhood of 
fellow nationals (what he glosses as an “imagined community”) and the 
availability of the nation-state, once it emerged, as a model to be copied. The  
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second point seems fairly uncontroversial. The first has been examined, 
debated, challenged, questioned and attacked from virtually every possible 
angle since Anderson first suggested it. It seems to me irrefutable, however, 
that the nation-form rests on the ability of fellow nationals to imagine some 
kind of connection to each other—at least if the kind of patriotic feelings that 
are so important to the war system are to develop. As Anderson puts it, “an 
American will never meet, or even know the names of more than a handful of 
his 240,000,000-odd fellow-Americans. He has no idea of what they are up to 
at any one time. But he has complete confidence in their steady, anonymous, 
simultaneous activity” (Anderson 1983, 30).  
  Though this is not the place to address Anderson’s argument in detail, I 
would argue that one way in which it can be usefully extended is to conceive 
of the development and spread of the nation-state as a possibility imbedded in 
a pre-existing system of inter-state competition and warfare. The dynastic-
state precursors to the nation-states were “always already” (perhaps a rare 
instance of a historically accurate use of this phrase) faced-off against each 
other, fighting for territory, resources and to promote particular religious 
orientations. Given this pre-existing tendency to organized violent conflict, any 
trend that produced even a modest tendency toward increased social unity 
and willingness to fight and die would give the state moving in that direction a 
potential advantage. Thus in the language of chapter 1 both selective and 
contagious processes are implied as engines to drive the nation-state machine 
through the transformation of the previous habitus into something that 
resembles what we now refer to as the “national” mode.
3 
                                                 
3 For a variety of reasons, including attacks from both the right (usually on religious grounds) 
and the left (in objection to biologism and the dubious claims of intellectual fashions such as 
social Darwinism in the nineteenth century, eugenics in the early twentieth century and  
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  One of the prime needs of the war system is soldiers (as discussed in 
detail in chapter 1 above), which is to say, human beings who have been 
thoroughly socialized with the habits, dispositions and capacities useful for 
fighting wars. If my suggested extension of Anderson is correct, and the 
interstate war system provided the ultimate impetus toward the creation and 
spread of the nation-state, and if masculinity has been as historically linked to 
the war system as I belief it has, then it seems quite likely that the new mode 
of sociopolitical organization would be connected to a new style of masculinity. 
  Here the work of anthropologists of the Mediterranean, with their well-
known focus on honor and the part it plays in the social dynamics of many 
Mediterranean communities, is a useful analytical tool. As Julian Pitt-Rivers 
writes in the introduction to The Fate of Shechem (1997), there is a basic 
distinction between monarchic/aristocratic societies and republican societies 
                                                                                                                                              
sociobiology more recently), evolutionary thinking remains in a stunted, often distorted form in 
the contemporary social sciences as well as the population at large. I see the “mid-level” 
theories of habitus as used by Elias and Bourdieu (and similar formulations by social theorist 
Anthony Giddens) to be examples of the application of evolutionary thinking forced through a 
social filter that require the removal of reference to evolutionary ideas.  
It should go without saying, but because of the checkered history of making social cum 
cultural arguments referencing evolution I will say it anyway: the development of the nation 
form is not the result of biological evolution, nor is it the inevitable outcome of genetic 
predispositions. Rather, the nation form seems like a historical accident, stumbled on not via 
natural selection, but through a process of sociocultural selection, initially emergent via 
tendencies toward selection of strategies that produce (relative) unity and the (increased) 
willingness to make sacrifices for the group, and then shamelessly copied, with varying 
degrees of success. This process neither requires conscious intent for the development of the 
first nations, nor does it exclude the possibility of such.  
Also—and again it should not require saying but widespread misunderstanding of 
evolutionary ideas makes it necessary—I am not saying that the nation-state is the final, 
ultimate or best form of political organization, nor implying that some other form might not be 
better even in the narrow sense of better at fostering victory on the battlefield. I am only 
claiming that nations were created, partially by intent and partially by accident, and they turned 
out to be a relatively effective way to organize groups of people to fight wars—probably 
because they also served as ways to legitimate authority, which helped to create national 
economies, which created further motivations for people to be willing to fight wars and more 
resources to be used to fight effectively. Another set of self-sustaining, recursive loops 
emerges at this point, which of course is the other face of a habitus, the steady-state face 
emphasized by Bourdieu, Elias and company.  
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with respect to behavioral codes. In short form: honor is the operative ideal in 
a monarchy and virtue in a republic. 
  At first blush such a duality seems almost too easy to tell us anything of 
interest. Not surprisingly it has been hotly disputed ever since its original 
formulation by Montesquieu, particularly by those who claimed honorable 
republics on the one hand, and those who insisted, on the other hand, on the 
possibility of virtuous monarchies. However, as simplistic as an honor/virtue 
dichotomy may seem, at its heart is a point that distinguishes the modes of 
loyalty in a dynastic state from those in a nation-state.  
  The dynastic state is vertically integrated. Allegiance is owed to the 
sovereign, who is invested with the honor of the group. Pitt-Rivers writes: 
 
The idea that the honour of the group resides in its head was 
fundamental to the conception of aristocracy and assured 
the fidelity through the oath of the liegeman to his lord; the 
inferior in such a relationship participated in the honour of his 
chief and was therefore interested in defending it (1977, 14). 
 
Thus in a dynastic state the honor of the subordinate is bound up with, indeed 
derivative of, that of the superordinate and ultimately the sovereign. This is 
because of the dual nature of honor itself: honor is both derived from 
appropriate behavior and a quality of social position or precedence. Note that 
“appropriate” is a loaded modifier—the behaviors appropriate to one person 
may dishonor another.  
  A person’s honor as precedence, the honor of his place in society, is an 
intrinsic quality measuring his distance from the sovereign, the font of honor as 
precedence. 
  The confusion between these two meanings of the word honor—
honorable behavior on the one hand and precedence on the other—results  
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from a virtue-oriented perspective favoring the former meaning over the latter. 
However, in an honor-bound society, the two meanings merge in the person of 
the monarch, the aristocrat, the gentleman and any other “man of honor,” for  
 
no man of honour ever admits that his honor = precedence is 
not synonymous with his honour = virtue. To do so would be 
to admit himself dishonoured. For him there is only one 
concept, his honour. However far apart the abstract notions 
of precedence and virtue may be, they come together in the 
individual at the level of behaviour. Therefore, as we have 
seen in the instance of the lie, an action may be potentially 
dishounourable, but it is only when this action is publicly 
condemned that it dishonours. Hence, just as capital assures 
credit, so the possession of honour guarantees against 
dishounour, for the simple reason that it places a man (if he 
has enough of it) in a position in which he cannot be 
challenged or judged (Pitt-Rivers 1977, 15). 
 
Thus it is impossible for a sovereign to be dishonored, since he himself is the 
font of honor and what he is guarantees him against dishonor. 
  Yet honor at its core is also a style or attribute of masculinity.
4 It is, I 
would argue, a war system adaptation for vertical social integration that 
functions by linking the masculinity of the subordinate to that of his superior. In 
this system, the liegeman who does not fight for his sovereign risks 
emasculation, as Shakespeare’s over-clever Henry V proclaims in his St. 
Crispin’s day speech: 
                                                 
4 As Pitt-Rivers discusses there is also female honor, but it differs significantly from masculine 
honor. “The honour of a man and of a woman therefore imply quite different modes of 
conduct. This is so in any society. A woman is dishonoured, loses her vergüenza, with the 
tainting of her sexual purity, but a man does not. While certain conduct is honourable for both 
sexes, honour = shame requires conduct in other spheres, which is exclusively a virtue of one 
sex or the other. It obliges a man to defend his honour and that of his family, a woman to 
conserve her purity” (Pitt-Rivers 1977, 20). Note that female honor, at least in this version, is 
based in an act of refusal—setting herself against the temptations of physical intimacy or even 
the appearance of impropriety so as not to dishonor herself and thereby undermine the 
perceived masculinity of her husband. This point will become important in later chapters where 
I take up the increased importance of refusal and the masculine self-definition in post-1945 
Germany.  
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This story shall the good man teach his son; 
And Crispin Crispian shall ne’er go by, 
From this day to the ending of the world, 
But we in it shall be remembered; 
We few, we happy few, we band of brothers; 
For he to-day that sheds his blood with me 
Shall be my brother; be he ne’er so vile, 
This day shall gentle his condition: 
And gentlemen in England now a-bed 
Shall think themselves accursed they were not here, 
And hold their manhoods cheap whiles any speaks 
That fought with us upon Saint Crispin’s day.
5 
 
That is, though the king cannot himself be dishonored in the usual sense, a 
threat to the sovereign is a threat to the honor, and hence the masculinity, of 
the subordinate individual. Any man who fails to answer the sovereign’s call to 
arms risks cheapening his manhood—though, of course, history is replete with 
examples of reluctant soldiers. 
  From the ever-competitive point of view of the war system—i.e. a 
system in which the signal issue is the capacity to resist conquest and 
annihilation—the problem with the vertically integrated economy of honor is 
that the further down in the order of precedence an individual is, the less 
invested in the king’s honor he is likely to be. His derivative portion of honor is 
comparatively so much smaller that his motivation to fight is necessarily 
diminished. 
  It is also true that the king as the font of honor and icon of collective 
masculinity is dependent, in practical terms, on his continuing ability to 
dispense royal favors, to elevate people within the order of precedence, to 
arrange or forbid marriages, and to allocate resources that accrue to him 
                                                 
5 Henry V, act 4, scene 3.  
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through his power to tax and seize booty through conquest. Such methods of 
social control function fairly effectively in an economy dominated by agriculture 
and handcraft. In an industrial society, however, it is much more difficult to 
view the monarch as the font of all that is good—the ring-giver in the old 
Anglo-Saxon ballads—when wealth is generated through means not 
previously conceived of, nor approved by the crown. 
 The  specifically  national answer to the war-system’s need for 
integration is to rely relatively more on horizontal integration. The nation-state 
tendency toward republican forms—even when such states retain elements of 
the previous system (as I think inevitable)—is not accidental. The nation-state 
as a sociopolitical form required the de-centering of the sovereign as the font 
of honor—as was accomplished via the expedient of regicide in both the 
English Civil War and the French Revolution. This does not mean that a 
sociopolitical entity recognizable as a nation-state could not subsequently 
arise with monarchic-aristocratic systems in place. However, without the initial 
de-centering of the vertically integrated honor system (with the divinely 
invested monarch as the source of honor and a chain of precedence 
proceeding from him downward to “the people”), there would have been 
precious little room for the development of the national state wherein the 
people, at least in theory, are sovereign.  
  The point is this: in a nation-state, honor does not flow from the king, 
but from the idea of the nation itself which is equally close to all citizens.
6 With 
                                                 
6 It is no accident that the age of nationalism and the rise of nation-states followed on the coat-
tails of the Protestant Reformation with its radical de-centering of religious authority. The idea 
that every man should read the sacred texts for himself and develop a personal relationship 
with God, unmediated by a hierarchically organized church, is a precise analogue of the 
difference between the order of precedence with the king as the divinely (sacredly) invested 
source of honor, and the sacred nation with honor arising only from virtuous behavior, 
especially behavior in defense of the nation.  
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the disappearance of the sovereign as the font of all honor, honor = 
precedence tends to recede in importance. Honor is reduced to (or at least 
strongly reoriented toward) honor = virtue. And yet, if the new national-state is 
to be capable of effectively waging war, then it must preserve its ability to 
produce soldiers—which means producing a certain type of masculinity. A 
situation thus arises where the undermining of the old honor-system in the 
horizontally integrated nation-state, the loss of honor = precedence, results in 
the heightened importance of honor = virtue as a component of masculinity. 
Suddenly, in the new order, anyone can be dishonored. Status is no defense 
against emasculation, and, in fact, the entire aristocracy is emasculated in the 
popular imagination as the bourgeoisie comes to power. In this sense, the new 
“national” masculinity is more fragile than ever—and thus more susceptible to 
the trumpet-call of the war system. 
 
The Bourgeois Revolution 
  In the case of England, the de-centering of the monarchic order was 
accomplished through civil war; in France by what came to be known as 
revolution. It is no doubt a mistake to consider either instance an ideal case to 
which other nation-states should be compared and found wanting. However, 
because the precedent for de-centering the ancien regime, as well as for the 
establishment of representative government, had been set, there were 
consequences of two types for nation-states that developed later. In the first 
place, such more recent nation-states were faced with the models, positive 
and negative, of what came before to follow or attempt to avoid. In the second 
place, more recent nation-states, particularly those that aspired to Great  
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Power status, found themselves in direct competition with those that came 
before. 
  Hence the relevant comparison is not normative. One ought not to 
speciously consider England, or more commonly France, the “normal” nation 
and every other as somehow deviant. Rather, the relative analysis is emic on 
the one hand, looking to how contemporaries understood events in France 
and England; and, on the other hand, competitive, considering the advantage 
gained through so-called modern institutions. In the German case it is 
important to understand the ways in which both the German bourgeoisie and 
the old order consciously responded to the developments in France, and the 
results of economic and military competition between the powers. 
  From the point of view of the German monarchy, of course, any 
revolutionary activity would inevitably be seen as the possible precedent for 
regicide. Yet, at the same time, there was clearly something to be said for the 
specifically military effects of broad social integration. Moreover, ever since the 
time of the Napoleonic wars, the bourgeoisie was becoming increasingly 
important in the industrializing economy of the German states and it 
increasingly desired and advocated for two causes: a liberal constitution with 
truly representative governance and a unified German nation-state. With their 
rising economic power, and the increasing importance of industrial potential to 
warfare, the old order leadership could ill afford to ignore this group, even 
apart from the threat of a bourgeois-led revolution. 
  For the bourgeoisie, and especially for the aspirants of the rapidly 
proliferating professional men, France was both a model for possibilities and a 
cautionary tale. They wanted, and increasingly advocated, a “modern” 
representative state in which aristocratic privilege was abolished and barriers  
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to career paths in the army and the higher echelons of the bureaucracy were 
smashed, but they also feared that any revolutionary activity ran the risk of 
getting out of control. Each year that went by resulted in the further 
development of industrial class relations—in Marx’s sense—and in the spread 
of socialist and anarchist ideas. The result was an increasing fear of the 
masses, not just on the part of the old order, but also amongst the 
bourgeoisie. 
  In the German states, and especially in Prussia, one result of the 
precedent of de-centering violence in France (and before that in England), was 
an attempt to replicate aspects of the revolution regarded as  positive while 
avoiding the revolutionary destruction of the old order. Thus the various 
Prussian governments attempted to work out constitutional compromises with 
the bourgeoisie even while maintaining key elements of monarchical control 
and aristocratic privilege—including the independence of the military as an 
institution not subject to parliamentary control. 
   During the period when Prussia was engaged in the long constitutional 
struggle between the monarchy and liberal reformers, a new style of 
masculinity was developing and spreading along with capitalist labor relations. 
The new bourgeois man differed from the old aristocratic-warrior ideal in 
several respects and the changes were linked to the assault upon absolutism.  
  In the old regime, the order of precedence created a kind of protective 
bubble around the masculinity of those with sufficient social stature. In the 
aristocratic order a man’s honor—and hence his masculinity—was something 
he only had to defend to his equals. In pre-revolutionary France, when Voltaire 
took offense at a slight from the Chevalier de Rohan and challenged him, 
Rohan ordered his retainers to administer a beating to the upstart. “In addition  
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to his hurt he was covered in ridicule. He did not forgive the Duc de Sully at 
whose house the incident occurred. Yet the Chevalier was not apparently 
dishounoured in the eyes of his peers, even though he evaded the duel to 
which Voltaire attempted to challenge him by procuring his imprisonment and 
exile” (Pitt-Rivers 1977, 10). The point is that under an honor system 
dominated by precedence, it is precisely those highest in the pecking order 
(with the most honor to lose) who are the most protected from being 
dishonored. They are born with an honorable position in society and only the 
most extraordinary behaviors could result in its loss. The result is that 
masculinity itself, which is an inherently fragile construction (see chapter 1) 
was, to a certain extent, protected. 
  By contrast the new bourgeois-dominated order—with its ideal of the 
“self-made man”
7— placed a two-fold strain on masculinity. Not only was the 
inevitability of precedence by birth and the protection of status removed, but 
the bourgeois order itself required a more flexible version of masculinity. As 
Goerge Mosse puts it: 
 
… modern masculinity contained a whole series of attributes 
that reflected both social realities and the hope for the future. 
Middle class sensibilities, as we shall see, demanded a 
“quiet strength” that did not conflict with virtues such as fair 
play, harmony, and order, which an undue display of power 
must not disrupt (Mosse 1996, 15). 
 
These bourgeois qualities, sometimes glossed as “respectability,” were the 
                                                 
7 In German the word Bildungsburger covers much the same ground as the English “self-
made man,” but emphasizes the element of self-cultivation through learning, increasing ones 
understanding and appreciation for Kultur (music, art, literature), as well as advancing in the 
world. As we shall see, the frustrations of the German Bildungsburger due to the continued 
domination of national politics by the aristocracy and the Kaiser’s court, as well as the stifling 
of opportunities for advancement, played a critical role in the shape of German nationalism as 
it developed in the twentieth century.  
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enactment of an honor = virtue orientation. They supported the ability of men 
of business to work with each other, each trusting in the honor of the other to 
fulfill his contracts—and in the power and willingness of the state to intervene 
to enforce contracts. 
  The basis of masculine identity thus had to change. In the old, 
aristocratic-led order, the foundation of masculinity was the willingness, even 
the duty, of a man to defend his honor, even to the extent of ignoring such 
niceties as the law when it placed unacceptable constraints upon his will and 
freedom of action. Without precedence, however, such a foundation for a 
manly identity is untenable. The main prop to masculinity in the bourgeois 
world became the separation of public and private spheres, and particularly 
the intimate or domestic sphere of the home. In the bourgeois world, both the 
“private” sphere of productive activity (business, trade, manufacturing) and the 
properly “public” sphere of political debate (Habermas 1962), were defined as 
exclusively masculine realms. This was in contrast to the home, the realm of 
nurturance and value formation, which was defined as feminine (Habermas 
1989, 28–31). The values of the manly spheres were then defined by 
honorable competition—meaning competition that honored its contracts, which 
were specifically excluded from the intimate sphere of the home governed by 
“softer,” female-identified values—communality, morality, spirituality and 
nurturance. The home became a retreat from the world and the definitional 
counter-point to a “man’s world.” 
  To the extent that the bourgeoisie came to power, then, bourgeois 
masculinity displaced soldierly-aristocratic masculinity as the socially dominant 
form. Aggressive displays and the private settling of disputes by violence—in 
the form of the duel, for example—were discouraged and gradually  
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disappeared. Thus what Elias calls a satisfaktionsfähig Gesellschaft tended to 
be de-emphasized in the bourgeois order in France and England.
8 
  In Germany the bourgeoisie came more slowly and less fully into 
power. The attempts at bourgeois revolutions in Germany in 1830 and 1848 
failed—or at least they failed in their own terms. The monarchical state was 
not replaced by representational government and Germany was not unified. 
The revolutionary activity of these years did produce changes. The events of 
1848 in particular led to the politicization of segments of the population that 
had, theretofore, been quiescent. The successes, however, were short-lived; 
the initial uncertaintly of the government lasted only as long as it took to mount 
an effective military response to revolutionary activities in the cities. The 
German princes, even the rulers of the smallest, least internationally viable 
states, were not displaced. And while the initial “capitulation of authority” in 
March 1848 may have “created a temporary power vacuum which new political 
institutions and movements filled” (Blackbourn 1997, 143), the old order was 
quick to reassert itself. 
  The reassertion of the old order, in both Prussia and Austria, was led by 
the military—and there is little doubt that if the Prussian army had not sided 
decisively with the monarchy, the results would have been quite different. In 
this context it is critical to understand that the forces of revolution were seen 
not only as a threat to the established order, but to German manhood itself. 
Revolution meant not just the threat of socialism, but the uncontested spread 
of what was widely viewed as gender dysphoria—decadence, homosexuality, 
                                                 
8 Satisfaktionsfähig Gesellschaft is one of those German terms that does not translate easily 
into English. The sense of it is a society in which “satisfaction” can be sought through dueling 
for offenses against ones honor and in which every “man of honor”—the only kind eligible for 
important office or authority—is expected to defend his honor at the slightest provocation.  
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effeminacy—and nervous disorders thought to arise from the urban living 
conditions and factory work (Mosse 1996, 77-84).
9  
  With crowds of laborers and journeymen rioting with alarming frequency 
in Berlin in 1848, not just the administration and its aristocratic supporters, but 
middle class conservatives began to look to the army as their savior. This 
moment was the root of what became an unsteady alliance between the 
aristocracy and critical portions of the German bourgeoisie. The constant 
threat that revolutionary forces would run beyond the bounds of what was 
acceptable to the bourgeoisie, and the dependence of the bourgeoisie on the 
military to put down riots and disorder was what cemented the alliance. In this 
context I suggest that a critical result of the “late” formation of the German 
nation-state and the “late” development of German industrialization, is that 
class culture and class consciousness was relatively more developed than at 
the time of the English civil war or even the French Revolution. There was, in a 
real sense, “less room” for a liberal revolution because there was more danger 
that any revolt against the established order would lead not to a liberal state 
controlled by the bourgeoisie, but to a socialist revolution and a state 
controlled by those sympathetic to the workers. 
  The socialist movement was mature and articulate at the time of 
German industrialization. The upshot of this was reduced room of maneuver 
for the bourgeois. Even in 1848, the threat of the revolution being overtaken 
by the interests of the working class was far greater than it had been in France 
at the end of the eighteenth century. This resulted in an increased willingness 
                                                 
9 Socialists, of course, rejected any connection to gender deviance and attempted to assert 
their own image of an ideal man—the worker, toughened by physical labor, able to stand up 
both to the boss and his political enemies. Mosse reproduces a fascinating German SPD 
poster, circa 1932, in The Image of Man. It depicts a bare-chested worker triumphantly holding 
a defeated Soviet soldier in his right hand and a defeated Nazi soldier in his left (1996, 124).  
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on the part of the bourgeoisie to cooperate with the old order and a 
concomitant respect for its most important institution, the military. When the 
nobleman Albrecht von Roon made reference to “The army, that is now our 
fatherland” (Craig 1995, 107), he was not only speaking for the Junkers and 
the monarchists but presaging the valorization of the military and military 
values by the bourgeoisie. In fact, “[m]ilitary rule in Berlin was greeted with 
relief by many bourgeois and shopkeepers, the backbone of the Civil Guard 
which had often clashed with workers and ‘flying units’” (Blackbourn 1997, 
156), during the revolutionary period.  
  All of this reflected a split within the German bourgeoisie between 
conservatives, who supported the established order as a guarantor against the 
excesses of revolution—as embodied in communism, socialism and anarchy—
and the more progressively oriented who thought it possible and desirable to 
create a liberal, democratic state in Germany. In this conflict charges of 
effeminacy were wielded like clubs on all sides of the aisle, but with the 
conservative nationalists as allies, the old order was able to hold onto power—
and this success had a profound impact on the subsequent development of 
German masculinity. Elias writes 
 
The conservative-nationalist sections of the middle classes 
in other countries often attempted to fuse humanist and 
moralist with nationalist ideals. The comparable sections of 
the German middle classes rejected the compromise. They 
turned, often with an air of triumph, against the humanist and 
moral ideals of the rising middle classes as ideals whose 
falsehood had been unmasked (Elias 1996, 133). 
 
When they turned away from “humanist and moralist” values, the bourgeois 
conservatives were in effect redefining honor = virtue in exclusively nationalist 
terms: if it supported the nation as a military power, it was virtuous. They had  
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no part in the precedence system of the old order, but nonetheless turned 
toward its court-centered, soldierly values. Or, rather, they attempted to adopt 
an idealized, romanticized version of those values. This is a key point, for the 
“honor” that Germany’s middle-class aspirants attempted to earn through 
dueling, institutional affiliation and the acquisition of a hard, untouchable, 
unflappable demeanor was not, and could never be, the honor of a man of 
precedence who was born with his honor and in many cases was immune 
from challenge. 
  It is probably less true to speak of the “failure” of a bourgeois revolution 
in the German states, than to speak of the victory of the conservative-
nationalist element thereof and its alliance with the old order. This alliance 
involved the ascendancy of military masculinity amongst the middle-classes 
and the rejection of “effeminate” liberalism with its reliance on party politics, 
debate and compromise. The true man didn’t debate, he demanded—and 
backed up his demands with the threat of force. This “recruitment” of the 
bourgeoisie to aristocratic values can be seen, for example, in the increasing 
number of individuals of middle-class background who entered  that bastion of 
aristocratic-soldierly values known as the Prussian officer corps (Bald 1977, 
43). 
  The aristocracy continued to dominate the highest ranks of the 
Prussian, and then German, military through the early 1930s, though the 
numbers continued to drop. In 1932, officers from noble backgrounds 
accounted for 52 percent of the generals, but only 23.8 percent of the officer 
corps as a whole, down from 30 percent at the onset of the First World War 
(Bald 1979, 645–46). By 1890, two years after his installation as Kaiser, 
Wilhelm II made a speech in which he remarked, “Today, the nobility of birth  
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can no longer claim primacy in furnishing the army with its officers. The nobility 
by disposition, however, which has given soul and inspiration to the officer 
corps throughout time, shall and must remain at its core” (Demeter 1930, 29). 
In the same speech he referred to the “Christian” qualities of a good officer. 
Thus his speech reflected what became know as the “desired circles” of 
recruitment: eliminated from consideration were Jews, those with left-wing or 
even liberal political views and those from social backgrounds considered 
insufficiently lofty (Bald 1979, 648). 
  In this context, it is not insignificant that hand-in-hand with the decrease 
of absolute domination of the officer corps by the aristocracy, officers were 
increasingly recruited from the ranks of university graduates and from the sons 
of the high bureaucracy. German institutions (especially the military, but also 
the universities and the bureaucracy) became collective reservoirs of honor 
such that belonging, especially in the military, provided a kind of surrogate 
precedence. 
  It is not incidental that it is precisely in these institutional contexts—the 
university, the student fraternities, the officer corps—that dueling not only 
persisted but was glorified as a necessary prop to appropriate character 
formation. Wilhelm II’s “nobility by disposition” equates to those who have 
been trained to aspire through a ruthless suppression of emotion in the face of 
discomfort and violence to a status they can never reach, that of nobility.  
 
Industrialization and Class Society 
  Perhaps the most important theorist of the nation form after Ben 
Anderson is Ernest Gellner. He proposes an industrialization-driven process of 
nation-state formation. In Gellner’s view, it is industrialization that is modular,  
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and the nation-state follows in its wake. 
 
…[T]he age of transition to industrialism was bound, 
according to our model, also to be an age of nationalism, a 
period of turbulent readjustment, in which either political 
boundaries, or cultural ones, or both, were being modified, 
so as to satisfy the new nationalist imperative which now, for 
the first time, was making itself felt (Gellner 1983, 40). 
 
Why is this so? Because, in Gellner’s account, industrial society requires 
vastly increased resources for education and communication—resources so 
costly that only the highest level of social organization, the state, can possibly 
hope to provide them. Moreover, because language is the chief means for the 
transmission of both the new skills needed in industrial society (which include 
not just those of the engineer and mechanic, but increasingly the lawyer, the 
accountant and the manager), and because multiple languages are a 
substantial barrier to such transmission, cultural homogeneity across the entire 
population becomes a key goal of such state-sponsored education. Thus in 
order to support industrial society, state-supported institutions take over the 
process of “the manufacture of viable and usable human beings” (Gellner 
1983, 38). 
  However, if industrialization required a certain amount of cultural 
homogeneity—in the sense that education and communication are fostered by 
a shared language and shared values—it also was the harbinger of a new kind 
of division within society: class. In old-order societies each person belonged to 
both a place—meaning, usually, the place where he or she was born—and to 
a particular segment of a particular estate. This is what I mean when I speak 
of the “vertical integration” of the ancien regime. In theory at least, any person 
within the society could be assigned a place in the order of precedence based  
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on his nearness or distance to a divinely-invested dynast. Even with the rise of 
absolutism, the reduction of the personal power of the aristocracy, and the 
general weakening of feudal relationships, the segmented nature of society as 
a whole, particularly in Germany, did not change that much. In fact, with the 
withering away of liege-vassal relationships, the rights, privileges and 
exemptions of each estate—nobles, clergy, guilds, townsfolk, master artisans, 
peasants, etc.—were all the more important. Moreover, it is important to note 
that though I list these various estates as if they constituted homogeneous 
groups, that is far from the case. Particularly in the case of Germany before 
unification, the concessions and rights granted to one town, or the citizens 
thereof, might be very different from those of another. Even within the same 
town, it was quite common to have varying levels of citizenship. 
  In industrial society, however, all of these divisions by estate and caste, 
with their non-transposable demands for particular goods, services and 
dispositions become a barrier to economic growth. More specifically, all of 
these particularistic, non-interchangeable relationships are drags against the 
development of a society dominated by class relations. A key difference 
between class society and old order society is that in class societies, at least 
in the context of the workplace, relationships are interchangeable. A worker is 
not bound to work for a particular employer nor is he limited to doing a 
particular job. Also, in class society an employer is not bound to hire particular 
workers, or to abide by traditional work rules, or to continue to employ a 
worker who is not needed. Class society serves industrial capacity by placing 
the new employee-worker relationship at the center of social organization. For 
the new working class, life became oriented to the factory and its needs, its 
inhuman rhythms effectively governing the daily routine of workers.  
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  As argued above, both the rise of the nation-state, with its horizontal 
forms of integration, and the rise of the bourgeoisie, with their ethos of bildung 
(refinement), meritocracy, and fairness (in the sense of equality before the law 
and the disestablishment of precedence), had a major impact on both the war 
system and masculinity. In some ways industrialization and the concomitant 
formation of class society had an even more profound impact. 
  One problem with Gellner’s arguments is that in treating the formation 
of nation-states as an epiphenomena—“… in actual history the effects of 
nationalism tend to be conflated with the other consequences of industrialism” 
(Gellner 1993, 40)—he ends up treating industrialization itself as sui generis. 
Of course he is under no particular onus to explain the origins of 
industrialization—since its historicity is not in doubt the way that the origin of 
nations has sometimes been taken to be—but it seems that industrialization 
can be seen as arising from the same kinds of variation plus selection process 
by which the nation-state habitus came into being.  
  There is no reason to suppose that the production of the nation form, 
the production of particular gender forms, and the production of industrial 
society were not part of the same process. The different strands, through the 
magic of categories, can be conceptually separated, but actual relationships 
involve gendered bodies, producing material goods in certain ways, socially 
organized in specific ways. The particular forms, of course, are not inevitable, 
but in a competitive environment, there will be winners and losers (which may 
or may not correspond to better and worse systems by any criteria you select) 
and the winners will tend to be imitated.  
  To say that the entire system (gender form, sociopolitical form, and 
mode of production) is oriented only toward war and international competition  
 
145
is to go to far. Even if we allow what seems to me a plausible extension of 
Clausewitz’s dictum and say that “competitive trade is the extension of war by 
other means,” this proposed single system is broad enough that no one factor 
can dictate its exact shape. The actual variation found in the history of the last 
two centuries provides sufficient evidence of this. Local forms of competition—
between non- or pre-national groups, social classes, races, different 
industries, families or companies for example—often dictate the strategy and 
tactics of each such group far more directly than interstate warfare. For that 
matter, the habitus that develops in response to inter-group conflict and its 
possibility still allows a wide range of cooperative behaviors. However, the 
demands of the war system end up as the lynch pin in this system—the 
bottom line of production—and at some level I think that it is the production of 
particular forms of gender that, as the most basic division of labor, acts as the 
ground for both sociopolitical organization and economic production. 
  The murkiness of Gellner’s arguments vis-à-vis the relationship of 
industrialization to nation-state formation disappears, if instead of seeing the 
one as the engine for the other, we see both as responses to inter-group 
competition and the war system.
10 As already discussed, the horizontal ties 
created via national organization support the war system. It should go almost 
without saying that industrialized production—giving the ability to produce 
more and more effective weapons—supports such a system. It is obvious that 
any argument linking industrialization to war production seems almost suspect, 
                                                 
10 It could be argued, of course, that this is simply a displacement of cause, but I don’t think 
so. I am not arguing that war causes gender, industrialization, state-formation, etc., rather that 
the processes by which people respond to the threat of inter-group conflict—which exists, 
logically, as soon as there are groups—shape, in the first place, the division of labor by 
gender, and subsequently the social organization of production, the development of social and 
political systems, etc.  
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suggesting, as it seems to, that social forms can be generated via conspiracy.  
  That is, the link between war fighting capacity and productive capacity 
is so clear that it would seem unlikely that any industrialist with the ability to do 
so would have long abstained from using his position as an indispensable 
producer to manipulate the sociopolitical system in his favor. But then again, 
this is really saying nothing more than that people with wealth and power will 
tend to use it to their advantage—not exactly a shock to the man on the street. 
History as conspiracy only seems shocking if we insist that everything comes 
about because of unconscious, systemic processes. Bourdieu insists that the 
processes of the habitus must remain unconscious and embodied in habits 
and practices. I think such a presumption is far too limiting and unnecessary. 
Both conscious and unconscious forces can contribute to the reproduction of 
social and cultural forms; both can also lead to shifts in these forms. 
  Industrialization impacts masculinity and the war system in various, 
somewhat fragmented ways. In direct terms, the importance of industrial 
capacity to war-fighting capacity means that in an industrial society, in 
competition with other industrial societies, the war system requires more non-
combatants than ever. In theory, these non-combatants—i.e. industrial 
workers—need not be socialized to the same kinds of masculinity as the 
potential combatants. In practice, the hierarchical organization of the factory 
and the demands of factory work promote dispositions not fundamentally 
dissimilar from those valued by the armed forces. Moreover, the 
interchangeability of factory workers, and their work with machines, provide a 
close analogy to the interchangeability of soldiers in modern armies using 
modern weapons. Since the war-system has always demanded the redundant 
production of possible soldiers (and large numbers of industrial workers have  
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in fact ended up as conscripted soldiers in the armies of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries), industrial workers became, in the war-structure of the 
industrial era, a ready pool of reserve military manpower, already hardened by 
work and accustomed to hierarchy and discipline. The factory floor, with its 
lines of command, clock-watching, and attention to detail, became the training 
ground for potential frontline soldiers. 
  In the system of class division that developed concomitantly with 
industrialization, the worker/owner (or manager) division sorted potential war 
system recruits in much the same way that the commoner/noble division 
sorted them in the old order. Especially with the advent of conscription, 
workers were drafted into the enlisted ranks; owners and managers, when 
they entered the military, typically did so as officers. In the old order the war 
system was at the very center of aristocratic male identity. A noble, as a man 
of honor with a place in the system of precedence, was expected to be able 
and ready to defend his honor and that of his family with violence. He was also 
expected to play a part in any war that came along, even if he was not a 
career officer. 
   The same expectation does not apply to the bourgeoisie. In bourgeois 
society the idea of defending one’s honor with violence is replaced by a 
reliance on the police powers of the state and the sanctity of contracts. The 
logic here is nearly inevitable: in a society where the order of precedence has 
been shattered, there is nothing to prevent a working class man from violently 
challenging a man of property. What, indeed, is to prevent him from 
challenging even his own employer, if, for example he feels cheated, or 
treated with less respect than he feels his honor deserves? Thus—all other  
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arguments about the state monopoly on legitimate violence aside—the dueling 
tradition had to be abolished. 
  However, if not all of the owning/managing class was expected to be 
ready for war, the same was not true for the working class. There was a strong 
expectation that workers should be war ready. Workers also continued to 
answer personal challenges with threats and violence even if this violence was 
embodied not in the formal duel, but in the brawl. A working man, as part of 
the definition of being manly, was expected to answer any threat to his person 
with his fists, not a call for help from the authorities. To a certain extent such 
episodes were tolerated by authorities, so long as they remained within the 
ranks of the workers, not least of all because the habitus of the factory floor 
was a proving ground for soldierly masculinity. 
  Finally, industrialization and the technological advancements that came 
with it put a higher premium on qualities formerly needed only by a few 
specialists—literacy, mathematical ability, and the ability to follow complex 
directions. With the advent and eventual dominance of non-infantry soldiers on 
the battlefield (first cavalry, then artillery, and finally armor and air power), as 
well as the masses of technicians and specialists needed to support a modern 
army in the field, the war system itself began to make new requirements on 
soldiers. This changed the style of masculinity most adapted to war—though 
the core values of emotional discipline and obedience remained firmly in 
place. 
  In fact, the close obedience and attention to detail required of the 
factory worker was cognate to the so-called Kadavergehorsamkeit 
(unquestioning obedience) that the drill-masters of the German army sought. 
The reasons were not dissimilar. In both the factory and on the battlefield work  
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was often dull and repetitive, requiring the worker or soldier to maintain focus 
under circumstances where failure could mean disaster and the bigger picture, 
the meaning or importance of the particular job at hand, was not always 
apparent to the person doing it.  
  In the soldier’s case, training men to Kadavergehorsamkeit was 
conceived as the only way to keep soldiers advancing when positions were 
defended by modern weaponry. Nor was this entirely wrong, or wrong-headed. 
There is a common misunderstanding that the modern battlefield is less 
stressful and requires less courage to successfully negotiate, than its pre-
modern predecessors. This is true only in certain cases. Close-quarter fighting 
with edged weapons, whether swords or bayonets, requires a particular form 
of bravery. However, the introduction of firearms and other devastatingly 
effective projectile weapons presents its own challenges. Soldiers facing fire 
show a nearly unstoppable tendency to seek cover and are almost impossible 
to get moving again once they take it. The whole point of the more brutal 
practices of the drill field was to train soldiers to move and take cover in 
coordinated ways, not to bunch up, and to work as a group under the direction 
of an officer. In fact, much of the development of military tactics after World 
War I involved finding ways to use technology, in the form of tanks, armored 
infantry vehicles and aircraft, to move soldiers on the battlefield. This was an 
effort to displace the suicidal discipline required to make soldiers walk into a 
hail of incoming bullets (Showalter 1983, 599). 
  As with nation-state formation and de-centering of the old order, the 
later arrival of industrialization to Germany had consequences for its 
competition with France and Britain. Yet, when it did come, it came with an 
organized vengeance and there is no reason to suppose that the same  
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combination of factors driving the transformation of masculinity in the other 
industrialized Western powers were not also at work in Germany in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century.  
  The same kinds of class divisions found in France and England also 
developed in Germany. Even as German industrial capacity began to overtake 
that of England toward the fin-de-siecle—making it the most powerful country 
in Europe by any number of measures—the worker’s movement was coming 
to maturity and the bourgeoisie was increasingly unwilling to submit to the 
leadership of the old order. In this environment, the military became the most 
important institution in society, both in its support for the monarchy and its 
idolization by the middle class. The adoption of an idealized version of 
aristocratic-soldierly masculinity by men of the bourgeoisie placed an 
extraordinary emphasis on manliness as a social value, and a particularly 
fragile version of masculinity into the bargain. The ongoing threat of revolution, 
the competition with the other Great Powers, and the uneasy alliance between 
the bourgeoisie and the old order generated a great deal of pressure that was 
focused, inevitably, on constructions of masculinity. Various aspects of the 
social order responded to this pressure, contributing to further shifts in the war 
system and masculinity (as I will examine in chapter 3).  151 
CHAPTER 3 
MASCULINITY IN CRISIS AND CONFLICT 
IN WILHELMINE GERMANY AND THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC 
 
Although counter-revolutionary forces were victorious in the German 
states in 1848, the victory did not come without concessions. Particularly in 
Prussia, under the governments of Frederick Wilhelm IV and his successor 
Wilhelm I, reforms were enacted and a constitution granted—albeit one that 
preserved the power of the monarchy. These reforms were granted not just in 
the aftermath of an upwelling of popular agitation, but during a period of 
nationalist agitation. The two struggles—for a liberalized political order and for 
a German nation-state—went hand-in-hand. In this environment, the Prussian 
leadership attempted to co-opt the nationalist issue and cast itself as the 
natural leader of a united Germany. 
The key point for the development of German masculinity in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century, particularly with respect to bourgeois 
masculinity, is the increased importance and prestige of the military. Its 
increased social capital stems from the fact that while the various national 
parliaments called into existence during the surge of revolutionary activity in 
1848 failed to make a viable German state “from below,” Imperial Chancellor 
Otto von Bismarck did manage to create such a state, as has so often been 
said, “from above.” The Prussian military played a decisive role in unification. 
In the process it acquired a sacred aura and became the foremost institution of 
the nation-state.
1 
                                                 
1 Prussian militarism is a cliché—but also something more. Though enjoying no special 
reputation for military excellence before the reign of Frederick II (aka Frederick the Great, first 
King of Prussia), beginning in the mid-eighteenth century Prussia became known for its army.  
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As Ben Anderson argues, nationalism has a lot in common with religion. 
There is a liturgy of the nation. Nationalists develop rites and secular prayers 
in its praise. At a deeper level, the nation is bound up with continuity. It exists 
over time, linking ancestors with successors, the dead with the unborn. Those 
who fight for the nation approach the sacred; those who die for it are sanctified 
thereby. The armed forces as institution acquire an association with the sacred 
that is in many ways more robust in a nation-state than in a dynastic state, for 
in a nation soldiers die not to defend the honor of the king, but for the sacred 
nation itself (Anderson 1983, 17–19). 
The Prussian army was soaked in the sacred blood of the nation during 
two wars that were the decisive factors in the creation of the unified German 
nation-state. The first of the two was the war pitting Prussia against Austria 
plus virtually all of the independent German states. Prussia emerged victorious 
at the battle of Königrätz in July 1866, leading directly to the annexation of 
much of northern Germany and the creation of a North German 
Confederation—which included a parliament elected by universal manhood 
suffrage. The victory at Königrätz was key not only in the creation of a 
Prussian Germany, but to crucial developments in Prussia itself. What had 
been a decades-long constitutional crisis, increasingly acute and nearly 
leading to the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm I, was abruptly settled after the 
Königrätz victory. As a result, the Progressive Party, the key party-political 
                                                                                                                                              
At the turn of the nineteenth century Baron Friedrich Leopold von Schrötter, a senior official in 
the Prussian government at the time, made the wry comment, “Prussia is not a country with an 
army, but an army with a country” (Dupuy 1984, 16)—indicative of the Prussian state’s 
growing association with militarism and the importance of the army within the state as early as 
beginning of the nineteenth century. Yet the prowess of the Prussian army under the 
eighteenth century kings did not equate to any popular support for the military or the 
government. In fact, the clash between Prussia and the armies of Napoleon in the early years 
of the nineteenth century was met by the population with indifference. Popular identification 
with the army developed only in the last half of the nineteenth century.  
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advocate for reform inside Prussia, split. The pro-Bismarck, anti-radical faction 
became the National Liberal Party, which would play a central role in the 
evolution of German party politics between unification and the First World War. 
  The second war, the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71), served to turn 
what had been an anti-Prussian tide in the new North German parliament in 
Prussia’s favor. When the Prussian military handily defeated the French 
forces, a new German Empire was proclaimed in Versailles in January 1871. 
The war, as wars are wont to do, led to an upsurge in nationalist feelings, and 
the decisive victory ensured Prussian hegemony and earned the Prussian 
military widespread admiration. Thus Germany was made on the battlefield 
and the rhetoric of Blut und Eisen (blood and iron) was more than a slogan.
2 
Not only did the Prussian victories against Austria and France create the new 
German Empire and kindle the requisite patriotism to make said empire 
internally viable, the victories also made the new state viable in international 
terms. From the point of view of the Great Powers, embedded in the war 
system, the powerful new state in the middle of Europe could be accepted, 
because it had the demonstrated capacity to force its acceptance. 
  With the declaration of the German Reich, the military accrued an 
unprecedented prestige. Bavarian statesman Prince Chlodwig Hohenlohe 
wrote of a parade he witnessed in May 1870: 
 
The whole garrison of Berlin had turned out. A great 
show of princes, generals and so forth. I mingled with the 
crowd and was struck by the interest manifested by the 
lowest of the people in things military. No trace of the former 
animosity against the military which used to be noticeable 
                                                 
2 After Otto von Bismarck’s much quoted comment that “Die Deutscher Einheit kann nimmer 
von ein Parlament ausgehen. Es kann nur duch Blut und Eisen Wirklicheit wurden.” That is: 
“German unity will never be brought about by a parliament. It can only be made real with blood 
and iron.”  
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among the lower classes. The commonest working man 
looked on the troops with the feeling that he belonged or had 
belonged to them. Everywhere stories of Königgrätz, Düppel 
& c., by old service men who were among the spectators 
(Hohenlohe-Schillingfürst 1906, 11, quoted in Craig 1965, 
215). 
 
This increased prestige played an important part in the adoption of military 
values by the Germany bourgeoisie. This is an important point: the celebration 
of military masculinity in the German middle class was not a vestige of times 
past, but something eagerly adopted by the bourgeoisie. 
  The post-unification period, roughly 1871 through 1890, was a time of 
an  important shift in German masculinity away from humane and liberal 
values and toward a way of being that celebrated hardness, discipline and 
duty. The values of the military and aristocracy became, increasingly, the 
values of the middle class. The reasons for this are complex, but the role of 
the military as institution in the civic life of Germany and the increased social 
prominence of military men were surely contributing factors. Moreover, 
military-style hardness was increasingly cast as the German way. This was in 
contrast to the liberal values of the “democracies” (a term of derision in 
imperial Germany), which were cast as effeminate, decadent and foreign. 
The impact of Germany’s relatively late industrialization and unification 
has been much discussed, and doubtless at times oversimplified. Yet, there 
were consequences to the “late” (compared to France and England) 
achievement of a unified German state and industrialization, particularly when 
combined with the failure of the German bourgeoisie to establish itself as a 
ruling force independent of the old order. The most important of these 
consequences may well be the impact on Germany masculinity and in 
particular the relative value assigned to each distinctive style of manhood. The  
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military, after all, was an important institution in all of the states aspiring to 
Great Power status. The war system continued to require the production of 
appropriately socialized soldiers in redundant quantities. The German 
difference, to the extent that there was one, was in the degree to which the 
middle classes actively sought to acquire a form of soldierly masculinity. 
The already-frustrated German bourgeoisie was, after 1871, faced with 
a dilemma similar to that faced by liberals and left-liberals in the United States 
during the Cold War: agitation for increased democracy was decried as the 
equivalent of support for socialist revolution. Liberal bourgeois politicians 
unwilling to make common cause with the establishment became isolated. The 
major political parties, including the National Liberals, came to be deeply mired 
in Honoratiorenpolitik (politics of notables)—a kind of extension of the ancien 
regime—whereby the “chief personages” of a district gathered to select slates 
of candidates and hammer out party positions, without concerning themselves 
with such democratic niceties as committee structures, canvassing and open 
meetings. The masses were distrusted and kept at a distance and the 
horizontal integration of the nation extended in practice only to notables, or, at 
most, to that section of the mittelstand—successful craftsmen and other petit-
bourgeois—who identified upward with the bourgeoisie. 
This was the situation in Germany after unification. In the last three 
decades of the nineteenth century, the trend away from liberalism continued. 
The number of liberal deputies in the Reichstag steadily decreased. The seats 
lost by the liberal parties went to socialists on the left and to a variety of 
conservative and nationalist parties on the right, polarizing the Reichstag. This 
period also marked the establishment of a number of non-party nationalist 
pressure groups (nationale Verbände). These organizations arose in the last  
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years of the 1890s as “a field of involvement for activists who tended to 
experience party politics as the closed preserve of notables” (Eley 1980, vi). 
These Verbände—most famously the Pan-German League 
(Alldeutscher Verbund), but also the Society for the Easter Marches 
(Ostmarkenverein), the Colonial Society (Kolonialgesellschaft), and the Navy 
League (Deutscher Flottenbund), as well as many other, more eccentric 
groups—offered both a forum for radical nationalist ideas and a field of political 
opportunity for those who felt shut out from the closed world of 
Honoratiorenpolitik. 
The social-political milieu of late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
Germany can rightly be described as one of national aspiration. The 
government of Kaiser Wilhelm II saw a more closely knit Germany as an 
essential element in its competition with the other Great Powers. The party 
politicians hitched their star to the idea of the nation as new mode of social 
organization in which they would govern. The activists in the Pan-German 
League saw their chance to enter into meaningful political action in fighting for 
a strong, more militarist nation. Yet for all of the attempts to create a politics 
that encompassed the interests of both the bourgeoisie and the old aristocracy 
(Sammlungspolitik) and placated the working class, a “deep discrepancy 
between the social structure and the political system” persisted (Bracher 1968, 
119). This discrepancy was the key tension in Wilhelmine politics. The state 
structure of Imperial Germany continued to guarantee the traditional privileges 
of the aristocratic landowners “at a time when the capitalist transformation of 
German society, the diminishing role of agriculture in the economy and the 
antagonism of capital and labor were all demanding an adaptation of that state 
to entirely novel situations” (Eley 1989, 8).  
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There was, then, a fault line between the old order ruling elites and the 
bourgeoisie. The politics of Sammlung, or hanging together, was grounded in 
a fear of Revolution that was not altogether paranoid—Germany had the 
strongest socialist movement in Europe in the years before the First World 
War. During these same years, the government, encouraged by the nationalist 
groups, pursued an increasingly expansionist foreign policy.  
It has been suggested, e.g. by Hans-Ulrich Wehler, that the aggressive 
foreign and military policy of Wilhelm II’s government was used to help 
stabilize an inherently unstable social structure, as a kind of patriotism-
inducing manipulation (Wehler 1970; 1972). This view has been sharply 
criticized by Geoff Eley as a misunderstanding of the forces at play in social 
mobilization and ideological formation (1980, 11). Eley’s critique is surely just. 
It is also true, however, that if the anti-revolutionary alliance between the 
bourgeoisie and aristocratic landowners was key to the politics of the era, and 
there was a deep division in terms of interests between the allies, it is no 
stretch to imagine the state acting on policies that tended to unite the deeply 
divided participants in the Sammlung.  
This highly selective capsule history is meant as a backdrop for some 
assertions about the state of German masculinity in Wilhelmine Germany. 
First, I want to argue that the heroic, untouchable, emotionally invulnerable 
male ideal described so dramatically by Theweleit (1987) as characteristic of 
the Freikorps in the world that emerged after WWI, was not simply a holdover 
of aristocratic-warrior tradition that survived into the Wilhelmine period along 
with the state-guaranteed privileges of the landowning class. Rather, 
masculinity during the Wilhelmine period was hotly contested. Segments of the 
society did attempt to reject soldierly masculinity. And many establishment  
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figures—medical men, pundits, popular authors—viewed these attempts to 
create new masculine identities as a serious threat. The militarists saw 
themselves as engaged in a battle for the hearts, minds and most of all bodies 
of the nation’s young men—young men the military needed to fight the next 
war. And it should not be forgotten, in this context, that the “next war” was on 
the drawing board of the German General Staff, almost from the time of 
unification.
3 
Here, then, was the basis for a serious tension. The military, and its 
nationalist-traditionalist supporters, saw war, and quite probably a large-scale 
two front war with France and Russia, as inevitable. To this end, the military 
itself promoted the growth of sports clubs, the expansion of reserve forces, 
and other measures calculated to toughen the men of Germany and prepare 
them for war. At the same time, the economic power of the bourgeoisie 
continued to increase. This increase supported the possibility of increased 
bourgeois political influence, as indeed Sammlungspolitik indicated: the 
monarchy and its adherents had not made common cause with the upstart 
bourgeois because it pleased them to do so, but because they had little 
choice. Economic production was essential to the state cum war system and 
this production was in the hands of the bourgeoisie.  
The increased status of the bourgeoisie was itself a threat to the ideal 
of soldierly masculinity. Even with the glorification of the army and the 
                                                 
3 Following the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War that resulted in the declaration of 
the German Reich and the unification of a “small Germany” under Prussian leadership, many 
German officers viewed Bismarck’s failure to allow them to “finish the job”—i.e. completely 
destroy the French army and war-making capabilities—as a serious strategic error. 
Increasingly the men of the German General Staff saw a new war as inevitable. They 
developed what became known as the Schlieffen plan, after its creator, which called for a 
“preventive” war against France, featuring a dramatic and decisive offensive. The thought was 
to avoid having to fight a prolonged two-front war against France in the West and Russia in 
the East. A version of this plan was attempted at the beginning of the First World War (Craig 
1964, 273–280).  
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aspirations of the middle class to military-style masculinity, the rise of the 
bourgeoisie opened social space for alternatives. This space opened because 
whatever style of masculinity the socially aspirant middle classes may have 
tried on at university or in the dueling fraternities, their work-a-day world 
required flexibility, compromise and the ability to come to terms with workers, 
clients and competitors. What is more, in terms of the nation’s ability to fight 
modern wars, the contribution of the bourgeoisie was at least as critical as that 
of soldiers. The bourgeois elite predictably tended to resent the notion, popular 
amongst the soldiers at the time, that only the soldiers were capable of the 
hardheaded politics required by the threats of the modern world. 
The wars of the latter half of the nineteenth century gave a fairly 
decisive answer to the question of industrial verses agrarian society in military 
conflict. Both the American Civil War and Prussia’s own war against Austria 
demonstrated the undeniable military superiority of industrial society. This 
does not necessarily translate into the social domination of the bourgeoisie. It 
did, however, give the bourgeoisie a very powerful argument in their bid for 
domination. 
The conflict in Wilhelmine society, however, was increasingly more than 
a conflict between the bourgeoisie and the old order. At least from the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century it became a multi-pronged conflict that also 
included the working class and the lower ranks of the middle class—that is, 
those excluded by definition from the rarified air of Honoratiorenpolitik. In the 
conflict between these groups, the worker’s movement, glossed as the 
Revolution, became the boogieman of the other factions, and the Verbände 
became a kind of nationalist opposition, agitating for a more aggressive, more  
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imperialist foreign policy and the growth of the German military, particularly the 
navy, as an instrument thereof. 
In this mix, each faction had its own range of masculinities—and no 
faction could afford to ignore the question of masculinity and its relationship to 
defense of the nation. The socialists and other left-wing parties not excepted, 
each group asserted a claim to genuine masculinity and cast aspersions on 
the adequacy of the masculinities of other groups. It may sound odd to speak 
of competing masculinities, and it would be wrong to say that masculine 
identity was the only zone of class/group conflict, but many of these conflicts 
were cast in just such terms: a man fights for his country, a man won’t bow to 
the whims of the bosses, a man does his duty, a man is strong in the face of 
the enemy, a man is the head of his family.  
Nietzsche, in many ways the incarnate voice of German masculine 
anxiety, wrote: “You say it is the good cause that hallows even war? I say unto 
you: it is the good war that hallows every cause. War and courage have 
accomplished more great things than love of the neighbor. Not your pity but 
your courage has so far saved the unfortunate” (Nietsche 1954, 159). 
A more popular version is found in a novel titled Hanseaten (Hanseatic 
Merchants), by Rudolf Herzog, first published in 1909. Herzog focused on 
entrepreneurial characters who embodied the peculiarly German combination 
of militarist and bourgeois values. He describes, for example, workplaces 
organized with military-like hierarchy and discipline, where workers snap to 
attention when the owner appears. The following scene is from a discussion 
between shipyard workers, who have lost a day’s work because of bad 
weather, and the owner-protagonist Karl Twersten. The workers have sent a  
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delegation to complain about the lost wages. The passage opens with 
Twersten’s reply. 
 
“Listen,” he began, and eyed them sharply, “you’ve all been 
soldiers, haven’t you? … Then in that case you should know 
full well what discipline means. And you old hands know as 
well as I do that in a shipyard there must be discipline just 
like on board a ship. Because here business and political 
affairs meet. Therefore all I need to do is give in to your 
demands, and I’ll be opening the door to lack of discipline. 
Why? Now I’m not saying anything about you three. You’ve 
got honour in you, and I’ve known you long enough. But it 
could occur to hundreds of shirkers every day to use wind 
and rain as an excuse when they want to come to the 
shipyard a few hours late. It only has to become known 
today that it’s a good excuse and it works—we’re still going 
to get paid!—and you hard workers who are decent, you’d 
be the ones taken for a ride…. No, you people, I don’t need 
to say anything more to you. You’re not green and know that 
there must be discipline. Whether it hurts or not it must be 
so!” (Herzog 1923, 126–27, quoted in Elias 1996, 205). 
 
Of course, given the limits placed on the range of acceptable 
masculinities by the war system, it is not surprising that conflict was often 
conducted by disparaging the masculinity of the others in the public sphere. 
Each had its own emphasis. The old aristocratic order claimed both an “honor” 
that allowed them to stand above the ordinary rules of society and the right to 
demand satisfaction, and to give it, from and to social equals. The workers’ 
movement emphasized physical endurance and the ability to get the job done. 
The bourgeoisie celebrated moral steadiness, efficiency and measured, 
thoughtful responses to provocation. 
In this environment of dueling masculinities, something of a crisis of 
masculinity developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A 
great deal of attention—scientific, pedagogic, and political—was focused on  
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the “problem” of making boys into men. As Mosse puts it: 
 
The education to manliness was directed toward making 
boys hard, sculpting their bodies, and giving them a proper 
moral posture. Within the constant preoccupation of how to 
make boys into men, worries about immaturity counted for 
less than fears of effeminacy: the attainment of a certain 
standard physical and moral fitness (Mosse 1996, 109). 
 
And, of course, the priority of qualities that fell under the rubric of “moral 
fitness” could be, and were, debated endlessly. 
  Given the three-way conflict between the bourgeoisie (and the Liberal 
parties), the old order (and its conservative supporters), and the workers, it is 
perhaps not surprising that the group that ended up making the most noise 
and defining the outer limits of the discursive ranges was none of the three. It 
was the political outsiders in the nationale Verbände that most explicitly 
embraced the idealized form of soldierly-aristocratic masculinity. These groups 
were the ones that most vocally denounced party politics as unmanly and un-
German. They most obviously embodied the call for the style of militaristic 
masculinity that would become the ideal of both the Frei Korps and of the 
National Socialists. The Verbände best expressed the frustration of the 
mittelstand in its exclusion from the political process and the determination to 
adopt the nation as cause and heroic masculinity as form. 
  Though he would have been deeply offended by the notion, it was 
precisely the hopes and concerns of these middle-class aspirants to which 
Nietzsche spoke most directly. He was their poet and their philosopher, even if 
he would not have considered himself to be one of them. In his valorization of 
the will to power and in the idea of the Übermensch Nietzsche glorified an 
aristocracy of the will that was the epitome of heroic masculinity. Admiring the  
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culture of warrior peoples, he wrote, “the unmistakable foundation of all these 
noble races is the predator, the splendid blond beast, voraciously on the trail 
of plunder and victory.”
4 Embedded here is an idea of the emotionally 
invulnerable man, the transcendent warrior fully alive in the undeniable 
passion of the moment translated into action. Morality breeds hesitation, which 
is fatal in combat. Here was the aphoristic antidote to bourgeois party politics, 
so often derided in the German context as ineffectual “debating societies”—
and to bourgeois virtue as well, for in Nietzsche’s words, and in the 
imagination of the nationalist aspirants, “Morality is the herd-instinct 
embodied.”
5 
 
Manly Men, Virtuous Order and Popular Literature 
If it was Nietzsche above all who was the philosophical voice of reaction 
to the bourgeois world, the discursive universe of the literary public sphere of 
Wilhelmine Germany was far more deeply penetrated by others. Certainly 
Nietzche’s ideas had an important influence on the high modernists, 
particularly Thomas Mann, but neither Mann nor Nietzsche were anything near 
as well known as writers such as E. Marlitt, Ludwig Ganghofer, or Karl May. 
The themes taken up by these popular authors—virtuous middle class 
romance by Marlitt, the grandeur of the Germanic mountains and the lives of 
the peasants who lived in their shadows by Ganghofer, and the encounter 
                                                 
4 “Auf dem Grunde aller dieser vornehmen Rassen is das Raubtier, die prachtvolle nach Beute 
und Sieg lüstern schweifende blonde Bestie nicht zu verkennen” (Zur Genealogie der Moral 
[1887], 1st treatise, no. 11). The above translation is mine and “splendid blond beast” is the 
usually remembered phrase in English translation, often applied to the Nazi ideal. A better 
translation might actually be something like “magnificently ravenous” or even “beautifully 
lustful”—though the usual English translation has now developed its own associations. 
5 “Moralität ist Heerden-Instinkt in Einzelnen” (Die fröhliche Wissenschaft [1882], book 3, 
section 116).  
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between good and evil in the American West for May—all supported the 
bourgeois order. Further, they supported it in a way that made it into a 
timeless, unchanging and unchangeable reality. May in particular, easily the 
best-selling German author of his time, is worth a closer look—precisely 
because an examination of his work reveals a longing for a world in which the 
bourgeois virtues and masculine honor have been seamlessly melded.
6 
Though it is tempting to place an “adventure” writer like May firmly in 
the camp of aristocratic-militarist style masculinity, his characters are actually 
a fusion of the bourgeois and aristocratic ideals of manhood. He presented 
images of “noble souls” (Edelmenschen) in whom the heroic spirit is tempered 
by law, order, and a solid commonsensical grounding in the timeless 
bourgeois order.  
May’s German hero, Old Shatterhand (alten Schmetterhand—though 
May freely mixes English loan words into his text and his hero’s name is often 
given in English), is in some ways a typical western-wilderness figure. For 
example, in one episode early in Winnetou III, the hero encounters a man on 
the prairie. This man tries to pry information from the laconic hero and finally, 
exasperated, calls him a greenhorn. May’s hero promptly snatches up a rock 
and throws it high into the air, then shoots it as it reaches its zenith, sending it 
flying even higher. The exchange between the two men proceeds as follows: 
“Heavens, what a shot! Do you always succeed?” 
                                                 
6 In fact May’s works continue to be printed, sold and referred to down to present. More than 
1.5 million copies of his books were sold between 1892 and 1913. In spite of his characters’ 
admiration for and tolerance of racial others, he continued to be popular even in the Nazi 
period, and sales of his collected works had reached 7.5 million volumes by 1938 (Böhm 
1955, 3). According to the Karl May Verlag, over 100 million copies of his over 80 books and 
short stories have been sold worldwide as of 2001 and he is far and away the best-selling 
German author of all time, outselling such stalwarts as Goethe and Thomas Mann. There is a 
renewed interest in his writings in the late 1990s and some of his best known works have 
been re-issued in English translation.  
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“Nineteen times out of twenty.” 
“Then you’re just the sort of man I’m looking for. What’s your name?” 
“Old Shatterhand.” 
Here we imagine the poor fellow’s discomfiture. Just before demanding 
proof of ability from the hero, the stranger had lamented that he couldn’t find 
someone like the famous tracker, Old Shatterhand. The dialogue continues 
thus: 
“Impossible. Old Shattered must be much, much older than you, 
otherwise people wouldn’t call him Old Shatterhand.” 
“You’re forgetting that the word old often means something other than 
age.” 
“True. But, hm, don’t take this amiss, Sir, but Old Shatterhand once had 
a run-in with a grizzly bear that surprised him in his sleep. It ripped him open 
from shoulder to ribs and he was lucky to walk away from it. The scar must be 
something to see!” 
Here we have the by now too-familiar scene of the misrecognized hero 
who does not look the part of his own legendary deeds—until he uncloaks 
himself and reveals his true nature. He shows his scars and recounts the story 
of how he got them. 
“It was a near thing. It happened in the Red River country and I lay 
there with these horrible wounds, next to the river and the carcass of the bear, 
for two weeks, with no one to help me, until Winnetou, the Apache noble, 
found me and gave me this name.”
7 
Here the tenor of the story tends more toward folk tale or legend than 
                                                 
7 This is my translation from the digitized text provided by the Karl-May-Gesellschaft e.V. The 
complete German text of most of May’s works, unabridged but in contemporary typography, 
can be found at http://karlmay.leo.org/. The quotations are all from p. 13 of Winnetou III.  
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adventure novel in its exaggeration. Nonetheless, Old Shatterhand is firmly 
established as a heroic type, able to endure unthinkable hardship. He is, 
however, obviously in the mold of a specifically bourgeois hero. His deeds 
make him extraordinary, but his manner is familiar and unassuming. He does 
not boast, and when the stranger is astounded by the hero’s marksmanship, 
Old Shatterhand merely shrugs and explains, “it was a shot I had practiced 
hundreds of times” and “it was no big deal” (“es war kein besonderes 
Meisterstück”).  
So, if May’s heroes are typical of a certain kind of masculinity, it is not 
heroic-aristocratic, but heroic-bourgeois. In an essay dealing with May and fin-
de-siecle popular literature in Germany, George Mosse writes: 
 
How did Karl May’s heroes conquer the prairie? Certainly 
not through fire and sword. Although the stable social and 
political conditions of Germany are absent in the American 
desert, May’s Old Shatterhand throughout the series of 
novels beginning with Winnetou (1893) attempts to exemplify 
law and order. For, as he tells us constantly, “in the prairies 
bad palefaces hide from the laws of the good palefaces.” 
When he has conquered the bad men, he does not kill them 
but brings them before judge and jury. He is apt to preach 
sermons about the evil of hate and revenge. Punishment 
must follow sin; that is part of human and divine justice, but 
cruelty must be avoided and so must the unnecessary 
spilling of blood” (Mosse 1987, 54). 
 
In other words, in May’s works it is the values of the virtuous German middle 
class that win out. Old Shatterhand is the good German who is able to fuse 
bourgeois virtue and heroic honor. The American West, as imagined by May, 
was a masculine utopia where such a fusion of the best of aristocratic values 
and bourgeois stability was possible—precisely because the German 
institutions are absent. That is, the fusion of aristocratic and bourgeois values  
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becomes possible because on the prairie, the institutions are absent. The 
individual becomes the sole embodiment of what they represent. It is only 
through his actions, and his example, that they are extended to the wilderness. 
What would be prosaic back in Germany, becomes  heroic. May’s hero is 
made heroic by his readiness and capacity to act in the name of German 
institutions and values, as the unofficial herald of Germanity.  
 
War, Masculinity and Social Organization 
  With the advent of gender studies, and masculinity studies in particular, 
it has become commonplace to speak of a “crisis of masculinity” that 
developed in the final years of the nineteenth century (see, for example, 
Dykstra 1986, Erhart and Herrmann 1997, Frevert 1995, Gay 1984 and 1993, 
McClaren 1977, Mosse 1996). Whether or not most men felt an internal crisis 
of masculine identity, or were themselves threatened by the “new women” and 
the inhumanity of industrialized work conditions, or by the increasing power of 
large scale institutions, it is clear that a significant group of normative and 
nationalist writers were very worried. They fretted at length about the 
“softening” of society, urban decadence, and the “threat” of a generation that 
would be unable to meet their country’s call to war (worries that would be 
repeated, almost verbatim, in the aftermath of both World Wars). That is, the 
public discourse referencing a “crisis of masculinity” was a crisis of other 
people’s masculinity and was focused on youth. 
  This crisis should not be confused with what I would describe as the 
fragility of masculinity—something I consider to be a permanent condition 
bound up with its artificiality. Appropriately gendered individuals have to be 
produced and, at least from existing evidence, almost no society considers  
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appropriate masculinity to be something “natural” or easily achieved (Gilmore 
1990). It takes a lot of productive activity, in the form of everyday modeling, 
teaching, training, and the much-studied rites of passage, to turn male children 
into men (Turner 1966, Bourdieu 1992).
8 Furthermore, masculinity, especially 
masculinity after the collapse of precedence, is never established once and for 
all. Rather it must be continuously proven, eternally defended, and renewed by 
manly deeds—a single moment of weakness can lead to emasculation. 
  The fin-de-siecle crisis of masculinity was bound up with changes in the 
war system. The increased importance of economic production as a prop to 
war fighting capacity opened social space for the production of alternative 
masculinities. With the population increasingly concentrated in urban centers, 
self-conscious gender “deviants”—homosexuals, effeminate men, self-styled 
degenerates—became increasingly visible (Mosse 1996). This creates the 
possibility of a backlash—and the vehemence with which critics responded to 
masculine deviants and the women’s emancipation movement certainly 
suggests that the element of backlash was present. However, as in the case of 
the post-Vietnam backlash against feminism in the United States, the roots of 
the “crisis” have to be found elsewhere, namely in the shifting relationship 
between the war system, social organization (the nation form) and economic 
organization (class relations). 
  For my purposes, two important currents ran through Wilhelmine 
                                                 
8 Bourdieu (1992) makes the interesting point that the real work accomplished in a rite is not 
so much the transformation of one class of person into another, e.g. boys to men, but the 
separation of boys from those who will never be so transformed, i.e. girls and women. This 
proposition, which seems likely enough, does not really contradict my thesis, for at base I 
consider normative manhood, at least in the vast majority of its incarnations, to be a 
thoroughly unattractive proposition. If you want men to accept the job of “being a man,” then 
you have to offer some compensations. These come in various forms including prestige, 
personal power and the “reward” of avoiding the penalties that accrue to those who default, 
demur or rebel against normative masculinity (see chapter 1 above).  
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Germany. The first: the rise of the military man as a national ideal, associated 
with the glory of unification and with the specifically German virtues of 
“manliness” and efficiency that led to victory over the French in the Franco-
Prussian War. The second: the increasing importance of industry, not just in 
economic life, but also in warfare. The latter meant that the social organization 
of warfare, in order to take full advantage of the potentials of industrialization, 
had to change. 
  Beginning in the 1890s, the German military, drawing on its prestige 
and its influence with the Kaiser, increasingly agitated for increased funding 
and the implementation of truly universal military training. Although nothing like 
this was ever achieved in peacetime, even the ambition to train every able-
bodied man and hold him in reserve, as part of the military capacity of the 
nation, was extraordinary. It bespoke the attempts of the General Staff, the so-
called “demi-gods of violence,” to reorient German society toward warfare. The 
primary obstacle in this goal, from the military point of view, was party politics 
in the Reichstag. 
  The attempt by the military to re-orient society toward war, it should be 
noted, was not based on some “rational” calculation of war system necessities. 
It was true, particularly with the warming of relations between the French and 
the Russians in the 1890s, that Germany would likely face a two-front war in 
any future conflict. It was also true that Germany would be outnumbered and 
faced by opponents who collectively controlled vastly superior resources were 
such a war to develop. But, the German government, following the lead of its 
military experts, abandoned the kind of Bismarckian diplomacy which had 
earnestly sought to postpone war and drive wedges between Germany’s 
potential enemies. The inevitability of war, as imagined by the German  
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General Staff, only makes sense when it is understood that for the General 
Staff war was desirable. 
  For the military leadership an aggressive policy was attractive for two 
reasons. First, given enemies with superior manpower and resources, they 
thought it essential that they be the ones to pick the timing of the war. The 
feeling was the sooner the better, before their enemies could build more 
weapons or defenses. Second, and probably more importantly, the dominance 
of the old order was increasingly in doubt. The threat of Revolution continued 
to form a basis for the politics of Sammlung, but the demands of the 
bourgeoisie for participation in the ruling coalition were increasingly irksome to 
the army. For the military leadership, the key issue was its own independence, 
which it held to be essential to protect Germany from itself—i.e. from the threat 
of Revolution, either socialist or democratic. Thus War Minister Falkenhayn 
told the Reichstag in early 1914, “Only by the fact that the Prussian army is 
protected by the constitution from party struggle and the influence of ambitious 
party leaders has it become what it is: the essential guarantor of peace” 
(Schmidt-Bückerburg 1933, 237). Ironic words, unintentionally so to be sure, 
regarding an institution relentlessly pushing for a war that began mere months 
after Falkenhayn’s statement. 
  In the period between 1890 and the dawn of the Great War, rapid 
industrialization and urbanization led at once to increased affluence and 
increased worry about the “health” of the nation. Men who spent their days in 
the unwholesome environment of the factory, it was argued, would inevitably 
suffer from physical degeneracy, as was evidenced by the discovery by 
Charcot (seconded by Freud) of the previously unheard of disease of male 
hysteria. At the same time, the more affluent were victims of their own luxury,  
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youths tempted away from the bourgeois values of self-discipline, moderation 
and chastity.  
  Reaction was widespread but mixed. The German Youth Movement of 
the early twentieth century, for example, glorified nature and the independence 
of youth. Journals associated with the movement, e.g. Der Vortrupp (The 
Vanguard), regularly depicted and glorified male strength, willpower and 
military virtue. At the same time adults worried about the potential for 
homoerotic adventure amongst young men camping together in the woods 
unsupervised—worries exacerbated when homosexual scandals shook the 
movement in 1911 (Mosse 1996, 95). Berlin became a center for homosexual 
and decadent culture on the one hand and on the other for the operation of 
Sittlichkeitsvereine (Purity Leagues), Christian associations dedicated to 
promoting moral health by opposing prostitution, masturbation, homosexuality 
and promiscuity. 
  Thus at the same moment when socialism became a serious challenge 
to the bourgeois/old order Sammlung, manhood itself—the essential prop to 
militarism—was widely regarded as under attack. The threat came in the form 
of the multiplication of contrary examples—effeminate men, homosexual men, 
romantic men—who threatened not just military masculinity, but especially the 
attempt at bourgeois-military symbiosis. The decadents lived masculinity in 
ways that were at once “soft” and “excessive,” openly sexual and anti-
normative. Though the military establishment rarely deigned to comment 
directly on this, the near-constant lament that German society was too soft and 
too undisciplined to make “good material” was indicative of their worries.
9 As 
                                                 
9 Michael Geyer (1980) argues that in the aftermath of the First World War, the Reichswehr 
attempted to organize all of society to lay the human and economic grounds for total war. This 
was not, however, a new trend—as Dennis Showalter (1983) points out—in the German  
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with the crisis in coalition politics, the crisis in masculinity, from their 
perspective, could best be cured by war—thus a viciously circular logic: we 
need good German men to fight wars; war makes good German men. 
 
War as Medicine and its Side-Effects  
  The insistent enthusiasm with which the German military leadership led 
the way to war in 1914 is too well known for any retelling here. Yet, what is not 
known quite so well is that on the eve of World War I, “the crucial decisions 
were made by the soldiers and that, in making them, they displayed an almost 
complete disregard for political considerations” (Craig 1964, 294). The military 
leaders believed in the supremacy of strategy in principle and in their own 
exclusive competence to decide essential questions of security. They did not 
trust civilian politicians to manage the nation’s interests. In particular they 
believed in the absolute necessity of preventive war along the lines of what 
came to be known as the Schieffen plan, after the Chief of Staff who invented 
it. In the Schieffen plan, German troops would make a bold first strike through 
Belgium to flank the French and force them to surrender in a matter of weeks, 
opening the way for the transport of troops by rail to the Eastern front. 
  The trend of military arrogation of areas of decision-making power 
traditionally held by the civilian government continued over the course of the 
war. By the time Field Marshall Hindenburg and General Luddendorf were 
installed in the High Command in August 1916, the military was dictating not 
only strategic policy, but economic policy and foreign policy; its leaders stolidly 
                                                                                                                                              
military. Rather WWI sharpened the focus of what was required. Even before the Reichswehr 
promoted society-wide physical training and organization (Craig 1964, 397–408), the Imperial 
Army had encouraged the gymnastic movement and increasingly called for the universal 
training of German men as reserve soldiers (Mosse 1996, 109; Craig 1964, 251–53).  
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resisted any attempts at a diplomatic end to the war. In no case were they 
willing to open negotiations with the enemy, not least because they 
understood that any negotiated peace would have to be negotiated in terms of 
the status quo ante. After two years of bloody war and a deluge of propaganda 
about the allied “war criminals,” they knew that a return to previous borders 
would leave the way open for democracy and civilian control of the military, if 
not outright socialist revolution.  
  The nationalist groups had demanded all along that the only acceptable 
outcome of the war would be the German annexation of territories in both East 
and West as well as the establishment of a right to German colonies in Central 
Africa. However unrealistic these goals were by late summer 1916, 
Hindenburg and Ludendorf were stuck with pursuing them or presiding over 
the diminution of the military as an institution. Without a decisive victory, 
control over the military would likely pass into civilian hands—a fate the officer 
corps had been fighting for over a hundred years. This was the best case 
scenario. In the worst case, from the point of view of the military leadership, 
the government would fall into the hands of anti-military revolutionaries keen 
on abolishing the prerogatives and prestige of the office corps. In any case, 
the lack of decisive victory would lower the social standing of officers as a 
group and cast serious doubt on any future bids for its leadership of the nation. 
  The eventual outcome was the collapse of the government in face of an 
obviously unwinnable war, soldierly mutiny and revolutionary activity among 
workers. The generals, finally recognizing that military triumph was impossible 
and that some kind of diplomatic settlement was required if occupation and 
disarmament was to be avoided, reluctantly formed an alliance with the least 
radical of the socialist revolutionaries. The military leadership made a deal to  
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prop up the new government as a vehicle for making peace with the Allies, 
resulting in the punitive treaty of Versailles.
10 The result, of course, was the 
“stab in the back” legend whereby civilian authorities were blamed for a 
“shameful” and unpatriotic capitulation even though the German army was 
“undefeated in battle.” 
  The stab-in-the-back myth would haunt the Weimar Republic and 
eventually be a key component of National Socialist ideology. The most 
immediate consequences of the defeat and revolution, however, were the 
drastic troop reductions and disarmament mandated by the Versailles Treaty 
and the dependence of the new “socialist” government on the military. This 
latter meant that real democratic reform of the military was practically 
impossible and the army was, in effect, left to reform itself, albeit under the 
constraints of the Treaty. 
  In the case of the mandated troop reductions, the armed forces were 
reorganized as the Reichswehr under the command of General von Seeckt. 
Seeckt, known for the conscious formation of the Reichswehr as a “state 
within a state,” meaning an institution with its own purposes subordinate to the 
Republic only insofar as this was a practical necessity, also emphasized the 
creation of an “elite” force. Given the Versailles-mandated need to dismiss the 
vast majority of both officers and enlisted men, Seekt was able to focus on 
retaining both the most able, and especially the most reliable. The limitations 
                                                 
10 The chaotic final days of the First World War and onset of revolution in Germany is a story 
too well known to require extensive commentary here. For an account of the dealings of the 
military’s relationship to the Majority Socialist government of Friedrich Ebert, particularly the 
role of General Wilhelm Groener in supporting the new Republic, see Craig’s The Politics of 
the Prussian Army (1964), 347–354. Craig argues that in some sense the Weimar Republic 
was doomed from the moment Ebert accepted the support of the military, since whatever 
reforms were subsequently enacted, the new German state, like the one that emerged in 
1871, owed its existence to the military. It did not help matters, of course, that Groener was 
intentionally using the new government to distance the military from the terms of the Versailles 
Treaty (Groener 1972, 466, as cited in Craig 1964, 347).  
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imposed by the Treaty also led directly to a series of covert moves by the 
military. The Reichswehr, from the moment of its creation, attempted to violate 
the limitations on the size and training of the armed forces, and to organize 
civilian society to promote military fitness. 
  More immediately, the revolutionary conditions at the end of the war 
made ordinary troops increasingly unreliable. Men who had marched off to the 
killing fields of Verdun and lived through the mind-numbing horror of trench 
warfare without protest mutinied, formed soldiers’ councils in their units, or 
simply vanished into the night when marched back to Germany. Whole units 
melted away. The generals had little left to offer the new government, the 
stability of which was threatened by internal divisions and by riots and strikes. 
  In response to this threat, the army leadership called for the 
organization of special units of volunteers, men selected for their political 
reliability and opposition to the revolution. Other such units formed more-or-
less spontaneously, under the auspices of successful officers, and attracted 
anti-Bolshevik fanatics as well as men too conditioned to battle to want to give 
it up or too adapted to military life to want to risk unemployment. These groups 
were eventually referred to as Frei Korps (Free Corps). The main thing to note 
about them at this point is that, though they were independent of the military 
command, initially at least they were conceived of and supported by the 
military leadership. They were used extensively to put down rioting and break 
strikes in the early days of the Weimar government and were essential to the 
pacification of the German cities.  
  However, the activities of the Frei Korps did not stop with putting down 
the most radical aspects of the revolution at the behest of the army command. 
Indeed, the goal of many Frei Korp units was to overthrow the government, as  
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nearly happened in March 1920 with the near success of the so-called Kapp 
Putsch. Given the treasonous neutrality of most of the high command 
(including Seeckt, who continued in his position after the attempted coup), the 
only thing that stopped it was a general strike that brought Berlin to a 
standstill. The enthusiasm for the strike raised new fears of mutiny in the 
remnants of the regular army and eventually led the coup-leaders to admit 
defeat at the insistence of officers concerned about the future of the military. 
  In the aftermath of the Kapp affair, which turned out to be humiliating for 
the military, Seeckt took steps to disband the Frei Korps, operating from the 
principle that the Reichswehr required a monopoly on violence. His attempts 
were, of course, only partially successful. The largest, most disciplined of the 
Frei Korp units were incorporated into the Reichswehr; others continued to 
operate independently, drilling and training in preparation for a showdown with 
Bolshevism at home and abroad. Even when they disbanded as private 
militias, the spirit of the Frei Korps lived on. Many former Frei Korps members 
were recruited to political vigilante groups that transformed the landscape of 
politics in Germany during the twenties. The best known of these groups, of 
course, is the Sturmabteilung (SA), Hitler’s storm troopers. 
  “The First World War,” writes Mosse, “added no new feature to the 
stereotype of modern manhood,  but it deepened certain aspects…” (1996, 
109). This is not quite correct. Certainly the main characteristics of military 
masculinity were in place before the war. However, the events at the end of 
the war in Germany spoke to the break-down of a key component of military 
masculinity: Gehorsamkeit. The mutinous soldiers were the nightmare of the 
military leaders. The eruption of refusal in the military meant that commanders 
could no longer command and military planning became a joke. The entire  
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force had to be reorganized along “voluntary” lines to insure its ability to quell 
riots in Berlin. 
  These mutinies went unrecognized in the right-wing propaganda of the 
1920s or in the mythology of the stab-in-the-back. Weak-kneed and traitorous 
politicians were blamed for the German capitulation; mutinous soldiers, 
increasingly unwilling to fight, were for the most part spared indictment—legal 
or otherwise. At the same time, the activities of the Frei Korps, though in 
support of tradition, nonetheless also represented a kind of refusal. Neither 
tendency could be tolerated by the military and yet both erupted into the 
landscape of potential masculinities. And if neither the mutinous objector nor 
the militant vigilante were absolutely new types, they represented a significant 
shift in the German military context of the previous half-century. 
  Of the particular form of masculinity fostered in the Frei Korps, of 
course, much has been written, whereas concerning the soldiers and sailors 
who mutinied at the end of the war little was said. Though not as long-lived as 
the Frei Korps, and not as organized, the military resisters in the German army 
at the end of the war warrant further study, though such study is beyond the 
scope of the current project.  
  And if masculinity in the Frei Korps did not constitute a break with the 
prewar past, there was a definitive shift. The distance between the bourgeois 
lieutenant aping and exaggerating both the virtues and vices of the old 
aristocratic officer corps and Jünger’s men baptized by flood and fire—the 
steely-eyed killers of the Frei Korps, alienated from civilian and particularly 
female society—was measured in the heaps of corpses and broken bodies 
and minds left by the war. Much attention has been focused on the 
mythopoetic, war-glorifying writings of Jünger (and less famous  
 
178
autobiographers of the Great War) and his famous descriptions of battle as 
purifying, intoxicating and renewing. Jünger’s post-war reminiscences, in fact, 
served to reinforce the common prewar fantasy that the coming war would act 
as a Stahlbad (bath of steel) for the men of the nation badly in need of moral 
and physical renewal (Ulrich 1992). It seems that even the stalling of the 
German offensive in the West and the onset of trench warfare did not diminish 
the enthusiasm for war as a cure for nervous conditions in men. Surely, 
however, it makes more sense to read Jünger’s writings against the grain, as 
suggested by Sabine Kienitz in a recent essay, as a kind of compensation 
(Kienitz 2002, 181). Jünger may have waxed rhapsodic about the sublime 
aspects of battle, but the reality of postwar Germany was that of the 11 million 
men mobilized, 1.7 million were killed or died as a result of the war and an 
astonishing 4.2 million were wounded over the course of the war.
11 These 
numbers indicate an unprecedented demographic tragedy and an incredible 
burden not just for the wounded and disabled, but their families and the larger 
German society struggling to recover from the war under the punitive terms of 
the Versailles Treaty.
12 
  With the masculinity of so many men called into question by their 
                                                 
11 World War I statistics are notoriously slippery. The above numbers are from the statistics 
page of the online Encyclopedia of First World War (recommended by Encyclopedia 
Britannica as a reliable source), found at 
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWdeaths.htm; this casualty number is on the high-
side of estimates I have seen, but even the most conservative numbers give a range between 
2.2 and 2.7 million German war-disabled requiring social services and rehabilitation.  
12 Rehabilitation of the war-disabled was a significant industry in postwar Germany, and it is 
significant that an important goal of this industry was to insure that veterans did not present 
themselves as victims of the war. Like the mutineers and deserters at the end of the war, the 
war-disabled tended to disappear from public discourse, even as discourses arose in reaction 
to what they represented that made no sense without tacit reference to them. A surreal trace 
of the war-disabled can be discovered in the documents of the Holocaust—particularly in the 
debate about what to do about disabled Jewish war veterans, whom many believed should be 
treated differently than ordinary Jews. The fact that there were enough of these to suggest a 
special category to the planners of the “final solution” is a further indication of the extent of the 
demographic impact of the First World War on Germans, including German Jews.  
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reduction to the feminized status of dependents by disability, and with the 
presence of numbers of men—no one knows how many—described as 
suffering from Kriegszitterern (war shakes), or what we would now doubtless 
classify as post-traumatic stress disorder, Jünger’s works take on an entirely 
different meaning. Instead of men of will, strengthened and toughened by their 
war experiences, the reality was literal “men of steel,” fitted with elaborate 
metal prosthetics and pushed back into the work force as rapidly as possible in 
order to prove that the war had not, in fact, destroyed German manhood 
(Kienitz 2002, 191–92).  
  There is no doubt that the experiences of the First World War radically 
transformed the consciousness, and the bodies, of those who fought it. The 
meaning of this transformation, however, was created discursively in the 
aftermath. The war-writings of Jünger were an attempt to deny the 
unmitigated, dehumanizing disaster that was the reality of the modern 
battlefield. The medical doctors, psychiatrists and prosthetic engineers 
constituted another interpretive frame. They worked to re-masculinize, and 
thereby re-humanize, the war-disabled. Through retraining and prosthetics 
they were to be made invisible, their injuries forgotten. 
  Another frame can be found in the work of artists like Max Beckmann. 
He served as a medic in the war and subsequently depicted the war-world not 
as masculine utopia, but as a grotesque nightmare. He then carried this 
imagery over into his images of postwar humanity. 
  The point to take away from this discussion is that during the Weimar 
era, the battle over masculinity (suppressed during the war years) reasserted 
itself in manifold ways. The threat to German masculinity posed by 
“decadents” like Otto Dix became ammunition for the National Socialists and  
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other right-wing parties. With the reduction of the military forced by the 
Versailles Treaty and its nominal subordination to civilian authority, alternative 
masculinities again had room to develop. While militarist writers and artists 
celebrated war and military manhood, an exuberant culture celebrating 
deviance flourished in Berlin’s cabarets—and both of these trends can be 
seen, at some level, as reactions to the dehumanizing horror of the war and 
the literal destruction of German masculinity, mutely proclaimed in the 
mangled bodies of the war-disabled that no amount of medicalization and 
rehabilitation could disguise.  181 
CHAPTER 4 
DEFEAT, HUMILIATION AND FEMINIZATION 
 
  The poster was one of many tacked up around the student center at the 
Free University of Berlin (FU). It depicted a grainy, black and white image of 
Wehrmacht soldiers in their characteristic Feldgrau (field gray) uniforms. There 
were three of them, two officers and an enlisted man. One of the officers 
tightens a hangman’s noose around the neck of a raggedly dressed civilian. 
The victim faces away from the camera. His hands are tied behind his back. 
The officer-executioner is shown in profile. His nose is prominent, aquiline, 
aristocratic, proclaiming the “von” in his name. His eyes are closed. 
  The emphatic caption is in English: “No Wehrmacht: No Holocaust!”  
  The subtitle reads “Veranstaltung über die ideologiscehn Prämissen 
des Bilderstreits” (“Gathering concerning the ideological premises of the 
picture controversy”). The meeting in question was sponsored by the 
Antifaschistische Hochschulgruppe (College Anti-Fascist Group) and the 
AusländerInnen gegen Rassismus (Foreign Women against Racism) and was 
to be held on an upcoming December evening at the FU. 
  The “Bilderstreits” of the title referred to an ongoing conflict about a 
traveling photographic exhibit sponsored by the Hamburg Institute for Social 
Research. The exhibit, titled “Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 
1941 bis 1944” (“War of Genocide: Crimes of the Wehrmacht Between 1941 
and 1944”), attracted both large crowds and controversy. As many as 900,000 
people flocked to see the exhibit between 1995 and the latter part of 1999,   182
when it was closed for review and the correction of perceived inaccuracies 
(Niven 2002, 143).
1 
  The sponsors of the FU-meeting were left-leaning organizations and I 
was not surprised that the vast majority of participants held the view that 
attacks on the exhibit were part of an ongoing attempts to rehabilitate the 
German national reputation by minimizing or relativizing the crimes of the Nazi 
era. The essential piece of background here is that the generally accepted 
view at the time of the exhibit was that it was the SS, and particularly its 
Einsatzgruppen (Special Task Forces), that was primarily responsible for the 
mass murders behind the eastern front. The exhibit did not challenge this 
picture, but highlighted the cooperation and participation of ordinary German 
soldiers in these acts, in accord with the most recent research (Bartov 2000). 
  Predictably, the exhibit received only a trickle of visitors when it first 
opened, with average attendance of between 5,000 and 10,000 in Hamburg, 
Ravensburg and Nuremburg in 1995 and 1996. Then, in 1997 the exhibit 
came to Munich and more than 90,000 people crowded into the Town Hall to 
view the photographs. The difference was pre-event media attention. 
Conservative CSU politician Peter Gauweiler took the extraordinary step of 
mailing a letter to over 300,000 Munich households pleading with people to 
avoid the exhibit, and characterizing it as Communist propaganda (FAZ 
1997a, 4; Niven 2002, 162). The publicity that erupted in response to the ultra-
conservative rejection of the exhibit—much like the public reaction to the Nazi 
characterization of certain art as “degenerate”—led to many more people 
viewing the exhibit than otherwise would even have known of its existence. 
                                                 
1 See chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of the Wehrmacht exhibit and its impact on 
German society.   183
  In the case of the Wehrmacht exhibit, however, this politicization was 
probably inevitable. The debate about the exhibit touched on one of the great 
sore spots of postwar Germany. I was warned by informants that the war and 
the Wehrmacht were touchy subjects, particularly for older Germans. Touchy, 
perhaps, but it was certainly not a topic that Germans avoided with me, 
especially once they found out I was researching the military. Quite to the 
contrary, as with the other taboo subject, German nationalism, they were 
eager to speak with me—at least once they ascertained that I was interested 
in listening. 
  The reporting on the exhibit in the German media, of which there was a 
deluge, grappled with the veracity of the message of the exhibit and with 
public reactions to it. The conservative-leaning, intellectual newspaper, the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), for example, while generally accepting 
the truth of the exhibit, contextualized it like this: 
 
Hoffentlich werden Amerikaner und Engländer eines Tages 
den Mut haben, ihre Bevölkerung auch über die 
Kriegsverbrechen an der deutschen Zivilbevölkerung 
aufzuklären (FAZ 1997b, 59).  
 
(Hopefully the Americans and the English will one day have 
the courage to explain their role in war crimes against the 
German population.) 
 
This quote references the tired arguments for the relativization of the 
Holocaust. The FAZ writer wants to place German crimes side-by-side with 
the crimes of the British and American military forces during the Second 
World War. While I would never deny that such an effort would be salutary in 
the American and British context, its mention in the context of the Wehrmacht 
crimes seems distracting and irrelevant—and that is part of the understanding   184
of the exhibit: even for those who do accept it as truth, it is a truth too bitter to 
swallow without such constant contextualization. 
  The second bit of “context” references the promising idea of “good 
Germans.” 
 
Die Ausstellung hätte etwas informativer und umfassender 
sein können. Man sollte jedoch trotz dieser 
Horrorgeschichten nicht vergessen, daß es auch Menschen 
gab, die den Juden geholfen haben und zum Krieg 
gezwungen wurden (FAZ 1997b, 59). 
 
(The exhibit has something broadly informative to say. One 
should not forget, however, in spite of this horrific history, 
that there were also people who helped Jews and opposed 
the war.) 
 
Which is to say that not all Germans were guilty, or equally guilty, of war 
crimes, which is to state the obvious.  
  The controversy around the exhibit arose because it transgressed 
against safe categorical boundaries. Focusing not on Hitler and the SS or 
other small groups, the exhibit had the potential to touch almost everyone in 
an intimate way—a way connected to family history. Even amongst the left-
leaning activists and university students who gathered at the Freie Universität 
in December 1999 with the advertised understanding that without the 
Wehrmacht there could have been no war, and without the war there would 
have been no Holocaust, there were still words of caution. One man in his 
mid-twenties rose to say, “You make a mistake if you attack the honor of the 
entire Wehrmacht. They may not be innocent, but that is not the same as 
being guilty.” 
  This is an interesting distinction, and one that is bound up with shifts in 
the relationship of  the military and masculinity in post World War II Germany.   185
More deeply it is bound up with the possibility of continuity with the past in any 
form. As Habermas put it with respect to the Historikerstreit of a decade 
before: 
 
Beneath the debate on the question in what sense the Nazi 
mass crimes were unique lies the deeper question of what 
attitude we want to take toward the continuities of German 
history—whether we can affirm our political existence while 
maintaining a clear awareness of a break with our more 
sinister traditions. Can we, and do we want to, give up the 
comforts and the dangers of a conventional identity that is 
incompatible with a critical appropriation of traditions? 
Nationalism is as virulent as ever. This question, I am afraid, 
has not yet come due (Habermas 1989, 193). 
 
With the Wehrmacht exhibit controversy, Habermas’ question does begin to 
come due. The Historikerstreit held open the door on a set of debates about 
tradition and the way in which the Holocaust ought to be understood and 
remembered. However, both the passage of time and the persistent belief in a 
relatively small number of perpetrators tended to protect not only the self-
image of contemporary Germans, but also their relationship to a family past, to 
relationships and memories of fathers and grandfathers. In other word, 
understandings of the role of the Wehrmacht in Nazi crimes were personal, 
linked to memories of fathers, grandfathers and forbidden subjects that form 
part of the narrative of identity. 
  The implication of the regular armed forces in the Nazi crimes collapses 
the distance between ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. As one visitor 
wrote in the guest book of the Wehrmacht exhibit: “Ich frage mich die ganze 
Zeit: War mein Vater hier dabei?” (“I asked myself the whole time: would I find 
my father here [in the photos]?”) (FAZ 1997b, 59). Here questions of tradition   186
and identity meet in the childhood memories of a father’s face; here the 
question of continuity comes due. 
  Yet the question of continuity itself is multifaceted. The continuity of 
consciously constructed claims about the past or the conscious preservation of 
traditions (Traditionspflege) is a different thing than identity. Identity is 
constructed through an alchemy of conscious and unconscious processes that 
include the various stories each person tells about himself, and how these 
stories position himself with respect to various possible relationships. Each 
person is also perceived through a grid of classifications—man, woman, 
Christian, Jew, worker, owner—which tend to limit his identity choices. In this 
matrix of classification, limitation and desire to belong identity is produced. In 
this context, history is grist for the identity-making mill. To a certain extent, 
people chose what stories they will appropriate as part of their own narrative. 
Habermas’ call for a critical appropriation of tradition requires its own 
process of bringing to consciousness. I would argue such a process is a 
necessary part of any identity that could be called post-conventional. 
Nonetheless, the extended moment of confrontation with the past and the self-
image made possible by the debate about the Wehrmacht exhibit points back 
toward various shifts in German self-image, and particularly to the relationship 
of German manhood to shifts in war-making that have occurred since the end 
of World War II. 
 
Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the Way Things Change 
  In Thomas Kuhn’s seminal work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(1962), he argues that significant change in scientific theory and associated 
practices comes not so much through the careful accumulation of   187
experimental results, as through a fairly dramatic shift from one paradigm to 
another. In his account, scientific paradigms behave a good deal like 
ideologies in that it is typically very difficult, if not impossible, to convince the 
bulk of those who have worked successfully under one paradigm to shift to a 
new one. To make such a shift means far more than changing a set of 
hypotheses. It means breaking with hard-learned techniques, colleagues (and 
funders) who have not made the break, and habitual ways of thinking. Both 
human relationships and material resources are at stake. 
  Any wholesale importation of Kuhn’s theory to considerations of 
masculinity or the relationship of the war system to masculinity would be 
suspect. Yet I think there are a couple of his points that should be considered 
generally applicable to all human endeavor. First, change can be divided 
between “normal” and “revolutionary” types. The former is characterized by 
problem-solving using a range of familiar concepts, tools, dispositions and 
procedures, even if results are in some sense new. The latter is characterized 
by a new way of looking at the world that calls for a new set of concepts, new 
tools, new habits and new procedures. Probably the tell-tale sign of a 
revolution, what Kuhn refers to as the shift to a new paradigm, is a change in 
relationships, by which I mean relationships between people. In fact, in 
describing the final stages of shift from one paradigm to another, he suggests 
that it is not so much that the committed adherents of the old paradigm are 
finally converted to the new, but that with time the influence of the new grows 
beside the old and the most influential adherents of the old paradigm grow old, 
retire and die. This last point is a striking one for considering what I see as the 
shift in masculinity in post-WWII Germany. 
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Demography as Destiny 
  The population of the German Reich in 1939—excluding those living in 
Austria and other annexed areas—was about 69.5 million. Of this population, 
which had been growing rapidly since the Nazis took power in 1933 and 
therefore included a large number of young children, about 24.6 million were 
men aged 15 to 65, which I will take as the outer limits for military service.
2 Of 
the men in this age group, an astonishing 17.9 million, or almost 81 percent, 
served in the German armed forces between the years 1939 and 1945. 
  Even before any discussion of casualties, this is one of those rare 
examples of a statistic that really does speak for itself. The content of the 
message is the success of what Michael Geyer has called the orientation of 
the Third Reich toward war. Even more than conquest, in National Socialist 
terms, war-making was about centering “state and society in combat, 
domination, and direct exploitation” (Geyer 1984, 198) as the very core of 
counterrevolutionary politics. Roger Griffin (1993), in his work on the essence 
of fascism in power, also points to the orientation toward permanent war and 
universal mobilization. Both men see Nazi ideology in practice as mobilization 
to violence—and both see National Socialist ideology as best understood as 
an ideology of action. War and the preparations for war were not only 
valorized in propaganda, but more importantly, they were realized. Thus the 
armed forces played a key role in the enactment of Nazi ideology. 
 
Thus, the military demanded in addition to general 
conscription premilitary training, postmilitary exercises, an 
appropriate air raid system and a host of other such 
                                                 
2 Unless otherwise attributed, statistics on the Wehrmacht and German population details 
during the Second World War are from Jason Pipes’ Feldgrau website 
(http://www.feldgrau.com/stats.html) and are compiled from a variety of sources. Exact 
statistics for Germany during the Nazi period are not available, but Pipe’s numbers are in 
general accord with other statistical sources.   189
measures. But most of all it demanded that society not 
organize on its own and spontaneously, for any such 
association would have counteracted the pervasive 
‘domination of everyday life’ in the interest of military 
preparation for war (Geyer 1984, 207). 
 
This mobilization, in turn, was at least partially in response to the National 
Socialist objection to the dominance of industry in society. For the Nazis, the 
turn to war was the only possible way to transcend the of values of the 
factory. The point, however, was not to return to a bucolic past, or to do away 
with industrial production. The effect was to valorize politics. The goals of 
society, and the orientation of life, they believed, should be determined by the 
leadership of the NS state, not the captains of industry. And it was “racism 
with its extreme form of annihilating whole peoples” that “realized and 
legitimized the extreme form of subjugation that was necessary to establish a 
German society outside the realm of industrial production” (Geyer 1984, 219). 
  This unprecedented mobilization of men to warfare resulted in an 
unprecedented human cost. The millions of victims of the German war 
machine—11 million soldiers and 7 million civilians in the Soviet Union 
alone
3—as well as the 5 to 6 million Jewish victims of the Holocaust, must, of 
course, be included in any global assessment. For my purposes the key 
figures are the German dead and wounded. The numbers are 3.5 million 
German soldiers killed either in battle or as a direct result of war-related injury 
and 5 million wounded over the course of the war.
4 In addition, some 3.4 
million were either missing or interned as prisoners at war’s end. 
  The meaning of these numbers is difficult to grasp. From the 
                                                 
3 “Table 7: World War II Casualties.” Encyclopaedia Britiannica from Encyclopaedia Britannica 
Premium Service. http://www.Britannica.com/eb/article?eu=126559 [Accessed October 18, 
2003]. 
4 ibid.   190
perspective of early twenty-first century America in particular, where U.S. 
deaths in recent wars have been counted in the hundreds instead of the 
thousands or millions, the numbers from the Second World War seem 
particularly surreal.
5 A useful comparison, both because of its historical 
proximity and the impact it had on masculinity and war-making capacity in the 
United States, is with the Vietnam War.
6 
  The population of the U.S. in 1970 was about 203 million, compared to 
about 69 million Germans (or about 80 million including the areas annexed by 
Hitler) in 1939. Yet in spite of the fact that the U.S. population in the Vietnam 
era was at least two and half  times as large as the German population during 
the Second World War, the German mobilization of 17.9 million men was 
nearly seven times as large as the American in the respective conflicts.
7 In 
other words, about one in four Germans served on active duty during World 
                                                 
5 According to the anti-war website Antiwar.com, war related deaths of U.S. soldiers between 
May 1, 2003 and mid-October 2003 in Iraq are 197. Iraqi casualties, though hard to estimate 
with any degree of accuracy, especially with the Pentagon adamantly refusing to provide such 
estimates, are universally presumed to be orders of magnitude higher and direct and indirect 
consequences of the two American-led wars against Iraq have been accused of causing 
hundreds of thousands or even millions of deaths in the country, most of them civilians. 
Though such claims are difficult to verify, there is no doubt that the wars have been 
devastating for the Iraqis, demographically as well as materially. 
6 The comparison is meant as a tool for feeling the weight of the demographic impact of the 
death of so many German soldiers in Germany; this analysis is not meant to detract from the 
impact of Allied causalities, especially those suffered by the Soviet Union, nor the even 
greater impact of the nearly successful genocide of European Jewry on Jews everywhere. 
Rather, I am pointing to the chauvinistic reality that even as the 500 or so American deaths 
per week at the height of hostilities in Southeast Asia had a far greater impact on the United 
States than the thousands upon thousands of Vietnamese deaths, so did the German deaths 
have a greater impact on Germany than the deaths of Allied soldiers or even the non-
combatant Jews murdered in the death camps. In fact, it is probably only the fact of 
Germany’s unconditional surrender, and the total collapse of the Nazi regime, that makes it 
possible for even a genocidal crime as vast as the Holocaust to be talked about at all in the 
nation descended from that of the perpetrators. 
7 Statistics on Americans and American casualties in Vietnam are from VFW Magazine (March 
1993).  A total of 2,594,000 American soldiers actually served within the borders of Vietnam 
between 1965 and 1973; a much larger number, 9,087,000, were on active duty at some point 
during the war, many of them serving out their entire service inside the United States, or in 
Korea or Europe.    191
War II compared to one in seventy-eight Americans who actually served in 
Vietnam. 
  The gross comparison of numbers served, however, does not really get 
to the key point, for the impact on those who did serve is derived largely from 
the casualty rates. In the German case this means that of the 17.1 million who 
served, more than 20 percent were killed as a direct result of the war. This 
compares to about 2 percent of those sent to Vietnam. If casualties are 
compared to the respective societies, the disparities are even greater. Thus 
nearly 5 percent of the entire German population, or 1 in 20 Germans, were 
killed in action during the Second World War; whereas about 1 in 3,500 
Americans were killed in Vietnam. 
  The reason for making these comparisons, of course, is not to suggest 
that the number of American dead in Vietnam was insignificant. My point is 
that even at the lesser casualty rates for Vietnam, the impact on masculinity 
and the war system in the United States was profound. All other factors set 
aside, try to imagine the impact on American society if, instead of 58 thousand 
deaths in Vietnam, there had been over 10 million. The difference is between 
knowing someone who served, and having a father, son, brother or husband 
killed or wounded in the war. 
  One final word on the demographics of German death during the 
Second World War, and this point is really the decisive one: the vast majority 
of the battle deaths recorded in these figures were men. When you add in the 
wounded (5 million), the number of war casualties reaches well over 8 million, 
or about one in three German men who were killed or wounded during the 
war. Casualty rates of this level can rightly be called devastating. If we make 
the assumption that a great many of those who were casualties of the war   192
were those who identified with soldierly masculinity, then the ground for a 
revolutionary shift away from militarist-style masculinity, in Kuhn’s terms, had 
been laid. Bluntly put, the leading proponents of soldierly masculinity were 
killed, devastated by physical and psychological injuries, held as prisoners of 
war in the immediate postwar period or politically disgraced through 
connections to the Nazi party.  
 
The Feminization of Postwar Germany 
  Even today, a German politician looking for a cheap round of applause 
can slip a reference to the Trümmerfrauen (women of the rubble) into a 
speech. Between 1945 and 1947, at a time when many of those German men 
who had not been killed or seriously wounded during the war were still held in 
prisoner-of-war camps, these women laboriously began the rebuilding process 
in the nation’s destroyed cities. They collected, sorted and cleaned bricks and 
building materials by hand. A fixture in the postwar German imaginary, the 
Trümmerfrauen are depicted in countless documentary photographs and film 
clips. A web page devoted to Trümmerfrauen documentary states: 
 
Die “Trümmerfrauen” sind zum Symbol für den Aufbauwillen 
und die Überlebenskraft der Deutschen in der 
Nachkriegszeit geworden. Ohne ihre Schwerstarbeit wären 
die deutschen Städte lange Zeit Schutthalden geblieben, 
ohne ihre unermüdliche Tätigkeit das Überleben der 
Familien nicht gesichert gewesen.
8 
 
(The “Trümmerfrauen” have become a symbol of the 
German will to rebuild and survive in the postwar period. 
Without their hard work the German cities would have 
remained, for a long time, in ruins; without their tireless 
                                                 
8 The web page is sponsored by the Berlin-based Deutsches Historisches Museum as part of 
its LeMO: Lebendiges virtuelles Museum Online project. The URL for the page is 
http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/Nachkriegsjahre/DasEndeAlsAnfang/truemmerfrauen.html 
(accessed October 22, 2003), and includes video clips.    193
activity the survival of their families could not be assured.) 
 
Which gives something of the flavor of a particularly female postwar German 
public—and the myth-charged language used to refer to this public.  
  In the text above, which is representative of similar contemporary 
presentations of the immediate postwar period, the Trümmerfrauen are a 
“symbol.” They represent the German “will to survive” even after the 
devastation brought by the war. During the Third Reich these same women 
had largely been confined to the domestic sphere. They were depicted in Nazi 
ideology as human brood mares with the particular responsibility of the “racial 
hygiene” of the Volk (Koonz 1987; Frevert 1990). Even in postwar 
interpretations, such as the one above, the work of the Trümmerfrauen is 
understood as a kind of extension of the cooking, cleaning and minding of 
children—i.e. the work to take care of their families. 
  In the postwar world, of course, even “ordinary” activities of providing 
for the basic needs of a family assumed heroic dimensions. “After the war,” 
writes historian Petra Goedde, 
 
women continued to do what they had done during the war, 
namely, concentrate their energies on securing food, 
preparing meals, and keeping house. Yet as the focus 
shifted from the battlefront to the ruined domestic landscape, 
women’s work moved to the center of the national 
consciousness. Because of the food and material shortages 
of the early postwar period, those ordinary household chores 
became Herculean tasks. Many women became the main 
providers for their families. They bore the brunt of social and 
economic reconstruction, because many German men had 
died in the war, were interned in POW camps, or had 
returned physically or psychologically maimed (Goedde 
1999, 6). 
 
  This new public presence of women in the postwar period had some   194
specific consequences. As Goedde argues, the absence of men, particularly 
military-aged men, in postwar Germany meant that when the war turned from 
battle to occupation, the Allied armies primarily encountered women, children 
and old men.  
  In the case of American soldiers, who had been spoon-fed a steady diet 
of anti-German propaganda which emphasized the male and masculine nature 
of the enemy, the publicly female character of those with whom they interacted 
led to an American reconceptualization of occupied Germany. Instead of the 
(male) Nazi perpetrators, they saw, (female) victims of war cast into a 
dependent role. The occupiers, who had entered Germany prepared to 
engage in a ruthless program of denazification, found themselves cast in the 
role of providers.
9 
  Thus both from the point of view of demographics, and in the eyes of 
the victorious Americans, the immediate postwar period saw a literal 
feminization of Germany. Of course we know well enough that this shift in 
population and public face did not equate to a dominance of postwar German 
politics or economics by women. It does, however, form the base from which 
any discussion of the shift in the nature of postwar German masculinity and its 
relationship to war-making must begin. 
  I emphasize this because it is tempting to start an analysis of postwar 
German masculinity with a focus on the meaning of defeat as refracted 
through masculine identity. John Borneman, for example, writes “one must first 
                                                 
9 American soldiers entering Germany were given the Pocket Guide to Germany (USASF 
1944). This guidebook warned, “during the war, Germany kept 500,000 trained killers at home, 
the black-uniformed SS Guards…. With the defeat of Germany what are left of these 500,000 
will discard their uniforms and disappear into anonymity of civilian clothes, many thousands of 
other Gestapo men and soldiers as well will do the same. This will not make them less 
dangerous. It will make them more dangerous. It will enable them to strike in the dark” (as 
quote in Goedde 1999, 4).   195
emphasize the peculiarity of postwar German sovereignty following the 
‘unconditional surrender’ of the nation. Given pre-1945 German gender codes, 
this surrender was a radically feminizing and humiliating act” (Borneman 1998, 
303). I do not want to deny the consequences of the defeat. Rather I want to 
push the analysis back to the existential consequences of the war and the 
reality of occupation. 
  The “feminization” of postwar Germany is not only a metaphor. Hans-
Gerd Winter asks the question: 
 
It is understandable that the collapse of the National 
Socialist empire delegitimized the image of masculinity that 
supported it and delegitimized patriarchal, fascist ideology as 
a whole. A completely different question, however is the 
extent to which this could possibly be recognized and 
comprehended so quickly by the conquered Germans 
(Winter 2001, 194). 
 
To this question, I offer a two-fold response. First, the German recognition of 
the downfall of militarist masculinity came nowhere near as fast as the 
recognition of the downfall of the National Socialist state. The latter case was 
realized through the presence of the occupiers, and, perhaps even more to the 
point, the dependence of the German population, in the short run, on the 
occupying forces for basics such as food and medical supplies. Postwar 
Germany was war-weary and exhausted, but this did not necessarily equate to 
a revolutionary shift in masculine identity.  
  This was made abundantly clear to me in interviews with older 
Germans early on in my fieldwork. Han-Erich Zeller was a retired Bundeswehr 
non-commissioned officer. Former Hauptfeldwebel (First Sergeant) Zeller was 
from a working class Hamburg family. His father was a mechanic who had 
served, reluctantly but honorably in Sgt. Zeller’s account, in the Wehrmacht.   196
Hans-Erich was drafted in the early 60s and never even considered 
conscientious objection. “In that time,” he said, “one did not do that. A man 
went to the army, he did his Wehrdienst and got it over with.” This meshes 
with stories I heard from other older Germans concerning service in the 
military, as well as the statistics, which saw only a trickle of those refusing to 
serve in the Bundeswehr in the 1950s and 60s.
10 
 Secondly,  the  recognition, in the sense of conscious understanding, of 
the link between soldierly masculinity and Nazi ideology was not necessary to 
the beginnings of a de-emphasis on militarist masculinity. The changed 
demographics—both the dead and missing soldiers and disgrace and downfall 
of the former Nazi leadership—opened literal room in society for the 
leadership of men who were less soldier-identified. The forced 
dismemberment of the Wehrmacht, and the physical presence of the 
occupation forces, left few institutional vehicles for the re-emergence of the 
types of masculinity celebrated by the Nazis. This was not the same as a self-
conscious shift in identity. Only gradually, over the course of decades, would 
new social movements—for example the 68ers and the anti-nuclear 
movement—make full use of the link between soldierly masculinity and the 
Nazis as a device for reorganizing consciousness, and only gradually would 
the majority of the population have its consciousness shifted. 
 
 
                                                 
10 According to information from the Press- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (Jan. 
1992) the total number of conscientious objectors between 1956 and 1958 was 2,447. In 1963 
the number was 2,777. 1972: 33,792. 1982: 59,859. For more recent years numbers from the 
Bundesamt für den Zivildienst, responsible since 1984 for reviewing and approving 
applications for conscientious objection, indicate that the trend was upward with objectors per 
year over 100,000 in the 1990s. For a more detailed discussion of conscientious objection in 
post-war Germany see chapters 6 and 7.   197
Amiliebchen 
  At the close of the Second World War, the American military leadership 
feared that too-close relationships between allied soldiers and the German 
population would lead to a breakdown in discipline. This in turn would make 
the draconian measures originally envisioned impossible to implement.
11 This 
fear was based in the widespread warm relations between American troops 
who occupied the Rhineland between 1919 and 1923 and the German 
population, where the official policy against fraternization broke down (Nelson 
1975, 3–7). Thus a key component of the occupation policy was a non-
fraternization order that the American military command was determined to 
enforce. 
  The policy against fraternization, however, quickly proved unrealistic. 
Whatever the opinions expressed on the editorial pages of the newspapers in 
the United States—predictably negative—American soldiers sought out the 
company of German civilians, particularly German women, in significant 
numbers. This led to the linguistically awkward construction “erotic 
fraternization.” Relationships, erotic or not, between American soldiers and 
German women provoked a great deal of concern on the part of the American 
military authorities. As early as September 1945 General Eisenhower, the 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, sent a memo to 
General Omar Bradley of the 12th Army Group complaining about 
fraternization and demanding a crackdown on the breach of discipline. Shortly 
                                                 
11 The original denazification and demilitarization plan for Germany was far more thorough 
than what was actually implemented even before the Marshall Plan and the development of 
the Cold War changed the orientation of American policy. The governing document for the 
occupation was JCS 1067. For a complete text see “Directive to the Commander in Chief of 
the United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany, May 
10, 1945,” in Documents on Germany, 1945–1985 (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of State), 1–2.   198
thereafter, then Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall ordered 
Eisenhower to take steps “to discourage fraternization” and he demanded that 
photographs of American soldiers acting on friendly terms with German 
civilians be banned.
12 
  Erotic fraternization between German women and American soldiers, or 
rather the complex of contemporary myth that surrounded such liaisons, 
resulted in the postwar female stereotype, the Amiliebchen (Yank lover). In 
mythic counterpoint to the sainted Trümmerfrauen, the whorish Amiliebchen 
filled the role of national scapegoat in the immediate aftermath of the war. In a 
provocative essay titled “Erotic Fraternization: The Legend of German 
Women’s Quick Surrender” (2002), Susanne zur Nieden describes an ongoing 
fascination with these women that she attributes to a massive shifting of guilt. 
Thus the nearly ubiquitous complaint that “German soldiers fought six years. 
The German woman, five minutes” (Nieden 2002, 204). In this construction it 
was not the loyal, hard-fighting German soldiers who were guilty of following a 
doomed, criminal regime to the bitter end. Instead it was German women who, 
by taking American lovers, refused to refuse and were judged as guilty of 
selling themselves cheaply, for food and cigarettes. 
  This supposed quick and absolute surrender of German women to the 
American occupiers gave rise to a plethora of anecdotes, dirty jokes, popular 
denouncements and stereotyped images collectively referred to as Fräulein 
stories. The following account is typical of the genre. It is from an unsigned 
                                                 
12 Eisenhower’s message to Bradley is dated September 17, 1944 (RG 311, file 9– [Germany], 
Adjutant General’s Records, 1944, SHAEF). Marshall’s orders to Eisenhower are dated 
September 21, 1944 (RG 331, file 9– [Germany], Adjutant General’s Records, 1944, SHAEF). 
Both are quoted in Goedde 1999, 13.   199
letter sent to a woman in Hamburg in the late 1940s. A notice had been placed 
in the paper announcing her engagement to an American. 
 
Dead tired, after weeks so long 
the soldiers are crawling home… 
She’s living it up, the German woman,  
in the worst possible way, we know for a fact. 
In pairs or on their own we see them walk along 
or stand longingly in doorways, in front of houses, 
a seductive smile on a cheery face, 
oh, German women, have you no shame? 
The German soldiers, armless and legless, 
you obviously don’t care for them. 
They have neither coffee nor butter, 
the foreigners have the lot, yes, even sugar. 
And if one brings along some chocolate, 
the color of his skin doesn’t matter at all; 
five years they needed to besiege us, 
but you, they got around in five minutes…. 
You’re dragging, and you know it, too, 
the honor of German woman through the dirt. 
(Domentat 1998, 18–19). 
 
The words are stereotypical and often repeated, found in placards and short 
stories. According to Hans Werner Richter, editor of the magazine Der Ruf and 
co-founder of the postwar German writers organization Gruppe 47, 
Amiliebchen were the hottest topic for casual conversation in the post-war 
period (Richter 1946/47, 6). 
  The often racially-charged myth of the quick and easy sexual surrender 
of German women, I argue, played an important role in the reconstruction of 
postwar German masculinity. Guilt is certainly a central issue in this 
reconstruction, and a particular kind of guilt: failure of refusal. Traditionally, 
women’s honor, as discussed briefly above in chapter 2, is all about refusal, 
specifically sexual refusal. That is, male honor is largely an instrument of 
support and conditioning useful in the social production of soldiers. Men   200
defend their honor by avenging insults and demanding their rights. Women 
protect their honor by guarding their sexual virtue, remaining chaste until 
married and faithful in marriage—by refusing the sexual attentions of 
unauthorized men (and relying on men to defend them). 
  The Third Reich was a period in which traditional male honor revolved 
around the ideal of loyalty. The National Socialist state even proposed, in its 
so-called Volksgemeinschaft, a substitute for old order honor as precedence. 
A true German was promised his proper place in the social order via his blood-
based membership in the German Volk, which was confirmed through his 
admittance to important institutions like the Wehrmacht and the Nazi Party. 
These institutions bestowed a collective honor that bound the individual to 
them as members. Yet as the war years dragged on and defeat became more 
and more certain, even traditionalists such as those involved in the July 20, 
1944 assassination attempt against Hitler came to see the NS state as 
bankrupt. The possibility of refusal, the most feminine of virtues, opened up—if 
only just—within the male universe.  
  For the most part, however, German men failed to refuse and held on to 
an identity and a mode of honor disgraced by the Nazis. The scorn directed 
against the Amiliebschen reflected an attempt at an ex post facto construction 
of moral superiority. The manly thing to do was to fight on, even in a lost cause 
for a criminal regime (“five years they needed to besiege us”); the 
appropriately female thing to do would have been to refuse the cigarette-and-
chocolate-sweetened advances of American servicemen and thereby avoid 
dragging “the honor of German woman through the dirt.” 
  I would argue further, however, that this continuing attack on the failure 
of erotic refusal in the Amiliebchen went hand-in-hand with a gradual shift in   201
masculine identity. The initial divide between heroic/loyal men and 
whorish/betraying women gives way, over time. The Amiliebchen is never 
forgiven, but gradually, through the activities of social movements and the 
reaction of public discourse to the post-war changes in the war system a new 
German man is made who is empowered to refuse.  
 
Resistant Sons 
   In her essay “Techno-Muscularity and the ‘Boy Eternal’: From the 
Quagmire to the Gulf” (1993), Lynda Boose discusses the road from Vietnam 
to the first Persian Gulf War in terms of the (re-)construction of American 
masculinity. In this thoughtful account she points out that much of the 
sociocultural impact of protest against the Vietnam War was provided by the 
participation of the draft-age sons of the middle class—and not just by active 
protest, but by a quiet refusal of  “future leaders” like J. Danforth Quayle—to 
put themselves in harm’s way for the sake of a war that no one could 
adequately explain. When, doubtless with an eye toward their own futures, 
they didn’t actually speak out against the war, they fled into protected statuses 
that allowed them to maintain a pretense of supporting the war, without 
actually having to fight it. 
  Thus, in Boose’s account, “in each of the mini wars staged in the 
decade before the Persian Gulf crisis, America’s primary goal was not, as had 
earlier been suspected, merely to undo defeat in Vietnam: It was to put to rest 
the legacy of resistant sons bequeathed by that conflict” (68). 
  This legacy of “resistant sons” indicated a significant intergenerational 
breach, a rupture in the every-twenty-year march to war which had served as 
much or more to justify a certain style of masculinity as to “defend” or expand   202
the boundaries of American hegemony. For the generation of men who came 
of age between 1964 and 1973, the Vietnam War represented the possibility 
of refusal—specifically the refusal to take up the torch of militarism and be 
proved “under fire” as worthy heirs to American masculinity. Moreover, this 
refusal differed from traditional conscientious objection—though certainly 
many philosophical pacifists opposed the Vietnam War—in that it was 
grounded not in a categorical refusal to fight under any circumstances, but in 
an ideologically contested milieu that included the notion that this specific war 
was “an unjustified act of political imperialism” (Boose 1993, 70). 
  From the point of view of the American ruling elite, pacifism has been 
viewed historically with a combination of amused disdain and reluctant 
tolerance—a tolerance based in the recognition that the rigors of the position 
will rarely attract more than a small fraction of the population and the firm 
belief that most avowed pacifists will do a rapid about-face if confronted with a 
little officially-sanctioned sadism.
13 What might be called situational pacifism, 
based in a critique of the politics of a particular war, however, is an entirely 
different matter. In such a case it is not war and violence per se that are 
questioned—an important point to be sure, but ultimately one that most 
militarists don’t take seriously—but the authority of the powers that be and 
their competence to lead. Obviously, over the long term, such a challenge is 
intolerable. The legacy of resistant sons had to be overcome and both the 
powers-that-be and the American culture industry went into overdrive 
                                                 
13 The only significant exception to this trend of which I am aware is the consistent refusal of 
members of certain religious communities, Quakers for example, to fight in all wars. Thus in 
the United States, at least, obtaining recognized conscientious objector status has virtually 
required the petitioner be a long-term member of such an avowedly pacifist religious order. 
This is not the case in contemporary Germany, where (as we will see), conscientious objector 
status is routinely granted to individuals based on a more-or-less unexamined statement of 
personal belief.   203
providing counter-examples of small scale “good wars” on the one hand and 
whole-scale reinterpretations of the Vietnam experience on the other. In 
retrospect, all of this may have been unnecessary. With the removal of the 
primary impetus to war resistance on the part of young men—i.e. the draft—
the pool of potential war resisters and anti-war activists promptly decreased to 
a manageable size. 
  Nonetheless, for a brief period—perhaps the span of a generation—
“what the debacle of America’s masculinized, militarized policies on both fronts 
of the Vietnam War had opened up was the sudden space in American culture 
for an alternative to the mythology of a national self born in and valorized by a 
history of conquest and dominance” (Boose 1993, 71). 
  In the German context, there was no specific legacy of “resistant sons” 
that developed during the Second World War. Rather, as discussed above, 
soldierly masculinity was destroyed, literally and figuratively. Then, over the 
next several decades, various new social movements, particularly the anti-
rearmament movement (ohne mich Bewegung), the student movement of the 
late 1960s, and the anti-nuclear peace movement of the early 1980s made 
strategic use of the link between Nazism, militarism and heroic soldierly 
masculinity. This resulted in a shifted understanding of what it means to be a 
man. 
  Perhaps the most crucial shift has to do with the normalization of 
refusal. As John Borneman writes of Germany in the 1990s: 
 
Based on my own ethnographic work over the last ten years, 
it is apparent that fantasies and self-conceptions, across the 
political spectrum and irrespective of gender or sexuality, 
have indeed changed dramatically among men and women 
in Germany…. 
With respect to the war in Yugoslavia, this change is   204
expressed, for example, in how both German men and 
women seem to have accepted all of the male refugees from 
the various groups in Bosnia without accusations of 
“cowardice” or “effeminacy.” Although the debate on the 
German role in Bosnia generated many different positions, 
there is a strong private commitment to the belief that men 
(German and “Yugoslavian”) have the right to refuse to fight 
in war (Borneman 1998a, 302). 
 
This right of refusal, enshrined in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic,
14 
has, in my analysis, become something more than an honorable option. In 
fact, I would argue that  in order for refusal to become a viable option, the 
stigma associated with it had to be displaced. 
  That such stigma did exist in the post-Nazi period, during the early 
years of the reinstitution of the draft, is clear from the contemporary opinion 
polling, the conscientious objector statistics, and interviews with German men 
who came of draft age between the late 1950s and early 1980s.
15 In contrast 
to young men who came of age in the mid- to late-1980s, and especially 
during the 1990s, men of the “older” generations, including those who came of 
age in the early 1980s, saw a significant stigma associated with 
Kreigsdienstverweigerung (war service refusal). 
  One man, Fritz Ostweldt, who served in the German Air Force as a 
draftee (Wehrdienstleister), told me that amongst his circle of friends there 
was little discussion about whether or not to refuse military service. This was 
                                                 
14 Article IV, Section 3. See chapter 6 for a closer examination of the Basic Law and the right 
to conscientious objection in the Federal Republic and post-unification Germany. 
15 Between 1953 and 1955, at a time when there was a significant movement against German 
rearmament, Germans were asked the following question: “It will also have to be decided 
whether it should be permissible to object to military service. Do you think those called up 
should, or should not, be allowed to object to military service?” In March 1955 just under half 
of those questioned, 48%, thought young men should be allowed to refuse and 35%—a 
striking statistic given that about half the population was against rearmament in any form—of 
those questioned thought those called up should not be allowed to refuse (Noelle-Neumann 
1967,449).   205
in spite of the fact that Ostweldt attended a Gymnasium, one of the elite 
college preparatory high schools most likely to produce conscientious 
objectors. He saw his military service (Wehrdeinst) as something to be 
endured and gotten through as quickly as possible. In spite of his assertion 
that there was “little discussion” about military service, he told me that many of 
his friends, particularly those who were “technically oriented” like him, feared 
that refusing service would be a mark against them with the higher ups in 
Germany’s major corporations. The argument was that since most of the men 
who now ran Germany’s largest companies would have served in the military, 
they would probably have a preference for hiring veterans. 
  When I asked him directly about the military and masculinity, Ostweldt 
told story after story. The notes of my conversations with him, spanning 
several hours- long sessions, runs to thirty-eight pages, single-spaced. Again 
and again he returned to the topic of the specifically erotic context of military 
life, and the pressure to live a life dominated by pornography and visiting 
prostitutes. Possessed of a particularly bourgeois sense of virtue, Fritz told 
me, “People said, ‘go to the Bundeswehr’ and you’ll be a real man. I don’t think 
this was true. There were no regulations, only the examples they [the officers 
and non-commissioned officers] set.” 
  As we sat drinking coffee in a smoky Kneipe near the Neukölln subway 
stop, Fritz told the story of one of his training NCOs. The trainer was a young 
man not much older than Fritz, but who held a position of considerable 
institutional authority vis-à-vis the conscripts. As Ostweldt put it, “he was 
always trying to be your friend.” One evening he brought some videos into the 
barracks and the trainees gathered to watch them. Even fifteen years later, it 
was clear that Fritz was still upset, angry even, about the incident. The videos   206
were pornographic, and Fritz felt offended by the content, but even more, he 
felt betrayed by the fact that it was someone in authority who had  introduced 
the material. The implication, he told me, was that anyone who complained 
would be a schweinhund (literally, a pig-dog). For Fritz this created feelings of 
alienation with the men in his platoon, most of whom were eager to follow the 
example of the NCO. Ostweldt considered this incident to be typical of military 
life and attributed it to the lack of definite separation between “work life” and 
“private life” in the military. 
  Fritz Ostweldt’s biggest critique of life inside the Bundeswehr was that it 
lacked the order and regimentation that he expected of military life. He told me 
that people think the military will “teach you to be a real man,” but it does not, 
in fact, do so. The non-commissioned officers, in his view, were undisciplined. 
People did not learn good work habits nor were such habits role-modeled by 
the NCOs. The constant preoccupation was a juvenile obsession with sex for 
sale. For Ostweldt at least, macho displays and erotic adventures were not 
“manly” but thuggish, associated with a degraded world without the clean lines 
separating public and private found in civilian life. These critiques, however, 
were from a distance of fifteen years. Prior to his service, he had no doubt that 
military service was the expedient choice and he believed the then commonly-
held notion that it was also the manly one. 
  Contrast this with the view of young men approaching draft age in 2001. 
I had the opportunity to interact with a number of such men at several training 
sessions held at the Akademie der Bundeswehr für Information und 
Kommunikation (AIK), where I did much of my fieldwork. The Akademie 
conducts trainings for Bundeswehr officers and NCOs on particular career 
paths—Youth Officer, Recruiter and Press Officer—as well as for more senior   207
officers faced with media and public speaking chores. As part of the training of 
non-commissioned officers as recruiters (Wehrdeinstberater), AIK holds a 
mock “open house” at the end of each training cycle. These training events 
simulate the kind of environment recruiters encounter at job fairs and other 
situations in which the Bundeswehr often sets up recruiting and information 
stations. The target audience, of course, is young people, but recruiters 
inevitably face questions from an often skeptical civilian population. On several 
occasions I was invited to act the part of such a civilian skeptic and 
encouraged by the trainers to ask difficult and embarrassing questions of the 
recruiters. 
  Besides giving me the opportunity to ask loaded, unfair questions of 
active duty soldiers—e.g. “Isn’t it true that most Bundeswehr recruits are right 
wing extremists?” and “Since the Cold War is over, isn’t maintaining a large 
military a waste of resources that could be better spent improving the lives of 
German citizens?”—these training events also gave me the chance to speak 
informally to high school aged Germans who regularly made fieldtrips to AIK 
just for these occasions. 
  I asked one group of three young men, recent Gymnasium graduates, 
what they were going to do about their social service responsibilities. Of the 
three, one said right away that he had already filed for conscientious objector 
status and planned to do Zivildienst (the required substitute service for those 
who refuse military service). A second said that he didn’t want to do either, 
regarding both as a waste of his time. He planned to try to get into an 
extended overseas program that would, he hoped, prevent him from being 
mustered at all. If he was mustered, he said that he would probably do the 
military service, because it was shorter. The third said (this was after speaking   208
to the recruiters, who tended to be fairly effective) that he thought he might 
volunteer for military service—meaning that rather than just allowing himself to 
be drafted, he would enlist for a specific branch and type of training. None of 
the three saw either military or civilian services as carrying a particular 
stigma—though two of the three saw service of either type as an infringement 
upon their lives. Asked which type of service was more important to society, all 
three agreed that Zivildienst did more social good, but they also thought that it 
should be strictly voluntary. 
  Nor should this be interpreted as anti-military sentiment. The majority of 
young people with whom I talked, both those just of draft age and those who 
had recently completed military service, were anti-draft, but not anti-
Bundeswehr. My perceptions are in accord with the results of a 1998 EMNID 
poll, wherein the Bundeswehr was ranked as one of the most trusted 
institutions in society, as well as with results of more in-depth research on the 
attitudes of German youth toward service undertaken in the 1990s (Böhne 
1998, 57). Attitudes toward conscientious objection have obviously changed 
and refusing to serve in the military is now in no way thought of as a negative, 
neither as a diminution of masculinity nor a mark against future employment.   209
  This normalization of conscientious objection goes hand-in-hand with 
changes in attitudes toward Gehorsamkeit (obedience) as a value in the 
society as a whole. Germany has long been stereotyped as a society 
obsessed with rules and obedience. The ethos traditionally required of 
soldiers, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3, was idealized and imitated in the 
larger society in the latter years of the nineteenth century. Young men were 
prepared for life in the army in dueling fraternities and then in later years in the 
Jungdeutschlandbund, a Boy Scout like organization where paramilitary 
training was instituted in the early years of the twentieth century.  
Starting from the period just before the First World War, the last 
vestiges of aristocratic refinement and bourgeois restraint were jettisoned from 
the image of ideal German manhood. Particularly for the National Socialists 
hardness, driven by the will to power, was the quintessential feature of 
manhood (Funck 2002, 57–8). The development of such hardness required 
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Figure 4.1 – Importance of Obedience in Children* 
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discipline and training, which in turn required obedience. Hence the fin-de-
siecle “crisis of masculinity” (see chapter 3), was bound up with debates about 
the raising and education of children. In order to prepare them for their future 
roles—men to serve in the military and women to order the domestic sphere 
and refuse the sexual advances of unauthorized men—children had to be 
taught to obey. A belief in the overriding importance of teaching children to 
obey lingered even after the Second World War, with attitudinal shifts on this 
count mirroring changes in the construction of ideal manhood. 
As Figure 4.1 shows, when asked the question: “What are the most 
important character traits toward which the education of children should be 
directed: obedience and subordination, orderliness and diligence, or autonomy 
and free will?”—the percentage of people ranking obedience first declined 
steadily between the late-1960s and mid-1980s.
16 The declining importance of 
obedience reflects, among other things, the new possibility of refusal as a 
component of masculinity. With the declining value of hardness, at least 
relative to other qualities, the need for obedience training is lessened and 
room opened in the culture for alternatives. Boys no longer had to be pre-
defined as fodder for the army.  
  To summarize: the shift in the content of masculinity—the increased 
importance of refusal and the decreased importance of obedience and 
subordination—is not just in reaction to the humiliation of the loss in the 
Second World War. The place of Germany vis-à-vis the international war 
                                                 
16 “Auf welche Eigenschaften sollte die Erziehung der Kinder vor allem hinzielen: Gerhorsam 
und Unterordnung, Ordungslieve und Fleiss, or Selbständigkeit und Freier Wille?” (Hoffmann 
1998, 88). Note that during the same period the rank of Selbständigkeit und freier Wille 
(autonomy and free will) rose steadily from 28% ranking them of most importance in 1951 to 
62% in 1995. The second set of characteristics, Ordnungsliebe und Fleiss (orderliness and 
diligence), remained stable at about 40%.   211
system has changed dramatically. Between 1945 and 1990, Germany 
remained a nation both divided and occupied. This, combined with the literal 
feminization of German society in the immediate post-war period, led to the 
valorization of refusal. In effect, in an occupied society, the relationship of 
masculinity to nation-state is shifted. At the same time, of course, market 
pressures have led to a more individuated society—yet it is important to point 
out that though refusal has become much more common in all Western 
societies, in none of the traditional Great Powers has the culture of the military 
itself become so accommodating to the idea of refusal. This shift, I think, can 
be attributed to the institutionalization of refusal within the Bundeswehr, and its 
valorization in German society as a whole. As subsequent post-war 
generations have encountered the historic failure of Germans to refuse during 
the Nazi period, in a war system context that has isolated the German military 
from deadly combat, there was room in the system for the assertion of 
different values. Of course, even as I write this, Germany’s position in the wars 
system continues to change. There are no guarantees. The future, however, 
will not be a simple repetition of the past—it never is. 212 
CHAPTER 5 
MASCULINITY, REFUSAL AND THE BURDEN OF HISTORY 
 
As discussed in chapter 4, one of the most significant phenomena that 
developed from the reaction to the Vietnam War in the United States was what 
Lynda Boose calls the “legacy of resistant sons” (Boose 1993, 68). It is 
doubtful that the number of resisters ever amounted to anything like a majority 
of the population of young American men. However, much the same thing can 
be said about other perceived crises in masculinity. The “new women,” self-
styled decadents and gender-bending homosexuals of late nineteenth century 
Europe never constituted a numerical threat to normative masculinity. Rather, 
they represented that most difficult of ideological challenges: the living 
counter-example. As in post-Vietnam America, the reaction to Wilhelmine 
gender deviance was distinctly out of proportion to any actual threat to 
masculine prerogatives—unless we take into account the twin factors of the 
fragility of soldierly masculinity and its presumed importance to the war 
system. 
The legacy of World War II, however, must be thought through in 
slightly different terms. The key point is still resistance—or rather, translating 
more directly from the word I heard so many times from German informants, 
refusal (Verweigerung). The starting place for considering what I view as the 
importance of refusal in shaping post-war German masculinity is the collective 
failure of refusal during the Nazi era. Nor is it particularly useful to fob off the 
stereotyped German penchant for following orders as an explanation for this 
failure. German men, no doubt with widely varying degrees of enthusiasm, 
joined the military and various National Socialist organizations, paramilitary   213
and otherwise. There was no wide-spread contemporary movement 
supporting refusal. The reasons for this failure are complex. But however the 
failure of refusal was understood during the Nazi era, in the years after 1945 it 
was increasingly interpreted as a lack. 
The consequences are enormous. Since the war was lost in spite of the 
lack of any significant internal opposition—since the Jews and democrats and 
socialists who had been blamed for the German loss in World War I had all 
been imprisoned, killed or driven into exile—there remained no one to blame 
but the German Volk itself. Not surprisingly the bulk of the guilt was laid at the 
feet of Hitler, the SS and the Nazi Party, which was re-characterized as a gang 
of criminals and thugs who had led Germany astray. In this construction, the 
majority of Germans never accepted the Hitler government and tended to go 
along with the Nazis, to the extent they did, out of a combination of fear and 
ignorance of the extent of its crimes.  
Officers and enlisted men who served in the World War II era German 
military, the Wehrmacht, remained “men of honor” who had served their 
country out of duty. Even Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, who tended to blame National Socialism on the 
Prussian military tradition, maintained this position. In a speech to the 
Bundestag in April 1951, as Jeffrey Neff reports, Adenauer told the 
representatives of the German people that “the number of soldiers who had 
committed crimes was ‘so extraordinarily minor and so extraordinarily small’ 
(Deutscher Bundestag 1951, 4,938) that the honor of the German military had 
not been injured” (Neff 1997, 292). 
Nor was this opinion necessarily extinguished with time, in spite of 
mounting evidence. It is true that in the years since the Adenauer era a   214
generalized distrust of all things military has developed amongst the German 
population, but the idea of widespread guilt in the Wehrmacht remains 
unpalatable. Beginning in 1995 an exhibit of World War II-era military crimes, 
“War of Genocide: Crimes of the Wehrmacht Between 1941 and 1944” 
(“Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944”) put together 
by the independent, highly regarded Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, 
began to tour Germany. Almost immediately it generated controversy in the 
German press. The exhibit became a nearly obligatory topic of conversation 
for me with any German who discovered that I was researching the military. 
I spent a long afternoon discussing the exhibit with one mid-career 
Bundeswehr officer, Major Wolfgang Heinz. Articulate and personable, Major 
Heinz was eager to speak about the future of the Bundeswehr—a hot topic at 
the time (May 2000), since the report of the Wiezsäcker commission was hot 
off the press.
1 Toward the end of our talk, I asked what he thought about the 
controversy surrounding the Wehrmacht exhibit. He frowned slightly at the 
question. 
“Yes,” he said, “I know about that exhibit. There are some.... problems 
with it. There was a photograph. It was supposed to show victims of the 
Wehrmacht, but it turns out that the bodies in the photograph were Germans. 
When they make mistakes like that, it undermines everything that the exhibit is 
trying to say.” 
                                                 
1 The commission was chaired by former Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker. It’s 
report, Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehre, Bericht der Kommission an die 
Bundesregierung (May 23, 2000), stirred up a controversy spurred by the criticism of Defense 
Minister Rudolf Scharping (FAZ 2000a, 2). The Ministry released its own, much less radical, 
reform plan only days after the publication of the Weizsäcker report. This was seen by many 
as a slap in the face to the long, hard work of the commission (FAZ 2000b, 2). Among other 
differences in the plans, the Weizsäcker Commission called for a smaller force of about 
140,000 professional soldiers augmented by draftees that would raise the peacetime strength 
to 240,000. The plan called for drafting 30,000 men a year for ten months of service. The 
Scharping plan called for a 277,000 man force and 100,000 draftees per year.   215
Here I get to engage in one of the strange pleasures of ethnographic 
fieldwork and point out an informant’s error—and then consider what it means. 
Major Heinz  was correct to an extent. There had been accusations that 
certain photographs in the exhibit, labeled as if they depicted victims of the 
Wehrmacht, might in fact have been victims of the Soviet NKVD. In no case, 
however, could the victims be construed as Germans. 
In Major Heinz’s version of the controversy, Germans are transformed 
from perpetrators into victims. The tone he took was not aggressive. Somber 
and earnest, his demeanor suggested patient suffering; he seemed to be 
doubtful that his complaints, the German complaints, would receive a fair 
hearing. On the surface his concerns—and the concerns of all of those who 
critiqued the exhibit for a lack of historical accuracy—had merit. A careful 
examination of the controversy, however, even as it was covered in the press, 
does not exactly show the Wehrmacht in an exemplary light. The initial 
questions came from historian Bogdan Musial. He charged that a row of 
photographs depicting supposed victims of the Wehrmacht were actually 
Ukrainian nationalists killed by the Soviets. There is, however, a relevant 
context for viewing these particular photographs.  
Yes, the German army, as it advanced into the Ukraine in 1941, did 
discover a mass grave of victims of the Soviet NKVD. It then forced the local 
Jewish community to exhume the bodies so that photographs could be taken 
and used as anti-Soviet propaganda. According to eyewitness testimony, in 
the days following the exhumation, the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS 
murdered some 3,000 Jews and blamed the Soviets for that as well.
2 It seems 
                                                 
2 The following account is from a press release put out by the Hamburger Institute, dated 
March 1999 (my translation): “By way of explanation: It has been known, for a long time, that 
in the period immediately preceeding the German advance into the Galician region that the   216
quite likely that the surviving photographs are the ones taken by the German 
propaganda corps, depicting victims of the Soviets—a fact that should be 
respected and clarified—but in a surreal way the same photographs, 
combined with the knowledge of what happened so shortly after they were 
taken, also document the Wehrmacht crime. 
For this particular informant, the bigger story was elided in favor of a 
call for “accuracy,” ostensibly so that the point of the exhibit would not be 
undermined by dubious material, but fact here seems to be at odds with truth. 
The process of identity-formation is revealed in “mistakes” of this kind. 
Even more than the various CDU-led efforts to reject the exhibit, this 
informant’s transposition of victims—that is, the misidentification of the 
Wehrmacht as perpetrators equals German victims—indicates an ambivalent 
longing. Like many Germans to whom I spoke, Major Heinz regretted the fact 
that it was unmöglich (impossible) for the Bundeswehr to “act like a normal 
army” with “normal national pride.” Yet his acknowledgement of the 
impossibility, however bitter, was genuine. He did not deny that Wehrmacht 
soldiers, perhaps whole units, were guilty of atrocities; nor did he deny that the 
very efficiency of the Wehrmacht and the loyalty of its officers prolonged the 
war with disastrous consequences. Rather, he longed for a way to move past 
                                                                                                                                              
NKVD murdered many Ukrainian nationalists. This was illustrated, for example, by the 
Tarnopol Exhibit. The massacre in Zloczow [where the photos are thought to be from] is an 
analogous case: the corpses had to be exhumed by the Jewish population after German 
troops entered the area in July 1941. In the following days some 3,000 Jews were murdered 
as Ukrainian collaborators by the German Waffen-SS and soldiers of the Wehrmacht, 
supposedly because they were implicated in the the NKVD murders. On July 7, 1941 the local 
commandant (Stadtkommandant) wrote a letter of protest against the murders and posted 
guards to keep the curious away from the crime scene. Furthermore, reporters and 
photographers from the Wehrmacht Propaganda Company 666 converged on the site in 
search of radical anti-semitic material for the press back home. This is no doubt the reason 
why the photos exist. An NCO named Worbs had them in his possession since 1944.” 
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it and hoped for, but did not expect, a sympathetic hearing from the outside 
world. Though he did not use the words, the refrain has been familiar since the 
earliest days of the old Federal Republic: the Germans too were victims of the 
Nazis, don’t hold us all equally accountable. 
The Wehrmacht exhibit, even more than the Historikerstreit, generated 
widespread dialogue about the role of “ordinary Germans” in the Nazi crimes. I 
attended a number of public meetings in Berlin on the topic. The format of the 
meetings was the professorial lecture followed by questions and discussion 
from and with the audience. It was the discussion segment that usually proved 
most interesting. Whatever the particular emphasis of the lecture, the 
questions and discussions uniformly revealed the dissonance of irreconcilable 
feelings. On the one hand, the participants, typically left-leaning students and 
activists, voiced suspicion, even hostility, toward the Wehrmacht and all things 
military; on the other hand, there were always those who would rise to caution 
against going “too far” with blanket indictments against German soldiers, the 
vast majority of whom had done no worse than soldiers in other armies. 
I was drawn to investigate this emotional dilemma: two seemingly 
irreconcilable positions—fundamental distrust of the military (particularly the 
pre-1945 military) and visceral recoil from the categorical indictment of the 
Wehrmacht—somehow merged to form a seamless totality of denial. Many of 
my informants brought up the exhibit and were eager to talk about it. One of 
the most interesting responses came from a friend of a friend who is a 
university professor and reserve officer in the Bundeswehr. He was the one 
who originally told me about the Wehrmacht exhibit controversy (correctly 
identifying its nature). I had several conversations with him about the 
Bundeswehr, military service, duty, honor and violence. At one point I asked   218
him directly: “Why do you think it’s so hard for Germans to accept the guilt of 
the Wehrmacht? Why the strong reaction to the idea that ordinary German 
soldiers participated in the Nazi crimes?” 
“Well, yes,” he answered, “as we’ve discussed—there is the element of 
the identification of the army and the nation, a kind of symbolism, but that’s 
mostly bullshit (Scheisse). The truth is that most Germans, when we talked to 
our fathers and grandfathers, didn’t talk about the war. We just know that they 
are decent men. We knew them. They weren’t criminals. And as soon as you 
say that the Wehrmacht was guilty of these Greueltaten (atrocities), these 
crimes against humanity, then you start to imply that even to have served was 
already to be guilty.” 
This analysis from the former Cpt. Klassmann followed on the heels of 
a conversation about pacifism and responsibility. He explained that it was an 
issue that had come up when he had done political education in his unit—not 
an unusual duty for officers in the Bundeswehr. Sometimes it would happen 
that a soldier with a “non-combatant” military occupation—cooks, clerks, 
mechanics and the like—would say to  him: “I could never shoot anyone.” He 
responded,  
“An army is a machine, a killing machine. It is a machine that you keep 
oiled and in tune and hope you never have to use, but it is a machine. It 
makes no sense to place disproportionate blame on the part of the machine 
that makes physical contact with the enemy. Without cooks, without truck 
drivers, without logistics officers, the machine would never make contact with 
the enemy. If there is war, you will not be less guilty for not having pulled the 
trigger.” 
I hasten to point out that in spite of this rather stark, unblinking analysis,   219
Professor Klassmann is a life-long member of the Social Democrats with a 
thoroughly liberal, even progressive outlook—to the extent that these labels 
are transferable from the American to the German context. He was, however, 
exquisitely tuned to the exigencies of the war system. He believed that even if 
armies, which he knows to be killing machines, are all too often used 
aggressively in ways that lead to suffering and death, this very possibility 
requires a responsible society to maintain military strength in order to defend 
itself from such tendencies. 
The point is that Professor Klassmann thoroughly understood the 
nature of collective guilt in a cooperative system. He had, as noted above, 
taught classes to soldiers on the subject. Yet even for him, a man of 
passionate logic and stark judgments, it was difficult to attribute to his own 
father, his own grandfather, a place in the Nazi killing machine. He was quite 
conscious of this contradiction. 
In the immediate aftermath of the war, when it was still unclear what 
level of collaboration with the Hitler-regime would be punished in what way, 
the idea that “even to have served was already to be guilty” was virtually 
unspeakable. In the Adenauer years the reintegration of those who had been 
part of the Nazi regime or actively supported it was considered by many to be 
more important than justice. The new Germany would never thrive, the 
Chancellor told the nation in his first Regierunserklärung (the equivalent of a 
state-of-the-union address), if people continued to be divided into “die politisch 
Einwandfrei und die Nichteinwandfreien,” (“the politically pure and impure” 
[Schwarz 1975, 163]).  
Yet the very notion of justice requires a division between the guilty and 
the innocent. Both the clamor of the outside world, including the voices of   220
many German émigrés, and the need to blame and punish someone for the 
catastrophe which had befallen Germany also pushed toward some kind of 
reckoning. The political climate, however, was very sensitive in the early years 
of the Bundesrepublik and it was by no means a forgone conclusion that the 
new West German state would be successfully integrated into the West. 
Adenauer’s government walked a fine line between widespread calls for a 
general amnesty and the desire of a small but vocal group of outsiders, 
supported at times by the international community, for vigorous prosecution, 
investigation and denazification. The upshot was a hard and necessary 
division into the pure and impure. A razor-sharp line was drawn between the 
small number of “actual perpetrators” and the broad masses who would 
henceforth be considered innocent.  
In this view of things, the actual group of perpetrators, the men who had 
so led Germany astray deserved to be punished. This group, however, 
consisted primarily of a handful of evil Nazi masterminds—Hitler, Himmler, 
Heydrich and a few others who were for the most part already conveniently 
dead—along with the frontline workers in the death camps, characterized as 
lower-class habitual criminals and sadists.  
Conspicuously absent from the ranks of the guilty, in this view, were the 
bulk of the professional men—railroad executives, contractors, engineers, 
lawyers, doctors and accountants—who had followed orders and thereby 
facilitated the machinery of death, but who had neither willed the Nazi crimes 
in the first place, nor carried them out in the last. In German the word used to 
refer to such individuals is Schreibtischtäter (criminals of the desk).
3 They 
                                                 
3 Another of the words that is impossible to translate conveniently into English, 
Schreibtischtäter is used to refer to both those who participated in planning the Holocaust—
the “architects of genocide”—as well as the functionaries who carried out the logistical aspects   221
typically belonged to the social elite and were able to exert considerable 
pressure on the new government, not least of all because it would have been 
virtually impossible to run the post-war bureaucracies without their help. 
In the context of military occupation and the Nuremberg War Crimes 
Trials, widely regarded by Germans as a show trial,  the concept of “victor’s 
justice” (Siegerjustiz) gained a good bit of political viability. Men of the 
Schreibtischtäter class were able to use it to argue that they “were unjustly 
being accused on political grounds of having committed acts which were not in 
themselves criminal, but were perfectly ‘normal’ aspects of the conduct of 
warfare, in the interests of a perfectly proper political cause” (Fullbrook 1999, 
60). 
Here we see the first efforts at constructing refusal after the fact. It 
hardly takes a detour into psychoanalysis to understand why this was felt to be 
important. If Hitler and the Nazis—a few ringleaders and a small band of thugs 
and criminals—were to be blamed both for the humiliating defeat of the 
German nation and the crimes committed in its name, then it would not do to 
posit widespread support for the National Socialist regime. Logically, blaming 
the few required the de facto innocence of the many. To be innocent meant 
that the many must not have actually been attracted to, loyal to, or otherwise 
in active collaboration with, the National Socialist regime. In effect, the 
constructed claim was the fiction that the bulk of the German population had 
refused to go along with the Nazis. The unsavory alternative was to say that it 
was the German nation that had been defeated and the German people who 
were guilty. 
                                                                                                                                              
of deportation, accounting, scheduling, etc., with varying degrees of knowledge and 
enthusiasm.   222
This initial effort to put some distance between the German people and 
the deeds of the Nazis (and to deny the degree to which ordinary Germans 
had identified with key aspects of the National Socialist program) may very 
well have been necessary in both psychological and practical terms. An 
obsessive dwelling on the enormity of the German defeat and the abhorrent 
nature of the collective crimes committed by the National Socialist state was 
not liable to lead to re-building the country, physically or morally. The 
demographics here must be kept in mind—a great many of the people who 
had fought for the Nazi state were dead or permanently disabled in the 
aftermath of the war.  Moreover, from the point of view of running the country, 
most of the men with any experience had cooperated with the Nazis in one 
way or another. When the guilty outnumber the innocent, justice is a hard sell. 
Thus the initial strategy for constructing refusal to the Nazi 
phenomenon was denial. “It didn’t happen that way. We didn’t know. We were 
never really with Hitler. We were afraid that if we said anything or did anything 
we would lose our jobs, be imprisoned, face a firing squad.”
4 To a certain 
extent, of course, denials of this sort were emasculating, admitting as they did 
both ineffectuality and cowardice in the face of danger, the very opposite of 
manly prowess, self-determination and strength of character. Such denials 
                                                 
4 During my two years living in Berlin with my wife, from September 1999 through October 
2001, we had a number of visitors from the United States. Besides the monuments, cafes and 
opera houses, one of the places we invariably would take people was the Gedenkstätte Haus 
der Wannsee-Konferenz, the one-time SS officers’ retreat where the details of the Holocaust 
were actually hammered out by top National Socialist bureaucrats in January 1942. The 
materials there run the range from the horrific to the Kafkaesque, but invariably the one that 
would draw peoples’ attention was a simple printed statement, available in several languages, 
from a former lance corporal of the 322nd Police Battalion. “Buddies [of mine] sometimes 
refused to participate in executions. A few times I was also among these. And just as nothing 
was done to me by those in command, nothing was done to the others either after they had 
refused to carry our such orders. We were simply given different assignments. Thus we were 
not threatened with punitive measures, let alone a firing squad” (Gedenkstätte n.d., 46). The 
consequences of refusal are not necessarily predictable and the impetus to obedience is not 
necessarily fear of harsh punishment, even in extreme cases.   223
were formulated by men like Adenauer who were identified with both 
bourgeois and Christian values—men who could plausibly express contempt 
for Nazi militarism and heroic masculinity.
5 
For those men whose relationship to the heroic form of masculinity 
celebrated during the Third Reich was more ambivalent, such blanket 
denunciations were more difficult. The majority had not been SS members or 
Nazi Party insiders, but  nearly half of all men (about 22 percent of the entire 
population) served in the military during the war. Since nearly 1-in-3 German 
men were either killed or wounded on the battlefield, virtually everyone in the 
society was closely related to someone who was a casualty (see chapter 4). 
To say the least, this experience of personal loss—the death or permanent 
crippling of a husband, son, brother or father—created a deep and quite 
possibly irremediable ambivalence toward the regime and cause that called for 
this sacrifice. On the one hand, it would certainly be possible to blame the 
regime for injuries and suffering—as the literary spokesmen of the so-called 
Young Generation discussed below did—but on the other hand, to believe the 
regime completely evil and without redeeming qualities, would be to conceive 
of horrible sacrifices made pointless and even criminal.  
What is more, especially in the early years of the Nazi movement, the 
National Socialists created a form of public representation, in the form of its 
rituals, iconography and propaganda—however crude and ludicrous it may 
have seemed to its detractors—that engaged many Germans in a national 
consciousness that had theretofore been lacking. As George Mosse argues, 
                                                 
5 The story of post-war Germany I am telling here is very much a West German story. Events 
developed quite differently in the East and if I had a pretense to tell the story of post-war 
German masculinity and militarism, it would necessarily have to include the DDR. That larger 
story, however, is beyond the scope of this project, focusing as it does specifically on West 
Germany and the subsequent Berlin Republic.   224
Nazism was a mass movement that took full advantage of a symbolic politics 
designed to engage people at an emotional level. It took as its model the 
secular religion of nationalism and as its style a triumphant, militarist 
masculinity. Though the Nazi style may never have appealed to some, and 
probably wore thin after the long years of war and privation, it obviously held a 
great many in thrall in the beginning. Brushing aside both the atomization of 
the bourgeois world for communitas in the volksgemeinschaft and the insipid 
compromises of party politics for identification with the leader, the Nazis 
“successfully adapted a tradition which had presented an alternative to 
parliamentary democracy for over a century before the fascist movements 
themselves became a political reality” (Mosse 1975, 9). 
And again, even Adenauer, who would for most of his post-war career 
take care to emphasize that only a few “criminals” were really responsible for 
the Nazi crimes, nonetheless understood that the Nazis appealed to the 
German people. “National Socialism could not have come to power if it had not 
found in broad layers of the population soil well prepared for its poison” 
(Schwarz 1975, 85). 
Even those who had not been particularly sympathetic to the Nazi party, 
its rituals and symbols, or its glorification of heroic masculinity, still had painful 
memories of silence or even complicity in the face of National Socialist crimes. 
Given such a record, and with an initially vengeful military government of 
occupiers in power, silence was the order of the day.  
As the philosopher Karl Jaspers, the first prominent German intellectual 
to give voice to the need for Germans to face their guilt, individually and 
collectively, in the post-war world, put it in a public lecture in 1946: 
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A proudly silent bearing may for a short time be a justified 
mask, to catch one’s breath and clear one’s head behind it. 
But it becomes self-deception, and a trap for the other, if it 
permits us to hide defiantly within ourselves, to bar 
enlightenment, to elude the grasp of reality. We must guard 
against evasion. From such a bearing there arises a mood 
which is discharged in private, safe abuse, a mood of 
heartless frigidity, rabid indignation and facial distortions, 
leading to barren self-corrosion. A pride that falsely deems 
itself masculine, while in fact evading the issue, takes even 
silence as an act of combat, a final one that remains 
impotent (Jaspers 2000, 11).  
 
Jaspers, however, was virtually alone in pointing out the nature of the silence 
and the need to move beyond it. As Moses Moskowitz, reporting for 
Commentary in the immediate aftermath of the war wrote “To date no one 
(except the philosopher Jaspers) has arisen in Germany to exhort his people 
to repentance and expiation for the mass graves of Jews dotting the European 
continent” (quoted in Rabinbach 1997, 130). 
  Of course many Germans were unrepentant. They saw the crimes of 
the Nazi state as separated from those of the Allies only by the purifying power 
of victory. Martin Heidegger, for example, is now probably even better known 
to the general public for his collaboration with the National Socialist regime 
than for his immensely influential philosophical writings—at least since the 
controversy erupted on the pages of The New York Review of Books.
6 
Heidegger’s career thrived under the Nazis. He was dismissed from his 
teaching position during the denazification period. Jaspers, by contrast, was 
                                                 
6 In the United States at least controversies in the humanities and social sciences typically first 
move beyond the confines of academia when they reach the pages of The New York Review 
of Books. Two essay reviews, both by Thomas Sheehan (1988, 1993), brought the issue to a 
wider public. The first was published in June 1988 dealing primarily with Victor Farias’ 
Heidegger and Nazism (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) and the second in 
January 1993 in the wake of the publication of prominent German historian Ernst Nolte’ Martin 
Heidegger: Politik und Geschichte im Leben und Denken (Berlin: Propyläen, 1992) and the 
collection The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader, edited by Richard Wolin (Cambridge, 
Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1993, earlier edition by Columbia University Press, 1991).   226
dismissed during the Third Reich and reinstated after the occupation. 
Less well known are the attitudes of the former leaders of the German 
military. It is not just in Germany that the Wehrmacht has been treated as 
relatively innocent in Nazi crimes, with the bulk of the blame being leveled at 
more ideologically suspect organizations like the SS. General Alfred Jodl, 
former Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff in the Army High 
Command, made his feelings known in a sixteen page letter sent to the War 
Crimes Commission. In this letter, dated September 6, 1946, the man who 
was one of the highest ranking military officers in the Third Reich writes: 
 
Of course, in history and especially in times of war 
success alone decides at the end. And this speaks against 
him [Hitler]. What is true, and what was right or wrong is 
decided by the victor. He will strive to picture Adolf Hitler as 
a ferocious beast, as had once also been done erroneously 
with Nero. But he was no such thing. He was much more a 
true German and despite all skepticism which mostly arose 
from a lack of sense of justice, he was an idealist and a 
visionary, an artistic nature. I can show through dozens of 
examples that it is only under the action of many disillusions 
of the unscrupulous fighting methods and threats of 
annihilation from our enemies that he became a fanatic and 
merciless fighter for his people as the enemy propaganda 
represented him from the beginning (Office of United States 
Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality 1946, 
665). 
 
Rather than repentance and acceptance of guilt, the tone is equivocal, citing a 
need to see even Hitler as a man driven by a desire to protect his country from 
foreign aggressors, including, as he emphasizes elsewhere in his letter, the 
grave threat posed by the prospect of “revolution” within Germany and the 
Soviet threat to the East. 
  With denazification, the Nuremberg trials and the creation of a new 
westward leaning government, voices such as Jodl’s were drowned out in the   227
post-war years, only to re-emerge with a vengeance in the Historians’ Debate 
(Historikerstreit) in the 1980s. In fact Jodl’s letter could virtually be a blunt 
abstract of Nolte’s revisionist writings. Both place the blame for the rise of the 
National Socialists on the Western powers and the Versailles Treaty; both 
invoke the Bolshevik threat as justification for World War; both relativize Nazi 
crimes, comparing them with the crimes of the other states and lament—Jodl 
somewhat more honestly than Nolte—the reality of victor’s justice.  
 
Enter the Young Generation: Refusal and Literary Blame Shifting 
The response to the problem of refusal, or rather its failure, during the 
Nazi-era, had many valences and trajectories that have continued to shift over 
time. Thus the responses of men like Jodl, Heidegger, Jaspers and Adenauer, 
while differing significantly each from the other, still formed a generational 
piece. They were all men of the older generation, in Adenauer’s case an elder 
statesman even when the Nazis came to power in 1933.
7 Some of these men, 
Jaspers perhaps most eloquently, and men of the left like Kurt Schumacher 
who suffered imprisonment and exile did speak up and speak out, but the 
ascendant modality was Adenauer’s carefully nuanced elisions.  
In response to the official balancing act of the “older” generation—
                                                 
7 Here I am taking the probably unforgivable shortcut of allowing Adenauer to stand in not just 
for the German conservatives and the Christian Democratic Union that he helped found, but 
for the post-war German establishment as a whole, at least in the long years of his tenure—
fourteen years (1949-1963), two years longer than the duration of the Third Reich and as long 
as the Weimar Republic. This ignores the perspective of men like Kurt Schumacher, the post-
war leader of the Social Democrats, who refused to be part of the world the Nazis were 
making, who earned the hatred of Nazi elites and ended up in a concentration camp. As a 
committed “man of the left,” however, Schumacher understood that his ship was sunk, as 
much if not as fatally as if had been a Jew, when the Nazis came to power. In fact, he was 
imprisoned for virtually all of the 12 years of National Socialist rule. His opinions, and those of 
other men of the left who opposed Hitler from the beginning, had an impact on post-war 
German society, but the inauguration of the Cold War put more conservative forces in power 
in the early years of the Bonn Republic.    228
wherein refusal meant either denial of any guilt (Jodl, Heidegger) or a carefully 
focused guilt, separating the Nazi leadership from the mass of innocent 
Germans (Adenauer)—a cadre of writers known as the Young Generation 
developed their own take on refusal. Their writings, coated in the dust of bomb 
craters and broken buildings, came to be referred to as rubble literature 
(Trummerliteratur). They focused on military de-mobilization and the 
homecoming of defeated soldiers to a shattered world. The literary 
representatives of the generation that had come of age during the Third Reich 
focused on the ordinary soldier’s attempt to reconstitute himself as a viable 
human being in the aftermath of a catastrophic war—and on the indictment of 
the older generation for betraying them to a lost cause. For men like Wolfgang 
Borchert, Hans Werner Richter, Alfred Andersch and Heinrich Böll, refusal 
meant an attempt to escape from under the weight of collective guilt. They 
passed that unwanted baggage up the chain-of-command to the older 
generation, and attempted thereby to establish themselves as fully 
autonomous human beings. 
In a symptomatic work titled “Das ist unser Manifest” (“This is Our 
Manifesto”), Borchert declares: 
 
Denn wir sind Neinsager. Aber wir sagen nicht nein aus 
Verzweiflung. Unser Nein ist Protest. Und wir haben keine 
Ruhe beim Küssen, wir Nihilisten. Denn wir müssen in das 
Nichts hinein wieder ein Ja bauen. Häuser müssen wir 
bauen in die freie Luft unseres Neins, über den Schlünden, 
den Trichtern und Erdlöchern und den offenen Mündern der 
Toten: Häuser bauen in die reingefegte Luft der Nihilisten, 
Häuser aus Holz und Gehirn und aus Stein und Gedanken 
(Borchert 1949a, 313). 
 
Or in my translation: 
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For we are the nay-sayers. But ours is not the no of despair. 
Our no is a protest. And we find no peace in kisses, we 
nihilists. For from out of the nothingness we must build up a 
yes. In the free air of our negation we must build houses 
above the sucking abyss of the craters and over the gaping 
mouths of the dead; build houses in the liberated air of the 
nihilists, houses out of wood and brains and out of stone and 
mind. 
 
Here the refusal, the nay-saying, is still not the refusal to fight, to be 
part of the Nazi war machine, but it is a kind of refusal of guilt bound up with 
the idea of a “zero-hour” (Stunde Null) in which the old order is obliterated and 
an entirely new society is poised to rise phoenix-like from the ashes. The 
writings of the Young Generation refuse identification with the father and with 
the National Socialist world made by their elders. Instead of “men of honor” 
who had fought to “the bitter end” for the Fatherland, the anti-heroes of their 
writings tended to be overwhelmed adolescents decrying the hardness of the 
world. The specificity of the Nazi crimes, the murder of the European Jews, 
the war of aggression, the political repression is, at most, a sideline. 
These writings strike me as elegiac and at times self-pitying. In this 
respect they are similar to the refrain of Vietnam veterans decrying lack of 
civilian support: “You weren’t there, man, you don’t know what it was like.” The 
army and the brotherhood of the army is gone. In the opening stanza of “Das 
ist unser Manifest” Bochert writes, “Die Kompanien sind auseinandergelaufen. 
Die Kompanien, Bataillone, Armeen. Die grossen Armeen. Nur die Heere der 
Toten, die stehn noch.” (“The companies are disbanded. The companies, 
battalions, armies. The great armies. Only the Army of the Dead still stands” 
[308]). The erstwhile soldier finds himself severed from his comrades, from the 
companionship of arms and blood and fear and the horrible elation of battle, 
alone, perhaps for the first time, his own way to follow. Borchert finds this   230
bittersweet, ambivalent: “Das ist schön. Das ist schwer” (“That’s beautiful. 
That’s hard.” [308]). 
The curious epigram at the beginning of Borchert’s play, “Draussen vor 
der Tür” (“The Man Outside”) reads, “A play that no theater wants to stage and 
no audience wants to see” (“Ein Stück, das kein Theater spielen und kein 
Publikum sehen will”). The epigram is curious because the play, written by 
Borchert over the course of just a few days in the Autumn of 1946, went on to 
achieve outstanding success. Its broadcast by Northwest German Radio 
(Nordwestdeutschen Rundfuk) on Februrary 13, 1947—and subsequent re-
broadcasts by that station and others—was electrifying. Years later, the writer 
Dieter Wellershoff, twenty-two at the time of the broadcast, would tell the story 
of his memory of the event thus:  
 
An einen dieser Abende habe ich eine herausragende 
Erinnerung. Ich war mit drei anderen allein auf der Bude, als 
Bodo S., einer von den beiden Leuten, mit denen ich mich 
manchmal über Literatur unterhielt—später wurde er Manger 
bei der Lufthansa—aufgeregt hereinstürzte und rief: “Kommt 
mal schnell rüber! Da is was Tolles im Radio!” Nur in der 
Nebenstube gab es ein Radio. Dort Sassen schon mehrere 
und gaben uns mit einer schnellen Handbewegung zu 
verstehen, wir sollten uns still dazusetzen. Es war der Abend 
des 13. Februar 1947, wie ich aus der Literaturgeschichte 
weiss. Für mich ist es das Initiationsdatum der deutschen 
Nachkriegslituratur. Das Stück, vom Norddeutschen 
Rundfunk aus Hamburg gesendet, sprach auf eine bisher 
ungehörte, leidenschaftliche Weise von den Verheerungen 
des Krieges, von der Verlorenhiet der Überlebenden und von 
heimatloser Heimkehr. Es stellte den Alptraum eines 
Heimkehrers dar, der seinen Erinnergungen nicht entkommt 
und überall vor verscholosenen Türen steht, under zum 
Schluss, als er erwacht, die ins Leere verhallende Frage 
schreit, wozu er den leben soll? (Wellershoff 1985, 201-02). 
 
Translated into English: 
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Of one of these [post-war] evenings I have a prominent 
memory. I was with three others in the shack when Bodo S., 
one of the two people I sometimes talked literature with—
later he would become a manager for Lufthansa—rushed 
over in a high state of agitation and called: “Get over here, 
quick! There’s something fantastic on the radio!” The only 
radio was at the neighbors. There were already several 
people there and they gave us to understand with emphatic 
hand-signals that we should sit down and be quiet. It was the 
evening of February 13, 1947, a key moment in literary 
history. For me it is the initiation date of post-war German 
literature. The play, broadcast by the Hamburg-based North 
German Radio, spoke in a passionate, theretofore  unheard 
of manner of the horrors of war, of the desolation of the 
survivors, and of the homeless homecoming. It depicts the 
extended dream of a returning soldier who cannot escape 
his memories and stands everywhere before closed doors, 
and who, when he finally awakes, cries out the question that 
echoes into the nothingness, why should he continue living? 
 
Borchert’s protagonist, Beckmann, spends the bulk of the play 
lamenting and complaining about what had been done to him and it is only in 
the end that he is able to “overcome his fruitless attitude of denunciation, in 
which he sees himself only as a victim. In that he finally recognizes his own 
role in the murderous violence of the war, his own readiness to fight at the 
command of the officers and fathers who sent him to war, he becomes a man 
with ‘bitter knowledge’” (Winter 2001, 206). 
This knowledge, hard-won and coming only after much working through 
of the experience of war and what it does to the soldier, creates an 
irredeemable divide between those who were there and saw, and felt, and 
those who weren’t. It is as if combat veterans, like Wittgenstein’s lions, have 
nothing to say. An ethical-experiential chasm opens between the combat 
soldier and those who “weren’t there,” resulting in a morbid silence. A similar 
divide in American culture has been attributed to Vietnam veterans. Of course   232
the refrain, “You weren’t there, man,” was never the property of the vets 
themselves, but of late night TV comedians and their cocktail party imitators. 
Humor is a distancing device and in this case it is used to diminish the divide 
itself—get over yourself, man, there’s still life to live. 
I experienced a mild version of this phenomena when I returned to the 
U.S. after being stationed for two years in a nuclear missile unit in Germany. 
This was 1982–84, at the height of the European peace movement during the 
first Reagan administration. My experience of “field service” in a nuclear 
missile unit, though by no means equivalent to combat duty, none-the-less left 
a strong enough impression that both I and the bulk of my comrades-in-arms 
had difficulty talking about it—or when we did talk about it, we spoke in terms 
that were raw and resentful. Our fellow soldiers who had never been stationed 
overseas or experienced the adrenaline-charged environment of a deployed 
missile unit under threat—albeit by peace protesters instead of “the enemy”—
took to parodying our attitudes and complaints, blending them with the fabled 
combat-hardened attitudes of war vets. A couple of them worked up their own 
comedy routine, the gist of which I remember clearly even twenty years later. 
“Yeah, we’d been in the field eleven weeks, man, and we had no 
fucking shoes and they didn’t feed us, but it wasn’t so bad.” 
“Sounds pretty bad, man. What’d you do?” 
“Well there were protesters and shit, so we never got to sleep. But it 
was okay, they were everywhere and we had to keep them out, but one got 
in.” 
“What’d you do? I bet you were in deep fucking shit!” 
“No, man, it was okay, because it was really cold. I mean really fucking 
cold, and we found the guy frozen to the EL [erector-launcher].”   233
“Wow. Like frozen, frozen?” 
“Yeah, frozen solid. It was fucking cold.” 
“So, what’d you do?” 
“Well, we were hungry, but it was okay, because we had this frozen 
protester, and we ate him.”  
They would trot out this routine as a kind of prophylactic, pre-empting 
any war stories we might be inclined to tell after the lubrication of a few drinks. 
It was, to say the least, disconcerting to have our attitudes mirrored back to us 
in this way, not least of all because we understood that at some level our own 
“war stories” were judged and found wanting. We had not been in a real war, a 
shooting war. Our war was cold and besides the ordinary hazards of military 
life—bureaucracy, bad weather and boredom—our actual conflict was limited 
to confrontations with peace protesters who were not considered a credible 
threat to men with M-16 assault rifles. The confrontation with our own 
consciences as we waited for orders to blow up the world was considered 
irrelevant. “You weren’t there, man. You don’t know what it was like.” 
In the short story “In May, in May Cried the Cuckoo” (“Im Mai, im Mai 
schrie der Kuchuck”), Borchert puts it like this:  
 
Was heisst denn la guerre oder the war oder Krieg? 
Armseliges Geschwätz, vor dem Tiergebrüll seiner 
glühenden Münder, der Kanonenmünder. Und Verrat vor 
den glühenden Mündern der verratenen Helden. An das 
Metall, an den Phosphor, an den Hunger und Eisturm und 
Wüstensand erbärmlich verraten. Und nun sagen wir wieder 
the war und la guerre und der Krieg und kein Schauer 
ergreift uns, kein Schrei und kein Grausen. Heute sagen wir 
einfach wieder: C’etait la guerre—das war der Krieg. Mehr 
sagen wir heute nicht mehr, denn uns fehlen die Vokabeln, 
um nur eine Sekunde von ihm wiederzugeben, nur für eine 
Sekunde, und wir sagen einfach wieder: Oh ja, so war es.  
Denn alles andere is nur Geschwätz, denn es gibt keine   234
Vokabel, keinen Reim und kein Versmass für ihn und keine 
Ode und kein Drama und keinen psychologischen Roman, 
die ihn ertragen, die nicht platzen vor seinem zinnoberroten 
Gebrüll (Borchert 1949, 240). 
 
Once again, in my translation: 
 
What is la guerre or Krieg or the war? The babble of 
inadequate memory in the face of the bestial roar of the red 
hot mouths, the cannon mouths. And betrayal before the 
glowing mouths of the betrayed heroes. By metal and 
phosphorous, by hunger and storms of ice and desert sand 
horribly betrayed. And now we say again der Kreig and  la 
guerre and the war and no thrill seizes us, no cry and no 
horror. Today we just say: C’etait la guerre—it was the war. 
Today we don’t have anything more to say, our words fail us, 
only for a second then it reasserts itself, only for a second, 
and we say yet again: so it was. For anything else is just 
babbling; for there are no words, no rhyme and no rhythm for 
it and no ode and no drama and no psychological novels that 
can tell it that won’t disintegrate in the face of its blood-red 
howl. 
 
A more eloquent version (at least in the original German) of “you weren’t there, 
man, you don’t know.” Words fail, yet the writer puts into words the unsayable, 
tells us he can’t tell us what he’s telling us. The divide between those who 
were there, and those who weren’t, is absolute. The returning soldiers, who 
had been cheered on departure, return to a ruined world which they can only 
see through aged eyes—in everything they tend to see the possibility of 
murder, of deadly danger and powerless terror.  
The “bitterness” of the soldier’s knowledge, in Winter’s phrase, flows 
partially from the ineradicable memory of his own fear and impotence, 
exacerbated by the loss of the anonymous camaraderie of the front lines. But 
more specifically it flows from a realization of betrayal. The metaphorical 
betrayal of exploding cannons and bad weather and terror, but also the literal   235
betrayal of the fathers. In “Draussen vor der Tür” Borchert’s charater tells the 
men of elder generation:  
 
Sie haben uns verraten. So furchtbar verraten. Wie wir noch 
ganz klein waren, da haben sie Krieg gemacht. Und als wir 
grosser waren, da haben sie vom Krieg erzählt. Begeistert. 
Immer waren sie begeistert. Und als wir dann noch grosser 
waren, da haben sie sich auch ür uns einen Krieg 
ausgedacht. Und da haben sie uns dann hingeschickt. Und 
sie waren begeistert. Immer waren sie begeistert. Und keiner 
hat uns gesagt, wo wir hingingen. Keiner hat uns gesagt, ihr 
geht in die Hölle (Borchert 1949, 157-58). 
 
They betrayed us. A terrible betrayal. When we were still 
very young, they made war. And when we were older, they 
told war stories. Enthusiastically. They were always 
enthusiastic. And when we were older still, they thought up a 
war for us. And then they sent us off to it. And they were 
enthusiastic. They were always enthusiastic. No one told us 
where we were going. No one told us, you’re going to hell. 
 
It may seem an odd comparison, but sentiments expressed in 
Borchert’s play are not very different from those found at the end of the film 
First Blood, the original Rambo movie. I proffer the comparison because the 
Rambo character—or rather his rejection—came up many times in my 
interviews with Bundeswehr soldiers. In describing the Bundeswehr, they told 
me “we’re not Rambos”—a decidedly odd thing to say. Yet the Rambo 
character represents a specific kind of resurgent American militarism and a 
specific image of masculinity, not the military ideal of soldierly masculinity. It is 
instructive to take a closer look at Rambo in order to understand what my 
informants were so eager to reject. 
In the climactic scene decorated Vietnam Veteran John Rambo, played 
by Sylvester Stallone, is confronted by the older generation in the person of 
various law enforcement officers and the Special Forces Colonel who   236
commanded him during the war. “In Vietnam,” shouts Rambo near the end of 
the movie, “I could drive a tank, fly an airplane, operate a million dollar piece of 
equipment, and now I can’t get a job parking cars.” He tearfully recounts (tears 
made permissible by the string of corpses he leaves behind earlier in the 
movie) trying to hold a friend’s body together with his bare hands after he is 
blown in half by a land mine. John Rambo, like Borchert’s character 
Beckmann, is “a man outside.” The civilian world is foreign to him. The powers 
that be have rejected him. In many ways both characters are part of a similar 
narrative—though the societal contexts imbue the two stories with different 
meanings. 
Beckmann is part of a story in which the soldier, who had not refused to 
serve during the war (on Beckmann’s account because he had been 
brainwashed by his elders into military enthusiasm), learns to become his own 
person in its aftermath. Part of that process involves the indictment of powers 
that be. Rambo’s story is not much different. He too never refused during the 
war, but learns refusal in its wake. He too condemns the powers that be for 
betraying soldiers like himself. The primary difference is that the meta-
narrative context of Rambo is one that suggests the particular betrayal in 
question was a failure to “support the troops” in the field, or upon return home. 
In the case of Beckmann, the betrayal was to have goaded and cheered the 
young men off to war in the first place. At the end of Borchert’s play Beckmann 
accepts his own role as perpetrator—a knowledge that eludes John Rambo.
8 
                                                 
8 Instead of accepting responsibility for his past as soldier-perpetrator, Rambo continues to 
blame the older generation of “soft” bureaucrats who didn’t support him in war. In Rambo II, 
granted a much more reactionary vehicle, he is sent back to Vietnam in search of American 
POWs, still supposedly held by the Vietnamese. He asks his commander, “Do we get to win 
this time?” And then goes on to re-fight the war with a more satisfactory outcome, at least from 
the point of view of American military pride.   237
This crucial difference makes the attitudinal similarity between the two 
protagonists along the way even more striking, as if “the soldier betrayed” 
were an invariant archetype.  
Borchert’s generation, as represented in the writings of the Young 
Generation, contains a crucial elision. The soldier/anti-heroes of these works 
tend to be human puppets, dehumanized by their removal from their homes 
and indoctrination into military life. On the front lines, in the company of other 
men, they experience the adrenaline rush of battle, the dissolution of personal 
responsibility that occurs when a great number of people are doing the same 
extraordinary thing. Their will, dissolved into the killing machine, is for the 
moment obliterated and with it their sense of responsibility. Someone else, at 
the field headquarters or off in Berlin, pulls the strings that move the machine. 
Thus responsibility, and with it guilt, is at least partially displaced. This 
literature tries to bridge the gap between the experiences of the front and 
normal existence, giving voice to emotions that are almost inexpressible, yet 
leaves, even exacerbates, the problem of refusal by shining a light on its lack. 
It also reflects something of the emotional, experiential rejection of militarism 
that would find political expression in the ohne mich (without me) movement 
against German rearmament. 
 
The Politics of Widerstand 
The literature on the German resistance (Widerstand) against Hitler, its 
modalities, extent, and post-war uses in both the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) is now vast. It includes 
the testimony of participants, journalistic commentary and political   238
commemoration, myth-making and myth debunking.
9 In the early years of both 
Germanys there was a desperate need to salvage something from the twelve 
years of National Socialist rule, some legacy to which the new regimes could 
point with pride. In the former East Germany the emphasis was on the 
resistance of the German communists. The German Democratic Republic 
legitimized itself as “the anti-fascist state,” claiming the legacy of all 
meaningful resistance to the Nazis, and accusing the Federal Republic of 
being little more than a continuation of fascism under slightly changed 
leadership. 
In the West, the politics of Widerstand took a different turn. Both the 
division of Germany and concurrent onset of the Cold War, as well as the 
generally conservative politics of the time, led to the exclusion of most 
resistance from the Left from the pantheon of anti-Nazi fighters. Particularly 
those who had aligned themselves with the Soviet Union were seen as beyond 
the pale. This left the resistance of traditional groups, particularly those 
associated with the attempt to assassinate Hitler on July 20, 1944.  
                                                 
9 A useful starting point in English is the collection of essays Resistance Against the Third 
Reich: 1933-1990, edited by Michael Geyer and John Boyer (Chicago: University of Chicago, 
1994). Peter Hoffmann’s The history of the German resistance, 1933-1945 (Cambridge, 
Mass.: M.I.T Press, 1977) and German Resistance to Hitler (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1988), both contain useful bibliographies. Eberhard Zeller’s Geist der 
Freiheit (Munich: H. Rinn,1956) is one of the first works in German to try to understand the 
meaning of the resistance. More recent works of interest include the essay collections 
Widerstand und Verweigerung in Deutschland, 1933-1945, edited by Richard Löwnthal and 
Patrick von zur Mühlen (Berlin: Deitz, 1982); Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus: 
Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler edited by Jürgen Schmädecke 
and Peter Steinback (Munich: R. Piper, 1985); Gegner des Nationalsozialismus: 
Wissenschaftler und Widerstandskämpfer auf der Suche nach der historischen Wirklichkeit 
edited by Christoph Klessmann and Falk Pingel (Frankfurt: Campus-Verlag, 1980); 
Widerstand im Dritten Reich: Probleme, Ereignisse, Gestalten edited by Hermann Graml 
(Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1984); and  Der deutsche Widerstand, 1933-1945 
edited by Klause-Jürgen Müller (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1986). Also of interest is Der 
deutsche Widerstand gegen Hitler: Vier historish-krtische Studien von Hermann Graml, Hans 
Mommsen, Hans-Joachim Reichhardt und Ernst Wolf edited by Walter Schmitthenner and 
Hans Buchheim (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1966).   239
Even the conservative resisters around Count von Stauffenberg—the 
Wehrmacht officer who actually attempted the July 20 assassination—
remained controversial. Post-war opinion was deeply divided concerning how 
their actions should be interpreted. A 1952 opinion poll indicated that only 20 
percent of those responding thought the actions of Hitler’s wartime opponents 
were justified. Asked the question: “How should the men of the Twentieth of 
July be judged?” less than half, some 40 percent answered in the positive; 30 
percent thought they should be judged negatively with the remaining 30 
percent expressing no opinion. This last statistic is itself fantastic—a third of 
Germans were not willing to express an opinion on whether those involved in 
an assassination plot against the erstwhile leader of the country should be 
judged positively or negatively. A third of Germans, 34 percent, thought that 
any resistance should have waited until after the war and 15 percent believed, 
even in 1952, that there should have been no resistance under any 
circumstances to the National Socialist government (Neumann and Noelle 
1956, 138). 
Not surprisingly in the climate of the times, both conservative and 
extreme right politicians and activists continued to characterize German 
resistors as traitors and their actions as treasonous. For example 
Sozialistische Reichspartei (SRP) politician Otto-Ernst Remer, an 
unreconstructed enthusiast of the Hitler government who helped to foil the July 
20, 1944 coup attempt, asserted that the men of the July Twentieth circle were 
traitors in the pay of foreign (read Soviet) governments (Schmollinger 1984, 
2,275). Remer, who would become the grand old man of the neo-Nazi and 
Holocaust denial movements in the 1970s and 1980s (a Google search turns 
up hundreds of references, the vast majority of which are Remer-positive   240
articles on pro-Nazi pages like those of the Institute for Historical Review), was 
hardly representative of the German mainstream, but it is worth noting that the 
“fringe” with which he was associated still attracted the support, or at least the 
sympathy, of relatively large percentages of the population, as indicated by the 
15 percent of Germans who in 1952 thought that resistance against Hitler and 
the Nazis would never have been justified. 
The ambivalence toward resistance in the early post-war years was 
clear, not only in the rhetoric of a life-long Nazi-sympathizer like Remer, but for 
example in the formal position of the nominally liberal Frei Demokratische 
Partei (FDP). Attuned to the feelings of its membership, the FDP officially 
accorded equal respect to those who had resisted the National Socialist 
government and those who had served loyally to the end of the regime. 
Moreover, the FDP’s military specialist, “former General Hasso von 
Manteuffel, declared that he was proud not to have been belonged to the 
Twentieth of July circle and to have done his duty to the bitter end” (Large 
1994, 250). 
Condemnation of the resisters, however, was not uniform and the new 
West German government was eager to lay claim to the legacy of resistance, 
even if it was equally eager to define what it meant. Remer was taken to court 
by the CDU Minister of the Interior Robert Lehr for his defamatory comments 
about the July 20 conspirators. The trial was widely publicized and Remer was 
eventually sentenced to three months in prison. The trial itself also acted as 
one of the first important public focal points for discussion of the meaning of 
the anti-Nazi resistance. Friend-of-the-court briefs (gutachten) poured in from 
professional jurists, historians and theologians and the judges acknowledged   241
that the resisters could not be branded as traitors since their actions were 
intended to help Germany, not to injure it (Niven 2002, 69; Large 1994, 245). 
The ten-year anniversary of the 20 July, 1944 assassination attempt 
was the occasion not just of commemoration of the deeds and spirit of the 
resistors, but also to extract some political capital. Adenauer and his CDU 
colleague Eugen Gerstenmaier used the occasion to point out that many of the 
conspirators had belonged to the German Foreign Office, characterizing the 
office as a stronghold of the so-called other Germany, implying at the same 
time that if the West had stood up to Hitler at Munich, as urged by Ernst von 
Weizsäcker of the Foreign Office, the German people might well have 
overthrown the Nazi regime (Presse- und Informationsamtes der 
Bundesregierung 1954, 1,211). President Theodor Heuss, in a speech given 
at the newly founded Free University of Berlin, claimed the resistors 
unambivalently, proclaiming, “Through their blood, the shame Hitler visited 
upon us Germans has been blunted, our sullied German name cleansed” 
(Heuss 1965, 262). 
Shortly after Heuss’s celebratory statement, Walter Huppenkothen, the 
Nazi-era prosecutor who had demanded the death penalty for key figures in 
the resistance, including Wilhelm Canaris and Hans von Dohnanyi, faced 
charges of murder in a Munich court. The court acquitted him, stating that he 
had acted in accord with then existing law (Friedrick 1985, 286). The German 
Federal court (Bundesgerichtshof), however, refused to validate the innocent 
verdict and sent Huppenkothen to Augsburg to be retried. In 1955 the 
Augsburg court ruled that Nazi-era courts existed largely to provide a legal 
cover story (“Schein der Berechtignung”) for what was, in effect, political 
murder. This court sentenced Huppenkothen to seven years in prison and Dr.   242
Otto Thorbeck, an SS Judge who presided over a concentration camp court 
that had condemned some of the resisters to death, to four years. 
Both men subsequently appealed their sentences back to the 
Bundesgerichtshof on the grounds that the judge who had convicted them in 
Augsburg had himself been persecuted by the Nazis and therefore must be 
considered biased. This time the Federal Court sympathized with the 
convicted former Nazis. Thorbeck was acquitted, the court ruling that “Jeder 
Staat hat aber um der von ihm vollbrachten Ordnugsfunktionen willen 
grundsätzlich das Recht, sich durch Strafandrohungen gegen gewalttätige 
Angriffe auf seinen inneren und äusseren Bestand zu schützen” (“Every state 
has the fundamental right to secure order and to indict those who engage in 
acts of warlike violence against it in order to protect itself internally and 
externally” [Friedrick 1985, 285]). This verdict was handed down after 
Hermann Weinkauff, who himself had been a member of the Reichsgericht, 
the German court system during the Third Reich, from 1937-1945, became the 
new president of the Bundesgerichtshof  (Friedrick 1985, 288). 
The conceptual defense of the acts of the conspirators, at least in legal 
terms, hung on the distinction in German law between high treason 
(Hochverrat, betrayal of the government) and treason to the country 
(Landsverrat).The former impies that that even if guilty a perpetrator could 
have been acting in what he considered at the time to be the best interests of 
the nation. The latter usually implies a transfer of first allegiance to something 
other than the nation. This distinction was key in the rehabilitation of the 
resisters—particularly in the context of a young German state on the brink of 
rearmament. The Federal Court under Weinkauff eventually ruled that under 
existing law during the Third Reich the judges and prosecutors who   243
condemned the conspirators were justified—that is, they followed proper legal 
procedure—in ordering the resisters executed. The trials also made it clear 
that from the post-war point of view that even though the conspirators were 
obviously guilty of Hochverrat, it was high treason against a government that 
had itself betrayed the German nation, in effect a treasonous, criminal regime. 
All of the above is part of the political context of the politics of 
Widerstand in post-war Germany. Resistance to the Nazi regime, especially 
during war time, remained controversial. It was sometimes embraced, 
especially by the powers-that-be at appropriate memorial occasions, 
sometimes condemned, especially by former military men and right-wingers 
who had never resisted. Surviving resistance figures were a living rejoinder to 
those who did not resist, who did nothing, of their complicity with a regime 
increasingly cast as the epitome of evil in human history. 
 
Ohne Mich 
In the context of continuing controversy concerning the meaning of 
German anti-Nazi resistance the Federal Republic faced one of its most 
explosive public debates: rearmament (Widerbewaffnung). The five volume 
Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, puts it this way: “No political 
theme since the Second World War had the West Germans so passionately 
angry with each other as rearmament” (“Kein politisches Thema seit dem 
Zweiten Weltkrieg hat die Westdeutschen so aufgwühlt wie die 
Auseinandersetzung über die Wiederbewaffnung” [Schwarz 1981, 119]). 
Strong words for a semi-official encyclopedic history, but probably justified. 
According to Joachim Joesten, a one-time member of the German 
Communist Party, writing in a series of post-war monographs:    244
Whoever I spoke to, manual laborer, white collar worker, 
civil service employee, farmer, businessman or professional; 
family father, housewife or draft-age youngster; whenever 
the question of remilitarization was brought up, they would 
answer as with one voice: “Ohne mich!” (“Without me!” 
[Joesten 1952, 4]). 
 
And if Joesten’s somewhat breathless style has the feel of left-wing conspiracy 
theory of the sort that—correctly or not—was liable to be attributed to Soviet 
allegiances, he was far from the only person to express such opinions. An 
editorial published in the December 5, 1951 issue of the mainstream German 
newsmagazine, Der Spiegel, for example, stated, “Die überwiegende Mehrheit 
der Deutschen halt in der jetzigen Situation ebenfalls nichts von deutschen 
Divisionen, da sie, abgesehen von allen anderen Bedenken, die deutsche 
Spaltung verschärfen müssen” (18). “The vast majority of Germans doesn’t 
hold with German divisions [military units], which they see, apart from any 
other consideration, as exacerbating German division [into West and East].”  
The numbers are not quite so one-sided. Polls taken at the time do not 
indicate “vast majorities” against rearmament, but a population deeply, and 
almost evenly, divided on the issue. One survey, comparing support and 
opposition as divided by religious confession found that the percentage of 
Protestants favoring rearmament declined steadily from 64 percent in October 
1950 to only 47 percent in February 1952. Protestants opposed to rearmament 
peaked at 39 percent in March 1951 and hovered in the mid-30% through the 
debate. Catholic opinion deviated slightly from Protestant, starting with 60 
percent pro- and 33 percent anti-rearmament in October 1950 and ending with 
52 percent in favor and 28 percent opposed (Schwarz 1981, 122). 
  It is not too difficult to see how after the catastrophe of the Second 
World War, many ordinary Germans would reject any further military   245
entanglements. Contrariwise, the number of people who could readily accept 
Karl Jasper’s insistance that Germany was and should be a stateless, pariah 
nation was also small (Rabinbach 1997,139). Moreover, while the German 
people were attempting to adapt to the post-war realities, the machinations of 
other states in response to the incessant demands of the war system were still 
in play. There was increasing fear of the development of a Korea-like crisis in 
divided Germany and with it the American insistence on German rearmament 
in response to the perceived Soviet threat. 
  Though the understandable nervousness of Germany’s European 
neighbors— particularly France—led to tense negotiations, arguably the 
international situation made rearmament a foregone conclusion. One 
consequence of this was a kind of uneasy bifurcation of identity in Germany 
between how many Germans thought of themselves—something closer to 
Jasper’s vision—and how the FRG actually did business, which is much more 
like a “normal” nation-state, albeit one thoroughly embedded in an 
international economic and defense system and beholden to the U.S. 
Rearmament, or even its possibility, also re-opened the possibility of 
refusal. For those who had been too young to serve in Hitler’s army, here was 
the opportunity to say no, ostensibly to current rearmament, but at a deeper 
level to an ex post facto construction of National Socialism. The younger 
German generations faced a dilemma: on the one hand they were tainted with 
a guilt they had not earned, and therefore could never accept; on the other 
hand they were also denied by pure generational luck from even the 
opportunity of refusal. The question would rise, again and again: what would I 
have done? It also led, famously, to endless explorations of the origins of 
fascism. Even more it led to a fascination with the seeming lack of resistance   246
to even the most extreme Nazi crimes. Famous explorations of these issues 
include Stanley Milgram’s obedience experiments (1974) and the 
“authoritarian personality” studies headed up by Theodore Adorno (1950), as 
well as stories, novels and popular essays, ultimately including the deep 
background for my own motivations in undertaking this particular research. 
To a certain extent, of course, the “without me” movement (“ohne mich 
Bewegung”) of the early 1950s was based in a facile logic: refusal to endorse 
or participate in Germany’s remilitarization after the war equals the notional 
refusal of the Nazi militarism and the National Socialist legacy. 
Notwithstanding the fact that there was a strong neutralist urge in post-war 
Germany, and that many saw polarization into Western-allied and Soviet-allied 
blocs as a recipe for the permanent division of Germany, the movement 
nonetheless harkened back—as would all subsequent peace and justice 
movements in Germany—to what ought to have been done, as if refusal in the 
present helped to expiate for its lack in the past. 
 
Shift and Flow: Militarism and Masculinity in Post-War Germany 
In the ex post facto valorization of refusal in the present, as if what were 
being refused was the Nazi past, the basic principles of masculinity, as much 
as the idea of human decency, are mobilized and to a certain extent, shifted. 
Whenever post-war Germany is discussed—whether by academic historians 
or the lay public, inside or outside of Germany—a key point of interest is 
always whether, and to what extent, there has been a break with “the past.” In 
many discussions with casual visitors to Germany, I have heard words to the 
effect that “they haven’t changed,” usually delivered in an ominous tone. 
Of course the German past is not a monolithic, singular entity, but a   247
plenitude of cultural, national, Marxist, linguistic, artistic, criminal, poetic, 
musical, feminist, industrial, military, agrarian, aristocratic, Protestant, 
Catholic, Jewish, National Socialist, absolutist, Prussian and Bavarian (to 
name just a few) tendencies, traditions and practices. Thus when a white-
collar worker in the American Midwest, on the strength of a ten-day guided 
tour, makes the pronouncement: “they haven’t changed,” one has to read a 
good bit into it. The proposition that they haven’t changed is shorthand for they 
are still dangerous, they still hate Jews, given a chance they might just launch 
another world war or murder another people. This is, no doubt, a harsh 
interpretation that in most cases would be somewhat weakened by the 
concomitant belief that such a repeat isn’t particularly likely, given current 
political configurations and so on. 
Nor is the issue limited to such casual milieus. No point has been more 
hotly debated by German historians—and historians of Germany—than that of 
rupture verses continuity. Do the liberal, parliamentary institutions of the old 
Federal Republic and its successor state, unified Germany, constitute a radical 
break not just with Nazism, but with the illiberal German past?
10 Given the 
continuity of personnel, of custom, and basic worldview between pre- and 
post-1945 Germany, in what sense is it reasonable to speak of a rupture? 
Does accepting the idea of a radical break cut Germany off from the unifying 
strength to be found in tradition? Does the pretense of a break unjustifiably 
exonerate the guilty? These were some of the questions addressed in the 
Historikerstreit (historian’s debate) of the mid-1980s and that erupted again in 
                                                 
10 The same questions can be asked about the DDR but are beyond the scope of the current 
project—and to a certain extent, irrelevant to it. Or, that is, it would be if so much political form 
and discourse in the old BRD hadn’t evolved in response to developments in the DDR and 
vice versa. A thorough investigation of the ways in which the two states mirrored each other 
during the years of the Cold War is no doubt in order.   248
the mid-1990s in the reception of Daniel Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing 
Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (Knopf, 1996) and the 
controversy surrounding the Hamburg Institute’s Wehrmacht exhibit 
(“Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944”).  
Jürgen Habermas, whose stature as a public intellectual in 
contemporary Germany allowed him to provoke the Historikerstreit in such a 
way that it was conducted at least partially in public, in the pages of daily 
newspapers instead of obscure journals, glosses the question of 
(dis)continuity this way: 
 
Historians write texts. The grammar of the narrative itself 
forces them to organize their sentences so that the 
succession of narrative events is articulated by comas, 
periods and paragraphs, and chapter divisions. This 
inevitably creates more-or-less deep ruptures, more-or-less 
close connections. Such retrospective divisions are 
relative—there are radically new beginnings only in art, not 
in history. But for the self-understanding of those who stand 
within traditions and who say “yes,” or “no,” and thus 
continue or interrupt these traditions, historical markers 
sometimes acquire the action-oriented quality of pivot points” 
(Habermas 1997, 165-66). 
 
He is surely correct in the gist of his analysis: historical moments acquire 
currency as they are mobilized for present use. 
  This perspective of instrumental pivot points constructed ex post facto 
does not erase the possibility of shifts—as opposed to discontinuities or 
ruptures—in post-war German identity, and in particular in the articulation of 
masculinity and the place of the military in society. This emphasis is itself an 
example of a claim on history, but one that I hope will be enlightening. 
 By  shifts I mean a change in emphasis, or balance, as when a person 
shifts his weight from one leg to another. The metaphor is consciously meant   249
to encompass both a process that could be either gradual or abrupt and one 
that includes the possibility of reversals. Rupture implies something broken 
and in some sense irretrievable; discontinuity likewise implies a break between 
what was and what is. Shift is meant to connote a particular kind of continuity 
with the past. The shift, however, is in many ways a radical one in that it 
valorized tendencies which had been fully disempowered in National Socialist 
Germany. 
  The point is not simply to settle on a personally satisfying vocabulary, 
but to show evidence of the shifts of which I speak and speak to their 
meaning. At the heart of the shift is the idea of refusal. The shifting meaning of 
refusal is put to use in a variety of ways in the creation of post-war German 
identities, particularly as the line of engagement between masculinity and the 
military. This plays itself out in changing valuations of refusal (Verweigerung) 
as compared to obedience (Gehorsamkeit). 
Yes, loyalty and courage to “the bitter end” are valued characteristics of 
militarist masculinity—but there is also another valence, the one addressed in 
Borchert’s writings, the will to autonomy. Writing of the Protestant resister 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Klemens von Klemperer puts it this way: 
 
I should add here that in Germany in particular, where the 
doctrine of natural law never really had found a home, there 
has always prevailed a presumption in favor of obedience. 
Bonhoeffer addressed himself to this proposition…. In his 
chapter on “civil courage” he pointed to the fact that in their 
history the Germans had learned the need for and the 
strength of obedience, but in so doing they had come to 
misjudge the world. They did not realize that their 
submissiveness and self-sacrifice could be exploited for evil 
ends. Only now, Bonhoeffer concluded, were the Germans 
beginning to discover the meaning of what he called “free 
and responsible action” (Klemperer 1992, 144). 
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Refusal thus becomes the counter-narrative to the proverbial German 
obedience (Gehorsamkeit).  
Much of Germany’s famous post-war search for identity has been about 
coming to terms with the failure of refusal during the Third Reich. This failure is 
still viewed with a certain ambivalence. What is almost unspeakable is that the 
fractured German identity is probably more about the humiliating defeat in the 
war than it is about the lingering guilt associated above all with the Holocaust. 
Even while refusal has become a central value to many Germans, and a 
central component of an acceptable form of heroic masculinity, two temporal 
impossibilities continue to haunt contemporary German thinking about the past 
and have a substantial, though not always explicit, impact on the politics of the 
German present. 
 The first is the impossibility of those born after to atone for the failed 
refusal of those who lived through the Nazi era. The second is the fact that the 
occupation could not be refused. It was forced upon a conquered nation. 
Those who failed to refuse the Nazis and their crimes, also failed to refuse the 
occupiers and the relentless waves of Americanization. The tendency 
continues to this day. It can be seen in the “professionalization” of the 
Bundeswehr along American lines and the seemingly unstoppable placement 
of a giant new Wal-Mart store in the Neukölln neighborhood of Berlin, with the 
inevitable displacement of corner stores and family housing, only a short 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF  
REFUSAL AND THE FOUNDING OF THE BUNDESWEHR 
 
  Many of the Germans with whom I spoke during my fieldwork (1999–
2002) were in their late thirties, men roughly my own age, who had done their 
military service (or refused to serve in the military and did civilian service 
instead) in the early 80s. This was during the first Reagan administration in the 
United States and the beginning of the Kohl-CDU dominance in the old 
Federal Republic. It is also the period during which I was stationed in Germany 
as a soldier in the United States Army. My own memories of the time, of 
serving in a nuclear missile unit and seeing the crowds of protestors outside 
the gates, inevitably color my reception of their stories. Prominent in my 
memories of the time are late-night launch drills during which we practiced 
raining thermonuclear devastation down on Eastern Europe and imagined how 
short a time we would live after launching our missiles. We talked about what 
we would do in the brief interval before the inevitable retaliation.  
My experiences, of course, were in an all-volunteer army and I, like all 
of my colleagues, had signed up for service in a missile unit. My reason, and 
that of most of my colleagues, was economic. I was looking for money for 
college and serving in a part of the Army designated “combat arms” paid a 
significant bonus. My less than 20–20 vision disqualified me from the infantry 
and my high test scores made me a “natural” candidate for nuclear service.  
All of the soldiers in my unit were investigated and given a security 
clearance, as the phrase went, of “the appropriate level.” We were considered 
reliable. Though a certain amount of thought about nuclear Armageddon is   252
probably inevitable in a missile unit, what strikes me in retrospect is how little I 
thought about my part at the time. It was really not until an unannounced drill 
on a lovely Autumn day in 1983, when Cold War tensions were running high, 
that I had occasion to think about refusal. 
It happened when we were “on pad,” where our missiles were mated to 
live nuclear warheads and sat ready, twenty-four hours a day, for launch. My 
job at the time was launcher operator. This meant that I stood at the side of 
the launcher wearing a headset and pushed various buttons in response to 
messages on an integrated LED display, upon orders from higher up. It was a 
fine afternoon when the klaxon blew, signaling us to hurry to our missiles and 
begin a countdown. Such drills were common. They happened every day or 
two while we were on pad. This one, however, had a different feel to it. The 
orders from our platoon leader, passed along via the headset, were sharper 
than usual, tenser. 
Now, to arm a nuclear warhead prior to launch requires the use of a 
very secure code. As launcher operators we did not have access to these 
codes, but at a certain point in the launch countdown an LED message would 
come up on our screens prompting us to “press enter” in order to have this 
code entered by our superiors. I and my fellow launcher operators would 
dutifully speak the words “enable PAL press enter” into our microphone. 
Inevitably the response from the higher ups would be, “press option.” That is, 
instead of pressing enter to arm the warhead, press the option button to 
continue the practice countdown without arming the warhead. But this time we 
were told to press enter. 
There were three missiles for each platoon, and at each launcher stood 
an operator and a non-commissioned officer assigned to supervise him. The   253
communication channel is an open one, such that all of these operators and 
supervisors can hear the progress of the other countdowns. Three curious 
things happened when I was told to enable the mode for arming the warhead. 
First, the launcher operators all simultaneously took a step back and looked at 
each other; it was obvious that we were startled out of our wits. Second, all 
three of us asked for a confirmation of the order to press enter. “Say again.” 
And third, all three of the supervising NCOs frantically began to ask us what 
was wrong—demonstrating that they had not, in fact, been following the count 
as closely as they were supposed to or that they really didn’t understand the 
significance of what had just happened. 
After confirming the order to press enter, to enable the possibility of 
arming the nuclear warheads with the security code back at command and 
control, I pressed enter. So did my colleagues. 
Since the world was not, in fact, blown to bits on that fine October 
afternoon, there is no more suspense to my story. The warheads never were 
armed. The missiles never were launched. It turned out that, unbeknownst to 
us, there was an evaluation team on site. To the best of my understanding 
they did not specifically intend to test our responses to “going live”—but by 
asking the command and control people to run a certain diagnostic, without 
informing the launcher operators and other personnel, the effect was as if they 
were testing our willingness to launch. The answer, in that moment, was yes. I 
would have done it; I did do it.  As did my colleagues. I doubt that anyone who 
had been trained and screened for the positions we were in would have 
refused. We had some sense that it had to be some kind of drill, but for all we 
knew, we were about to start World War III. 
Another set of experiences from the same period also sticks in my   254
memory. The deployment of the Pershing II intermediate range nuclear 
missiles was very controversial in Germany. It sparked large scale anti-nuclear 
peace protests and re-invigorated the European peace movement. As a 
soldier in a nuclear unit, in fact the very first Pershing II unit in Germany, my 
primary interaction with German peace protestors was as a guard. On guard 
duty my mission was to prevent protestors, or anyone else, from getting near a 
missile (whether or not it happened to have a nuclear warhead attached). 
During the course of many interactions with these protestors, 
sometimes thousands of them at a time, I had another set of encounters with 
refusal, or rather with its failure. On the one hand, the command structure in 
my unit made it clear to us that to every extent possible we were to let the 
German police deal with German protestors. On the other hand, we were 
routinely assigned crowd control and defensive duties for which we were 
neither trained nor equipped. One particularly tense day, returning from the 
field, cold, wet, hungry and exhausted, we encountered several thousand 
protestors blocking our route. The Polizei were not yet on the scene and the 
protestors were attempting to barricade the road—all in all,  perhaps not the 
wisest choice of tactics. Fortunately for them and for us, we didn’t have any 
warheads with us and therefore had not been issued live ammunition. 
As we pushed our way through the throng of protestors, many of the 
activists attempted to infiltrate the convoy and climb up onto the erector-
launchers (mounted on flat-bed trailers). Several of my fellow soldiers took it 
upon themselves to go beyond the requirements of duty. They pursued 
protestors out across the fields and assaulted them. One slight, red-headed 
nineteen-year-old from Paris, Texas bent the barrel of his weapon over the   255
head of a young woman in her mid-teens. She had been standing, holding a 
sign and screaming, a good thirty feet from our missile. 
Even at the time I wondered about this, about the lack of institutional 
support for finding less violent ways to interact with activists who were, after-
all, exercising their democratic rights. Our brigade public relations officer made 
the appropriate noises to the German media, supporting the right of free 
speech and peaceful protest. Our orders, however, though not quite “shoot to 
kill,” did little to support peaceful interaction with the protesters, and our 
training was completely inadequate to the situation described above. Though 
we were not encouraged to act aggressively the institutional context was clear: 
our training was to follow orders without thinking. The constant refrain of our 
non-commissioned officers was “you are not paid to think.”  
The possibility of going to the unit commander, or working the chain of 
command, and saying, “maybe it isn’t such a good idea to try to muscle this 
convey of missiles through this close-packed crowd of protestors,” never even 
occurred to me. Apparently it didn’t occur to anyone else, either, even though 
the necessity for such communication must have been clear to anyone who 
wasn’t more concerned with demonstrating manly resolve than preserving the 
peace and keeping everyone, soldiers and civilians alike, safe. Moreover, 
there was a presumption at the time of this incident, (the early days of 
Pershing II), that the missiles themselves were reasonably stable and unlikely 
to combust. This assumption proved to be false when several American 
soldiers were burned alive by solid rocket propellant a few months later after 
their missile was struck by an aluminum tent pole (in the official account), or 
(as many of us believe) a round from a sniper rifle fired from several hundred 
yards away.   256
We were very lucky that day. 
In understanding the stories of my informants, and the importance that 
refusal seems to have in Germany with respect to all things military, these 
memories come back to me. I remind myself that the stories I heard from my 
informants, though data for me, were memories for them. It also strikes me, as 
I remember my own interactions with military authority, that the institutional 
culture of an organization will go a long way toward determining what kinds of 
decisions people will make when faced with morally difficult choices. I will now 
turn my attention to the founding of the Bundeswehr as an institution. 
 
Wehrdienstverweigerung 
The German word for what in English is referred to as a conscientious 
objector is Wehrdienstverweigerer (“defense service refuser”) or 
Kriegsdienstverweigerer (“war service refuser”), often abbreviated as KDV. 
Conscription is Wehrpflicht (defense duty) and someone doing service as a 
conscript is a Wehrdienstleister. I hesitate to use the word “draftee” because 
the social and historical context of mandatory military service is so different in 
contemporary Germany than those associated with the idea of a “draft” in the 
United States. This is not to say there are no commonalities, there are many, 
but oftentimes minor differences in context can lead to major 
misunderstandings. In order to set the stage for an understanding of both 
military service and refusal in post-Cold War Germany, I will start with an 
historical exploration of German rearmament after World War II, the founding 
of the Bundeswehr, and the reintroduction of conscription. 
In May 1949, a full six years before the re-founding of the German 
military, at a time when it was unclear if Germany would ever be allowed to   257
rearm, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of the old Federal Republic guaranteed a 
right to conscientious objection. The relevant portion is Article 4, Section 3: 
“Niemand darf gegen sein Gewissen zum Kriegsdienst mit der Waffe 
gezwungen werden. Das Nähere regelt ein Bundesgesetz.” In the English 
translation provided on the website of the German government: “No person 
shall be compelled against his conscience to render military service involving 
the use of arms. Details shall be regulated by a federal law.” Not a precise 
translation, since “Kriegsdienst” literally means “war service” which is 
theoretically slightly different that “military service.” The wording did lead to 
some contention in the early years of conscription, until a court ruled that the 
right of conscience established in the Grundgesetz extended to mandatory 
service in the peacetime military (Kuhlmann and Lippert 1993, 98). 
Thus the Grundgesetz held the refusal to serve in the military to be a 
basic right, even though it contained no explicit provision for a military force, a 
defense ministry, a military command structure or military law. Yet, at the 
same time that conscientious objection was inscribed in the German Basic 
Law there was widespread consensus that if there had to be an army, it had 
best include a strong conscript component. From the point when the Adenauer 
administration out-maneuvered the opposition Social Democrats and the ohne 
mich movement, setting the Federal Republic on the road to rearmament, the 
right to conscientious objection and conscription became linked in German 
political culture and “both were always regarded as salient ingredients of the 
new, democratic Germany” (Bredow 1992, 290). 
The link is not without its internal paradoxes. Democracy in the liberal 
tradition means something more than majority rule—it means the guarantee of 
the rights of minorities, and in particular that smallest of all minorities, the   258
individual, even when those rights are inconvenient for the majority. 
Conscription, by its very nature, takes away the most basic autonomy of the 
individual. Conscription into the armed forces dictates, under threat of legal 
punishment, where the soldier will live, the work he will do, the manner of his 
comportment toward “superiors,” etc. This involuntary induction into a total 
institution is exactly what Borchert and the writers of the Young Generation 
reacted to so strongly, when the theretofore previously impenetrable armor of 
military prestige was blasted away by the disaster of the Second World War. It 
is this theft of personal autonomy that many young soldiers, whether draftees 
or volunteers, find hard to endure. In the U.S. Army of the mid-1980s, this loss 
of personal autonomy was often labeled “communist.” Amongst the more 
critical of the Bundeswehr conscripts whom I interviewed, the lack of freedom 
was referred to, perhaps inevitably, as “Faschismus” (“Fascism”). 
Nor does a right to conscientious objection, even one written into the 
constitution, obviate the two-fold attack on the liberal idea of personhood and 
democracy embodied in conscription. In the first place, quite apart from the 
right to insist on pacifist beliefs, involuntary service impinges on the most basic 
right of the individual to go his own way, chose his own work and make his 
own decisions regarding the ordinary business of daily life. This impingement 
is nowhere considered a valid grounds for refusal.  In the second place, 
insofar as the state claims the right to conscription, it places itself above the 
citizens as the arbiter of life and death.
1  
Conscription, of course, is not unique to post-war Germany. The 
                                                 
1 The sacred qualities of the nation-state are bound up with its monopolization of legitimate 
violence and particularly with its holding the right to take life, as in the imposition of the death 
penalty as well as in connection with the use of military force. See chapter 2 above for a 
discussion of the connection between violence and the sacred.   259
majority of post-World War II states have had a draft, though the tendency in 
the last thirty years, following the lead of the United States, has been toward 
an all-volunteer armed forces.
2 As Habermas puts it in one of his essays: 
“General military duty has been the flip side of citizens’ rights ever since the 
French Revolution; the willingness to fight and die for the fatherland is 
supposed to prove both national consciousness and republican consensus” 
(1997, 173).
3 In post-World War II Germany, however, universal conscription 
has been considered to be far more than a necessary evil. As 
Bundespresident Theodor Heuss put it in a speech to the Bundestag, it is “a 
legitimate child of democracy” (Winter 1983, 186). 
 
The Past as Present  
Given the rather obvious tension between compulsory military service 
and a democratic society grounded in the rights of the individual, the question 
is this: how did the institution of conscription come to be considered essential 
to democracy? In the German case, the link is considered to be a negative 
one, grounded in reaction to the history of the German military. Specifically, 
conscription has been considered a kind of inoculation against the 
development of the military as a “state within a state” (Staat im Staat). The 
reference is to German armed forces of the past, especially the Reichswehr, 
wherein the military became so disconnected from the official democratic 
values of the larger society that it lacked any real investment in it values and 
embraced National Socialism as an ally against revolution from the left.  
                                                 
2 The “all-volunteer” military is sometimes referred to as the “economic draft,” meaning that for 
many young men, and for a growing number of young women, enlistment in the armed forces 
is the best economic opportunity available to them. 
3 See chapter 2 for a discussion of the link of the nation, liberal democratic forms and the war 
system.   260
The particular source of this fear is an understanding of German (and 
particularly Prussian) armed forces of the past and their ominous preference 
for the rule of conservative, nationalist factions. In the words of historian Craig 
Gordon the Prussian army was  
 
…the main pillar of absolutism in Prussia and in the German 
Empire that Prussia founded in 1871 and the chief barrier to 
effective parliamentary government and progress toward 
democracy. If it can be argued that modern German history 
was a prolonged constitutional struggle between 
conservative and liberal forces, it was clear that in the critical 
moments in that process, it was the army that played the 
decisive role, throwing its weight in every instance against 
the cause of popular sovereignty” (Craig 1982, 238). 
 
Nor was the Prussian military simply separate. It saw itself, and was widely 
seen as, the elite of the German nation. “Die insbesondere in bürgerlichen 
Kreisen weit verbreitete Bewunderung für das Offizierskorps ging soweit, dass 
die Erwerbung eines Reserveoffizierspatents zu den höchsten 
gesellschaftlichen Weihen gehörte.” (“Particularly in bourgeois circles 
admiration for the officer corps was so strong that attainment of a reserve 
officer’s commission granted admission to the highest social circles” (Förster 
1999, 23). Or as a rather standard pre-1945 joke went, “any German mayor 
would snap to attention if addressed by an officer” (Nelson 1972, 19). 
  From the post-Cold War perspective the swaggering, arrogant, 
Prussian officer—like the officious, inflexible, unimaginative Prussian 
bureaucrat (Beamter)—carries a grotesque mythological weight, like a figure 
out of Kafka. Both have become stock comic figures. Separated from times 
present by the far more menacing figures of the Waffen-SS and the 
Schreibtischtäter of the Nazi period, and with large parts of old Prussia now 
ceded to Poland, there would seem to be little left to fear. Yet at least for the   261
officer corps of the Bundeswehr, concern with the development of an elite 
Staat im Staat mentality in the military is still current. 
  In a lengthy interview with me in November 2000, Oberst (Colonel) 
Jürgen Weidemaier, then commander of the Zentrum Innere Führung, Bereich 
5 (Center for Innere Führung, Section 5) located in Strausberg—a subsidiary 
institution of the main Center in Koblenz—spoke to me about the principles of 
organization of the Bundeswehr. In response to my question on the matter, he 
said, “Die Bundeswehr ist kein Staat im Staat” (“The Bundeswehr is not a state 
within a state.”) “Soldaten sind Staatsbürger zuerst.” (“Soldiers are citizens 
first.”) The emphases were eloquent, and if he, like many of the Bundeswehr 
officers of all ranks with whom I spoke, tended to quote official Ministry of 
Defense literature when questioned, his commitment to the principles he 
expressed seemed genuine.  
He wrote in a conference paper for a meeting of the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) that he was kind enough to give 
to me: “By committing themselves to a conscript army, government and 
parliament intended to emphasize that one of the self evident obligations of all 
citizens is the duty to defend the state against any attack from outside. In 
addition, conscription contributes to a permanent exchange with society and is 
thus regarded as an essential element for the integration of the armed forces 
into state and society” (Weidemaier n.d., 2, original in English). 
Oberst Weidemaier’s rhetoric is virtually identical to that which has 
been used to describe and defend the political orientation and principles of the 
Bundeswehr since its founding. These principles, centered on the idea of 
citizen-soldiers (Staatsbürger in Uniform), informed by the doctrine of 
individual moral responsibility, civic integration and priority of conscience,   262
collectively referred to as Innere Führung amount to a double doctrine of 
refusal.
4  
On the one hand, the reform called for a refusal of tradition that sought 
to break not only with the immediate Wehrmacht past, but with the very idea of 
Traditionspflege (preservation of tradition) so associated with German armed 
forces of the past (Abenheim 1988, 28–30; Demeter 1962, 135–141). On the 
other hand, the duty to refuse was integral to the idea of Innere Führung. Thus 
when Elmar Branstetter, the legal expert of the administrative group 
responsible for inventing the new military (the so-called Dienststelle Blank), 
briefed the members of the Security Committee of the Bundestag, he told 
them that Kadavergehorsam (blind obedience) would play no part in the new 
military. Moreover, he said, that it was a soldier’s duty to disobey orders that 
violated international law or undermined fundamental human rights.
5 
 The immediate context of this proposal, as noted by parliamentarians 
present in the session, was the Nuremberg trials. These trials had established 
that, whatever the difficulties faced by a soldier in the field, it was ultimately 
and unavoidably his responsibility to judge the legality, moral appropriateness 
and military necessity of his orders. In the aftermath of the Nuremberg trials, 
and in the proposals of the Bundeswehr reformers, no soldier would ever 
again be able to fall back on a legal defense of “just following orders.” 
Theodore Blank, the head of the Dienststelle, was present at this same 
                                                 
4 Innere Führung is another German term that proves difficult to translate with any economy. 
Most authors, including Large ( 1996 ) and Abenheim (1988) offer footnotes stating as much 
and use the German expression whenever possible. The difficulty of translation comes not 
least of all from the controversy that has surrounded the phrase, and the attitudes it is 
supposed to represent, since its inception. In short, it is a piece of contested military jargon 
that refers to the appropriate attitude of soldiers in the Bundeswehr, emphasizing self-directed, 
ethically informed action and “normalized” relationships between officers and common 
soldiers. 
5 Stenographische Protokolle, Sonderausschuss zur Mitberatung der EVG Vertrages, PA, 8. 
Sitzung, 128-31 (as cited in Large 1996, 195).   263
session and echoed this view. He told the parliamentarians that soldiers, like 
every citizen in a democracy, are responsible for their actions and would be 
held accountable for their legality. Faced with the objection that a soldier in 
wartime might face summary execution for failing to carry out an order, Blank 
countered that the first requirement of duty is obedience to a “higher law” 
regardless of consequences.
6  
Although the idea that a soldier only has the responsibility to obey 
“lawful orders” was not radically new, the duty to disobey—to refuse to obey 
orders that conflicted not just with the national, constitutional order but with 
notions of international law and human rights—was both new and unsettling. 
For someone who has never served in a traditional military, including that of 
the United States, it is hard to convey just how bizarre this idea is from the 
military perspective—even fifty years later. The vast bulk of the professional 
military men I knew as a soldier in the United States Army were a far cry from 
being either the vainglorious martinets or fanatic ideologues of military 
caricature. I have no doubt, however, that the vast majority would uphold the 
traditional principles of obedience, hierarchy, toughening and the basic 
separation of the military from society as necessary to the coherence and 
function of the army—without reflecting on the function of such principles. 
Arguably, in an era when technological advancement and technical proficiency 
has become more important to success in war than toughness and discipline, 
such traditions have become at least somewhat anachronistic— supporting 
not military success, but soldierly identity.
7 
                                                 
6 ibid, 135 (as cited in Large 1996, 195). 
7 The preservation of a good bit of military tradition, particular traditions around “toughness” 
and “separation” have everything to do with masculinity. In 1980, for example, the 
commandant of the Marine Corps testified to Congress that if women were allowed a role in 
combat it would be a devastating psychological blow to men who like to conceive of   264
Whether or not contemporary American officers generally support a 
kind of traditional militarism, what is certain is that such traditions were 
embedded in the training and daily life of soldiers in the Imperial Army of the 
Kaiserreich, the Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht—the three German armies 
that immediately preceded the Bundeswehr (e.g., Abenheim 1988; Craig 1964; 
Demeter 1962; Frevert 1991; Messerschmidt 1975). The conservative 
resistance to the Staatsbürger in Uniform and Innere Führung reforms, was 
focused in the veterans groups. The groups complained that the 
“überreformer” in the Dienststelle were endangering the distinctiveness of the 
military profession. Otto Mosbach of the umbrella group Verband deutscher 
Soldaten (VdS), for example, wrote that the Bonn government was “giving 
young people the impression that military service was just another job, 
complete with an eight-hour day.”
8 
This, of course, was exactly what the reformers intended. In fact, when 
a group of experts met in September 1954 at Bad Tönnisstein to lay the 
groundwork for the Personalgutachterausschuss or PGA (Personnel 
Screening Board—the group responsible for selecting officers for the new 
military), the major topic of discussion was Innere Führung—and this 
discussion emphasized the similarities between what Baudissin was proposing 
                                                                                                                                              
themselves as defending women. “When you get right down to it,” he said, “you’ve got to 
protect the manliness of war” (Enloe 1983, 154). And the manliness of war has to do with far 
more than the inclusion of women in combat roles—it also demands a morbid conditioning in 
misery. To the extent that such conditioning is no longer necessary to the war system per se, 
but a prop to military masculine identity, it will quite likely be swept aside by capitalist 
processes that demand increasing specialization. Tradition is a source of resistance to these 
processes—and tradition is probably strengthened in militaries, such as that of the United 
States, with a high profile, neo-imperialist mission—but the increasing presence of women in 
the military, even in combat roles, shows that it is breaking down. In this context it is 
interesting to note that the second face of Innere Führung, beyond the idea of citizen soldiers, 
is a normalization of soldierly life to make it more like employee-like. 
8 Mosbach to Deutsche Press-Agentur, 22 June 1953, BA-MA, BW 9/757 (as cited in Large 
1996, 190).   265
and modern management theory. Soldiers, in the new model, were to be 
treated like employees and officers like managers, called upon to maximize 
efficiency (Genschel 1972, 208).  
Thus the intended reforms were multifaceted. They were, in the first 
place, intended to normalize military life. The daily life of soldiers was to be 
conducted much as civilian economic life, without the constant drills, 
inspections, and petty exercises of arbitrary authority common to the armed 
forces in most societies. In the second place, the reforms were meant to 
create a military “without pathos”—one in which the concepts like “duty” and 
“honor” were redefined and effectively stripped of the trappings of the sacred. 
Even though the profession of arms necessarily brings the soldier into contact 
with the extraordinary prospect of killing and facing death, duty was not to be 
so much drilled into him, but something that he understood as important to the 
defense of a society in which he himself lived. And in the third place, soldiers 
in the new army would be expected to accept full responsibility for their 
actions—a test of which was their ability to understand and respect the 
decision of the 20th of July conspirators (Abenheim 1988, 140–145). 
As extensive as the Bundeswehr reforms were, however—and to be 
clear, many were actually instituted only years after the founding—their impact 
went beyond what was intended. Focused on the problem of creating a military 
structure that would both be appropriate to a democratic state and prevent a 
return to the nationalistic militarism of old, the Bundeswehr reforms both 
reflected and helped to create a significant shift in German masculinity. 
The vehemence of the opposition to the reforms—both before the 
Bundeswehr was established and in the new officer corps after its founding—
speaks to the emotional attachment to the old ways. Veterans of previous   266
German militaries, who numbered in the millions, had been trained in the often 
brutal traditions of military manhood. These traditional military values were 
central to the self-definition of military men, i.e. to their identity as not just any 
kind of men, but men of honor (Ehrenmänner). In an elegiac tract written in the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War, prominent German historian 
Gerhard Ritter defines these values, those of “Echtes Soldatentum,” (“real 
soldiers”) as including four essentials: “Gehorsam, männliche 
Selbstbeherrschung, Willensstärke und ritterliche Tapferkeit” (“Obedience, 
manly self-control,  strength of will and knightly valor.” And it was thought that 
only those soldiers possessed of these values would be able to “manfully meet 
the challenge” of war (“…männlich ins Auge sehen” [Ritter 1947, 26]). 
Baudissin’s view could not be more antithetical. In a radio address 
broadcast November 8, 1954, he stated, “A secularized ‘soldier’s honor’ that 
enshrines obedience, duty, hardihood, and readiness for action as 
unquestioned and absolute principles, leaves the soldier blind and helpless 
against the whims of criminals and charlatans” (as cited in Large 1996, 182). 
Yet in downplaying the cult of the military-masculine tradition in favor of 
politically informed self-consciousness and efficiency—in the spirit of the 
emergent theories of labor-management relations—he and the other reformers 
were not just asking a lot from soldiers and officers, they were asking them to 
give up the distinguished status of an elite estate (Stand) grounded in a 
particularly difficult and disciplined form of masculinity. Central to this 
masculine identity was the necessity of its difficulty—its hardness—and its 
glorification of sacrifice (Opfer). The soldier was called upon to be willing not 
only to kill, but to risk his life and even die to defend his country. This was a 
sacred mission, the importance of which was deemed to justify the subjection   267
of the soldier to constant training and a strict code of unquestioning 
obedience—so that, in the heat of battle, he would do as ordered. 
Verweigerung became integral to a new, shifted self-image, and much 
desired social image, of the Bundeswehr. Though refusal contradicts the 
tradition of obedience, it nonetheless supports a masculine self-image as 
strong-willed, independent and courageous. The increased valuation of refusal 
indicates an important shift in masculine cum military identity. Obedience, of 
course, is not thrown completely out the window in its everyday sense, but in 
the new order the connection to the sacred comes less from obedience unto 
death and more from the manly will to stand firm and judge for oneself—all the 
more important in a society about which jokes are still routinely told about a 
slavish penchant for rules and blind obedience.
9 
The historical precedent for the rising importance of refusal, of course, 
is the Reformation and Protestantism, both of which Germans claim as their 
own. Pietism in particular calls on its adherents to practice conscience-driven 
disobedience, construed as true obedience to a higher duty. Baudissin himself 
was influenced by his experiences as a volunteer for the Evangelische Kirche 
in Deutschland (EKD), the Evangelical Church of Germany. In the immediate 
post-war period he was involved with an EKD-sponsored labor relations 
counseling program. As part of this program he worked as a lay counselor in 
the mining industry where he began to develop the management ideas that 
                                                 
9 One such joke I have heard on numerous occasions, usually told in the first person but with 
something of the air of an urban legend, goes like this: While crossing the street in a quiet part 
of town I stopped at the curb and carefully looked both ways, then proceeded to cross. A 
German citizen immediately stopped me, pointing out vehemently that the walk light was still 
red. I responded that there were no cars coming. His livid reaction was to say “Regeln sind 
Regeln!) (Rules are rules!). I heard this story once from an anthropologist, once from a British 
ex-patriot living in Berlin and read it in a popular ersatz ethnography of German culture. I was 
doubtful until something similar happened to me. Most Germans to whom I relate the story, 
however, respond dismissively, accusing me of spreading stereotypes. They don’t think it to 
be the slightest bit amusing.   268
would become the working core of Innere Führung. As a result of his 
experiences with the EKD, he also became convinced “of the need to infuse all 
public institutions, including the military, with Christian ethical principles” 
(Large 1996, 179). 
The context here is not just the memory of the vulnerability of soldiers 
to the allure of National Socialism, but the supposed attraction of communism, 
particularly for Germans, given the division of Germany and the proximity of 
the East. Nor were these worries entirely unsupported by experience. The so-
called “John Affair” in which Otto John, a well-known survivor of the July 20, 
1944 plot against Hitler, defected to the East, casting doubt on the wisdom of 
honoring, or even trusting the resisters. John’s defection was particularly 
inauspicious in that he publicly accused the Bonn government of disgracing 
the legacy of the Widerstand. His criticism was directed against the Amt Blank 
(which would become the Ministry of Defense) and the Gehlen Organization 
(which would become the Bundesnachtrichtendiesnt, or Federal Intelligence 
Agency, equivalent to the CIA).  Nor had John been shut out of the leadership 
in the West, as so many of the resisters had. He was, ironically, head of the 
new Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, or Federal Domestic Intelligence 
Agency, roughly equivalent to the FBI (Schwarz 1981, 236–39). As reported in 
the December 21, 1954 issue of Der Spiegel magazine, Reinhard Gehlen, a 
long-time opponent and rival of John’s who would become head of the 
Bundesnachtrichtendiesnt, echoed the feelings of many when he said, “Once 
a traitor, always a traitor” (11). 
In this context, the reformers felt the need to inculcate principles that 
would both provide an ideological grounding for acting on principle and 
counteract the attractiveness of communism. They chose the values of   269
Christian chivalry. Here is an excerpt from a training manual for Innere 
Führung (my translation): 
 
Concerning Western tradition—it can refer to nothing other 
than the Christian tradition. Those who want to deny this, 
even in the face of the treat of Soviet materialism, deny 
Europe itself. But whoever affirms the Christian tradition, 
regardless of denominational profession, also affirms the 
archetype of the Western soldier: the “Miles Christianus,” the 
knight (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 1957, 76, cited 
in Bald 1999, 61). 
 
Ironies abound here, of course, in that the Miles Christianus (Christian Soldier) 
is actually a fairly late doctrine promulgated by the Catholic Church at least in 
part to insure a hierarchy of virtues culminating in obedience to the church. In 
Germany, and in Protestantism more generally (as in the hymn, “Onward 
Christian Soldier”), the notion became fused with the ideal of service to God as 
interpreted by the individual. In the tradition debate with respect to the 
Bundeswehr it is referenced as part of the “knightly tradition” of the German 
officer class as evidenced in the actions of the men of the Twentieth of July. Of 
course it leaves out a discussion of just how ineffective this tradition proved to 
be as a source of inspiration within the military during the Third Reich—that is, 
just how few ordinary soldiers of whatever rank did refuse, resist even when 
they witnessed or were ordered to participate in crimes against humanity. 
  Yet the context had changed—or rather, it was changing. Baudissin and 
the Bundeswehr reformers were, in many ways, in front of the larger society. 
No other group in German society has so systematically examined its own 
failure—in its previous incarnation as the Wehrmacht—as the new military. 
Nor has any other group in German society attempted to break with the past in 
quite so radical a manner. The winning slogan of Adenauer’s CDU was “no   270
experiments!” and most of the major social institutions reflect this attitude. The 
Bundeswehr reforms were not fully implemented until the 1970s, indicating a 
significant lag between what the reformers could imagine and what the 
Wehrmacht-trained officer corps of the new military could realize, particularly 
with pressure from the United States for rapid rearmament. Yet the gist of the 
reforms reflected an understanding of the implication of soldierly manhood in 
its previous heroic incarnation as a central problem for the military. The 
valorization and institutionalization of refusal reflected this understanding.   
 
Development of Wehrdienstverweigerung 
In 1955–56 when the Bundeswehr was founded, German society as a 
whole remained deeply divided between those in favor of rearmament and 
those opposed, and public opinion on the matter fluctuated monthly. When 
SPD parliamentarian Carlo Schmid proclaimed, in the immediate aftermath of 
the war, “Should this insanity of war break out again somewhere, and if fate 
should have it that our land becomes a battlefield, then we shall simply perish 
knowing at least that we neither committed the crime nor encouraged it” 
(Schmid 1979, 490), he spoke for many war-weary Germans. In March 1950, 
one poll reported 52 percent of all Germans against rearmament, even in the 
context of a European Army, and only 33 percent in favor. By July 1954 those 
numbers had nearly reversed with 43 percent in favor and only 34 percent 
against, even if it meant building up an independent national force. The 
numbers, however, continued to fluctuate. The percentage of the population 
who considered it a good thing that a new German army was being built 
dropped from 42 percent in January 1956 to 31 percent in June 1956, as the 
new military was formed (Noelle-Neumann 1967, 436–438).   271
  With respect to the question of conscription, those generally in favor of 
it—once it became clear that Germany would rearm—rose from only 30 
percent in March 1950 to 51 percent in March 1956, presumably in response 
to the dispersion of the idea of citizen soldiers promoted by the reformers 
(Noelle-Neumann 1967, 443). And, in spite of the constitutionally guaranteed 
right to refuse to do military service, in March 1955 only about half of the 
population (48 percent) thought that draftees should be allowed to refuse to 
serve and over a third of the population thought they should not be allowed to 
refuse (35 percent) with the remainder undecided (Noelle-Neumann 1967, 
449). 
  Even with public opinion divided on rearmament and conscientious 
objection, there had clearly been a historically significant shift. Conscientious 
objectors during the First World War were routinely declared to be mentally 
incompetent or sentenced to prison terms. During the Third Reich, when 
conscription was reinstated, those who refused were subject to imprisonment, 
or, after 1938, the death penalty (Kulhmann and Lippert 1993, 98–99). 
  The numbers indicate that, for many Germans, identification with the 
military tradition remained strong in the early years of the Federal Republic. 
However, the constitutional guarantee of a right to refuse military service and 
the orientation of prominent Bundeswehr reformers towards a more humane 
organization of military labor power was indicative of a shift. It was, however, a 
shift that did not happen overnight. Again, taking the case of conscientious 
objectors as a social indicator of shifting attitudes toward the military and 
appropriate masculinity, a clear pattern emerges wherein both the absolute 
and relative number of those refusing to serve increases over time. When the 
draft was reintroduced in the mid-1950s objectors were a tiny minority,   272
constituting only 2,447 individuals between 1956 and 1958, compared to tens 
of thousands of draftees. Nor did the number or percentage of Verweigerer 
change very much until the mid-1960s, when the number of objectors climbed 
nearly every year until it reached a level of over 70,000 a year in the late 
1980s and then jumped to over 150,000 per year in 1991, after the end of the 
Cold War and with the beginnings of a push for the use of German troops 
outside of Germany.
10 In the 1990s the number of applications filed continued 
at a high level, with 135,000 in 1995, 152,381 in 1998 and 155,929 in 1999. In 
2000 the number dropped to 87,203, coincident with the reduction of the total 
number of draftees required for the Bundeswehr and the decision of many 
potential Verweigerer to wait to see if they were mustered at all before filing a 
conscientious objector petition that would obligate them to Zivildienst.
11 
  The growing number of conscientious objectors, beginning in the mid-
1960s, reflects a shift in the societal view of the military. The student 
movement of the 1960s, as it began to confront the older generation about the 
German past, also objected to military service in the present. It is important to 
understand, however, that the ground for such a shift had been laid in the 
Basic Law of the Federal Republic, the ideals of the Bundeswehr reformers, 
and, perhaps most of all, in the integration of Germany into an international 
system of defense following the post-World War II occupation. The Cold War 
provided a context of refusal in which the German military was insulated from 
                                                 
10 These statitics are from the Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung from 
January 1992 (Bredow 1992, 297). 
11 Statistics from Bundesamt für den Zivildienst available at http://www.zivildienst.de/ under 
Kriegsdeinstverweigerung, Daten und Fakten, in a table titled “Anerkennungsverfahren des 
Bundesamtes (Anträge und Entscheidungen) and dated June 30, 2000. Note that statistics 
from the Bundesamt für den Zivilidienst records applications for conscientious objector status 
since 1984 when responsibility was for determinations was transferred there. The previous 
statistics from the Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung are compiled from 
unstated sources and differ slightly, though they do not impact the general trend.   273
actual conflict by the doctrine of mutually assured destruction and the massive 
presence of American and other foreign troops on German soil. In this context 
a system of conscription and refusal had the social space to grow up without 
having to meet the demands for either war or international peacekeeping. 
  Though such language always tends to obscure, it is not unfair to say 
that between the founding of the Bundeswehr in 1955–56 and the end of the 
Cold War in 1989–90, Germany was structurally insulated from the demands 
of the war system. Under such circumstances the main obstacle to 
Wehrdienstverweigerung was the damage such an act would cause to an 
objector’s self-image and in some cases to his career prospects.
12 Even if the 
old-style military manliness was no longer needed, or even wanted, by the 
military itself, social expectations took time and political agitation to reflect this 
change. As Kuhlmann and Lippert, two researchers associated with the 
Sozialwissenschaftlichen Institut der Bundeswehr who have studied the 
phenomena put it: “Conscientious objection in Germany was considered, for a 
long time, to be an aberrant (abweichend) behavior. This was particularly true 
of those over 50 with previous military experience who took every chance to 
see objectors as draft dodgers (‘Drückebergers’)” (Kuhlmann and Lippert 
1991b, 14; see also Bredow 1992, 294).  
 The  word  abweichend, usually translated as deviant or aberrant, is an 
interesting characterization, offering a clue to the sort of “deviance” in 
question. The root weich means soft (or weak) and is a typical German cut at 
someone’s masculinity, as in Weicheier (soft eggs) with the understanding that 
                                                 
12 Older informants report fear of discrimination from employers if they refused to do their 
Wehrdienst. Younger informants no longer considered such matters and recent surveys of 
business report, predictably, that industries close to the military—arms manufacturers and 
heavy industry for example—prefer employees who did military service, whereas the health 
and human services industries prefer those who did Zivildienst.   274
the euphemism for testes in German—balls, nuts, stones in English—is eggs. 
A Weicheier is a wimpy man, lacking in physical courage, will power and 
personal drive, an un-masculine man. He is a fragile man, easily devastated 
by opposition. 
  Abweichend, in the case of Wehrdienstverweigerung, means deviation 
from ones duty to the Fatherland, community and family. It is also, 
fundamentally, gender deviance. Gerhard Scharnhorst, one of the early 
nineteenth century Prussian reformers, stated that every citizen, meaning, of 
course, every male citizen, is “a born defender of his state” (Kuhlmann and 
Lippert 1991a, 21). A man who refuses to defend himself, his family, and his 
nation is not so much seen as “unnatural” but as “unmanly”—for unlike 
femininity, which is widely associated with the natural, true masculinity is 
regarded as a necessary artificiality, a willed construct created through the 
systematic training of mind and body.
13 The failed man is one who lacks the 
capacity and will to fight. 
  The institutionalisation of refusal in post-World War II Germany, 
however, opened up space in the West German culture for the acceptance of 
deviant masculinity. Neologisms like Schlaffi (literally “sleepy” or “drowsy” but 
sometimes “wimpy”) and Softi (softy) carry an ambivalence in contemporary 
German culture. Instead of failed masculinity, they indicate a new kind of 
maleness informed by sensitivity and an ability to talk about oneself and be 
                                                 
13 Though Scharnhorst used the phrase “born defender” indicating a “natural” manhood this 
should be seen as a piece of rhetoric, like Jefferson’s felicitous phrase (actually from Franklin) 
about self-evident truths. The need to “make men” has been central to thinking about the 
military experience as in the idea that joining the army with “make a man out of …” someone. I 
take up this discussion in Chapter 2, following the work of Gilmore (1990) and, in particular, 
Goldstein (2001).   275
emotionally open, the equivalent of the American “sensitive new-age guy” 
(“SNAG”).  
Even with the shift towards the increased valuation of refusal and less 
militarist forms of masculinity, the term “Wehrdienstverweigerer” still makes its 
appearance on a humorous website that lists more than a hundred 
“synonyms” for Weicheier.
14 Nonetheless the humour has become something 
less than vicious and the numbers tell their own story.  
The percentage of the population holding a positive image of those who 
refuse military service, and more particularly those participating in the 
alternative civilian service, has steadily climbed, particularly since 1984 when 
the procedure for refusal was reformed. Previously objectors had to appear in 
person before a review board appointed by the Ministry of Defence. The board 
ruled on the sincerity of the applicant and the validity of his grounds. Obviously 
an appearance before such a board was an intimidating prospect. What is 
more, having the Defence Ministry review applications for conscientious 
objection, if not quite like setting the fox to guard the chickens, was a clear 
conflict of interest.  
In 1984 decisions regarding refusal were moved to the Office of Civilian 
Service (Bundesamt für den Zivildienst), which is housed in the Federal 
Ministry for Families, Senior Citizens, Women and Children. Simultaneously, 
the appearance before a review board was replaced with the submission of a 
written statement which is examined for completeness and legal grounds but 
not investigated as to its sincerity (Kuhlmann and Lippert 1991b, 5). 
                                                 
14 See http://www.witzbank.de/weichei.htm and note that the antonym, Harteier (hard eggs), 
also rates its own joke page (http://www.witzbank.de/) that includes such attributive gems as 
“Bank-ohne-Maske-Überfaller” (“Without-a-mask-bank-robber”), “E-mail-vom-Chef-ungelesen-
Löscher” (“Guy who deletes E-mails from his boss without looking”), and “Minenfeld-ohne-
Suchgerät-Räumer” (“Minefield-without-a-mine-detector-wanderer”).    276
  In the wake of these institutional changes, both the number of objectors 
and the positive public perception thereof increased dramatically. Refusal, 
originally thought of by many as deviant and by virtually all as exceptional, 
something outside of the ordinary run of things, had by the late 1980s become 
ordinary, particularly amongst Abiturienten—univeristy track high school 
students and graduates therefrom. Of course the very meaning of refusal 
changes in a cultural context where, in certain circumstances, it is not only 
accepted, but even expected.  
  “When I told my high school friends that I was joining the Bundeswehr,” 
one informant reported, “they were shocked. They asked me why I would do 
something so stupid and wanted to know if I had gone crazy.” 
  This was in 1982, two years before the reforms. The man in question, 
Hans-Georg Lutz, attended a Gymnasium (university preparatory high school) 
in the Ruhr region. Informants from similar backgrounds—the middle-class 
sons of professionals and university graduates—who elected not to refuse, or 
even more so, those like Hans-Georg who volunteered for service without 
being drafted, report similar reactions throughout the 1980s and 1990s. A 
common accusation—and a common complaint—is that military service in 
particular is a waste of time. Though civilian service is also seen as an 
unwanted life-interruption, it is considered to have some redeeming social 
value. Military service, contrariwise, is widely thought to be pointless and 
useless, especially in the post-1989 world where I heard the refrain, many 
times, “es gibt kein Feind” (“there is no enemy”). Also, to the extent that a 
standing army is considered necessary, people both inside and outside the 
military increasingly consider draftees to be completely superfluous to the “real 
army”—a kind of anachronistic remnant of the Cold War. As one circa 1999–  277
2000 draftee told me, “We are just there to drink beer and watch porno movies 
and if anything happens, we wait for the real soldiers to arrive.” 
  It is easy, however, to overdraw the extent to which refusal, at least in 
the form of Wehrdienstverweigerung, has become normal. Decisions on this 
matter continue to be class-constrained and conscientious objection has been 
ironically referred to as the “Abiturientengrundrecht” (“fundamental right of the 
college bound”) (Krölls 1980, 51). Dieter Kreutz, a man about the same age as 
the aforementioned Hans-Georg Lutz, came under intense pressure from 
friends and family, particularly his parents, when he announced that he was 
going to file an application for conscientious objection. After months of having 
his manhood impugned by friends and compared to those filthy (dreckig) 
conscientious objectors, he finally capitulated and agreed to be drafted, telling 
his mother: “Okay, if this is what you want, I’ll do this shit.” Unlike Hans-Georg, 
Dieter came from a working class background and was attending a 
vocationally-oriented high school (Fachoberschule) at the time his decision 
vis-à-vis Wehrdienst came due. 
  Verweigerung continues to be weighted toward the university bound, 
even since the 1984 reforms went into effect. By the mid-1980s, just a few 
years after Dieter felt so much pressure to serve in the military, the percentage 
of non-Abiturienten (Hauptschüler and Realschüler) who filed for conscientious 
objectors status rose to over 57 percent of all petitions. In the same period the 
relative percentage of Abiturienten petitioners dropped to 39 percent—still a 
strong overrepresentation, given that Gymnasium students make up only 15 to 
20 percent of the affected population, but nonetheless indicative of an 
increasing acceptance of Wehrdienstverweigerung across German society 
(Kuhlmann and Lippert 1991b).   278
  By 1990 Wehrdienstverweigerung had become so common, and so 
normalized, that close to 99 percent of all applications were approved and 
about one half of all potential draftees were refusing (Kuhlmann and Lippert 
1993, 100). A willingness to do Zivildienst has become the only real 
qualification for the pro forma acceptance of an application. By the late 1990s 
attitudes toward objection have become cavalier. According to several 
informants, standardized statements of conscience are circulated on the 
internet and routinely accepted by authorities. 
  One Verweigerer who did his Zivildienst in the late 1990s had just 
begun an internship at a major electronics firm in Berlin when I interviewed 
him and a colleague who had done his Wehrdienst at the same time. When 
asked if he felt there was any stigma attached to conscientious objection or 
doing Zivildienst—which had previously been associated with “women’s 
work”—he laughed. “You mean,” he asked, “was I afraid people would think I 
was one of these… Schlaffis?” 
  Yes, that’s exactly what I was interested in. 
  “No,” he answered, “it was no big deal.” 
  His colleague, who had done Wehrdienst, likewise reported that his 
decision was a pragmatic one—military service lasts three months less than 
civilian, he told me, and he wanted to hurry up and get on with his life.  
  The Verweigerer, a friendly young man who had done his Zivildienst as 
a counselor for a church-based youth group, enthusiastically offered to give 
me a copy of his Begründung (grounds), his personal statement of conscience 
submitted to the Bundesamt für den Zivildienst. I told him that I was very 
interested in seeing it and that he need have no fears about my failing to   279
protect his confidentiality. He had no worries on these grounds and gave me 
permission to use it as I saw fit. 
  A few days later he sent it along to me and I have to admit that it was 
something of a disappointment. Less than 500 words in length, it is a far cry 
from an impassioned plea of carefully considered conscience. He states that 
“Armed conflict is, for me, unthinkable” but goes on to reference, in one 
improbable sentence, Martin Luther King, Jr., Gandhi, the Dalai Lama and 
Nelson Mandela. To me, at least, this hardly indicated a sturdy grounding in a 
pacifist worldview or even an orientation towards a self-willed refusal to 
engage in state-sponsored violence. Yet such a reading misses the point. The 
young man’s statement is a virtuoso demonstration of refusal by conformity, 
through a carefully worded statement pushing all of the correct bureaucratic 
buttons. In its institutionalization through Zivildienst, and in the changing social 
perception of what it means to be a man, refusal has become institutionalized. 
 
An Interlude: War, Death and Manhood  
  One of the spookiest places in Berlin is the Soviet War Memorial in 
Treptower Park. The memorial stands in what used to be the heart of East 
Berlin and, as far as I know, is unique in that it is a major war monument that 
stands on foreign soil. Its presence reflects the “special relationship” between 
the former German Democratic Republic and the former Soviet Union. The 
monument itself depicts a gargantuan Russian soldier—looking suspiciously 
like a Teutonic knight in cape and medieval arms—carrying a child in his arms 
and stamping on a shattered swastika (see figure 6.1). You approach the 
monument through a garden and it is surrounded by dozens of sub-
monuments. The inscription over the triumphal arch-entry way proclaims that   280
the purpose of the memorial is so that the heroic sacrifice of Soviet soldiers in 
the fight against fascism will never be forgotten. 
  In many ways the memorial is akin to the tombs erected to Unknown 
Soldiers that Benedict Anderson talks about in Imagined Communities. 
Anderson references the peculiarly “national,” and therefore “modern,” 
character of such tombs. He takes such monuments as paradigmatic of a 
certain aspect of nationhood—its peculiar givenness. “Void as these tombs are 
of identifiable mortal remains or immortal souls,” he writes, “they are 
nonetheless saturated with ghostly national imaginings,” adding the 
parenthetical comment: “This is why so many different nations have such 
Figure 6.1 – Soviet War Memorial   281
tombs without feeling any need to specify the nationality of their absent 
occupants. What else would they be but Germans, Americans, 
Argentinians…?” (Anderson 1983, 16). 
  While Anderson points to the paradigmatic and abstract—some 
unspecified tombs of The Unknown Soldier—I find that the eccentric and 
particular can be more instructive. The Soviet War Memorial is anything but an 
ideal exemplar of Anderson’s point. Though it commemorates unspecified war 
dead, it is also a monument erected by an imperial state upon the soil of a 
conquered, satellite state, neither of which could claim “national” status and 
both of which have ceased to exist. Built atop a grass-covered mound 
constructed of the rubble of Hitler’s Reich Chancellery, it can hardly be 
interpreted as a transparent symbol of German national sacrifice and 
continuity. Yet still it stands, an anomalous (at least in the nationalist logic of 
the sort of cenotaphs Anderson refers to) reminder of a bitter history, on the 
territory of a now sovereign united Germany. 
  I spent a good bit of time at the memorial during my stay in Berlin. In 
the time before the Wall came down, they took East German school children to 
the monument, to teach them about the “unbreakable friendship of the people 
of the GDR and the USSR.”
15 Now it is usually quiet, at least when the 
weather is cold and damp, as it so often is. It felt to me like a refuge from 
Berlin. But it was also something else—a towering symbol of heroic military 
masculinity, undaunted, seemingly even untouched, even after the 
unspeakable sacrifices of the Red Army. This meaning becomes all the more 
apparent if one takes the time to walk the entire grounds and discover the 
matching feminine counterpart to the Soviet hero. Instead of a sixty-foot tall 
                                                 
15 A buzz-phrase of the East German government.   282
figure of copper sheeting on a giant pedestal, she is life-sized, close to the 
ground, and is meant to depict the sorrow of Mother Russia for her lost 
children. She looks off to the giant in the distance, as if for rescue. 
  What can this mean? The question is worth considering in terms of 
Anderson’s argument that the affective appeal of the nation-form has to do 
with the idea of continuity. The nation, he contends, has in common with 
religion a concern with issues of mortality, immortality and the contingency of 
life. As I once heard one of his seminar students remark somewhat 
sardonically, the patented answer to one of Professor Anderson’s sphinx-like 
questions was always: “Does it have something to do with the dead?” The 
national imagination, like religion, “concerns itself with the links between the 
dead and the yet unborn, the mystery of re-generation” (Anderson 1983, 18). 
  The Soviet War Memorial clearly has to do with the dead, with the idea 
of memory and immortality. The soldier-hero stands boldly on the ruins of 
Nazism, clutching a child to his breast whom he has rescued at a cost in lives 
and suffering probably unprecedented. The lives memorialized, however, are 
those of the Red Army. At least at first glance, this fits uncomfortably into a 
tale of a specifically national continuity. Likewise the rescued child, though 
doubtless representing the future, is also ambivalent. Given the location of the 
moment both geographically and symbolically, it is difficult to see this future as 
other than a German future. 
  Can this interpretation possibly be correct? Does the monument to the 
heroism of the Red Army depict the rescue of the German future? The short 
answer is yes. The qualified answer is that the memorial is a sediment of a 
specific time and a specific place. It embodies not national continuity per se, 
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a liberating one. Resting on German soil, at the center of what had been 
imperial Prussia, the monument is also a reminder. Germany under the Nazis 
had “sowed the wind” in the murderous brutality of its war in the East, now it 
would “reap the whirlwind” of Soviet occupation. 
  The distance, however, between a liberating Soviet hero and a 
conquering Nazi hero is not something that could easily be derived from the 
monument itself—at least not without a good knowledge of history and notice 
of the shattered swastika. Visually the heroic Soviet could as easily be an 
idealized German soldier of the precise type so admired by the Nazis. This 
should not surprise us, for the image of a soldierly man—in many times and 
places the world round the very ideal of manhood—has always been, like the 
nation-form, available for imitation. Moreover, the qualities most useful in 
warfare—courage, discipline and strength—are very nearly universally 
regarded as the essential characteristics of manhood. The male figure looming 
over the gardens has these characteristics. In spades.   
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CHAPTER 7 
REFUSAL AND THE SELF-IMAGE OF SOLDIERS 
 
  At least from the point of view of the legalities involved, conscientious 
objectors can be divided into four categories: the civilian facing conscription, 
active duty military personnel, total objectors (pacifists), and selective 
objectors (e.g. to a particular war or a particular type of weapon). The vast 
majority of existing commentary refers to the relatively clear-cut case of the 
pacifist civilian facing conscription (Noone 1993, 178). In many ways, 
however, selective objection and active military refusal are socially and 
politically more interesting phenomena. Though the primary complaint of most 
active-duty soldiers, the loss of personal autonomy, is nowhere considered 
grounds for conscientious objection, the willed refusal of actually serving 
soldiers has a powerful potential impact on the ability of any military to 
maintain discipline and predict combat effectiveness.  
  The four-fold division actually parses out into six categories, as 
represented in figure 7.1. The dark vertical line in the center of the chart 
represents the strong division traditionally drawn between civilian and military 
life. This separation, grounded in the connection of soldiers with “sacred 
violence” and brutal necessity, creates a distinction that is, in the words of a 
former German infantry general, “Unchanged and unchangeable in the 
                       Civilian                                                 Military 
   Total Objection          Selective            Total Objection          Selective 
      (Pacifism)               Objection               (Pacifism)              Objection 
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soldier’s world, but that plays no part in the world of civilians (Bürgers)” 
(Sondenstern 1952, 244). Though this division is much less discussed than 
the one between public and private spheres of activity, in terms of the social 
organization of violence, and arguably social organization itself, it is of a 
similar level of importance. True, the civilian/military division directly impacts 
only a minority of the population. However, the ramifications of things 
military—economic, social organizational, demographic, cultural—extend far 
beyond the barracks. 
  Within each main category there are two potential grounds for 
conscientious objection to military service. These are logically the same, if 
practically different, for soldiers and civilians alike. Looking at the chart, 
categories further to the left are traditionally more acceptable grounds for 
objection than those to the right. The hard division between civilian and 
military is a key factor here, creating separate categories of legal personhood 
for those inside and outside of the armed forces. Even countries that have 
fairly “liberal” laws pertaining to civilian conscripts—e.g., Austria, Belgium, 
France, Italy and the Netherlands—accept no applications for refusal from 
soldiers. Both Britain and the United States have procedures in place to deal 
with military conscientious objectors, but both countries require soldiers on 
active duty to jump through hoops that make objection within the military an 
ordeal (Noone 1993, 189; WRI 2000). 
  Under the 1983 German Kriegsdienstverweigerungsgesetz (Act on 
Refusal to Render War Service involving the Use of Arms on Grounds of 
Conscience) both reservists and active duty soldiers are allowed to file for 
conscientious objector status. The reasoning behind this is clear-cut; the legal 
precedent is straightforward: the law commonly recognizes that people can 
change their minds on matters of conscience.    286
The procedure calls for soldiers in the Bundeswehr who refuse further 
service to appear before a review board convened by the Ministry of Defense 
while reservists appear before a panel convened by local political authorities 
(Noone 1993, 189). Though more onerous than the now largely pro forma 
written statement required of civilian conscripts, the procedure is not 
prohibitively difficult. In fact one of my informants actually went through the 
process. Originally drafted, he found military life particularly uncongenial and 
increasingly found that he objected to the idea of taking life, and especially to 
state-sponsored violence, abhorrent. Consequently, when he was called to do 
reserve duty, he filed for conscientious objection. As he put it, “there was a 
group that helped me, the KDV organization”
1 and “by then I had friends who 
supported me.” But, he added, that he was older and less susceptible to social 
pressures and would have made the application even if he had been all alone. 
Though the preparation was stressful, his actual appearance before the board 
was, as he put it, “not so bad” (“nicht so schwer”). His application was granted. 
  The reservist in question is the same Dieter Kreutz reluctant draftee 
described in chapter 6. A closer look at his military experience is a good place 
to start with an examination of the meaning of refusal inside the Bundeswehr. 
As previously noted, Dieter elected, in the face of pressure from friends and 
family, not to file for Wehrdienstverweigerer status. Once drafted, however, he 
was faced again and again, with decisions of obedience and refusal. Unlike 
many, perhaps most, conscripts in the Bundeswehr (or in any military), 
Dieter’s decision to allow himself to be drafted and inducted into the military 
did not equate to a final decision to follow orders and “go along to get along.” 
  He cited, for example, the painful absurdity of marching in formation, 
particularly in one case where his platoon was directed by an inept or sadistic 
                                                 
1 Zentralstelle für Recht und Schutz der Kriegsdienstverweigerer aus Gewissensgründen e.V., 
one of several private organizations that provide legal advise to conscientious objectors and 
help them to prepare to go before the review board or compose written statements.   287
(Dieter suspected the latter) trainer to march straight into a wall. This resulted 
in an odd fiction. The platoon pretended to be marching forward as it bunched 
up against the wall, the soldiers moving their feet in place. No doubt the effect 
was comic to anyone watching, but disconcerting to those involved. 
  It is possible, of course, that such an exercise could have been 
intended as a demonstration of what can happen when soldiers follow orders 
blindly. (Dieter was not the only Bundeswehr soldier to report similar 
experiences to me.) He did not, however, experience it as a lesson, other than 
a lesson in futility and humiliation leaving him disgusted with the military.  
  Such demonstrations are not uncommon in the military and by 
standards with which I am familiar the incident in question is relatively mild. I 
vividly remember something called “rock patrol” from my own days in basic 
training. The incident occurred about eight weeks into training, when some of 
the most stringent disciplinary provisions of the first weeks had been slightly 
relaxed. The pretext for the incident was the disgruntlement of the Senior Drill 
Instructor over the loss of a pocket knife, which he presumed to have been 
stolen by one of the trainees. He called the entire training company, about 200 
soldiers, into formation. We gathered in a large, plowed field where he 
announced that every soldier would crawl around, picking rocks out of the dirt 
and carrying them to the edge of the field until someone confessed to stealing 
his knife. This went on for several hours, until late at night—after a full day of 
strenuous training activities and with wake-up call at 5:00 the next morning. 
Finally, long after dark, he dismissed the company, stating that we would pick 
it up again the next night if no one had confessed. 
  The upshot of the incident was that the next day a large number of 
pocket knifes, some of them fairly similar to the missing one, were 
anonymously dropped in the company commander’s mailbox—after which the 
Senior Drill Instructor relented. He seemed amused by the whole incident.    288
  Nor was this incident extreme by military standards. Recruits have 
traditionally suffered beatings, physical training to the point of exhaustion—
until significant numbers of the participants pass out—as well as other kinds of 
physical or emotional pain and disgust. Though post-Vietnam era reforms 
have largely de-legitimized the more extreme forms of informal training in the 
United States military, incidents such as the rock patrol described above 
remain fairly common. 
  From its founding the Bundeswehr set out to eliminate, or at least 
minimize, such informal and often brutal training styles (Kommissköpfen) 
directed by NCOs against soldiers, particularly fresh recruits. None of the 
Bundeswehr or former Bundeswehr soldiers with whom I spoke reported the 
kinds of extreme hazing or abusive training incidents that I witnessed or 
experienced in the United States Army. However, even in the normal course of 
training soldiers are called upon to do things that are, from the civilian point of 
view, extraordinary. For example, proficiency in the use of various weapons is 
integral to the job of a combat soldier and weapons practice is typically 
required of all soldiers, at least during their initial training. This can be done in 
a variety of ways, more-or-less technologically assisted, but requires, at some 
point, firing live ammunition at a target of some kind. 
  As Dieter Kreutz tells of his experience, his initial weapons training was 
done on standard circular targets marked with concentric rings. The targets 
were affixed to a frame which could be lowered down into an underground 
bunker to be scored and then raised again. Soldiers would take a specified 
number of shots from a specific distance in various firing positions (standing, 
supported, prone) and then back up to another specified distance and shoot 
again. 
  “It was no problem for me,” Dieter explained, “to shoot at the paper 
targets that were just targets. I hit every time—didn’t miss. But then they   289
replaced the paper targets with targets shaped like people. And I was looking 
through my sights, looking on the target painted to look like a person, and I 
thought, ‘I can’t shoot at this. It’s not for me.’” 
  Human silhouette targets are regularly used in military and police 
training. They are designed to simulate a combat target as closely as possible. 
Shooting at a silhouette, as Dieter understood, has nothing to do with 
improving accuracy, but with desensitizing the shooter to the possibility of 
targeting an actual person. Instead of aiming at the proverbial bulls-eye, the 
center of the circular target, in silhouette practice the shooter is forced to 
target isomorphically mapped human body parts—the torso, the head, etc. 
  “So I put my gun away and went to the Unteroffizier (sergeant) and 
said, ‘I can’t do this, it’s not possible for me.” 
  The NCO in question asked Dieter why and he answered that he didn’t 
want to shoot at the image of a person unless he was forced to. The sergeant 
told him that if he didn’t do it he would be subject to arrest for disobeying an 
order. 
  Dieter asked to speak to the officer in charge, a First Lieutenant 
(Oberleutnant). This officer asked Dieter what was wrong and he explained the 
situation, saying that he didn’t want to shoot at the human silhouettes. The 
officer told him that he had no choice. Dieter responded, “Okay, then every 
day that we shoot at the human-shaped targets, I’ll go on sick call.” The officer 
in question responded, “Well, okay, I didn’t hear you say that, but I accept it.” 
  Here is an extraordinary moment of complicity between an enlisted 
draftee and an officer in the Bundeswehr. Though in Dieter’s account, told 
many years after, he didn’t think of it that way, he and the Oberleutnant 
engaged in a collaborative act of refusal. By a strict definition of duty, the 
officer ought to have reported Dieter and arranged punishment for his twin 
acts of disobedience: refusing to shoot at the human-shaped targets and   290
threatening to go on sick-call when he wasn’t sick, known in military parlance 
as malingering. Instead, the officer went along with Dieter’s refusal in a way 
that could have harmed his career. 
  From another point-of-view, the whole incident is extraordinary from the 
moment Dieter refused to fire on the silhouettes. I remember an almost exactly 
analogous moment from my own basic training days. A young soldier—a 
volunteer to be sure—had a sudden change of heart on the firing range and 
refused to shoot at the silhouettes. The young man in question, I’ll call him 
Private Bodin, was a tall, lanky African-American from a Christian background. 
He had a thick Brooklyn accent and a slight stutter on top of it. Bodin had 
enlisted to be a communications specialist and no one had bothered to inform 
him that during basic training he would be forced to shoot an assault rifle, 
throw live grenades, fire anti-tank weapons, etc.  
Private Bodin was in my basic training platoon at Ft. Still, Oklahoma in 
1982. The first day at the firing range, after going through all of the safety and 
weapon handling lessons, we were given live ammunition and placed in 
position. Bodin was in the next foxhole over from mine. The range sergeant 
gave the command for us to load and begin to fire. Bodin held his position in 
the foxhole, weapon in hand, but didn’t load or fire. After a specified amount of 
time, the sergeant called for a ceasefire and then walked down the line to 
check each weapon to see that it had been fired. Each soldier in turn would 
hand the weapon up to the instructor, breech open, so that he could look 
inside and see that all of the rounds had been fired. When he came to Bodin, 
the sergeant immediately noted that the trainee hadn’t fired a shot. 
“Private Bodin,” he said with a military drawl, something like a Southern 
drawl on speed, “why didn’t you fire your weapon?” 
Bodin said a very strange thing then, in his mumbling, barely intelligible 
way. He said, “Conscientious objector.”   291
“What? What are you saying?” demanded the range instructor. 
“Conscientious objector,” he repeated, slightly louder but no more 
intelligibly. 
“What kind of rectal-cranial inversion is this?” asked the sergeant. 
“Bodin, you’re a goddamned volunteer. Now you fire that weapon.” 
Bodin, however, just kept repeating that he was a conscientious 
objector who would not fire a weapon. The range sergeant, of course, called 
over more senior NCO’s who proceeded to brow-beat and otherwise berate 
Private Bodin as “pussy,” asking him what kind of “limp dick shit” he was trying 
to pull. 
Bodin never changed his story, in spite of the abuse heaped on him. 
The reaction from the other soldiers was, at first, amusement. Many of us had 
never even heard of conscientious objection, as strange as that may sound. 
Then Bodin was told that he would remain in the foxhole, on the firing range, 
until he fired his ammo. Furthermore, the rest of the platoon was told that we 
would also remain on the firing range until Bodin fired his ammo. After a long 
day in the hot Oklahoma sun, this is not a nice thing to say to a bunch of tired, 
hungry soldiers. It wasn’t long before Bodin’s peers started to shout out 
“encouragement.” 
At least in the American Army of the early 1980s, the drill sergeants 
were masters of setting the group against the dissident individual, thereby 
appealing both to the individual’s sense of solidarity and setting him up for 
what is euphemistically referred to as “extra training.” The reality is that 
soldiers living in a squad bay, in constant contact with each other, are in some 
ways in a stronger position vis-à-vis the dissident individual than the NCOs 
and others invested with authority. True, fellow soldiers can’t call on all of the 
institutional power of military “justice,” but to put it in plain terms they can 
administer collective physical punishment of a type that would put a drill   292
instructor at a real risk of being prosecuted. A very typical instance is the so-
called blanket party. Stanley Kubric’s film Full Metal Jacket—the best 
cinematic portrayal of basic training ever filmed—depicts the type of incident to 
which I am referring. A couple of soldiers pin the man to be “trained” to his 
bunk with a blanket. The rest of the platoon then files by and hits him 
repeatedly, usually in the stomach where the signs are less obvious. Though it 
is little talked about, soldiers have been hospitalized or even died as a result of 
such assaults. 
In both of these acts of disobedience—Dieter’s and Bodin’s—there was 
a certain amount of “push-back” or counter-resistance on the part of those with 
authority. They applied pressure to get the recalcitrant soldier to do as 
required by the procedure. In the case of the Bundeswehr, however, push-
back was not extended to Dieter’s fellow soldiers. He was allowed access to a 
higher ranking officer straightaway and came to a modus vivendi with him that 
was honored by the others, soldiers and NCOs, who must have known of the 
fiction of Dieter’s repeated sick calls. In the case of Private Bodin, the 
authorities ganged up on him, intentionally provoked the ire of his platoon-
mates, and eventually subjected him to what is known as “recycling.” A trainee 
who is recycled is sent back to start basic training all over again with a new 
unit, beginning with the most restrictive rules and physically brutal training. 
After that, I don’t know, but if he continued to claim objector status, Bodin was 
likely given an administrative discharge from the military for being 
“untrainable.” 
It is probably ethnocentric to pose the situation in the American military 
as the standard of comparison. When I presented a portion of my research on 
the Bundeswehr to an audience of German academics, one of the criticisms 
was that I was taking the “imperialistic” Army of the United States as the point 
of departure. Would I not find something different in the army, say, of Hungary   293
or the Czech Republic? Maybe—but given the economic power of Germany 
and its history as a Great Power the only appropriate comparisons, I contend, 
are with the United States or the other dominant powers of Western Europe in 
the Twentieth Century, France and Britain.  
 
The Bundeswehr and the Nationalen Volksarmee 
More than one Bundeswehr officer related stories to me about their 
interactions with officers from the former Nationalen Volksarmee (NVA), the 
East German Military, some of whom had been accepted into the unified force 
after re-unification. In these stories, related with various decrees of good 
humor, the former NVA officers (as represented by my informants) complained 
bitterly about the “softness” and lack of discipline in the Bundeswehr. The old 
Bundeswehr officers, in turn, complained that the former NVA officers had no 
feeling for Innere Führung, for democratic forms of self-expression or respect 
for basic human dignity. 
The merger of the two armies—really the selective incorporation of a 
relative handful of former NVA professionals in the Bundeswehr—has led to 
new structures of refusal. Here it is useful to look at what John Borneman 
(1998b) has called genres of state legitimation. In his account, the dominant 
regime-genre of the old German Democratic Republic—and typically in 
socialist and fascist regimes—was romance.  
Borneman references the 1989 testimony of Erich Mielke, the godfather 
of the East German Stasi, before the East German parliament. This was 
during the short period between the time when the Wall fell and unification with 
the West. The new parliament took up a hasty examination of the repressive 
organs of the state. Mielke was called largely to give the parliamentarians a 
chance to go on the record as critics of the old regime. Completely 
unrepentant, Mielke protested, “Ich liebe euch doch alle!” (“But I love you all!”).   294
Contrary to the disingenuous outrage of the politicians and media, Borneman 
plausibly considers Mielke’s statement to be sincere. “Indeed,” Borneman 
writes, “he really did love these people, and he couldn’t understand how they 
had the audacity to claim, after thirty intimate—oh, so very intimate—years of 
living together, that they were not one, a natural unity, like a family, motivated 
by love” (Borneman 1998b, 189). 
“Motivated by love,” yes, in the sense of the future-oriented romantic 
utopia that is always at least partially a narcissistic projection of the lover’s 
own desire. Those in power in the former East Germany, sold on the ideology 
of a utopian future, struggled to see in the people the transformed higher form 
of humanity that their beliefs promise to be just around the corner. At times, of 
course, the people fell short. Hence the joke about the regime lacking 
confidence in the people and being forced to dissolve it and form a new one; 
hence the state disciplinary measures promulgated by institutions like the 
Stasi—in the name of the state, in the name of love. 
By contrast, the dominant genre in the Federal Republic, and in most of 
the “democratic” West, is satire. Legitimation in the satirical mode relies on 
appeals to an idealized past, a golden moment, a Garden of Eden—a 
constitution. The satirist critiques the present for deviation from the past. To 
the extent that satire becomes the dominant mode of legitimation it is adopted 
not only by the regime and its elders, but by those in opposition. The powers 
that be may fault the people (or some significant subset thereof) for a lack of 
faith, patriotism, republican virtue, etc.; those in opposition fault the regime for 
hypocrisy, for failing to live up to their nominal creed. Public discourse in this 
context tends to be grounded in particular readings of founding documents 
and exegesis (or Constitutional interpretation) becomes increasingly important 
to public life (Borneman 1998b, 194–96).   295
The tendency toward one genre or the other, of course, is rarely total. In 
most states legitimacy is expressed in a variety of genres. In the case of both 
the former Federal Republic and post-1989 Germany the satirical mode is 
clearly dominant, though it is also ambivalent. In the United States, by way of 
comparison, satirical critique of the present is always tempered by a romantic 
relationship with the past. It is a rare critic indeed, and no critic prominent in 
the political public sphere that I know of, who casts aspersions on the 
Constitution. Moreover, even if the mythology of the Founding Fathers, 
manifest destiny, the frontier and the rest has come in for increasing criticism, 
the basic relationship of (white) Americans to the American past is one of 
imagined virtuous triumphalism. 
In Germany the situation is different. The Basic Law was composed in 
the shadow of a humiliating defeat and occupation. The crimes of the Nazi 
regime made the immediate past suitable only for negative example. The 
history between Bismarck and Hitler was widely regarded as a troubling, 
militaristic prelude to fascism punctuated only by the ineffectual and “weak” 
Weimar Republic. This only leaves a disunited German past of poets and 
thinkers to fall back on, at least for the most hard-headed of the satirists. This 
ambivalence, of course, has itself been a matter of considerable public 
comment, as in the Historikerstreit, wherein “conservatives” sought to reclaim 
a more romantic relationship with the German past. The fear, of course, is that 
this romanticizing of the past would be the ground for a critique of the present 
in the form of a nationalist, militarist and xenophobic position. 
  The immediate point here is that the former NVA officers who were 
incorporated into the Bundeswehr—after a non-trivial amount of examination 
and re-education—had been raised and trained in a social milieu in which 
utopian romance was the dominant mode of legitimation. The NVA was, in this 
sense, a fully socialist army—the authority structure was fully romantic.   296
  This characterization, however, remains obscure—as I think it does in 
Borneman’s essay—unless I can say what I mean by “romantic.” There is the 
element of narcissism, of projecting an object-fantasy onto the beloved. But 
the key point is that in the romantic fantasy the object-other is a kind of 
pornographic icon, completely subject to the will of the lover, and completely 
dependent. To the extent that the beloved fails to conform to the fantasy of the 
lover, the lover either fails to see her as she is (including her wants and needs) 
or becomes disillusioned, resentful and punitive. In other words the key 
element of the romance is fundamental asymmetry in power between lover 
and beloved. 
Borneman also sees a lack of reciprocity in romance, sees such 
“relationships” as characterized by an anti-social, monological non-
relationship. This strikes me as overdrawn. The state-regime, or its local 
institutional surrogate, the military, does not legitimate itself purely in terms of 
utopian longing, but in present-provision or nurturance. The army, and the 
state, are not so much father figures, but dominant mothers (and thus 
appropriate objects of heterosexual desire for male leaders). The military in 
particular, and the socialist state as well, provide basic needs for their 
soldier/citizen children. Moreover, it also “trains them up” in appropriate ways 
of being human—appropriately gendered and useful for the war system. The 
relationship is still romantic, but it is at once domestic/paternalistic. In this 
familial context there is no appropriate way for the soldier-children to refuse or 
resist the authority of the paternal officer/NCOs or the female dominant 
military/state. Obedience is the reciprocal duty (Pflicht) of the citizen, and, 
especially, of the soldier in traditional militaries. The relationship is not without 
reciprocity. In fact from the liberal-individualist (and Protestant) perspectives, 
what the individual gives back to the traditional military (or the romantic, total 
state) is exactly that which is most valuable, his right to decide for himself,   297
especially when it comes to matters of conscience—in other words, his adult 
autonomy. 
Thus the former NVA officers who became part of the Bundeswehr 
were confronted with a much bigger job than simply adopting different 
ideological content. They could learn to profess belief in “democracy” and 
“individual rights” but the basic grounding of authority in the unthinking 
obedience to a “loving” regime or a paternalistic order that exists to guide its 
sometimes recalcitrant children is another thing. This characterization of the 
NVA is, no doubt, over-broad, grounded not in a systematic examination of the 
institution, or first-hand contact with its former members, but in the 
extrapolation from comments by West German officers and soldiers. That is, it 
is grounded in former NVA officers seen through West German eyes. 
 
Gegen den Strich (Against the Grain) 
One of my informants was a young army Oberleutnant (First 
Lieutenant) named David Lindenhurst. Cheerful and soft-spoken with the 
carefully cultivated manners of the high middle-class, Lt. Lindenhurst was in 
demeanor about as far from the iconic Prussian military man as could be—for 
all that his towering height and imposing appearance seemed to fit that image. 
Raised in what he describes as a conservative family, and standing politically 
to the right, David was originally drafted into the Bundeswehr and only later, at 
his father’s suggestion, decided to apply to become an officer. This eventually 
led him to one of the two Bundeswehr universities—in Munich—where he 
earned the German equivalent of a Bachelor’s Degree (Diplom) in 
Sozialwissenschaft (social science), in all ways considered equivalent to a 
similar degree from a civilian university in Germany. 
After university, David was assigned to various tank units, where he 
learned the craft of leading troops in the field—and where, as he described it,   298
he often felt like an outsider. “I felt like I was always going against the grain” 
(gegen den Strich). Especially in his early days as a platoon leader, facing 
harsh criticism from non-commissioned officers with ten to fifteen years 
experience who were predictably skeptical of young officers, he was 
depressed to the point where he often considered suicide. 
For David, individualism was a carefully cultivated aspect of his self-
image. Even his toying with the idea of suicide was part of his oppositional 
persona. Yet in his case, given his conservative background and politics, the 
specific content of his refusal was shifted. In his account—backed up by the 
statistics—conscientious objection was the norm for university bound young 
men. In refusing to refuse he was rejecting what he saw as the hypocrisy of 
the status quo. Though clearly proud of the liberal reforms of the Bundeswehr, 
David tended not to see them as a radical departure from the Wehrmacht. 
Likewise, for much of his time in the Bundeswehr his gegen den Strich 
personality met its other not in the powers that be, but in his fellow soldiers. 
These young men, particularly the draftees, were largely of working class 
origin and seemed, especially at first, alien to him. “They cared nothing for 
books or politics or conversation, but only about drinking beer and finding 
women.” 
Thus as a young soldier David constructed a personal ethos of 
Verweigerung vis-à-vis the time-honored soldierly pursuits of getting drunk and 
(trying) to get laid. “These things can be good too,” he said, “but they aren’t 
everything.” This created alienation and distance from his fellow soldiers and a 
sense of being different. His suicidal thoughts in this context can be seen as a 
form of refusal—a way of willing self-empowerment in a situation where he felt 
otherwise powerless.  
Later on, however, after completing his officer training and earning his 
university degree, David was promoted to Leutnant (Second Lieutenant) and   299
assigned to another tank unit not far from Berlin. Once again he reports not 
fitting in and, for the first time, he had a significant conflict with a commanding 
officer—an officer formerly part of the NVA. 
In David’s account, the man was something of a self-important martinet. 
More importantly, he was totally lacking in the refinement of the Adelsstand 
(nobility) that Lt. Lindenhurst so identified with. As a former NVA officer David 
considered the officer to be “naturally” hostile to his “upper class” mannerisms 
as well as the refinements of Innere Führung. The encounter between the two 
men proved stressful, even enraging, to David. 
“At one point,” David told me, “I was ready to hit him—but I held myself 
back.” 
The basic difference between the two men, the point of contention, was 
ultimately one of interactive style. The former-NVA commanding officer 
believed in, or in any case acted on, the traditional military formula of brow-
beating and public humiliation. David, true to the teachings of Innere Führung 
and his own personal beliefs, treated and trained the soldiers under his 
command with respect and work-a-day professionalism. This apparently 
infuriated his commander, particularly when David’s unit consistently scored 
well in military exercises. At one point he called Lt. Lindenhurst in front of the 
entire unit and humiliated him in public, berating him for being soft with his 
men and lacking “leadership.” 
This treatment, it should be pointed out, though common enough during 
basic training or when directed against the lower enlisted ranks, is rarely 
meted out to senior NCOs and almost never to officers—even in the most 
traditional militaries, where the “tradition” of treating officers as “gentlemen” 
tends to pertain.
2 In the Bundeswehr it was extraordinary to the point that none 
                                                 
2 The public humiliation of officers is also avoided on the theory that it undermines unit 
cohesion and the command effectiveness of the officer chastised. It can also create factious 
divisions in the ranks wherein disaffected soldiers band together with a sympathetic officer, 
creating the foundations for mutiny in the field.   300
of the other officers or enlisted men I interviewed reported anything even 
remotely similar from a company commander in a public setting. (Nor did I 
ever witness a scene of this type, directed by a commander against a 
commissioned officer, in my four years of active duty in the United States 
Army.) 
David’s response to the stress he was under in his unit was to volunteer 
for two tours of duty in Bosnia. Largely because of his skill with languages—he 
speaks both English and French with considerable fluency—he was accepted 
to the multinational force. For him these tours in the war-torn former 
Yugoslavia were a reprieve that proved far less aggravating than dealing with 
his commander. Upon return to his unit he became physically sick and was 
hospitalized with heart palpitations and arrhythmia. “The stress,” he said,  “I can’t 
be sure, but I think it was the stress. I was under such stress in that unit I volunteered 
twice to go to Bosnia. But, also, it was not conscious, but it was a way out—if I had 
health problems, I was in the hospital, away from the unit.” 
I asked him if it was like thinking about suicide, a way out of the current situation. 
“Yes,” he said “but it could have been something physical.” 
And, indeed, it was something physical—chest pains and heart arrhythmia are 
serious business. Whether or not there was an underlying organic cause, there is no 
doubt from Lt. Lindenhurst’s own testimony that he experienced the hospital, like 
Bosnia, as a refuge. There is also no doubt that the condition disappeared after he 
was transferred to a new unit, doing a new job, away from the former NVA 
commander. 
David’s persona—which he cultivates as that of an outsider, someone who 
perpetually goes against the grain—is in a dominant form of post-war German 
masculinity: the strong-willed individual, refusing to go along. As with the arrogant, 
cock-sure but obedient Prussian officer of the pre-Nazi period or the brutally efficient 
officer of the Waffen-SS during the NS regime, the self-directed individualist is not   301
necessarily the most common form of masculinity, but it is an ideal. The specific 
ideological content is to a certain extent plastic, the archetype available to both the left 
and right—though practitioners tend to accuse those with the opposite values of being 
slavering conformists. Furthermore, I would argue that David’s “heart sickness,” like his 
suicidal fantasies, were modes of embodied refusal that allowed him to continue with 
his life without actually having to confront existing authority—in what would, quite likely, 
have been a quixotic gesture—and still preserve his preferred self-image. 
If this analysis seems unduly harsh, what I want to highlight are the limits of 
refusal and “non-conformity” as political tactics. One of the prime implications of the 
elevation of refusal to heroic status in post-war Germany is the fostering of a kind of 
socio-political isolation—the retreat of the individual into self-satisfaction based in the 
first place on a refusal to engage with the larger society. It seems clear enough to say 
that any effective ethics must expect individuals to refuse evil, but the elevation of this 
principle obscures the reality that such refusal is in fact a rather pathetic minimum, 
particularly when the context is shifted from that of an aggressive, murderous regime 
determined to wage perpetual war to a more-or-less liberal, slightly paternalistic regime 
in an increasingly atomized, consumerist society.  
Moreover, in a society where refusal itself has been institutionalized—
enshrined in the Basic Law and more importantly normalized through established 
bureaucratic procedures—the meaning of refusal itself shifts. In the realm of 
conscientious objection to military service at least, only so-called Totalverweigerer 
(total refusers)—those who refuse all cooperation and substitute service—face 
significant consequences, legal or social, for their position. Also the elevation of refusal 
as a societal value does not speak to what ought to be refused. Even amongst the 
Bundeswehr reformers the exact content of which traditions were to be rejected, and 
which continued, was a matter of controversy.  In the larger society, in which no 
equivalent examination of tradition and continuity has ever been  attempted, the 
content of refusal—once presumed to mean the permanent refusal of nationalism and   302
militarism at a minimum—is up for grabs in the changed national context of the post-
1989 world. 
 
McSoldiers 
Lt. Lindenhurst’s stressful confrontation with a former NVA officer 
serving in the Bundeswehr is not unique—and given the very different style or 
genre of authority adopted in the two militaries it would be surprising if it were. 
Another informant, Hauptmann (Captain) Gunter Wegemann, also reported 
tensions and concerns dealing with former NVA personnel, and moreover with 
draftees from the former East Germany. 
An officer in the army reserve (Heer), Hauptmann Wegemann is a 
relentlessly logical man, good-humored, with left-leaning politics. He is a life-
long member of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) from an SDP family. Like 
Lt. Lindenhurst, he was, as he put it, an “oddity”—a gymnasium student who 
elected not to refuse to serve in the military. In fact he actually volunteered for 
service in the Bundeswehr instead of waiting to be drafted and then went on to 
become a reserve officer. 
Like David, Gunter was clearly proud of the Bundeswehr as a force, 
and particularly of its tradition as a liberal military in a democratic society. He 
enthusiastically related to me that some of the Bundeswehr barracks were 
named for officers of the Widerstand, for example Ludwig Beck Barracks in 
Sonthofen and Stauffenberg Barracks in Sigmaringen. He was at some pains 
to convey to me just how extraordinary this was, that any nation-state would 
name military facilities after people who were part of an unsuccessful 
resistance movement. At the same time he also pointed out that other 
barracks had been named after officers who had been Wehrmacht loyalists, 
including some who may have been guilty of war crimes. In fact, he said, the 
Ministry of Defense had recently changed the name of one barracks because   303
they found out that it was named after a Nazi. He cited the name change as 
evidence of a willingness to reassess and correct past mistakes. 
One of the facilities in question, Dietl Barracks in Füssen, was named 
for Wehrmacht General Eduard Dietl, a notorious anti-Semite allegedly 
responsible for crimes against humanity in Finland during the war. The name 
change occurred in 1995 and it is probably too generous to say that it was 
because it was “found out” that Dietl was a Nazi. Rather, the shifting politics of 
time made it possible to repudiate the original naming at a moment when the 
future of the Bundeswehr—specifically its transformation from a purely 
defensive mass army of conscripts to a professional force of “peace keepers” 
able to be deployed internationally—was much in evidence (Niven 2002, 70). 
Cpt. Wegemann had the opportunity to participate in military exercises 
in the mid-1990s in the new Eastern Bundesländer, serving with units that 
included both former NVA officers and soldiers from the East.  
  “I was appalled by the conditions there,” he told me, “and noted the 
tension between those of an NVA mind-set and those from a West German 
background. The East Germans seemed to think of us as not being a “real” 
army. We lacked the discipline, were too soft—and there is no doubt that they 
were more authoritarian.” 
  There is some truth in the charges of the old NVA regulars Gunter 
admitted. The Bundeswehr was never conceived as an all-purpose military, 
but rather as a purely defensive force. This, according to Wegemann, had an 
impact on the mentality of both the Bundeswehr and the (West) Germans 
more generally. The attitude during the Cold War was that conventional 
militaries were more-or-less obsolete and that the Bundeswehr was an army 
the purpose of which was never to be used—and certainly never to be 
deployed beyond the borders of Germany. Hence, following this logic, the 
physical discipline of extended practice at being miserable—the almost   304
compulsive “toughening up” of soldiers for combat, was not as necessary in 
the Bundeswehr. 
  Cpt. Wegemann also saw the push for “professionalization” and 
“modernization,” the confrontation with the more authoritarian traditions of the 
East and the out-of-country missions as potential dangers to the culture of the 
Bundeswehr. He was not certain that the carefully nurtured traditions of 
“transparency,” treating soldiers as citizens with rights and the moral message 
of Innere Führung could survive in the new climate. His concern was not a 
return to old-time German nationalism, but an acceleration of a move toward 
soldiers as employees evident in the Bundeswehr since its founding. This is 
what Michael Geyer has called the tendency for German soldiers to “become 
quite literally a service class, the producer of security” (Geyer 1990, 203). One 
thing that such a move portends, particularly with the decreasing importance 
and eventual abolition of conscription, is the diminution of any ethic of service 
in the sense of service to society.  
  Gunther’s reaction to this was to see it as a loss, not so much to the 
military—which may be smaller, cheaper and more efficient without 
conscription—but to the larger society. He felt that the loss of Wehrpflicht, and 
the simultaneous loss of conscientious objection and Zivildienst, would 
undermine what was already one of the few important commonplaces, or 
grounds, of social integration in German society. He rejected this tendency—
what he referred to as “Americanization” as the “wrong way to go.” 
 
Das ist nicht meine Bundeswehr 
 
Resistance to the Americanization of the Bundeswehr was a common 
theme amongst the professional soldiers to whom I spoke. They ironically 
echoed, from the point of view of defending the German democratic tradition,   305
the arguments of the right-wingers in the 1950s, who objected to modeling the 
new German military on the degenerate Americans. Ludwig Gumbal, a former 
Colonel in the Waffen-SS and leader in the Bavarian branch of the Verband 
deutscher Soldaten (VdS), an umbrella group of veteran’s organizations, said 
of the Americans, they have “deliberately corrupted our young men with their 
cowboy films and hot jazz, rendering them unfit for genuine soldierly discipline” 
(Large 1996, 190).  
The complaints of the Bundeswehr officers about the American military 
were eerily similar, often grounded not in critique of the American military as 
such—though some officers with first-hand knowledge did provide such a 
critique—but in what they saw as American militarism as represented not in 
the Gulf War, but in Hollywood movies, particularly the Rambo films.  
It was, in fact, quite astonishing to me the number of times that the 
Rambo character came up in conversations with German officers. One man, 
Oberstleutnant  (Lieutenant Colonel) Walther Schuler, was eloquent on the 
point. A professional soldier who was drafted in the early 1970s—when the 
“spirit of  68 was still alive and well”—was born in a small town in the East, but 
his family fled to the West when he was a child. Lt. Col. Schuler spent much of 
the last several years developing curricula and training non-commissioned 
officers in the values of the Bundeswehr. He placed a high value on 
conscription not just as a means of social integration, but because conscripts 
force career-path soldiers to be mindful of the values they are there to 
defend—because they have constantly to teach them. Referring to armies that 
have become professionalized  along the American lines, he said, “I see the 
kinds of people those armies attract and they are not always the best.” 
He emphasized that the current Bundeswehr was a professional military 
in spite of the number of Wehrdienstleister, because of the professionalism of 
the career officers and long serving officers and NCOs. Then he said   306
something quite astonishing, “Wir sind kein Rambos; wir möchten kein 
Rambos.” (“We are not Rambos; we don’t want any Rambos.”) 
With his slate-gray hair and professorial glasses, Lt. Col. Schuler had 
the look of an avuncular intellectual. Though physically fit, he was about as far 
from the hyper-masculine character of John Rambo as could be found, not just 
in appearance, but in demeanor. Yet it is interesting that Rambo, though 
identified with American militarism, is actually a kind of “anti-military” figure, in 
a very specific sense: Rambo embodies, literally, the refusal of the a moribund 
and wimpy military bureaucracy without the guts to take the fight to the enemy. 
Such a military, beholden to public opinion polls and double-talking politicians, 
betrayed soldiers like Rambo in Vietnam (in the logic of the narrative), forcing 
them to fail because of their lack of will. As the Rambo character proclaims in 
the second First Blood movie (where he returns to Vietnam in search of 
American MIAs supposedly still held as POWs), “to survive war, you have to 
become war.” 
Rambo, however, is an interstitial champion of renewed military 
aggressiveness, a hard-bodied, rage-fueled rejection of accommodation and 
compromise. His inflated physical presence is a metaphor for American 
military prowess and masculine daring reclaimed after the debacle of Vietnam. 
In a real sense the Rambo movies could not be made today, in the aftermath 
of the two Gulf Wars, when it is not American military prowess (or masculinity) 
that is at issue, but America’s ability to cooperate and work with others to find 
peaceful solutions. 
The figure of Rambo, however, is a pivotal image in the societal 
reorganization of the image of American soldierly masculinity. For the 
relatively short period between the end of the Vietnam War in the early 1970s 
and the First Gulf War in the early 1990s, there was a certain amount of room 
for the development of alternative masculinities in the United States and the   307
militarist style of masculinity was de-emphasized. Rambo waged war against 
these alternative—feminized—forms and laid the groundwork for the re-
valuation of militarist masculinity. However, through the peculiar magic of 
capitalism, operating in the military since the abolition of the draft in the United 
States, masculinity within the military, I would argue, has become relatively 
decoupled from masculinity in general. The expectation that every young man 
of able body, or virtually everyone, will quite likely have to fight in a war is 
beginning to fade from the public consciousness, even amongst active duty 
soldiers. I remember a crusty old taxi driver in Lawton, Oklahoma who was a 
former Sergeant Major. He complained, “These kids, they join the army and 
they say it’s because of the education. What kind of horseshit is that? 
Education? What about fighting in wars? What are they gonna do when it 
comes? We’re gonna be in a lot of trouble.” 
The trouble anticipated by the ex-Sergeant Major, of course, has not 
materialized. The professional, career-oriented, military of the United States 
does not see itself as embodying a “Rambo” mentality. Discipline in the 
American military, at least so far, has been quite adequate to the task of 
conquering forces with vastly inferior resources. Whether it would do as well 
against a force of roughly equal strength is an open question—but then that is 
in the nature of military operations.  
What has happened in the case of the American military is that as 
memory of the draft fades, and post-Vietnam administrations become more 
adroit at marketing their wars, war protest has been effectively marginalized to 
a hard-core of peace activists. Opposition from active duty soldiers, and 
particularly from a generation of young, middle-class men facing conscription, 
has not re-materialized. In a sense the United States government dodged the 
draft and with it intensive public scrutiny of its war-making policies. This gives 
the administration far more of a free hand in terms of what it can do with   308
American troops, where they can be deployed, and for how long, before they 
can start to expect societal resistance. This shift in American military policy is 
what the Bundeswehr officers identified as the danger of the Rambo image, 
not because John Rambo is the ideal American soldier, but because he 
symbolizes an opening to more aggressive militarism. Rambo is the 
embodiment of a masculine critique of a feminized war-making bureaucracy. 
Though Lt. Col. Schuler acknowledged that conscript armies, as history 
shows, can certainly be used for aggressive, imperialist purposes, in a 
democratic society, where politicians have to face the voters, at least 
unpopular wars can be avoided. His fear was that a fully professionalized, 
Americanized Bundeswehr would eventually be drawn into conflicts in far-flung 
parts of the world where the Germans have no business intervening. Under 
such circumstances he imagined that the values of Innere Führung would be 
at risk. His hope was that at this point democratic values were deeply enough 
ingrained that they would endure. Imaging a German military that gradually 
loses its defensive, democratic character, he said, “das ist nicht meine 
Bundeswehr” (“that is not my Bundeswehr”). In his Bundeswehr, the one he 
believed in, soldiers trained and prepared because they understood what they 
might have to fight for and believed it worth defending. 
As Cpt. Klassmann (see above) put it when asked why he decided to 
volunteer for service: “I already said that I thought the Western system and the 
system of the Federal Republic of Germany are worth defending... and that 
since it is worth defending, I also thought that it is everybody’s duty to.”  
There is a flip-side to this, however, and that is an equally compelling 
belief in the right not to fight, to refuse, as Cpt. Klassmann added to his 
reasons for not refusing, which he gave me unasked for: 
 
I didn’t have any disrespect for conscientious objectors, no, 
because they are doing socially valuable work. If they 
weren’t doing that, then I would have been critical of their   309
position. I don’t really mind, even in a war situation, whether 
somebody works as a nurse or as a soldier. It doesn’t make 
much of a difference. Every job counts. 
 
Which is to say that he found alternative service just as valid as military 
service, and that he saw the right to refuse to be an important one, even if he 
personally believed pacifism was illusionary and self-defeating. 
Lt. Col. Schuler, echoing the worries of the ex-Sgt. Major quoted above, 
thought that young soldiers today did not really understand the deadly 
seriousness of joining the military. He said that polls indicated that the number 
one reason young men volunteered for the Bundeswehr was for “social 
security.” He found this ironic, in that ultimately the one thing that no soldier 
should expect is to be secure. A soldier puts his life on the line. Most young 
people, he said, have no idea what it might mean to be put in a place where 
they might have to kill, to see their friends die, to die themselves. Yet instead 
of calling for a German Rambo to repudiate the weak-willed bureaucrats and 
inaugurate a new golden age of militarism, he wanted a balance of realistic 
training and education that emphasizes the values and lives that the 
Bundeswehr is there to defend. Though he said no such words, implicit in his 
hopes was the hope for a societal refusal to deploy a military that would be the 
handmaid of an aggressive foreign policy, whether that policy be German-led, 
or dictated by the United States.   
As an afterward, the shift toward an Americanized Bundeswehr is 
probably inevitable. German special forces troops were deployed in 
Afghanistan and the international pressures for Germany to participate not just 
in United Nations sponsored peace keeping missions, but aggressive 
campaigns like the one in Iraq are likely to continue to increase. Nonetheless, 
the continuing importance of refusal in German society is evidenced not just 
by the oppositional German stance vis-à-vis the Iraq war, but its importance to 
Schöder’s position as Chancellor. Without the opportunity to refuse to go along   310
with American militarism, Schöder would probably have lost the last election. 
His ability to chart an “independent” German course, albeit seen in some 
quarters as too much dependent upon the French, has been crucial to his 
continued popularity. At the same time, the ruling by the European court 
requiring the general admittance of women into the Bundeswehr and the 
various Verweigerer movements continue to undermine the conscription 
system, hastening the day when the German military is composed entirely of 
volunteers—i.e. those least likely to refuse.  311 
CONCLUSION 
 
  Standard communicative practice calls for a tripartite structure of 
repetition: tell them what you are going to tell them—tell them—then tell them 
what you told them. I prefer a slightly different model: lure them in with 
evocative chit-chat and gossip—club them over the head with five hundred 
slightly different iterations of the same argument—then change the subject. 
The watchword for the last phase is straight out of Monte Python: and now for 
something completely different… 
  A recent half-page article in the New York Times (Nov. 6, 2003) tells the 
story of Sergeant Georg Andreas Pogany, the first American serviceman 
facing a potential court-martial for cowardice since Vietnam. The outcome of 
the case are still pending as I write this, but circumstances of the case are as 
follows: 
  Sgt. Pogany is an interrogator sent to Iraq to help with the questioning 
of Iraqi prisoners. He was assigned to an elite Green Beret squad and on his 
second night in Iraq he witnessed an Iraqi die, cut in half by machine gun fire. 
Not surprisingly, the sight had a profound impact on him. He vomited. He 
couldn’t stop shaking. His head and heart pounded. In short, he panicked. 
  “I couldn’t function,” Sgt. Pogany told the Times. “I had this 
overwhelming sense of my own mortality. I kept looking at that body thinking 
that could be me two second from now” (Gettleman 2003, A14). 
  His reactions are textbook in their normalcy. Fear is a severe challenge 
to battlefield functionality, especially before a soldier’s first battle. Studies 
indicate that in the American Civil War, for example, just before a battle the 
“fear was so intense that men would fall to the ground paralyzed with terror,   312
bury their face in the grass, grasp at the earth, and refuse to move” (Dean 
1997, 54). This accords with other studies of battlefield reactions in both World 
Wars and Vietnam (Dyer 1985; Grossman 1995; Kellett 1990; Turner 1996). 
  It was the evening of September 29th, to continue with Sgt. Pogany’s 
story, when he witnessed a group of U.S. soldiers dragging the remains of an 
Iraqi man past him. “From his waistline to his head,” said Pogany, “everything 
was missing” (Gettleman 2003, A10). According to the report, while Sgt. 
Pogany stood in shock, several of the other soldiers laughed at the corpse. 
  This, too, is understandable. Laughter is a distancing mechanism that 
separates the seasoned combat soldier from the new guy. Laughing at the 
dead and dying is an age-old soldierly ploy to de-realize the battlefield, to deny 
the impact on the psyche. Reports of the Japanese occupation of Nanking 
(1937–38) tell the story of the murder of as many as 300,000 civilians, many of 
them tortured to death (Chang 1997, 99–103). Soldiers transferred into the 
region reported being shocked, almost to the point of paralysis, when they first 
arrived. Gradually they acclimated to the brutality and violence. One Japanese 
soldier said that when he first arrived he found the murders “so appalling that I 
felt I couldn’t breathe.” He added, however, that “[e]veryone became a demon 
within three months” (Chang 1997, 57–59, quoted in Goldstein 2001, 367). 
  The reports from the occupation of Nanking accord with those from the 
death camps and mobile killing units in Nazi occupied territory, though 
reactions seemed to vary depending on the individual. As Gustav Fix, a 
member of Special Unit 6, testified, speaking of the work of the mobile killing 
units (Einsatzgruppen): 
 
I would like to state that as a result of the considerable 
emotional strain that accompanied such executions, 
numerous men proved after a while unable to carryout   313
further shootings and thus had to be replaced. Conversely, 
there were other persons who could not get enough of it and 
who frequently volunteered for these executions” 
(Gedenkstätte n.d., 45–46). 
 
And, in fact, much of the rationale for the development of the death camps, 
with their gas chamber and crematoria technologies, was to spare as many 
German soldiers as possible the experience of cold-blooded murderer 
(Breitman 1992). 
  So, both Sgt. Pogany’s panicked reaction to a close encounter with 
death on the battlefield and the distancing laughter of the war-hardened 
special forces troops are within the bounds of the expected. What makes the 
case exceptional, and gets its own half-page story in the newspaper of record, 
is what Pogany did next: he asked for help. 
  “I wanted to speak to someone,” he said, “who could tell me what was 
going on” (Gettleman 2003, A10). 
  Pogany, at least by his own account, never refused to go on a mission 
or asked to be permanently relieved from front line duty. Rather, he 
recognized that he was experiencing combat-related psychic trauma and 
requested access to medical attention. Instead of psychological counseling, 
however, the army chose to ship Pogany back to Ft. Carson to face a tribunal 
of inquiry that may lead to a court-martial. If convicted of cowardice in the face 
of the enemy, he could be sentenced to a lengthy prison term or even 
executed. 
  In essence, Pogany’s case is that of a man caught between models of 
soldierly manhood. On the one hand is the traditional military notion of men 
who need to be “toughen up” so that they can do their jobs in combat. In this 
model any adamant refusal has to be punished harshly as an example, to   314
prevent others from modeling their own behavior after that of the soldier who 
refused or failed to function. On the other hand is the more contemporary 
model, in which soldiers are service sector professionals who provide security. 
In this model, battlefield paralysis is essentially a medical problem, to be 
treated with the techniques of psychiatry and psychology. Both models are 
available to the military—as comments from military spokesmen about the 
case make clear—but which model to apply is at the discretion of local 
commanders. Pogany chose to interpret his problem as medical, as a case of 
psychic trauma that needed treatment. The army disagreed. 
  In some ways the army’s reaction is understandable. Medical 
intervention implies pathology. Everyone understands, however, that Pogany’s 
reaction to the seeing a man cut in half by machine gun fire was normal. The 
implication, then, is that it is the situation which is pathological. Pogany’s case 
was probably exacerbated by an inappropriate articulateness. His very ability 
to say what he thought was happening to him meant that his reactions were 
not outside of the norm. Had he frozen completely, shut down, gone catatonic 
or completely non-verbal, he might well have been referred for treatment. By 
asking for help, however, he was admitting that he still had psychic reserves 
available to him which could have been used to face his fear and soldier on. 
To ask for help under such circumstances—i.e. when it is still elective, when 
one still has the capacity to ask—is the very definition of cowardice. A man 
who completely breaks down might be weak-willed, but at least he has applied 
every bit of his internal resources to the job of soldierly functioning, even if he 
ultimately fails. 
  As I read the story in the Times, I asked myself, could this have 
happened in the Bundeswehr? Would a soldier who asked for medical   315
attention have ended up facing a court of inquiry? The answer—and this goes 
to the very heart of what I have argued herein—is that it is impossible to say. 
The situations are disparate enough that no comparison is possible: without 
facing combat, cowardice in the face of the enemy is impossible. The culture 
of the Bundeswehr is such that I suspect a soldier in Sgt. Pogany’s position 
would be treated differently—yet the organizational culture I am referring to is 
dependent on the Bundeswehr’s current, internationally insulated place in the 
war system.   
 
Manhood after Auschwitz 
  In early October 1942, Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler addressed a 
group of higher SS officers in Posen. The speech has become infamous as 
the most direct acknowledgement of the genocide of European Jewry by a 
high-ranking Nazi. In the midst of a long, rambling speech that was recorded, 
Himmler told the assembled officers of the SS, “…the Jewish people are being 
exterminated; every party member says, ‘Of course, it’s in our program, 
elimination of the Jews, extermination, we’ll do it all right.” For most of these 
party members, according to Himmler, this was just talk. To the assembled, on 
the contrary, such talk reflected personal knowledge. 
 
Most of you know what it means to see 100 corpses lying 
together, 500, or a 1,000. To have gone through this and 
yet—apart from a few exceptions, examples of human 
weakness—to have remained decent, this has made us hard 
(hat uns hart gemacht).
1  
 
Here is the apotheosis of heroic masculinity, purified of every factor but one: 
                                                 
1 Nizkor Project transcription of Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler’s Posen speech (October 
4, 1943). The full text can be found at http://www.nizkor.org. My translation.   316
hardness. To the hard man, nothing is forbidden—any means is acceptable. 
Limits are unacceptable, particularly when the “defense” of the highest ideals 
of the group—racial purity in the case of the Nazis—are at stake. 
  It is probably just a little too easy to dismiss Himmler as an “extreme 
case.” The style of masculinity he celebrated in his Posen speech is not so 
very different than the style of masculinity expected of American soldiers in 
Iraq. As noted above, laughing at a mutilated corpse is considered normal—
asking for help to deal with shock and panic is criminal, or, at best, 
pathological. Moreover, genocide, organized torture, rape, and murder are still 
with us. We know about Bosnia and Cambodia, Rwanda and Burundi, and 
there are many other cases that are less known. Though in some sense each 
case of genocide is unique, and no post-World War II case has replicated the 
industrialization of murder that characterized the Holocaust, there can be no 
doubt that the mantra of “never again!” ought to include all cases of genocide 
and attempted genocide. Hence, from a certain perspective, the hope of 
“never again” has failed. Only in the limited senses of never again in Germany, 
and never again to the Jews, has the mantra been a success. 
  A cynical and altogether self-satisfied take on the relative harmlessness 
of post-1945 Germany would be: of course they haven’t murdered another 
people; we, the virtuous, civilized nations, haven’t let them. The absurdity of 
this should be patent, but it is, nonetheless, the attitude lurking behind the 
smugness of American foreign policy. 
  Perhaps the most devastating critique of self-satisfied “we are the voice 
of civilization” illusion is the work of Theodor W. Adorno. Adorno’s scholarly 
work, however, is notoriously difficult and convoluted. His overall pessimism 
with the project of Western civilization is clear enough. “The universality of   317
ideas as developed by discursive logic,” writes Adorno (along with like-minded 
colleague Max Horkeimer), “domination in the conceptual sphere, is raised up 
on the basis of actual domination” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1994 [1944], 14). 
That is, the project of understanding universals is inevitably bound up with the 
domination of people and societies. They continue thus: 
 
The individuality that learned order and subordination in 
the subjection of the world, soon wholly equated truth with 
the regulative thought without whose fixed distinctions 
universal truth cannot exist. Together with mimetic magic, it 
tabooed the knowledge which really concerned the object. 
Its hatred was extended to the image of the vanquished 
former age and its imaginary happiness. The chthonic gods 
of the original inhabitants are banished to the hell to which, 
according to the sun and light religion of Indra and Zeus, 
the earth is transformed” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1994 
[1944], 14). 
 
Any number of scholars could probably make a decent career out of explaining 
and exploring just exactly what they were saying in this one paragraph. Nor 
would such a focus be a waste of time. The ideas here are pregnant and 
provocative—but hardly accessible. 
  In my mind Adorno’s “popular” essays, written for a wide audience and 
often delivered as radio addresses, are equally brilliant but have the added 
virtue of comprehensibility. Of these, one of the most interesting is “Education 
after Auschwitz.” In many ways this entire project is my attempt to respond to 
his essay. The spirit of Adorno is infused in the previous chapters, even if I 
have distorted him in ways that have made me shy away from quoting or 
attributing the argument, even in inspiration, to him. Here, however, in the 
relative safety of reflection, I feel safe enough to point to my inspiration. 
  “Every debate about the ideals of education is trivial and   318
inconsequential,” writes Adorno, “compared to this single ideal: never again 
Auschwitz” (Adorno 1998, 191). 
  Here it is out in the open, the sort of statement that Adorno was allowed 
to make as a Jewish émigré who returned to Germany after 1945. He had 
license, both as one of Germany’s most prominent intellectuals, but also as a 
Jew who had escaped the Holocaust. This double prestige allowed him to say 
publicly the kinds of hard truths that Germans did not appreciate. 
  What happened at Auschwitz 
 
was the barbarism that all education strives against. One 
speaks of the threat of a relapse into barbarism. But it is not 
a threat—Auschwitz was this relapse, and barbarism 
continues as long as the fundamental conditions that favored 
that relapse continue unchanged. That is the whole horror. 
The societal pressure still bears down, although the danger 
remains invisible nowadays. It drives people toward the 
unspeakable, which culminated on a world-historical scale in 
Auschwitz (Adorno 1998, 191). 
 
So, for Adorno, in a real sense, the Auschwitz was not in the past, but 
continued to be pregnant as long as “the fundamental conditions” that drove it 
in the first place persist. 
  What then are these conditions? For Adorno these conditions are 
imminent in modernity itself, a consequence of the power humans have over 
the world and the capacity to control and organize. In many ways he sees 
modern society as a giant trap. “One can speak of the claustrophobia of 
humanity in the administered world, of a feeling of being incarcerated in a 
thoroughly societalized, closely woven, netlike environment” (Adorno 1998, 
193). This echoes his thinking in the famous “culture industry” chapter of the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, and the overall idea is one in which individuated 
human beings are increasingly defined by niche marketing, their choices pre-  319
made for them by manufacturers and retailers. Welcome to life, the voice mail 
system: press 1 for relationships; press 2 for education; press 3 for art, 
etcetera.  
  As he sees little hope of changing the “objective” circumstances of the 
world—the ways in which society organizes commodities, bureaucracies, 
media, etc.—he suggests that any ability to resist another Auschwitz must be 
produced at the subjective level. This is, of course, a veritable impossibility in 
the social theory imminent in Adorno’s writings, but at least in this essay for 
broader public consumption, he believes the effort, however quixotic, ought to 
be made. 
  What subjective characteristics, then, might help prevent another 
Auschwitz? 
  One possibility Adorno dismisses out of hand is the idea that closer 
connections between people, what he refers to as “bonds” in the essay, can 
prevent genocide. The commonsense notion that with closer ties an emphatic 
“You must not!” in response to atrocity and murder would naturally prevent 
such is an illusion. One need only reflect on the special viciousness of civil 
wars, or on the fact that in repeated experiments psychologists have found “no 
minimum criteria” for the emergence of in-group and out-group biases and 
behaviors (Sherif and Sherif 1953), to see the false hope of social bonds 
alone. 
  Moreover, for Adorno, the idea of producing bonds artificially is 
abhorrent and liable to lead in exactly the wrong direction. Such bonds 
“amount to heteronomy, a dependence on rules, on norms that cannot be 
justified by the individual’s own reason” (Adorno 1998, 195). Any attempt to 
produce bonds replaces conscience with adherence to the dictates of authority   320
and its rules. “Yet the very willingness to connive with power and to submit 
outwardly to what is stronger, under the guise of a norm, is the attitude of the 
tormentors that should not arise again” (Adorno 1998, 195). 
  The only viable refuge is in the possibility of autonomy. “The single 
genuine power standing against the principle of Auschwitz is autonomy, if I 
might use the Kantian expression: the power of reflection, of self-
determination, of not cooperating” (Adorno, 195). 
  Autonomy. Refusal. Here is the idea that was at the center of the 
thinking of the Bundeswehr reformers. It is also the notion that connects so 
many of the stories told to me by my informants and repeated in the chapters 
above. Refusal constitutes a limit that may in fact stand between a people and 
the commission of genocide, but it is a stunted standard of humanity. Never 
again Auschwitz is a watchword with which almost no one can disagree, yet in 
it there is also a potential crutch to the continuance of injustices that ought to 
be remedied. How? Because if refusal is the key virtue, it can overwhelm all 
others and make intragroup cooperation to remake the world impossible. The 
standard of “never again the worst thing that ever happened” is too low a goal, 
and the reflection, “at least we didn’t murder the Jews” ought to produce self-
righteousness in no one. 
  Adorno’s one concrete suggestion is to work against the enactment of 
brutalizing rites of initiation into collectives, and the in-group consciousness 
that results therefrom.  
 
One must fight against the type of folkways (Volkssitten), 
initiation rites of all shapes, that inflict physical pain—often 
unbearable pain—upon a person as the price that must be paid 
in order to consider oneself a member, one of the collective 
(Adorno 1998, 197). 
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And with this he almost comes to the point of addressing the production of 
gendered human beings. This becomes even clearer when he writes that such 
initiation rites are bound up with an educational philosophy designed, above 
all, to produce hardness. 
  “I remember how the dreadful Boger,”
2 writes Adorno, “had an outburst 
that culminated in a panegyric to education instilling discipline through 
hardness” (Adorno 1998, 197). The relationship to my long line of argument 
about the relationship of the war system and favored qualities of masculinity is 
fairly clear. Adorno continues: 
 
He [Boger] thought hardness necessary to produce what he 
considered to be the correct type of person. This educational 
ideal of hardness, in which many may believe without 
reflecting about it, is utterly wrong. The idea that virility 
consists in the maximum degree of endurance long ago 
became a screen-image for masochism that, as psychology 
has demonstrated, aligns itself all too easily with sadism. 
Being hard, the vaunted quality education should inculcate, 
means absolute indifference toward pain as such. In this the 
distinction between one’s own pain and that of another is not 
so stringently maintained. Whoever is hard with himself 
earns the right to be hard with other as well as avenges 
himself for the pain whose manifestations he was not 
allowed to show and had to repress (Adorno 1998, 197–98). 
 
  Here, I think, is the kernel of the answer to the Auschwitz riddle. The 
question is not really education after Auschwitz, but masculinity. Masculinity, in 
turn, is ineluctably tied to intergroup conflict, to war and the war system. A 
significant change in the former requires change in the latter. In some ways 
this is not quite as hopeless a proposition as it might seem and the case of  
 
                                                 
2 William Boger, one of the defendants at the Auschwitz trial (1963–65), known for his 
invention of a torture device that bore his name, the “Boger Swing.” He was sentenced to life 
plus 5 years of hard labor.   322
Sgt. Pogany, discussed above, is not all bad. Yes, Pogany is being brought up 
on charges of cowardice by the American army—which has been far more 
relentlessly traditional in its ideal of manhood than the German or many other 
European militaries. Yet it occurred to Pogany, himself a professional soldier, 
to interpret his reaction to death along different lines than the military. What is 
more, the most important newspaper in the country presented his case 
sympathetically. Hardness as an absolute value, even in the context of the 
military, is diminishing. 
  It is not only in Germany that refusal has become increasingly common, 
increasingly valorized. Rules for conscientious objection have been relaxed in 
many western European armies and the number of objectors has tended to 
rise steadily, if not quite to the levels found in Germany. In some lights these 
are small changes. The horrors of war and even genocide can even, in theory, 
be inflicted even by a small professional military of volunteers. Yet to the 
extent that interstate violence can be minimized, social space opens for the 
assertion of alternative modes of masculinity. This is evident in post-Vietnam 
America. True, the United States continues to pursue a violence-saturated 
foreign policy, but since the abolition of the draft, the pressure to socialize 
boys to military hardness has diminished. The women’s movement in the 
1960s and 1970s and the movement for gay and lesbian liberation in the 
1980s were at least partially a result of this opening—and at the same time an 
articulation of alternatives. The logical counterpoint to the proposition that 
women don’t have to be soft and dependent, is that men don’t have to be hard 
and cold. Homoerotic possibilities undermine the inherent association between 
gendered stereotypes and sexual preference. 
  Even inside the military, even as long ago as my own basic training in   323
1982, consciousness of alternative modes of masculinity were in evidence—
however derided. I remember the lecture of the senior drill instructor on my 
first day at my training company at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma. 
  “Tomorrow,” he said, as we stood sweating in the ninety-degree heat, 
“we’re going to have PT [physical training]. We’re going to see which one’s of 
you played football and which ones of you hung around your mama’s feet. 
We’re going to see which of you is hard.” 
  I was hard. My first PT score was 299 out of a possible 300. I had 
played football, lifted weights, and dreamed heroic dreams even while 
doubting their viability. I thought of myself as a liberal, in later years as a 
radical, a feminist, a progressive, yet the ideal of hardness has never left me, 
to my own diminishment.  
The dispositions and habits of soldierly manhood, once instilled, are 
stubbornly persistent. And this is my final word in response to Adorno and to 
manhood after Auschwitz: the moment of refusal is not the moment when the 
institution sets you up with the role of executioner; the moment is much earlier, 
in the rejection of hardness itself. To the extent that our lives are controlled by 
the potential of war, the fear of war, war is our reality. And in war the rule of 
survival is the deferral of internal consequences.  
Hardness means the rejection of feeling. Atrocities can also be 
committed in rage, but the ability to refuse to hurt some other is ultimately 
grounded in the immediate perception that to do so is hurtful to the self. With 
hardness, with soldierly masculinity fully in place, this is not possible. The war 
system seems unlikely to go away anytime soon and there are real threats in 
the world, but in our collective responses to these threats it would seem a step 
in the right direction to understand just how intertwined masculinity and war    324
really are—and to find ways to mitigate the extremes of manhood 
indoctrination as Adorno suggests. A little softening will not result in a collapse 
into passivity and victimhood. The challenge may be to find a viable middle 
ground for gendered existence. 325 
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